DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000400330001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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10 October 1951
CIA No. 49385
Copy No.
143
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It. does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. Austrian Personnel in Soviet Occupation Forces dismissed: The
dismissal of indigenous personnel employed as servants at Soviet instal-
lations in Austria continues, The vacancies are being filled by an un-
known number of Russian women who recently arrived from the USSR. Sev-
eral local rumors predict that the Soviet Occupation Force will dismiss
all non-Communists employed in military installations., but there has been
no indication that large-scale dismissals are intended.
A field comment notes that a small-scale arrival of Russian char
women has been in progress for several months in Austria,. primarily for
use in officer clubs and messes. Indigenous personnel continue working
in Soviet Ordnance camps and warehouses.
Comments Apparently, as a security measure, the same type of re-
placement has taken place in the Soviet Occupation Forces of East Germany.
The German dismissals have been on a larger scale and have included a
broader category of personnel at military installations. It may be as-
sumed that a similar development is in progress in Austria.
2. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. Communists again advocate modified neutralism:
Pravda, on 3 October published an article by Pierre Cot, editor of the
World Peace Council magazine In the Defense of Peace which the US Moscow
Embassy feels is one of the most important of such statements in some
time. After painting a dark picture of the worsening conditions between
the two camps into which the world as become divided, Cot called at-
tention to the many differences existing among nations in the "war camp"
Weste
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He alleged Western governments faced adverse public opinion in
their own countries due to uneasiiess about Korea and fear of US domin-
ation of world trade. He urged the World Peace Council and national
peace committees to use these conflicts by whatever method suited their
particular country in order to impede agreement in the West. He stated
that, while the WPC cannot recommend the passive forms of neutralism or
religious pacificism which the fight against war takes on in some coun-
tries, it can. still act jointly with the local peace committees if a
foreign policy based on neutralism could ru ture the war coalition and
"return the UN to its original role."
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Comments The Communists alternate between condemning neutral-
ism and advocating it as a disruptive device under certain conditions.
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3. World Federation of Trade Unions Conference: The East Berlin con-
ference of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions, 13 - 21 Nov-
ember, is expected to present an important decision which will strength-
en the unity and action of the group according to the East German labor
federation's newspaper, Tribulene. Main subjects to be discussed con-
cern results of capitalist war preparations deterioration of workersu
living standards, and colonial problems, 25X1
Comment: This will be the first general meeting of the WFTU since
its Second World Congress in 1949 at Milan. During this interval WFTU
strength in the West has been weakened by the withdrawal of many unions,
The East German labor union announced that representatives from 64 coun-
tries will "make vital decisions upon the preservation and consolidation
of peace" - an indication that Germanyes participation in Western de-
fense will receive special attention,
4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, New propaganda angle on Oatis: The Prague radio is
now alleging that the US is exploiting the Oatis case "for an even
sharper campaign against Czechoslovakia," A recent broadcast stated
that Secretary Acheson had told both American and West European press
correspondents to "blow up the Oatis case in every possible way until
the General Assembly opens in Paris on 6 November," This reportedly
is part of the US propaganda campaign against the possible candidacy of
Czechoslovakia a a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.
5. Two-policemen murdered: The US Army Attache in Prague has re-
ceived information about the murder of two uniformed police (SNB in a
city near Prague on 1 October, The attaches 25X1
also quoted a Czech on stating that the commander of the
troops in that city knew nothing of what was going on in the present
day army, that organization., training and future planning is "in chaos
at all levels.," and that Minister of Nat onal Defense Cepicka is despised
at, all levels,
Comment: No confirmatory information is available for the above
report, Moreover, other evidence would indicate that this situation
is not general throughout the Czech army,
6. Intelligence interest in Belgium shown: According ti ::1 25X1
I Ia representative of the Czech Government in Belgium Has ex
an interest in detailed surveillance of the port of Antwerp,
deliveries of war materials to Belgium., FLrance9 Germany and Yugoslavia,
the construction of a new oil storage tank, the construction status of
a new General Motors factory, and a map of navigable rivers and canals
of the Benelux area,
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Comment: Since 1949 reports from Brussels have indicated the Czech
Legationas interest in procuring military and economic information on
Belgium through questionnaires distributed to s~E?i pr!toA ~o?~.~ ?a+ , -. ,
lea sue countiry, in August j ireported that 25X1
between 1948 and 1951 there had been uncovered certain continuing manifes-
tations of Czech interest in the Rhine Valley, including detailed ques-
tionnaires on specific information and maps of bridges, banks, industry,
communications, US bridge exercises, etc. A 1951 questionnaire was par-
ticularly noteworthy for its clearly offensive nature since it sought in-
formation on which sectors of the Rhine could be inundated, easily defen-
dable bridges possibilities of bivouac, docking facilities, etc. The
25X1 C pointed out that among the Satellites, the Czechs alone had
shown curiosity of this sort. No indications of Soviet offensive inten-
tions have been uncovered through their questionnaire in which political
and economic matters predominate.
