CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001000110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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- SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
27 May 1952
OCI No. 5189
Copy No. 2 6 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
*ARMY , STATE REVIEWS
COMPLETED*
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
le Soviet resumes Japanese boat seizures: The US Embassy
in To yo believes that e resumption o oviet seizures of
Japanese fishing boats after the effectuation of the peace
treaty may be intended as a means of forcing a partial re-
sumption of diplomatic relations. Varying reports say that
between 5 and 16 boats have been seized, some of which were
in Japanese territorial waters. (S Tokyo 231, 23 May 52)
Comment: The Embassy's analysis is supported by the
fact ahe USSR, apparently as part of its friendship
campaign toward Japan, refrained from seizing boats during
the first four months of 1952.
In recent actions, such as refusing Soviet trade offers
and withholding diplomatic privileges from the Soviet Mission,
the Japanese likewise may be exerting mild pressures in an
effort to encourage a Soviet proposal to settle pending
issues.
2. Comment on Soviet note of 25 May protesting German agree-
ments: The latest Soviet note on a rman peace treaty was
a propagandistic protest against Allied-German agreements which
reiterated the USSR's previous proposal for a four-power con-
ference and warned that a future all-German government would
not be bound by the contractual agreement.
The note serves as another clear indication that the
USSR is not yet prepared to make any significant concessions
in Germany to prevent Western defense plans. Although it was
the Soviet Union's last chance to prevent Allied signature
of the contractual agreements and the EDC treaty, the Soviet
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Union not only did not meet the Western condition that there,
be prior Soviet agreement to hold free all-German elections
before Western agreement to have a four-power conference, but
also did not advance from its position as stated in the
Soviet note of 10 April,
The notable absence of any concrete proposals in the
Soviet note suggests that the USSR intends to continue its
present policy, through East German action, of threats,
harassment and tightening of interzonal borders. Such tactics
do not preclude, however, further Soviet diplomatic moves or
ostensible concessions as ratification of the Western agree-
ments becomes more imminent. (R Factual Data from Moscow
1880, 25 May 52)
3. Bulgaria protests treatment of diplomatic personnel in
ugos av m asst' n ofia a note-of protest against "the un-
warranted restrictions applied against officials and employees
of the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade." Noting that Yugo-
slavia has recently instituted regulations making almost
three quarters of the territory of Yugoslavia a prohibited
area, the Bulgarian note stated that, should the Yugoslav re-
strictions not be discontinued within seven days, identical
measures would be taken against Yugoslav Embassy personnel in
Sofia o
Also on 22 May, a similar note of protest and threat of
retaliatory action was presented by Bulgaria to the Turkish
Legatign in Sofia. (R FBIS Sofia, 22 May 52)
Comment, It is possible that these two notes might
presaginstitution of even more stringent regulations re-
stricting the movements of non-Orbit diplomatic personnel in
Bulgaria.
4. Purge in Rumanian Ministry of Interior rumored, Accord-
ing to the American Legation in uchares , ere are strong
rumors that a "clean up" in the Ministry of Interior, with
removals reaching a sub-cabinet level, is now in progress in
Rumania. These rumors follow earlier reports of Army arrests
and dismissals, in which an assistant minister of the armed
forces and two other generals were reported involved. (S
Bucharest 460, 24 May 52)
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Comment: There is no information available to sub-
stant-a a ese rumors, which have been current in Rumania
since mid-April.
5. Soviet submarine base reportedly established in Rumania:
The American Legation in Bucharest reports a e ugos av,
Swedish, and Danish Charges d'Affaires have received informa-
tion, which they consider to be reliable, concerning a recent
evacuation of the city of Mangalia and a closing off of
traffic to the area, reportedly in connection with the establish-
ment of a Soviet submarine base there. (S Bucharest 457,
21 May 52)
Comment: Reports of low evaluation concerning the con-
25X1C strut of submarine pens at Mangalia, a town on the Black
Sea some thirty miles south of Constanta, have been received
since 1950.
The Mangalia district has been for some time one o
25X1C the most highly restricted areas of Rumania.
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6, Japan unable to grant equal rights to UN forces: Foreign
Minister Okazaki told Ambassador Murphy at pu is and Diet
opposition will make it difficult, if not impossible, to grant
UN forces in Japan the same rights as American forces operating
under the security treaty. He said that parliamentary defeat
for the proposed UN agreement was certain if the government
publicly relinquished its jurisdiction in cases involving
violation of Japanese law, although in practice Japan would. not
exercise that right. Additionally, Diet sentiment was such
that the government had no chance of obtaining money to support
the UN forces.
Murphy is convinced that the Japanese Government is eager
to cooperate with the UN, but is restricted by the solid
opposition. (C Tokyo 245, 24 May 52)
Comment: The Commonwealth governments Are highly critical
of Japan s unwillingness to accept any financial obligation
for the support of non-US troops based in or sojourning in
Japan, as well as its desire to retain criminal jurisdiction
over UN forces. The government has been severely attacked by
its political opposition on these points under the US-Japan
security treaty; it fears that extending similar privileges to
non-US forces will have serious domestic repercussions.
7. Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom:
t e Chinese ommun s s ave
25X1C taken the initiative from the North Korean delegation in con-
ducting the Panmunjom talks, and that Nam Il is now merely
their spokesman, Chinese Communist delegates are in constant
communication with Soviet political advisers,
The Koreans are said to have abandoned their demand for
the withdrawal of Chinese "volunteers" along with that of all
25X1A
non-Korean UN troops,
The Chinese reportedly believe that a Soviet "political
feint" directed at Britain, France, India, and Japan will im-
pel some favorable "change in American Plans."
Comment: Peiping's views are presumed to determine the
North Korean line in the talks, because the over-all military
position in Korea depends upon Peiping's willingness to
continue its commitment.
25X1A
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25X1 D
Communist China has indicated an intention to hold its
"volunteers" in Korea at least until all UN forces are
withdrawn.
Rhee uses dictatorial measures against opposition: US
Embassy Pusan reports that, since early on 25 may, -resident
Rhee has taken a series of high-handed actions against the
political opposition. Four opposition members of the Assembly
have been arrested while 15 or 16 others are in hiding. The
imposition of martial law by the ROK Military Police has been
employed as an excuse for this action. Some 44 Assemblymen
were held incommunicado by the Military Police on 26 May.
Recently appointed Prime Minister Chang, finding his telephone
wires cut and himself under virtual arrest, has resigned.
The UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation in
Korea called on Rhee on 26 May and expressed shock at this
series of events. The President was unimpressed. The US
Embassy comments that the President appears to be operating on
the basis that the UN and the United States will not intervene
and will sit by and watch the demise of democratic government
in Korea. (S Pusan 1160, 26 May; S Pusan 1164, 26 May; S
Pusan 1163, 27 May 52)
10. First Communist admission of Chinese air operations over
Korea: The Communist newspaper a Kung Pao in Hong Kong claimed
on 21 May that CCAF's hero ChangZ`ibi-hui1iad shot down two US
aircraft over North Korea on 10 February. The reporting
agency comments that this news story is the first Chinese Commu-
nist claim that their "volunteers" are flying MIG-15's in combat
in North Korea, a fact accepted by most observers for months.
(S Hong Kong 3117, Joint Weeka 21, 23 May 52)
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Comment: It is not known how many of the estimated 350
to 50 e s in the Manchurian-Korean border area are piloted
by either Chinese, Russians, or North Koreans. This is the
first Communist publicity indicating the nationality of the
pilots of any enemy jets.
11. American official doubts Peiping will compromise on POW
issue: The American Consul General inHong Kong no es incas-
inpropaganda coverage of the POW issue in the Chinese Commu-
nist press and an adamant stand on what Peiping describes as
the UN's "forcible retention" of POW's.
