DAILY DIGEST JUN 14

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200400001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 14, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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25X1A,
COPY NO. 39
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date:--
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" items indicating-Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" other information indicating trends
and potential developments
DIA, DOS, AND USAF INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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SECTION I (SOVIET)
OCR USSRO objet l~rc a ands Taken I~?a i n Clgi to Wry n Island. Along
with continued attention to developments in AN, the Soviet press and radio
now has cited Teheran TASS reports of alleged demonstrations on Bahrein
Island for the expulsion of the Sheik and the nationalization of the oil in-
dustry. According to the reports, thi demonstrations broke out due to British
25X1 preparations to recognize the-full independence of the island thus malting
it more difficult for Bahrein to be returned to Irani.' 25X1
0O. To The'old Iranhian comp a n or
the re uarn o the Bahrain I s an s has .been-? mewed -since the nationalization
crisis by both nationalist and Counist gupe, as a -means to heighten anti-
British feeling and further the nationalization cabseo It-serves as another
peg in the AU SSR u s propaganda exploitation of the Iranian oil situation which
seeks not only to focus attention on"US-U "exploitation" of Iran,, but to
cause trouble for QOwesterh inperi. lis b? in other' etraitegic parts of the Near
East such as the oil islands in the Persian Gulf, and the oil industry of
Iraq.
"Cu Ss en pgrtMreJ;o Tck o of Seven ~a i t .i ion ea b era Resorted,
25X1 According to an unconfirmed news report, seven military officers of the Soviet
Mission in Tokyo departed suddenly for Khabarovsk on 7 June-1
gomnan There is no other information to confirm the departure o
personnel of the Soviet Mission whose principal members are military, headed 25X1
by Maio Gen. A. P. Kislenko. It is known that on March 25 Colonel Sevastyran
., Polyashenko, Deputy Chief of the Office of the Soviet Member, left Japan
on the S. S. Smoin ? yy accompanied by W6 Polyashenko o Fifteen other members
of the staff departed at the same time with their families f, including
Mr. Alexander A. Rozanov, Assistant Political Adviser. It iy believed that
Colonel Polya shenko will not return to Japan, although no notification has
been made of a replacement for him. On its arrival on March 23 the S. S.
Smoln ? yy brought sip new staff members for the Office of the Sovit Member,
and eight dependents o
RA&KRK EUROPE
BUI o i ~ . lies v ati,o 0C;onti~mtl ems. The hrkith Minister of
Agriculture in a recent report to the Assembly stated that 113,301 ethnic
Turks have returned to turkey pursuant to the Bulgarian demand in August
1950. that Turkey repatriate 2509000 of the Bulgarian Turkish minority. He
further stated that of this number 46% are under 16 years of age and 3O 25X1
are between 16 and 45 Fifty-three percent of the immigrants are men. The
US Consulate in Istanbul has learned that 16,260 ii rain ? n Turkey
during the month of April alone a CONMT o
The high percentage of children and youth represented among the repatriates
acknowledges of the failure of the Bulgarian Government to convert young
Moslem Turks to Communism. Apparently the Soviet Union has been forced to
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US Ambassador Bragge Wit, Praha reports that as of 12 June the Czechoslovak
foreign office has refused to acknowledge the landing of two lost 'US jet
planes at Kbely airfield near Praha on 8 J~me 0 The foreign office has mai
Bulgaria was forced in December 1950 to modify its original demand that the
repatriation of 250,000 Turks be completed in three montheo In order to
reinstitute the flow of i grante. t .porarily halted late in 1950 by Turkish
closure of the border for two monthsaBulgaria agreed to accept-the return of
unqualified immigrants. Since then the virulent anti-Turkish propaganda
campaign which accompanied the demand has diminished to sporadic outbursts.
HAM ZECH WY o .xin o~rera ment oanco~ it 7l a~ ~~n . J~ 3:ra of_ Jets,
eed for maximum security in a satellite bordering on non-Communist areas.
conclude that it is better to sacrifice a large potential labor force to the
tamed that the investigation of the planes ? where sabouts is the responsibili-
ty of another branch of the government, but promised to push the Asompetent?,
authorities for a reply, The Ambassador comments that the plane incident
furnishes Cammunist hotheads with an opportunity to impair US=Czech relations
still further. Briggs is of the opinion that delay of the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment in confirming the presence of the jets may indicate that the authorities
are still debating a course to adopt. Meanwhile, the Embassy has been in-
formed tha-d caught 25X1
a fleeting glimpse of a jet plans near Kbe1Ly on 10 June which he was Wason?
