OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100450001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 21, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date: APR 21 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the intern.l use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. t does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3.
Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
other information indicating trends
and potential developments
ARMY, USAF, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A"
25X1 C
USSR. Soviet Proposals to I ran on "New"_Trade Agreement and Other Questions.
has reported that Toward a en of January, Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko
and the Director of Middle East Affairs submitted Soviet proposals to the
Iranian Ambassador to Moscow. These proposals envisaged a new trade agree-
ment between the USSR and Iran and the opening of new consulates in central
and southern Iran on a "reciprocal basis." GGromyko was also alleged to
have made a number of other sweeping proposals which included Soviet oil
rights and exploration concessions in Iran; Soviet reorganization and.
training of the Iranian Army; and neutralization of Iranian foreign policy.,
The Iranian Ambassador reportedly agreed that the trade agreement should
be revised, but asserted that-that part of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty
which gives the USSR the right to intervene in Iran should be abolished be-
cause it violated the basic principles of the United Nations.
COMMENT: Although it appears possible that Grorryko may
have discussed some of these subjects with the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow,
there is no evidence that any formal proposals were advanced by the USSR at
this time or at any subsequent time. Since the current Soviet--Iranian trade
agreement was only signed on 4 Nov 50, it is improbable that any questions
concerning a new trade agreement have been raised. Such talks would be more
likely to concern difficulties already encountered in the implementation of
this agreement. In view of the known Soviet attitude toward foreign consu-
lates within the USSR, which inclines toward their total elimination, Gromyko
would not have proposed the opening of consulates on a "reciprocal basis.01
Other proposals seem consistent with Soviet objectives in Iran, but no
Iranian Government could accept them and certainly the present pro-Western
Premier Ala is not likely to do so. Moreover, the USSR has much to gain
from continuance of the current conditions in Iran, particularly in relation
to the nationalization of Iranvs oil, Any ill-timed Soviet demands for oil
rights and other concessions might well cause these advantages to be for-
feited.
PRAVDA Comments on MacArthur Dismissal, Embassy Moscow feels that the
Pravda 18 April editoria'l-on the MacArthur dismissal (1) reiterates the
Soviet position on the Korean war; (2) was needed to explain the removal
of an important "symbol of US aggressive policy" to the Communist world;
(3) and is noteworthy in asking what steps the US intends to take for
peaceful settlement of the conflict. (C Emb Moscow 1834, 19 Apr 51).
COMMENT: Pravdaos editorial comment which was given prominent treatment,
adds no new twists to the established line consistently supporting the
Chinese terms for settlement. The week0s delay before Pravda published its
comment was probably due to a desire to be sure that the dismissal repre-
sented no basic change in US policy. The question of US intentions on
peaceful settlement is rhetorical in context and, therefore, is not in-
tended to indicate an interest on the part of the USSR in such a.settlement.
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eb r 1-
reports tha according to the
nese Ambassador in Moscow, Sino-Soviet relations are "not very good " The
NBn
25X1 C
reason given is that the USSR entangled China in the Korean war and has not
given the aid promised. At a February meeting with Malenkov in Harbin, Mao
aired his complaints. In reply, Malenkov explained that the entry of the
USSR Into the Korean campaign would result in World War III, to the detriment
of both China and the Soviet Union. Therefore, Malenkov wanted to continue
wearing down the West on various fronts. Mao did not press his views and
agreed'that Soviet aid at this time would be limited to continued supplies
for China, COMMENT: Other unconfirmed reports
also claim that the Chinese Communists are dissatisfied with the extent of
Soviet participation in the Korean war. In view of the high casualty rate
sustained (probably greater than the Chinese had calculated prior to their
entrance in the Korean war), the superiority of UN equipment, and the signifi-
cant role of the virtually unopposed UN air force, it is quite likely that
the Chinese Communists feel that the USSR has failed to share the burden in
this "Communist crusade." A new Chinese Ambassador arrived in Moscow 15 Apr 51,
and his predecessor is believed to have been absent from Moscow for some time
prior to that date. Since Mao's last confirmed, public appearance on 26 Jan 51,
he has been rumored to be at various places. One report was that he left
Peiping 29 Jan 51 for Manchuria and later conferred with Kim I1 Sung in Harbin.
Except for the fact that Malenkov did not attend the Chinese reception in
Moscow 14 Feb 51, there is no evidence concerning his whereabouts during the
period covered by the above report. ,
EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA, Resistan
25X1A
northern Albania in order to help liberate Albania. They-have planned~an
anti-Communist demonstration on May Day but have been unable to obtain ex-
plosiveq "from the resistance band." (This may refer to "Resistant Front"
described in 0/C2 Daily Digest, 16 Apr 51). An Albanian now in Yugoslavia
has stated that "Provincial Committees" of a Yugoslav "Albanian Committee"
are now being formed, suggesting that a Yugoslav version of the Committee for
Free Albania may be organized. One provincial committee is specifically located
i
Tit
d
n
ogra
which is directly north of Shkoder in Yugoslav Montenegro,
egos avs have had a long-con nu ng =sire to wield influence in Albania a
d
n
have encouraged the formation of anti?Hoxha exile groups in Kossovo-Metohija
and Montenegro. It has also been reported that an Albanian brigade has been
formed in Yugoslavia for action in Albania,
HUNGARY. Minister of Interior Be-placed. According to Radio Budapest,
Minister of the Interior Sandor Zold has been removed from his post and re-
placed by Arpad Hazi. The Hungarian news service described Hazi as a
Communist of 20 years standing, a member of the Central Committee of the
Hungarian Worker's (Communist) Party, Chairman of the State Control Center,
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and a deputy in the National Assembly..(N FBIS, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT.
Sandor Zold, as Deputy Minister of the Interior, replaced Janos Kada as
Minister on 23 June 1950 when the latter was relieved of his ministerial
duties to concentrate on special Party problems, Zold had been mated a
member of the Politburo on 31 May 1950.
POLAND. American Scantic Line Barred. The Polish Government in a note
of 18 April has specifically barred the further "carrying on of activities
of the American Scantic Line in Poland." The note added that the Polish
Government held the US Government responsible for the actions of the New
York City authorities in barring the Polish-controlled Gdynia-American
Line vessel Bator from berthing facilities in New York Harbor and that as
a result the Bator was being withdrawn from the Gdynia-New York run.
(R Warsaw 822, 19 Apr 51 ). COMMENT: The Bator!', had not been prohibited
from berthing in New York Harbor as alleged in the note, since piers were
available for the vessel in Brooklyn, Hoboken, and Jersey City. On 16 April
the US Consulate in Gdansk was informed that the 19 April schedule departure
of the Batory for New York had been cancelled. At that time no date for
a future sailing was given. The American Scantic Line has been the only
regular US shipping service to Poland and had already contracted for forty-
eight voyages during 1951, According to the statement in January 1951 of
a Polish Ministry of Shipping official, stoppage of American Scantic
service to Poland would completely upset the Polish Six Year Plan for mari-
time activities. Moreover, American Scantic had apparently recently
.reached a satisfactory settlement with the Polish Government concerning
taxes it owed and the debts of the Gdynia American Line to American
Scantic Lines,
non YUGOSLAVIA, Yugoslav Note to Bulgaria, The Yugoslav Foreign Minister
has addressed a note to the Bulgarian Government protesting 20 frontier
incidents perpetrated by Bulgarian frontier guards between 19 December 1950
and 5 April 1951. The note accuses Bulgaria of endeavoring to aggravate
the present situation and insists that the Bulgarian Government take
measures to prevent such aggressive acts. (R Belgrade 1549, 20 Apr 51).
COMMENT: In the past two weeks Yugoslavia has made similar formal protests
to Hungary and Rumania. Since 16 March all of Yugoslav's neighbors
(Albania,' Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania) have despatched notes to the
Yugoslav Government accusing it of frontier violations.
"B" Yugoslav-Czechoslovak Relations at Low Ebb. The Yugoslav Charge in
Praha has reported to US Ambassador Briggs that he foresees the possibility
that the Czechoslovak Government may declare him per ona non grata and
then refuse an entrance visa to his successor, The Yugoslav Charge does
not believe that the timing of recent incidents in other satellites and
the case of the Yugoslav radio operator Novak, who disappeared recently
from'the Yugoslav Embassy in Praha, are coincidental. Ambassador Briggs
comme.ts that while the Yugoslav radio operator's presence and conduct at
the press conference arranged by Czechoslovak authorities, during which
Novak maintained that he had voluntarily sought asylum in Czechoslovakia,
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raises some doubts as to whether his departure from the Yugoslav Embassy
was involuntary, the Yugoslav Charge maintains that there is ample proof
that the Yugoslav employee did not depart the Embassy voluntarily. The
US Ambassador adds that there is no evidence yet regarding the manner
in which the Czechoslovak Government plans to use the radio operator,
but a public trial of recently arrested Czechoslovak Communists with
Novak appearing as a state witness, is undoubtedly a possibility.
(C Praha 637 and 638, 19 Apr 51).
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" SYRIA. The_Arm_yo_ s Continuin ,Influence upon the Government. Colonel
Shishakli, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, at a press con-
ference in Damascus, on 16 April, following his return from Cairo, stated
that his purpose for going to Egypt was to discuss military cooperation
but that he had taken the opportunity while in Egypt to "correct erroneous
impressions" concerning Syrian politics and to deny that the Syrian Army
had interfered in the Syrian Government. Concerning Syria's foreign
problems Shishakli indicated; (a) that the whole Arab world supports
Syria's insistence that Israelis respect the truce agreements, and (b)
that Syria may soon receive extensive military assistance from Egypt.
According to US Ambassador Cannon, Shishakli's reference to new elections
and to the Nationalist Party may indicate Shishakli's intention to use
the Nationalist Party as a counterweight to Qudsi's Populist Party. Cannon
concludes that Shishakli's declarations on foreign and domestic issues
leave little doubt that the Syrian Army actually rules Syria and that it
intends to continue doing so. (C Damascus 539, 17 Apr 51). COMR4EN~:
In spite of Colonel Shishakli's statements to the contrary, all indica-
tions have pointed to the dominant influence exerted by the Army upon the
Syrian Government. Syria's political instability is not likely to be
improved by the continuing interference of the Army in the Government's
domestic and foreign affairs. (See OCI Daily Digest, 27 Mar and 16 Apr 51).
"A" IRAN. Iranians Propose Nationalization of the Iranian-Soviet Fisheries.
Prime Minister Ala has informed US Ambassador Grady that Parliament plans
to nationalize the Caspian fisheries on expiration of the Soviet con-
cession in September 1952. Several Parliamentary deputies are now
drawing up a bill on this subject and will introduce it shortly in Parlia-
ment. (S Tehran 2474, 19 Apr 51). COMMENT: The Caspian fisheries are
owned jointly by the Iranian and Soviet Governments with each government
having 50% of the shares. The terms of the contract permit the Iranian
government, if it does not wish to renew the contract at its expiration
date, to dissolve the company and to divide the assets between the two
share-holders. Under such circumstances the Iranians must exploit
the fisheries themselves for a period of 25 years without the assistance
of non-Soviet foreign nationals. The Iranian Government has long planned
to do this. While the move might be interpreted as an extension of the
current fervor for nationalization of foreign concessions in Iran, it is
not comparable to the move.to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(AIOC), which is envisaged as taking place immediately rather than when
the AIOC contract expires in 1993.
"B" INDONESIA. Security Deterioration at Surabaya 4arbor, Extensive looting
in the Surabaya harbor area on 17 April resulted in a suspension of all
harbor facilities for a day and a half and government arrest of 400 persons,
Although the harbor reopened on 19 April, shippers say they will close all
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facilities again at the first sign of trouble. US Consul Surabaya
comments that the situation highlights-the prospect of serious diffi-
culties and complete paralysis of the port in "time of trouble." The
Consulate feels that the situation is steadily deteriorating. (C
Surabaya 96, 19 Apr 51). COMMENT: Security in and around Surabaya has
been poor for months. Although East Java is under martial law, the
Indonesian Army has only limited control over its troops in this area.
"A" PHILIPPINES. Huk Timetable Revised. According to a Philippine Military
Intelligence Service analyst, captured Huk documents reveal th vt the Huk
timetable no longer contemplates overthrow of the Philippine Government
by 1952. The documents reportedly state that, until increased assistance
and revised orders are received from the USSR and Communist China, top
priority will be given to recruiting, propagandizing, and conduct of
limited raids and ambushes'to keep the movement active and bolster
sagging morale. (S PHILCOM USAF C-1937, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT: Huk
propaganda has often referred to expected external assistance. A revised
Huk timetable would indicate Huk leaders are coordinating their plans more
closely with international Communist objectives and do not wish to dis-
credit the movement by adhering to an unrealistic timetable.
"A" Possible Submarine off East Luzon Coast. The Philippine Army
received a report on 17 April (which it evaluates B-3) that about 10 men
and some material were landed on the east coast of Luzon in Quezon province.
The Philippine Navy also reported on 19 April that a periscDpe was sighted
in the same general area. Military units are conducting a r econnaissance
in force, but neither report has thus far been confirmed. (S PHILCOM USAF
C-1937, 20 Apr 51; C Manila 3283, 20 Apr 51) COMMENT: See Daily Digest
dated 13 April 1951, page 5, concerning a report that a Russian. submarine
left Y'ulin, Hainan on 15 March 1951 with 10 Filipino agents enroute to the
Philippines.
"C" AUSTRALIA. Election Campaign. The campaign for the 28 April election is
in full swing with the outcome for Senate seats still highly speculative.
The Government's chances to win a Senate majority are best in Queensland
and Western Australia. However, Labor has won. two Queensland by-elections
during the past week. The emphasis on issues remains unchanged except
for increased Labor charges that the Liberal-Country Government is court-
ing war by its policies. Although party leaders are drawing good crowds,
there is considerable public apathy. The Communists are quiet on the
industrial front as a contribution to Labor's campaign. (R SANA Melbourne
C-26, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT: As previously reported, Labor is attacking the
Liberal-Country Government for tolerating inflation while the Government
is standing on its anti-Communist and defense program which it hopes to
enact by gaining control of the Senate.
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"C" CHINA. New Version of Rumored Death of MAO Tye-tun
25X1C MAO Tse-tung died in Peiping on 19 February.
LIU Shao-ch'i (MAO's presumptive successor) did not choose to announce
the death at the time, ""for fear of the consequences," but the announce-
ment will be made "very soon." 25X1A
25X1A COMMENT: A Rumor of MAO's death-- u on March--was reported in the OCI
Daily Digest of .17 April. =comments that, despite the discrepancy in
dates, these reports are believed to be of the same origin. Reliable
information on MAO's health is still not available. If MAO is indeed
dead, the Peiping regime will probably be compelled to announce the fact
in the near future.
25X1C
"A" KOREA. ommunist Prisoners Taken Recently in Korea .Extracted He,?Tr Support
for Coming Offensive. Both North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners,
taken since late February, have reported overhearing or being told that a
great quantity of air, armor, and artillery support was being assembled in
Manchuria to be sent into Korea to support the coming major offensive.
Estimates varied from 4,000 aircraft and 3,000 tanks to a vague reference
of a "large number of tanks, artillery and 400 aircraft" to be'received
in time for the "May Offensive". (S CINGFE-DA Telecon 4619, 19 Apr 51).
COMMENT: The large number of reports received, not only from Korea but
also from sources within China, concerning the expected scale of Soviet
materiel support from Communist troops in Korea lends added credence to
the. possibility that the coming offensive will be supported by more modern
equipment that heretofore encountered. The possibility continues to exist,
however, that such reports were circulated deliberately by the Communist
authorities for morale reasons alone.
"C" Muccio Comments on COF Morale in Korea. Ambassador Muccio report-
ing on the morale of. Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Korea based. on POW
interrogations, cautions that all his comments are derived exclusively from
POW attitudes and may therefore not be representative since it is of signi-
ficance that all UN forces in Korea have taken only 3100 Chinese POWs.
Also influencing the results may be the fact that a majority of the POWs
are ex-Nationalists, who are believed to represent 60% or more of the total
CCF forces in Korea. Dissatisfaction ith the conditions of the CCF in
Korea have been clearly indicated, based on heavy losses, serious hardships,
and equipment shortages. There is little evidence that the ordinary soldier
has any convictions concerning the war. The Chinese POWs interviewed claim
that physical restraint and strict surveillance rather than Communist in-
doctrination are the major factors preventing greater defections. Judg-
ing from this information, in the event of a major military defeat, result-
ing in the breakdown of discipline and surveillance, an opportunity for
mass desertions would be provided and a majority of the CCF would probably
take advantage of it. (S Pusan, 21 Apr 51).