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7. 1UNGARY, Slavs utilized in anti-Tito propaganda: At the recent celebra-
tion of International Peace Day in Budapest, one of the principal events
was a speech by a South Slav peasant comparing the happy life of the Hun-
garian Slav minority with deplorable conditions in Yugoslavia. In the
name of the South Slave he sent a message to the Yugoslav "brothers" to
"fight against Tito." The US Legation in Budapest reported that increas-
ing use is b zarian South Slave to carry on anti-Tito
propaganda.
Comment: South Slave have not been used in recent months to carry
on the verbal battle against Tito.
8. Hog surrender period extended till Spring.- A
the Ministry of Food extends till spring the period 5 oOrt kulaks to surren-
der of
their hogs. The US Legation in Budapest poinnts s out that, for
, beissides re-
vealing that g governmental hog collections by the 30 September
deadline were insufficient, the decree indicates that the government is
not yet ready to liquidate the kulaks. It could ha
property nstead of extending the surrender period,
Comment: There have been numerous indications since the end of the
harvest that an intensive campaign is underway to increase the number of
cooperatives. It does not appear, however, that the government is pre-
pared to undertake full scale collectivization this fall,
9. YUGOSLAVIA.- Tito describes Cominform espionage activity. Speaking at
Zagreb before a Congress of Yugoslav trade union workers, Marshal Tito
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charged that the Cominform_has employed 1,932 Yugoslav citizens and 7,930
"White Guards" for espionage purposes. The Premier alleged that the Sov-
iets had founded a network of 98 spy.centers in the Cominform countries
(including 35 in the USSR and 12 in Czechoslovakia) whose function was to
send "diversionists hourly across the borders into Yugoslavia." Although
he claimed that Bulgaria has employed more agents than any of the other
satellites, Tito stressed the point that Dimitrov had refused to en a
Yugoslavs as agents prior to the Cominform resolution.
Comments Minister of Interior Rankovic stated in June that since
the Cominform break in 1948, 8,403 Cominformists had been arrested.
TitoJs figure of 98 spy centers in the Cominform countries represents a
considerably larger number than previously estimated. Early this year
the Yugoslav radio stated that over 20 00centers for sabotage" were located
in the Satellite countries on Yugoslavia.0s periphery. While over 90 Como
inform subversive camps have been reported to exist in the neighboring
satellites, fairly reliable information is held on less than 20 of them.
10. Recent Y oslav de ortees to Bul aria ma have been Cominformistss
Ambassador Allen believes that a large number of the recent Yugoslav to Bulgaria, among whom were several dentists, enginers, anddem
professors, may have had Cominform connections. One of the deportees
was a former MVD officer in Germany and Poland who had remained in Yugo-
slavia following the Cominform break by playing down his Cominform con-
nections. Another was his wife who formerly was the secretary of Major
General Pero Popivoda, a former Yugoslav Communist Party member and now
the leader of the Yugoslav Cominfo-rmists in Rumania. The Ambassador
cites as additional evidence the manner in which the
in Bulgaria and the lack of subsequent Bulgarian ublicity was received
The Ams-
ador hopes to verify a rumor circulating among White Russians i
n Belg ad
that the UDB chief in Belgrade has been arrested for his grade
in deporting the group to Bulgaria. ability
Comments Although there is little doubt that some of the deportees
were not Cominformists, the circumstances surrounding the incident, in-
cluding the apparent foreknowledge and cooperation of Bulgarian auth-
orities, suggest that the group may have been deported to Bulgaria in
exchange for Yugoslav citizens.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1, IRAN. Iranian Prime Minister desires to avoid Security Council con-
sideration of oildis utea Prime Minister Mossadeq prefers to settle the
British- ranian oil dispute by prior negotiations and to avoid Security
Council action. Mossadeq expressed this sentiment in an interview with
Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and US United Nations delegates, and
added that the strong statement which he must make in the Security Council
would preclude successful negotiations, Therefore he'su este a dela
?x'da s during which an agreement could be sought,
Comments There is no reason to assume that Mossadeq is willing to
negot a e- on terms more favorable to the British than those previously
offered* Resumption of negotiations,, however9,might avoid the dilemma
of an Iranian refusal to comply with a UN recommendation. The USSR
would similarity'not be given the opportunity of posing in the UN as the
champion of Iran,
2. BURL. Burmese officials cool in di lomatic dealings with Chinese Communists;
Prime Mm n stet Thakin Nu, refused to attend a mass rally celebrating the
Chinese Communist Government's second anniversary, although he was strongly
urged to do so as a "calming influence" to prevent possible "disturbances."