25X1
voodoo 8 8
State has requested deferment of the US Embassy Praha suggestion
that Czech. aiov ak oved, f;Light permits of the US Zone of Germany for July be
suspended until the sitnation of the missing jets .h clarified. The plane
sight l on 0 June may have been one of two US hunrder jets which became lost
and apparently landed at Kbely on 8 June after running out of fue to No Soviet
jet planes are known to be in Eastern Europe which could be-readily mistaken
for a Thunder-r jet o
25X1
25X1 C
ably certain was an American Thunderjet We. EE: 1 25X1
FMAW,, a T ~ n a s ark ~ 5~ ? 6 n zz 5 rr ss~~/g o US Legation Helsinki re-
ports that four weeks prior to the general Dist Elections to be held on 2-3
Jug y the principal apparent ca..paI gnl activity consists of editorial attacks
in, the press organs of the various political parties against opposing parties
and press comment regarding member absenteeism at Diet seasiorsa The public
is rep: t be f'o ,d the elect en urerars ationn with customary cool- 25X1 C
mess o
a garb in seats in the Veit by the Co-mmascnis1 is to be ex-
pected unless the center and right parties not only make strong efforts to
get out their voters but also agree on joint candidates . an unlikely possi-
bility so faro
~~r a':, Jr? ~ ILe_tu' ~e_ Y na ~ d fry, a~ n~z~l.s1a rdq Bill.
A reportedly unanI ous Finnish Cabinet recommendation that the article pro-
tested by the USSR be eliminated from the pending Aaland Wands Autonomy
Bill has been acccepted, by the Diet Committee handling the measure. I
25X1
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25X1 COMMENT., While the change recommended by the
Cabinet 11 undoubtedly meet Soviet press and propaganda objections to the
Bills it will not be approved by the Aaland Islands Dist which must also ap-
prove the Bill after it is passed by the Finni h Dist. However, passage of
the-measure by the Fin nish Diet in its changed form will nullify to some ex-
_-tenet- rent Soviet propaganda on the question of the Aal1 and Islands o It Will
also serve as a good electioneering point for the Agrarian Party in the
elections on 2-3 July-
"B" YUGOS ?VIA. o Redl_rctSLo iL Pl g cif FBefugees t2 Tri?st omised 0 Yugoslav
Deputy Foreign Minister Mates has assured Ambassador Allen that no more refugees
will be allowed to cross the Yugoslav border into Trieste without proper
visas o Mates asked Allen to inform him if improper entries did not cease im
ediatelyo Ambassador Allen therefore urges that the US and UK authorize the
British Exabassyg which is responsible for issuing Trieste visas in Belgrade.,
to grant visas on a liberal basis to classes of persons whom the US and UK -
25X1 most desire to assist t the Yugoslav Government be promptly informed0
COT s AI4G authorities in Trieste have
been continually beset by the problem of caring for large-,numbers of refugees
and have made numerous efforts to solve this problem. IR.O recently reported
plans to resettle 1600-2000 of the approximate 4500 refugees in Trieste with
in the next 3-4 months. The refugee problem has been aggravated by the Yugo-
slav policy of pelling to Trieste some 400-500 persons monthly. Britiih
officials were assured by the Yugoslav Foreign Office in January that Yugo-
slavia was not expelling anyone to Trieste without a visa to enter another
country. This pronnrse,9 ever, was not carried oat.
sagas ? of rgr= s ~- in Greek Communist party re i ,d o Yugoslav Deputy
Foreign Minister Mates has informed Ambassador Allen that a national move-
ment within the Greek Communist Party is not possible since the Greek Party
is thoroughly disorgannised o Mates gave no indication that Yugoslavia had
any expectation of a split in the Greek Party. Mates characterized former
Greek guerrilla leader .rkos and his followers as "dopes" who had allowed
their mo vemmen`, to be taken over by Moscow stooges when they could have easily
25X1 retained cant r o 0 00M,=2 Ambassador
Peurifoy in Greece has reported that, while there is no evidence of Yugoslav
f inanciall b w .tin 9 Y:u, gr,sla* diplomats in Greece are in close contact with
Greek is tirstss w o are seeking to found a national Communist Party. lrre-
gar;?dissh of whether the Tito Government foresees hope of such a Party in
Greece, it would probably profess disinterest in such a, venture before it had
reached f itiono at, e remarks regarding Markos reflect Yugoslav resent-
ment and frustration at the loss of a large measure of c,, ntrol in the Greek
guerrilla movement by the ousting of Markos in January l949.
HAaa Rankovicc Visit W stern B sropean Countries. Yugoslav Minister of In-
terior Rankovic has left Belgrade on a vacation trip of several weeks in
Swritzerland9 Francce9 Belgiu 9 Holland, and the UK. Ambassador Allen in Bel-
grade has been . informed that Rankovic was urged to make the trip by leading
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Politburo members in the belief that he should become better acqua.rated with
western lifeo Since Rankov ,c is generally regarded as responsible-foie the _
repressive measures of the present regifl Allen believes 1t: likely-that Tito
and the Politburo also felt the visit would enable Western officials to form
a better impression by meeting him, since he is personally affable and mild-
manneredo Allen notes that Rankovic has been endeavoring recently to over-
come the security police stigma. Colo
Since the beginning of 19519 there has been a steady ream of igh ranking
lugoelav visits to the West.. Politburo members Pijade and .D Jas visited
London and Paris in January and February and Pi jade again in Marsh o ''Franc
Leskcv sek, another Politburo member, and Svetozar, Vu anovic (Tempo) 9 the.
famo Partisan general in Macedonia during the last war and candidate member
of the Politburo
, `visited Switzerland and reportedly Italy in May. Current-
1y9-Ctnisf of Staff Popovic is in the US to discuss the possibility of ob-
taining arms for Yugoslavian These visits probably have several objectives"
(1) to gain internal support for the regime among anti-Communists by demon-
strating the close association of the West with the present leadership; (2)
to make the regime more palatable to the West by bringing Yugoslav leaders
into direct contact with Western officials3 and (3) to promote closer ties
between Yugoslav Communism and Western Socialism. Since Rankovic will.have
an opportunity to observe Western police practices during his visit? some
alleviation of the repressive Yugoslav police methods may follow.
