SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPLEMENT TO THE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000500090002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 23, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

ApprovWo
23 October 1951
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains information within the meaning of Public
Law 513 - 81st Congress. It is to be seenonly by US PERSONNEL
especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive Special Intelli-
gence information. The security of this document must be main-
tained in accordance with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY
REGULATIONS. Na action may be taken by any person on the
Special Intelligence presented herein, regardless of any advantage
which may be gained, unless such action is first approved by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
State Dept: declassification & release instructions on file
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23 October 1951
CIA No. 49394-A
Copy No. 49
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. TNDIAQ US delegate .urges speedy UN Security Council action on Kashmir
Ambassador Austin states that the assassination of the Pakistani Prime
Minister emphasized the need for immediate consideration of the Kashmir
case when the UN Security Council reconvenes in Paris on 29 October.
Austin suggests preparing a resolution outlining areas of agreement and
disagreement between India and Pakistan on Kashmir., instructing UN Repre-
sentative Graham to continue his efforts to effect demilitarization, and
possibly extending his authority to fields outside the narrow limits of
that subject. Austin also suggests a declaration that the Security
Council will not recognize actions of the recently "elected" Kashmir
Constituent Assembly. (TS, $/S New York 5079 19 Oct 51).
Comment' Disavowal by the Security Council of Indian-sponsored
Constituent Assembly actions should produce an adverse reaction from the
Indians. The "election" of the Assembly has been widely publicized as an
expression of the will of the Kashmiris,, and New Delhi undoubtedly foresees
imminent ratification by the Assembly of Kashmirvs accession to India.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
2. GERMANY. Adenauer relaxes position on a "peace contract": Although West
German Chancellor Adenauer has not yet accepted the contractual arrange-
ments which the three Western Occupation Powers are offering as a replace-
ment for the Occupation Statute., he is backing away from his insistence
that any powers retained by the Allies in the future should be based on
agreements with the Germans and not on the fact of Germany's surrender..
He has now conceded the Allies supreme authority in relation to Berlin and
German unification,, and he seems about to do so in the matter of the sta-
tioning and protection of Allied troops in Germany.
Adenauer is still unhappy about the occupation restrictions which the
Allies want to carry over into the period of contractual relations. These
include the "security safeguards" forbidding certain scientific research
and the manufacture of heavy weapons and aircraft, and the so-called
"programs" such as decartelization. He also wants a guarantee from the West
that forces of a definite size will be stationed in Germany.
In considering the arrangements offered by the Allies., Adenauer must
take into account the probable reaction of the more nationalistic elements
in his coalition. If these elements joined the Socialists to defeat the
contractual arrangements in the Bundestag, the Chancellor's program of in-
tegration with the West would be wrecked. To avert such a eventuality.,
Adenauer is suggesting that the question of "security safeguards" be dealt
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with by the European Defense Community, and that Germany be subjected only
to those limitations common to all members of the Community, (Factual
data from; TS, Bonn 249, 18 Oct; TS, S/S Bonn 250, 19 Oct 51),
3, FRENCH MOROCCO, Nationalists fear loss of following if Moroccan question
is not included in General Assembly agendas Acute anxiety among Moroccan
nationalists has been caused by a French press article alleging that the
French Ambassador in Washington has received assurances that the US would
work with France to prevent the placement of the Moroccan question on the
UN agenda, Several prominent nationalists have told US representatives in
Tangier that if the question were thus kept from appearing on the UN agenda,
the Moroccan people would lose confidence in their leaders, and might turn
"elsewheregf for guidance. The nationalists, therefore, recommend that the
subject be placed on the a 1 ends, with discussion postponed for a year, (C,
S/S Tangier 150, 19 Oct 51 ,
Comments Although the Moroccan question was automatically added to the
provisional agenda by the petition of several Arab states, the French are
making every effort to have it omitted from the finalized General Assembly
agenda.
There has long been considerable fear among the moderate nationalist
leaders that the rank and file would turn to Communism or extremist national-
ism, Many leaders also have not felt that their case is sufficiently pre-
pared for discussion in the General Assembly this fall. Because they have
looked to the US - as the champion of oppressed peoples -- for assistance
in achieving independence, they are apprehensive lest the US support the
French,
4, UNITED KINGDOM, US -ponders additional aid to Britain in the current fiscal
taro The US is seriously considering whether it should give additional aid
to the UK in the current fiscal year, and if so, whether the aid should be
economic or military, and what techniques should be used, The US Embassy in
London urgently cautions against any leak on this matter which would involve
the US in the current election campaign, The Embassy also points out that
any post-election announcement of US aid must still be handled in the most
nonpartisan manner possible, (S, S/S London 1907, 18 Oct; S, S/S to London
2103, 19 Oct 51).
Comments Britain?s worsening economic situation was discussed in
Washington last month by Chancellor of the Exchequer Gaitskell,who said
that anything beyond the present .,7-billion-pound rearmament program was
next to impossible, as the British would soon have to decide whether exports
or defense plans would have priority. The present rearmament program, which
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an ECA appraisal considers the maximum now possible, will not achieve the
goal of NATO"s medium term defense plan; the program cannot, without some
form of aid, be increased without a general economic mobilization. The
coincidence with the British elections of the need for decisions on these
matters preparatory to the Rome Council meeting will make it especially
difficult for the US to avoid charges of political use of assistance,
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