The American official, recalling Indian Ambassador Panik-
kar's prediction in early 1952 that the POW issue would be the
most difficult of all to solve, remarks that it is "difficult
to conceivd'of Peiping backing down on this point. (S Hong
Kong 3117, 23 May 52)
Comment: The Communist negotiators do not appear convinced
that the Command will not compromise on the POW issue. There
is thus insufficient evidence to indicate whether the Communists
will allow the talks to founder on this issue.
12. Communists dredging new harbor in North China: Six dredges
were o serve wor ing in - t e new harbor a Tangku, near Tientsin,
(S Hong Kong 25X1X
25X1X
3117, 23 May 52)
Comment: As many as five dredges were observed at work on
this new ar or in late 1951. These reports support Communist
claims that the new port will be sufficiently near completion
this year to handle 10,000-ton ships.
At present the Communists report. that the Taku Bar prevents
ships over 3,000 tons from gaining access to the Hai Ho River
channel and Tientsin. The Japanese started the construction of
this new harbor and port. In 1948 it was estimated that their
completion would cost 25 million dollars and require three years.
13. Hong Kong government deports 21 pro-Communist labor leaders:
The Hong Kong au or es have, eporte pro- ommun s a or
leaders from the Colony in the past three weeks.
The US Consul General in Hong Kong remarks that the
government's firm policy has quelled labor unrest for the time
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being, but that workers are being told that the "day of libera-
tion is not fear off." (S Hong Kong 3117, 23 May 52)
Comment: Peiping has protested these deportations as an
exampel British "persecution" of Chinese in the Colony.
Rumors of the imminent "liberation" of Hong Kong are
circulated periodically by Communist agents in an effort to
restore their sympathizers' morale and to frighten their
opponents. While the threat to the Colony increases as its
economic value to China declines, there is still no indication
of an early assault.
14. India buying 100,000 tons of Chinese rice; The American
Embassy n New Delhi e eves a n a has signed an agree-
ment with Peiping to buy 100,000 tons of rice, to be shipped
in the next four months. Indian officials state that the
price is reasonable. (C New Delhi 4402, 24 May 52)
Comment: Earlier this year the Chinese informed India
that ey could spare other grains, but not rice. Their pre-
sent willingness to sell rice may result from their need,,.to
ship food through India to Tibet.
Last year India contracted to buy 66,500 tons of rice
and 450,000 tons of kaoliang, a coarse foodgrain, at reasonable
prices. India has not revealed whether it is also negotiating
to buy kaoliang or other grains besides rice.
15. Ho's birthday widely observed in Rangoon: The Viet Minh
Agency in. Rangoon a is mss success u reception to date
in honor of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The party was attended by
the Chinese, Russian, Indian and Indonesian Ambassadors,
Cabinet members, members of Parliament and many news editors
and their leading reporters. The press comment regarding the
Viet Minh and its local representative was universally favor-
able. The American Embassy in Rangoon states that the United
States' attitude toward Indochina is clearly not shared by
any sector of opinion in Rangoon. (C Rangoon 1124, 23 May 52)
Comment: Such occasions as Ho's birthday, and international
Communes anniversaries like 7 November and May Day, are semi-
holidays in contemporary Burma; whereas holidays observed in
Western countries are virtually unknown even to Burmese leaders.
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16. Thai police chief reported in contact with Peiping: The
25X1X rV11k:G -
Peiping in arc ntact Chinese authorities on arrangements
"for future protection."
Phao admitted to the local press in a mid-May interview
that he had recently sent "secret agents" to Canton and. be
Shanghai. This was interpreted
an effort to conceal the real mission of these "agents" when
their trip became known. (S Bangkok 2501, 24 May 52)
Commenta General Phao is one of the most powerful. and
influe=figures in Thailand.
While this report cannot be confirmed, the Thai have aJ
historical record of "bending with the wind" in time of crisis.
Furthermore, there have been several recent indications that
Thai enthusiasm for cooperation with th'e West has cooled.
17. Burmese mission to eastern Europe to be composed of
high-level o cia s. T e urmese -mission o ugos av a and
Orbit coon r es o eastern Europe will be led by U Kyaw Nyein,
Secretary General of the government party, according to a
reliable press report. Other members include the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, director of the govern-
ment-controlled trade union and the military commander of south
Burma. The objective of this mission is to study the armies,
economies, labor conditions and rehabilitation work in the
countries visited. The Burmese War Office confirmed plans for
the trip to Yugoslavia, but not its extension behind the Iron
Curtain. (C Rangoon.128, 24 May 52)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
18. Government leaders dissatisfied with Iranian Prime Minis-
ter's po a esa ran an -MInister o oa s s er o the
n his cabinet position
i
g
a on 15 may that he wished to res
d
e
s
ter Mossh
e
~a
25X1C because of his differences with Prime Mini
25X1C persuaded Busheri to remain in the cabinet at east until
Mossadeq returned from pleading Iran's case at The Hague.
tween Mossadeq and National Front leader
lit b
e
The sp
Mullah Kashani is also reported to be so great that Kashani
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US Officials Only, F
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19.
has withdrawn his support of the Prime Minister. (S/:Control
_
Comment: There is no evidence that the Prime Minister's
contro over his party is yet seriously threatened. These
reports, however, reflect the growing dissatisfaction'among
National Front leaders over the Prime Minister's handling of
the elections and his attempt to purge the-opposition from
Parliament.
Angolan governor protests ""arbitrary'" overseas policy
of Lisbon governmen : The Amer can o su in Luanda reports
on reliable authority that the Governor General of Angola
may resign in protest against "arbitrary" measures tending
to stifle Angolan commerce which are imposed by the Lisbon
government without consulting him or heeding his protests.
(C Luanda 35, 23 May 52)
Comment: This unconfirmed report points up the Governor
Genera s growing complaint that, while technically charged
with the execution of Angola's Five-Year Development Plan,
he is not consulted by the Lisbon authorities on the desira-
bility of specific projects or the best means of financing
them.
The Governor General perhaps considered it a severe
blow to his prestige when three representatives of embittered
Angolan commercial interests were credited with persuading the
Lisbon National Assembly to modify the original drastic form
of the government's 28 March decree which established what
Angolans termed excessive surtaxes on the territory's exports
of sisal and coffee.
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20. Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro- 25X1C
25X1C it may be neces- 25X1C
sary for elements of the party to break away from the leader-
ship of Vittorio Vidali. Vidali has ?25X1C
been controlling the party through a special junta established
about 1 April 1952. This group is ';sacrificing old comrades
for new members who automatically obey directives without
question o'? F_ I 25X1 A
Comment. Vidali's party has been losing members steadily
t
for more tnu a year. In addition, considerable dissension
recently was generated among party officials when reports
reached them that Vidali had advocated the return of the Free
Territory to Italy in pre-election speeches in southern Italy.
Large elements of the party desire for various reasons to
maintain the present line calling for an independent Trieste.
Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet
unity proposal- Reportinbg t e views of oth East and West
ra~sa~s on t e Soviet unity proposals, American observers in Bonn
state that the proposals have apparently elicited no more support
in East Germany than they have in the West.
East Zone residents interviewed in West Berlin believe
that the proposals are nothing more than propaganda and should
be rejected. Even if the USSR were to drop its insistence on
the Oder-Neisse border, opposition would still outweigh ap-
proval among East Zone respondents. Among West Germans, however,
Soviet concession of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line
would make the proposal acceptable to better than half of those
interviewed, including not only those of neutralist inclinations,
but also those who have previously supported the West. (C Bonn
3043, 24 May 52)
Comment. There has never been any evidence of substantial
East rman support of the Soviet proposals; there have, on the
other hand, been reports of uneasiness among Socialist Unity
Party functionaries for fear that their party might be sacri-
ficed for unity.
The one reported declaration by the East German radio in
March that the USSR was willing to reopen the Oder-Neisse
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question was refuted by subsequent Soviet statements that the
border was finale
The latest Soviet note on a German peace treaty serves as
another clear indication that the USSR is not yet prepared to
make any significant concessions in Germany. Although it was
the last chance to prevent Allied signature of the contractual
agreement and the EDC treaty, the Soviet Union not only did
not meet the Western condition that there be agreement on free
all-German elections prior to a four-power conference; it also
did not advance from its position as stated in the Soviet note
of 10 April.
25X1C 22. East Germans draft law for establishment of national army:
ment has drafted a law for the establishment of a national army.
United States Army observers in Heidelberg believe this action
was taken in anticipation of the signing of the contractual agree-
ment. (S CINCEUR Heidelberg SX 5506, 23 May 52)
Comment: The recently reported allocation of heavy weapons
to the paramilitary police, an acceleration in recruiting, and
vigorous propaganda on the need for an armed force to counteract
West German contingents all suggest that the 24 Alert Police units
may soon be formally unveiled as a national army., The probability
is supported by a governmental reorganization which may culminate
in the establishment of a defense 'or armaments ministry.
The paramilitary police, a force of 52,000 which includes
14,000 to 16,000 officers, can easily be expanded at least to
keep pace with the growth of a West German defense force.
The formal establishment of an East German national army
would not preclude continuation of the unity campaign.
23. New interzonal travel control procedures seen augmenting
East erman responnsi ilityo mer can o icia s in West Germany
nterpret angel in Soviet Zone procedures for the issuance of
interzonal passes and residence permits as presaging mor&rigid
police controls, "exploitation" of interzonal travellers, and
facilitated movement of "agents" into West Germany. They also
believe that the new procedures could be an initial step in
giving East Zone People?s Police control over interzonal travel,
contrary to Allied agreements. (C Bonn 3028, 23 May 52)
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Comment- Procedural changes announced by the East German
Government on 1 May provided that applications for passes or
residence permits should be submitted to district People's Police
offices, with the possibility, in the event of denial, of a
final appeal to provincial police authorities. Heretofore
procedures in both East and West Germany, although utilizing
local German officials for screening of 'applications, have
required final approval of permits by occupation authorities.
Some East German spokesmen have asserted that the Soviet
answer to conclusion of the Allied-West German contractual agree-
ment would be the announcement ofa "nominally sovereign". East
German Republic o
France taking initiative on concessions to Saar: The French
Ambassa or an a aar vernaanent ave ecide on the immediate
formation of a mixed commission to revise the 1950 conventions
governing French-Saar relations. The commission will file a
report early in July for the French Assembly's consideration.
The French Ambassador at Sa:arbruecken is said to favor
"substantial concessions," provided strengthening the Saar as
an autonomous state does not prejudice French economic interests.
Saar demands will be in the direction of greater autonomy,
particularly in the fields of taxation, banking, social welfare,
and labor relations, QS Strasbourg 158, 24 May 52)
Comment- France and Germany have been keeping the Saar
issue n. a eyance until the signing of the contractual agreement
and the EDC treaty. The latest move seems to be a now French
approach designed to win local goodwill and promote autonomy
for the Saar as the alternative to reintegration with Germany.
Cabinet member opposes Belgium?s plan to control transit
the American delegation that the Beigian minister ?a rc?nomic
Affairs is now opposed to the transit trade control plan. The
Belgian delegate, who does not know the reasons for or extent of
this opposition, believes that an American approach emphasizing
the importance of achieving practical results would be successful.
(S Paris 7277, 23 May 52)
Comment- The Belgian Economic Affairs Minister probably
fears ta.t ntroduction of the control plan will reduce the
trade e e Z ann delegate to D M as con entia ly informed
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volume and value of trade through Belgian ports, with both
direct and indirect economic loss to Belgium.
Ousted Communist leaders expected to establish rival
Canal a,n un ono T e ousted ommunist leadership of the Canadian
s r c o t e United Textile Workers of America is expected to
organize a competing union, the American Embassy in Ottawa
reports. The Communists are denouncing as "American interference
in Canadian affairs" the move taken against them on 26 May by
the American Federation of Labor with which the union is af-
filiateda (C Ottawa 221, 24 May 52; U NY Times, 27 May 52)
Comment: This Canadian textile union represented the last
major s ronghold in the Canadian affiliate of the AFL. Although
most Communist unions have been ousted from both major Canadian
labor federations, the Communists remain strong in such
vulnerable areas as the base metal mining industry and the
electronics and radar industry.
to initiate reform in Guatemala's backward agricultural economy
and is a "far cry" from the radical suggestions previously
offered by the Communists. It has, nevertheless, caused alarm
among the landholding aristocracy, which has labeled it an
attempt to "incite class war." The reform bill is generally
considered the cause of a serious run on the local banks which
lasted five days. (C Guatemala City Weeka 20, 17 May 52; U
La Prensa, 23 May 52; U NY Times, 23 May 52)
Comment: Arbenz will probably be able to get the agrarian
reform through Congress, but possibly with some Communist-
inspired modifications. In any event, the strong Communist
influence in the government will cause many to look at the bill
with suspicion, even though many Guatemalans and even some
conservative businessmen recognize the need for some sort of
agrarian reform.
1 June to debate the agrarian reform bill sent to Congress by
President Arbenzo The bill appears to be a moderate attempt
A special seas on ? the uatema an Congress has been called or
Agrarian reform bill alarms large landowners in Guatemala:
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The reform bill will undoubtedly harden the attitude of
the landowner class and intensify their efforts to undermine
the Arberiz government.
28. Peru ready to recognize Bolivia: The Peruvian Foreign
Minister o the United States, Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors
in Lima on 23 May that Peru is now ready to recognize the new
Bolivian regime. He strongly urged simultaneous action by the
four countries. (S Lima 560, 24 May 52)
Comment: Shortly after the Bolivian revolution, Brazil,
Chile,eru and the United States agreed to joint consultation
before recognizing the Paz Estenssoro government. Peru has ap-
peared the most reluctant due to fear of local repercussions
from the Bolivian coup and reports that MNR leaders were inclined
to assist Aprista plotters. Chile, also fearful of the revo-
lutionary example as well as the presence of another unfriendly
government across its border, recently showed an inclination
to await Peruvian action. Last week Brazil and the United States,
after more than a month, indicated their desire to recognize
Bolivia and subsequently made overtures to Chile and Peru. Peru's
decision would appear to clear the way for simultaneous recog-
nition.
To date Bolivia has been recognized by only Argentina,
Paraguay, Guatemala, and Spain.
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
27 May 1952
CIA No. 49674
Copy No. 46
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1146AO01000110001-9
 Approved For ease 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79TO11464E01000110001-9
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW, .
1, Pei ing believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be 25X1X
sent to Formosa:
25X1X inese officials claim to have information that
Chinese prisoners held in South Korea are "about to be sent
to Formosa," (S S/S New Delhi 4371, 23 May 52)
Comment: Peiping is probably aware that many Chinese
prisoners, particularly those who once served in the Nation-
alist armies, have asked to be sent to Formosa and that the
Taipei government is urging such a transfer. The claim 0
25X1X may be introduced at any time into Peip-
ing's propaganda about Korea and alleged American plans for
"aggression" in Asia, possibly in an attempt to block any
plans for a transfer.
25X1X
Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146A00100011( 061*y 52
 UNCLASSIFIED when TdOVE IYefea'SQ,a OCfL~$92~PT PC~2~FJ~'0'r'A ~i4~tl9Q~bO~DFO~IOG or declossi-
Pied when filled in form is etac ed ro m control'ed gocument.
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Release 2002/05/20 : DP79TOJ
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