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"C" KOREA. North Koreans Act Against "Malicious Traitors Who Betrayed the
Fatherland." A 20 April North Korean broadcast described portions of an
ordinance enacted "to punish the more malicious traitors who betrayed
the fatherland and cooperated with the American imperialistic aggressors
and their hounds." The decree, signed by Kim Du Bong, Chairman of the
Supreme Peoples Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
provided for confiscation of all properties and death in a public exe-
cution for "national traitors". The decree further authorized that the
"police shall - - - conduct the trial 24 hours after a written accus^+ion
has been issued to the accused" and that "any appeal against the sen-
tence - - - shall not be admitted." (R FBIS Ticker, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT;
The severity of this decree and the manner of carrying out trial suggests
a serious internal security problem. within the North Korean "Republic".
Although in practice the North Korean regime has never hesitated in dis-
posing of the opposition by such means, prior public statements have
usually emphasized the leniency and "democracy" of the North Korean judicial
system.
JAPAN. Japanese Apprehensive Lest UK Delav Early Peace Try , Conser-
vative JIJI SHIMPO commented on 19 April that "if Britain suceeds in her
soft but persistent efforts for giving Communist China a voice in the
Japanese Peace, it will be a kind of over-all peace with Communist
countries. and it is feared that we shall be dragged into endless negoti-
atLons." Since the US will not recognize Communist China as long as the
Korean War lasts and will not agree to that nation's participation in the
peace treaty, "if Britain insists on the participation of the Chinese
Communists, it will hinder the early conclusion of a peace treaty."'
(R FBIS 20 Apr 51). COMMENT: This type of comment is rather typical of
a rather widely expressed Japanese fear that the UK's influence in peace
treaty terms and decisions will prove to be much greater with General
MacArthur's dismissal. The Japanese are suspicious of the UK's motives
with regard not only to the inclusion of Communist China but also to
economic restrictions that might be placed on the Japanese were the UK to
have a free hand.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" GERMANY. Favorable Reaction to Schuman Plan Signing. Initial
West German reaction to the Apri .signing of e Schuman Plan
in Paris has followed the previous pattern. of favorable comment
in press and political circles, exclusive of the Social Democrats
(SPD). Leaders of ChancellorAdenauer's Christian Democrats and
their coalition partners, the Free Democrats, have praised the Plan,
as.well as the diplomatic handling of the thorny Saar question.
The press almost uniformly commends the signing. (P Bonn 752,
19 Apr 51). Meanwhile Adenauer gave a press interview on the Plan
on 20 April, outlining the significance of Germany's participation
as an equal partner in the negotiations, and stressing the impor-
tance of the Plan to the European people (P Bonn 760, 20'Apr Si).
COMMENT: Now that the Schuman Plan has been signed, the Chancellor
tempt to have it ratified as soon as possible. US observers
.WM predict its ratification'by the Bundestag despite vehement SPD
opposition. (OCI Daily, 10 Apr
"C" Soviet Soldiers Fire on US Vehicle. A vehicle belonging
to the US M ary aison in the- ovie zone of Germany was fired
on. by Red Army soldiers on 18 April. The car, travelling with 3
passengers along the road between Torgau and Bad Liebenwerda (in
Saxony-Anhalt, Soviet zone, 70 miles south of Berlin), had stopped
momentarily near the Alt Lonnewitz airfield when 2 Red soldiers
emerged from the woods and fired three times. A bullet missed one
observer by ten inches, hitting the car as it sped off. (TS Frankfurt
8)8I., 19 Apr 51). COMMENT: Numerous incidents have occurred since
the end of the war involving trigger-happy Red Army soldiers or
East German police personnel. In the most recent incident, East
Berlin policemen fired on a US Army sightseeing bus on 28 March
(0CI Daily, 29 Mar 51).
"C" FRANCE.. General de Gaulle Gains Strong Financial Back
ing r'renen inaus?-
trialistshave decided to cease their financial support of the
25X1 C
25X1 C
25X1A Popular Re ublicans NitP) and elan to give their funds to the RPF
instead,, COMMEMC.- Although well-
to-do elements of the extreme ki.biiL are reportedly favorable to
de Gaulle., they have heretofore been chary of underwriting the RPF.
With adequate financial backing the Gaullists may gain substantially
more than the hundred odd seats they are now conceded, particularly'
if the MRPts resources are reduced.
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"C" NETIMLANDS.. Dutch Close Canton Consulate. The Dutch Consulate
Genera has closed down because ere are no more Dutch commercial
affairs to be taken care of in South China. The Consul General,
who had been granted an exit permit by Chinese authorities, has now
arrived in Hong Kong. (R FI3IS, 20 Apr 51). COIAENT: There is no
indication that the closing of the Consulate i`'~s'cue to Chinese
Communist pressure. Dutch interests in the Far East have become
of secondary importance as a result of the transfer of sovereignty
to Indonesia.
"B" ITALY. Magnani-Cucchi Movement Handica ped'by Lack of Funds. The
wor erst movement Headed Communist a ec ors Magnani and Cucchi,
although apparently gaining ground in some localities, is reportedly
at a standstill in Rome. In Turin, arrangements made for the two
dissidents to, address a meeting were cancelled at the last minute
because Magnani and Cucchi believed the program too ambitious and
the hall too large. Their refusal to appear in Turin is attributed
mainly to their reluctance to face possible large-scale disturbances
by local Communist Party (PCI) members.
25X1A COMMENT: Lack of funds is perhaps the most crying
e a e need of thie Magnani-Cucchi group. Without adequate finan-
cial support the movement will experience great difficulty in pub-
licizing its program and in creating an organizational structure.
Achievement of these two objectives is essential if the movement
is to succeed in supplanting the PCI as the champion of the workers'
interests.
Communists Plan General Strike in War Production Plants*
The Communis -controlled metal workers union has called a 24-hour
general strike for 27 April as a protest against "the Government's
intent to demobilize,a large portion of the national production
structure and suppress democratic freedom" among the workers.
Specifically, the strike assails the Government's delay in settling
the long-standing dispute over dismissals in North Italian metal-
lurgical plants. Management has declared the layoffs necessary
because of lack of sufficient orders. (R Rome 4742, 19 Apr 51;
R FBIS, 18 . Apr 51). COMMENT: There is das yet no indication whether
the two anti-Communise or organizations will support this strike,
which is clearly designed by the Communists to obstruct Italian
rearmament. Without the participation of these organizations, the
strike will probably not be successful, despite the validity of the
economic issues and widespread public sympathy for the workers'
grievances.
"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Serious Conservative 0position to Budget not
Developing. US Em asst' London estimates that the Conservatives may
nee to challenge the tabor Government effectively on the
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regently announced Budget in view of its generally moderate., non-
partisan nature and the Liberal decision to support the Government
on this issue. An apparent Conservative decision to withhold seri-
ous criticism at this time is interpreted by the Embassy to mean
at least a temporary abandonment of Conservative parliamentary
"blitz" tactics, and a reversion to the hope that the Labor Govern-
ment will fall of its own weight. In this connection., the recent
Cabinet crisis over the Budget (Daily Digest, 12 Apr 51) is con-
sidered by Conservatives to be a hopeful omen. (S London 5510,
19 Apr 51). COMMENT: Conservative reconsideration of their
parliamentary tactics springs in part from the mixed reception, in
and out of Parliament, accorded their previous attempts at a British
version of filibustering and in part from indications of increasing
stresses.and strains within the Labor Party. Ernest Bevinas death;,
Sir Stafford Cripps' serious illness, and rumors of Aneurin-Bevants
continuing dissatisfaction with the Budget have bolstered Conserva-
tive hopes that Attlee may not be able to avoid an inmiinent, open
split between the right and left wings of the Labor Party.
"C" BOLIVIA. Junta May Take Over Governments A group of Bolivian army
officers has repor edly orthe a junta which plans to take over thie
government by 23 April. Defense Secretary Ponce Lozada and Defense
Sub-Secretary Ballivian are reported to be members of the junta,
which is said to include five officers and five civilians. 'Another
25X1 C many top-ranking army
'icers- ave offered their a eg e o General Ballivian. (S
_.
25X1A C USAIRA 50022 La Paz, 6 Apr_51).
COI& NT:. Should it appear that the Nationalist, Revolutionary Move-
men would poll more votes in the 6 May presidential elections than
the government-sponsored candidate or that it would attempt a revolt
prior to the elections, a military junta headed by Ballivian may
well take. over the government. The juntais purpose would be to re-
store order and call for and supervise another election. At the
present time it seems unlikely that any of the six candidates., in-
eluding those of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and the
government party, will receive the required absolute majority pf
votes. It would then be necessary for the winner to be selected
by the Congress., in which case the government party, with its allied
political groups should be able to wino
"C" NICARAGUA. Guardia Nacional Unrest May Contribute to Political
the morale of the Guardia acion a an-me o e
during the recent months. He states that there-is no longer the
fanatical devotion to President Somoza that there has been in the
past, and that the president would'not be defended as effectively
should his political position weaken
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MCOMMENT: The stability of the present administration
is primar y tiepen ent upon the support of the Guardia Nacional.
In view of President Somoza's effective interns security service
and the probable loyalty of key units, it seems improbable that a
military coup could be effectively planned or carried out against
him at the present time. Howeve', even loyal members of the Guardia
are undoubtedly considering the possibility of a political reaalign-
ment when, as seems likely, Somozale health forces him to leave the
country or otherwise incapacitates. him for office. This possibility,
plus discontent within the ranks, popular opposition to Somoza's
policies of political and economic favoritism, and the unpopularity
of his son and deputy might well cause Guardia elements (and even
key officers) to seek. alignment with hitherto powerless anti-Somoza
liberal factions. Such an alignment, once established, would
threaten the stability of Somozats administration and might even
precipitate action against him.
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CY-Irl.L' ,L INT4iL.I,IGTyl7C]'a A(} ICYr
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLENtIONT
1951
Not for, d.iosemina-tion outeid.e O/0I end. O/NE.
49162o--
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
21 Ail 195l
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" IRAN. Iranians Highly Critical of the An lo-Iranian Oil Corn n
US Ambassador Grady, in reviewing Anglo-Iranian Oil Company AIOC)
"past differences" with the US Embassy in Tehran, stated on 18 April.
that "those differences were only with regard to the policies of the
Company which have led them closer to disaster". Grady reports that
the attitude of the most conservative Iranian leaders is far more
extreme than AIOC and the British Foreign Office realize. (S, S/S
Tehran, 2465, 18 Apr 51). COI TT: Although the AIOC has on the
whole been liberal in its policies toward its Iranian employees and
has treated them fairly when judged by labor conditions as they exist
in Iran, the Company is now regarded throughout the country as a mammoth
exploiter of resources properly belonging to the Iranians. In the pres-
ent crisis the Company appears to think that time is an its side and. that
financial pressure will eventually force the Iranian Government to accept
the Company's terms. However, any concession at this time short of accept-
ance of the principle of nationalization will. not solve the present crisis.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"B" UNITED KINGDOM. British Seen Conciliators but Firm on Far East Issues.
Embassy London estimates that although the UK now appears willing to
make limited concessions to the US on Far Eastern questions and Japanese
Peace Treaty procedures in particular, the Government continues to view
its own Far Eastern policies as based on fundamental principles and
realities which it cannot afford to compromise. The Embassy finds speci-
fic indications of a more conciliatory attitude in the UK9s agreement to,
priority consideration of limited economic sanctions against mainland..
China in the Alternative Measures Committee of the UN, and in informal
statement by the Foreign Office that the British position on the question
of Peiping Government representation in Japanese Peace Treaty deliberations
will depend on the US position toward representation of the Chinese
Nationalists. Since the UK Cabinet has recently rejected a Foreign Office
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suggestion for avoiding this conflict, (see OCI.Daily Digest, 31 Mar 51),
the Foreign Office is now suggesting that the US be asked by the British
to propose a compromise on the issue. COMMENT: (S$ /S London, 5527,
20 Apr 51). C0_ : The fundamental "principles and realities" on which
the British see theizr. present Far Eastern policy as based are (a) the gen-
eral British policy of recognizing as the government of a country that
regime which is actually in control, (b) a belief that refusal to do this
in the case of the Peiping regime would be widely regarded in Asia as an
attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of an Asian nation, and "(c)
the belief that for important strategic considerations, UK policy must not
be allowed to deviate too far from that of India. Furthermore, the exi-
gencies of the UK domestic political situation also militates against
great changes, since the present government has already come under some
criticism for allegedly truckling to US pressure.
SECRET
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 UNCLASSIFIED when b~gq~gaA E~ tt~lq /a~/ :S~r t r ri# ff ft1 i i'Y0 ?cal or declassi-
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