He attended a reception at the Chinese Embassy with other high Government
officials, but they all significantly left before the showing of a Communist
movie,
Meanwhile, the new Burmese Ambassador to Peiping is reliably reported
to have refused to present his credentials to the Chinese Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and to have threatened to return to Burma unless
granted an audience with. Mao Tse-tung, Despite the intervention of the
Soviet Ambassador the Burmese diplomat remained adamant with the complete
Of his 'Go ernment and the Chinese finally acceded to his desire.
Comment& In addition to these indications of a stiffening Burmese
attituce towards the Chinese, Thakin Nu in a recent parliamentary speech,
obviously referring to China, stated that if Burma were to be invaded it
would fight the aggressor along with the "many countries which hate injus-
tiee" Nevertheless, the Burmese, by and large, still refuse to face
squarely the threat of Chinese Communist intervention in their affairs,
This report also tends strongly to refute information that the Burmese
Ambassador intends to invite Chinese Communist troops to enter Burma to
eliminate Chinese Nationalist forces.
3. BPPspokesman outlines party programs In a press conference a
leader of the urma Workers and Peasants Party stated that his
party stood for the prevention of Burma becoming a second Korea, the
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expulsion of Chinese Nationalist troops, and the insurance of "full
democratic rights" for the Burmese People. He added that the BWPP was
prepared to cooperate with any other political organization, including
the Anti_Fascist Peoples Freedom League which controls the Government.
The US Embassy in Rangoon believes that this statement provides the
framework for the formation of an above round united front dominated
by the BWPP.
Comment: This relatively mild statement regarding BWPP aims con-
trasts sharply with the greetings sent to Communist China on 1 October
by the former's labor organization which denounced the "bloodthirsty and
warlike reactionary Americans who 61re aiding the reactionary rulers of
Burma in constructing military bases in Burma?"
The BWPP has long been suspected of having an intention to develop
an anti-Government coalition which would parallel the Burma Communist
Party's strategy of establishing an underground "Peoples Democratic
Frontes made up of the various insurgents.
4. Karens threaten to Join Communists: The US Embassy in Rangoon has
received a letter from an unspecified Karen "delegation" which stated that
the Karens would join the Communists unless the US and UK supplied them
with arms. The Embassy believes that this incident reflects "des eration
coupled with i creased Communist influence" among the Karens.
Comment: There is no, doubt that the Karen position has become pro-
gressively more desperate. The failure of the West to do anything what-
soever in their behalf has no doubt been a keen disappointment which
probably has gradually turned to resentment. Since the Karens do not
expect the Burmese Government to offer a satisfactory solution to the
struggle, they probably have become increasingly receptive to Communist
propaganda. Wholehearted Karen-Communist collaboration would be
disastrous for the relatively pro-Western Government now in power;
Burmese to ti hten controls on tire shi meats to China: have stated that the Government will discontinuetheRissuan emcee
of import-transit licenses for tires. They indicated, however, that out-
standing licenses would be honored. After reiterating the Burmese conten-
tion that the US should control the transit trade through Burma by stopping
pping
at their source, these officials indicated that the cabinet
was about to consider the entire problem of the shipment of tires to China.
The US Embassy in Rangoon comments that the current interest in controlling
the traffic in tires stems from a desire to insure the approval of US
exports against rec-n+~y ?ssued li
censes for the import of goods from
the dollar area o
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6. BUi.MA CHINA, Burmese intercede for Americans: The Burmese Ambassador to
Peiping recently joined several other chiefs of mission in calling the
attention of the Soviet Ambassador to the harsh treatment being accorded
American citizens in China. The Russian claimed to have raised the
question with the Chinese Foreign Minister who stated he "would give
the matter consideration." The Burmese Ambassador also reported that the
various embassies had agreed to approach the Chinese Foreign Minister
dividuall on the matter as opportunities presented themselves,
7.
25X1 C
Comment: There is no evidence to date that any of these representa-
tions., including those of the Soviet Ambassador, have altered Peiping's
policy toward US nationals.
MALAYA. Reaction to murder of Mala a~ ? s High Commissioner: The US Consul
General in Singapore concludes that the murder of High Commissioner Gurney
on 6 October will probably convince the notoriously noncommittal Chinese
population of Malaya that cooperation with the British is dangerous policy.
The US representative also transmits the unofficial views of the
office of the Commissioner General for Southeast Asia that the incident
will arouse the British Government to a greater awareness of the serious
Malayan situation be a strong boost to bandit morale, increase dissatis-
faction with security operations, and possibly call for substitution of
stiffer measures.
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Thai police officials have stated that celebrations will not be pro-
hibited on 10 October, the Chinese Nationalist holidays 25X1
8. THAILAND. Verdict given in regicide case: The Thai criminal court,
after more than two years, acquitted two of the three persons charged
with complicity in the death of the late King and sentenced the third
to death. The prisoner is reported to be preparing an appeal1in which
case the matter "can drag on another few years." The US Embassy in
Bangkok observes that the verdict is politically useful to the Phibun
regime: it can be used to discredit Pr.idi, with whom the prosecution
associated the defendents, and it can be held u as fulfillment of
Phibun?s premise to solve the cased
9. Police grant Nationalist Chinese special favors: No overt cele-
bration was permitted in Bangkok on 1 October in honor of the second
anniversary of the Chinese Communist Government. On the other hand,
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Comments The strong and open anti-Communist position of the Phibun
regimeally precludes any compromise with Communism and requires that
the regime be replaced should Thailand become oriented towards Communism.
10. INDOCHINA. French confident in western Tonkins The French consider that
trie Kcal p ase o The a a or N g a Ip is now over and that Viet
Minh ability to mount further attacks in this area is decreasing: .win to
their lack of supplies. 25X1
11. CHINA' reports competition among Party, government,
a J inese ommunis r y9 w o as pro e a
great deal of useful information on Party organizations and personalities,,
states that there is a "bureaucratic struggle" for funds and privileges
among the Party, the government, and the armed forces, with the Party ap-
parently in the "weakest position." states that the govern-
ment "has the advantage of controlling funds, while the army has the
"historic advantage of having been once virtually identical with the Party
and the government." The military leaders regard the government as "es-
sentially their own-creatureH and have adoped a "rather independent"-line
with the political cadres. observes that, although directives
flow from the Politburo, Party off ic a s have been told to act on govern-
ment directives, Army directives and editorials of the Party press without
waiting for explicit Party' directives..
Comments It is believed that this account is out of date. The Party
controls The government absolutely, and appears to have effective control
over the armed forces. All important leaders of both the government and
the armed forces are members of the Party's Central Committee. Directives
on major matters
origins a solely with the Politburo; government and army
directives, and the editorials of the Party press, of course transmit the
will of the Politburo and have not been observed at any time to take an
independent line.
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12. Chinese Con>.ist armed forces join Sino-Soviet Friendship Associa-
tion en blocs Peiping radio states-that he inese ormnunis armed forces,
11 numbering five million," have beco " ole" with the
wino-Soviet Friendsi.ip Association. _
Comment; Chinese Communist field forces, military district troops?
and naval and air forces are believed to total about 3,625,000 men; Pei
ping's figure of five million is obscure. In any case, this new member-
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ship was obviously acquired by fiat, possibly in order to claim achieve-
mentof Peipinggs 1951 goal of 20 million SSFA members. Peiping radio
last month, while citing 16 million SSFA members, admitted that the Chi-
nese people remain apathetic to the Association and its program. Peiping
may next turn its attention to government employees, and so on to other
groups, until the USSR has more official friends in China than it has
citizens of its own.
130 S ecial Sinkiang currency abolishedo The Chinese Communists have
announced that beginning on 1 October 1951, Sinkiang notes will be redeemed
and the regular Chinese currency will be circulated throughout the pro-
vinoe. Uighurian language characters will be printed on the currency for
.Sinkiang circulation, but currency without Uighurian characters may also be
circulated. The Chinese currency is to be the standard legal tender in the
province and all business transactions are to be in terms of that curren-
Comments One aspect of the special status of China9s border areas as
spheres of Soviet influence has been the special currency systems of those
areas. In the past year, however, the Chinese Communists have sought to
promote the economic integration of the border areas with the rest of China
by currency unification. In the summer of 1950, the special Port Arthur-
Dairen currency was abolished. The Manchurian and Inner Mongolian cur-
rencies were reoaa.led in the spring of 1951- With the redemption of the
Sinkiang notes, the circulation of Chinese currency will extend to all the
areas bordering on the USSR.
tionsi Reacting to the latest Communist offer to resume negotiations a
KOREAO South Korean reaction to latest Communist offer to resume ne otia-
Panmunjon with an extension of the neutral zone to Munsan, ROK Foreign Min-
ister Pyun stated that extension of the neutral zone'is "fraught with
dangers lethal to the UN strategic position in Korea." He argued that ex-
tending the neutral zone across the Imjin River into Munsan would give the
Communists a foothold across that strategic river. Pyun asserted that "it
is high time" for the Communists to be presented with an ultimatum on the
conferences.
Comments It is generally believed that the Communist proposal to ex-
tend the neutral zone is equally unpalatable to the UN command. This of-
ficial ROK statement is merely another attempt to discourage further cease-
fire efforts on the part of the UN.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
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1. GERMANY. Retail stores in East Germany cut prices: Effective 8 October,
the East German Government cut prices on certain foods, textiles, and
industrial wares, and removed marmalade, soap, and textiles made from
cellulose from the ration list. US officials in Berlin estimate that these
reductions will cause West Berliners to increase their purchases in East
Berlin.
Comment:. West Berliners find that they can buy more with their West
marks in East Berlin. Although the West Berlin Government realizes that this
practice is injurious to West Berlin's economy, efforts to control it have
met with little success.
25X6
3. FRANCE. Popular support of European Defense Forces cooled by East German
proposa ss The US Embassy Paris repo s that the East German
unitr proposals have confused the current of French opinion favorable to
the European Defense Forces plan, but have not reversed it. The virtual
absence of non-Communist opposition to any German military contribution
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whatever is considered by the Embassy as "perhaps the most outstanding
feature of public opinion development." _
Should the USSR demonstrate, however, that it is prepared to make real
concessions in its campaign for German "unity." French public opinion
"would be very profoundly affected."
Comment: US officials in Berlin recently warned that the East German
"unity'1 campaign might lead France to reconsider its German policy, It is
unlikely, however, that the defense plan will be abandoned by the French
Government under any foreseeable international circumstances, inasmuch as
this plan is an essential phase of the integration of Europe. The French
are increasingly inclined to view such integration as attainable.
25X1
AUSTRIA. Communist pamphlet attributes atrocities to US soldiers in Korea:
Vienna's Communis bookstores now offer or p-05116 consume ion a urn. s ory
of American "atrocities" in the Korean conflict. The pamphlet, prepared
by the Austrian member of a 17 woman delegation sent to North Korea last
May by the World Federation of Democratic Women, is entitled "An Eyewitness
Account of the Modern War of Destruction." Four pages of the report are
devoted to reproduction of "original" documents, reputedly convicting South
Korean and American "politicians" of.initiating a war of aggression against
the North Koreans. The remainder of the pamphlet is devoted to an
imaginative account of crimes attributed to Americans or to South Koreans
acting under US orders, such as bacteriological warfare, the use of various
instruments of torture, and the usual acts associated with brutal and ill-
disciplined soldiery. The author is supplementing her writte report on
Korea with a series of lectures, 25X1
Comment US officials in Vienna discount the effectiveness of the
pamphlet's i lustrations, but indicate that the text is clever. The circu-
lation appears to be very limited at present. The non-Communist press has
ignored the publication.
Similar reports have been submitted in other countries represented
by the delegation, and have been recognized as the end results for which
the World Federation of Democratic Women engineered the trip to Korea.
5e Austrian press surveys consequences of prospective ERP cuts:
Vienna's leading newspapers continue their gloomy analysis o t e conse-
quences of the anticipated reduction of about 709000,000 dollars in external
assistance to Austria for the coming year. Attributing Austria's economic
plight to the rise in world prices following the Korean crisis, there is
general agreement that further gains in living standards and the achievement
of economic independence by 1952 are now precluded. Surveying the prospects
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of an Austrian solution within the framework of declining foreign aid, most
editorials emphasize the necessity of increased productivity, an expanded
export program, and strict austerity in the matter of imports. A People's
Party paper calls for all-out mobilization of the country as a prerequisite
to meeting the crisis. A right-wing., independent newspaper vigorously
criticizes the coalition government for creating an economic climate un-
favorable to the obtaining of external credits to ensate for the
diminution in foreign aid.
Comment: The proposed reduction in ECA allocations has caused con-
siderable rd,ismay among the Austrian public. The semi-official press has
suggested that US authorities were unaware of Austria's special position.,
and the recent invitation for a delegation from Congress to visit Austria
suggests a new plea for an "understanding" of Austria's peculiar problems.
Though the Austrian press is'taking an uncommonly realistic view of the
alternatives to foreign aid., its suggested remedies are those which ECA has
been urging upon the Austrian Government for some time.
6. NETHERLANDS. Government's proposed economic controls may still labor
cr mac sma: Ir# view of interna Iona economic evelopmen s stemming rom
rearmament, the Dutch Government has introduced a bill to enable it to
control trade in a number of metal and chemical products, in effect a
reintroduction of some of the clauses of the 1939 vital materials distri-
bution act. the Government also plans to introduce a bill to ban hoarding
and profiteering. These proposed laws would enable the Government "to keep
an effective eye on prices in general," and on trade in critical raw
materials in particular.
Comment: Passage and enforcement of these measures may serve to quiet
the criticism of labor that it is shouldering a disproportionate share of
the defense burden.
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8. Communists plan strikes and land seizures this fall: Recent intense
activity in he Communist Party and in ommunist-dominated labor unions has
stimulated rumors of nation-wide agitation and strikes to be carried out this
fall, The opening of parliamentary debate on the controversial labor law
will be the signal for this agitation, The Communist Youth Federation has
given its support to a plan for land accu titian in the Rome area to be
carried out at the same time.
Comment: The Communists obviously hope to use the issue of restrictive
labor egis ation, scheduled for parliamentary discussion in the near future
and vigorously opposed by all labor organizations, to win the support of
the anti-Communist trade unions for their strike program; Prospects for
success are fairly good in regard to strikes on purely economic issues.
All unions supported the 19 September strike of state employees for higher
wages. However, illegal land seizures, in which the Communist Youth
Federation has actively participated in Central Italy, are opposed by the
anti-Communist unions.
9. PORTUGAL. Lisbon government acts to limit flow of military goods to China:
Hong Kong reports that
in late September the
Lisbon government instructed the Macao authorities that an embargo on the
shipment of milita supplies to Communist areas was to go into effect on
1 October. on 26 September the avowedly anti-
Communist Macao chief of police prevented the transfer of eight aircraft
engines from a Macao warehouse for possible sale to the Chinese Communists.
Meanwhile, the head. of Macaous Economic Services, P.J. Lobo, reportedly
refused to announce the embargo He t ?
financial interest in Macao's smuggling activities, haslopp weth a sattampt
y
to regulate the China trade. osd any attempt
Although Portugal has not recognized the Peiping Government, it is
anxious not to antagonize the Chinese Communist regime, because of possible
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0 ML exort trade with
could continue inasmuch as no e
x ortmlicensesdarearequired in Macao0 China
Comment: Lobo, reputedl
ol?ti
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loss of the colony. While in general agreement with the need for an embargo,
the Lisbon government has hitherto maintained that Macao, which depends on
Communist China for much of its food and even its water, is an exceptional
case,
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re-election, and therefore could decline with the same explanation.
No possible successor was mentioned, although Vice-President Hortensio
Quijano, who is ill, and Rear Admiral Teisaire, President pro tempore of
the Senate, are next in line. However, they, too, are candidates for
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12, CENTRAL AMERICA. Comment on the Conference of Central American Foreign
1 nisters: At the "First Cenral American Conference of Foreign Ministers"
which opened Monday in El Salvador, the five Central American republics
will attempt to revive some of the aspects of the single state of which
they were all once members. The conference was called at the initiative
of El Salvador which has long coveted the role of prime mover in a Central
American bloc.
Announced on the joint Central American Independence Day, 15 September,
which followed by a few days a conference of Central American chambers of
commerce, the conference is described by the Foreign Minister of the host
country as a "preliminary exchange of impressions on the best means of
achieving joint action by the five republics." The agenda includes the
establishment of special commissions for dealing with common problems and
discussion of a charter of a Central American organization to promote group
action.
The conference comes on the crest of an unprecedented wave of
confraternity among the widely divergent countries. In recent years there
has even been considerable hostility among certain of the republics over
the issue of the Caribbean Legion and its plots. Although the current spirit
of goodwill seems genuine enough at the moment, and has been given some
substance by the recent exchange of ambassadors between the ideologically
opposed governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua, it is likely that the more
grandiose of the conferences aims will eventually meet the fate of other
previous attempts at unification -- namely: falling afoul of shifting
governments and underlying mistrusts.
13. ARGENTINA. Peron asks leave of absence until after the elections: President
Peron has called a special session of Congress to meet on 11 October to
consider his request for a leave of absence until after the 11 November
elections, according to an official broadcast. It was stated that Peron
did not want it to be said that his presence had influenced the elections.
The broadcast was Peron's first official acceptance of the Peronista
nomination for re-election.
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Comment: Peron's request for leave may represent a compromise with
the arme Drees, who reportedly had demanded Peron's resignation and had
planned to replace the Peron-Quijano slate with Colonel (retired) Domingo
Mercante and ex Foreign Minister Bramuglia (see OCI Daily Digest, 8 Oct 5l),
It is not clear whether Peron, in officially announcing his candidacy,
was also speaking for Quijanoa If he was not, there is the possibility of
a further compromise in that Mercante may yet replace the ailing Dr. Quijanod
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10 October 1951
CIA No. 49385-A
Copy No.
49
25X1
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
25X1
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. INDONESIA. Foreign Minister will recommend against triangular arrange-
ments with India and Burma: Foreign Minister Subardjo told US Ambassador
Cochran that Indonesia had received no invitation to participate in
scheduled India-Burma talks in New Delhi. He further stated that the time
has come for Indonesia to determine friendships on a political rather than 25X1
a sentimental basis. Subardjo told Cochran that he would recommend to his
government that it not enter into triangular conferences with India and
Burma but instead strive toward good relations with all of Asia.
I I
Comment: Prior to the San Francisco conference, there was some dis-
cussion of India-Burma-Indonesia consultation in Djakarta. These talks,
however, did not materialize. Recent press reports in both India and
Indonesia have mentioned Indonesia's inclusion in India-Burma talks
scheduled for 21 October.
The Indonesian Government has received considerable criticism, par-
ticularly from Socialist Party members, for not pursuing closer relations
with Burma and India.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
2. ITALY. Italy seeks semblance of equality for small powers on temporary
NATO committee: The US Embassy in Rome "trusts that the Department of State
will firmly oppose the French demand that the US, UK and France openly domi-
nate the temporary NATO committee," and points out that "neither the French
nor the British are inclined to spare the susceptibilities of Italy and other
smaller countries on vital issues."
The Embassy adds that Communists in Italy would take full advantage of
the opportunity to point out the lack'of equality in NATO and charge that
Italy is being exploited in the interests of the larger powers. It believes
that the benefits resulting from De Gasperits trip to the US could quickly
be lost through such a development. 25X1
Comment: Although the Italians have long been resentful of what
seemed to them an inadequate participation in the policy decisions of the
NATO councils, it is doubtful that any predominance of the Big Three in
the temporary NATO committee would arouse Italian public opinion to a
serious degree.
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