25
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"A" CEYLON. Government Refuses to Ban Rubber Exhorts to Communist
Consumers The Colombo press has reported that Ceylon will permit
the export of rubber to Communist countries, at least for the
present, and the Acting Rubber Commissioner has officially informed
the US Embassy that export licenses would be issued for shipment
to all destinations. Concurrently, Ceylonese firms are reported
to be receiving inquiries from Hong Kong and Macao for shipments
of rubber at prices far above those offered elsewhere. One firm
has been asked to supply a total of 800 tons. Failure to obtain
shipping space has apparently prevented filling of any orders to
25X1 date. CO s Except for 3, 015
tons exported to the USSR in 1946 and 35 tons sent to Hong Kong in
1947, Ceylon has had no rubber trade with the Communist orbit
in recent years. By far the greatest part of its annual output
has been exported to the US and UK. The Governmentus reluctance
to ban exports of rubber to Communist countries is probably the
result of its desire to ensure that Western buyers continue to
pay the currently high prices for Ceylonese rubber. Though
Ceylon is not a member of the United Nations and is.-not bound by
the.resolution which embargoes shipments of strategic materials
to China, itnevertheless.does have a record of consistent
cooperation with the "'S and the Commonwealth countries. In view
of this friendly record, it is believed that Ceylongs partici-
pation in the embargo will shortly be obtained.
"C"
25X6
NB" INDONESIA. Negoti!tions for Lame Rice Purchase from Communist
China Reported.
negotiations are taking place for the purchase of 500,000 tons
of rice by Indonesia from Communist-China. The Chinese are asking
that, in payment, Indonesia set up a credit in US dollars against
which the Chinese may purchase "other commodities". (See OCI
Daily Digest, 8 June 51, p. 4i.) .
1A CO s It is known that the Chinese Communist have
`
5X
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25X1 C
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approached the Indonesians with a view to exchanging rice for
rubber., and the quantity of rice mentioned in one previous report
was also 5009000 tons, The Java Bank had earlier indicated to
the US Embassy in Jakarta that it was unaware of negotiations
for such an amount and the Embassy expressed its own skepticism.
Indonesia has not yet made its position clear with regard to
the inclusion of rubber among the items to be covered by the
UN=sponsored embargo on goods to Communist China, It might, view
Chinese rubber purchases from private dealers with credits obtained
from rice deliveries as less in conflict with the spirit of the
embargo than would be an outright barter of rubber for rice.
"B" BURMA, Chinese Commxuni t 'Show ter, t in Burma Road,
-25X1 C Chinese Communist officials of the
Ministry of Trade in Peiping 00viewed with interest" the proposition
of a Hong Kong businessman to transship goods through Burma should
the US and UK enforce further economic restraints against Chins,.
25X1 A CC s The Chinese
Communists have been smuggling goods into China via the Burma Road
for some time and there are strong indications that they are
planning to intensify their exploitation of this route in order
to obtain scarce c ommoditiese
"A"
"C"
5X1
25X1 C
INDOCHINA. Viet Minh Admita jagpontent Within Its Rams. A
regional service broadcast by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRy) radio advises that lesser officials (cadres) have not yet
understood that our retancce is a difficult task of long durition.,"
and do not appreciates th obstatt" w ., n'e tabl j th ve . n Ms re-
hera the-_;aa e --lack u or th ing of ? .t1 bb H'uduty wh2bd-i -falls - ran :them...
;, e ~ h ?dfens of peas es again;~jla., the imoeri i t ?mimoa a ?e
(a `) ia. ec= R~ i'ng ?sight of` tla n' ;ct that ?` ; si e .s m a ted
in , their w 3lr~l : f t fir peak?. e?! i i' ' e se. e~`? t)i n t ens a _. ceIr-
in. labk'of combat7~:vvn6ss is::.: o edo ~.' Cm s 25X1
~ l o s 'a c o r s.0 the central'.. &1e: o ? sae --I. ve in'
:dinged i critici n ate. sellf iti ie ";a F? rwe a~9 ,: e r have never
,before':6ome,.so. cli 3 to d ittixug the?'e sten of belllc chess
and weariness !t the k , bile And' along= the a and file.
gtr,is3. ,spec t ily :, i Q f i at .thht.. t ie s?uita of. disocmgent,. is. r,
the imaa e eu ti ti :sir: