DAILY DIGEST 15 JUN 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200410001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
JUN 1951
Date:
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence. ?
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
*A* - item's indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
*B* - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
*C* - other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B" EASTERN EUROPE. FINLAND. Etba'ssy Analyzes Recent Trade Unix:: Elections. A
recent analysis by the US Legation Helsinki of el,,h3tion pes.alts for delegates
to the forthcoming quadrennial Congress of the Central Fe0.oration of Finnish
Trade Unions (SAX) clarifies the relative streneths of theomallaiists and
Social Democrats in the Finnish labor movement. The Legation study came to
the following conclusions; (1) the representation of the political groups at
the Congress does not accurately reflect their strength 12-, the SAX rank and
file - for example, Social Democratic delegate strength le 68.5%, but its
voting strength was 54.7%; (2) the 1951 election results compared to those of
1947 reflect an improved Social Democratic org ational position in certain
key unions; (3) Social Democratic strength in SAX is based pninoipally on
skilled workers, non-intellectual civil servants, and commeroial employees -
all of whom traditionally tend toward conservatism; (4) the Communists remain
a powerful and dangerous minority in the Finnish tde onion movement; and
(5) the strong Communist showing in the recent union eleJtions was largely due
to public dissatisfaction with social and economic eondieions and not to large
scale rank and file support for Communism. (C 5e.slnki Di,sp 810,18 May 51).
COMMENT; The Legation's conclusions give a tentative indication of a slight
shift to the Left in the national Diet electicme 2-3 July. The Social
Democrats now control 55 'Diet seats and the Communists 37 ,,,ut of a total of
2000
"An HUNGARY. Only Sporadic Civil Defense Prepanat"ei,l)r Tn a summary of
-."
current Hungarian civilian defense activityn - Micntan at%ache Budapest
notes only a few indications of a planned proram of sa:,-.3-,-aft defense,
which apparently is being implemented slowly 'out s-c,eadily. 1) permanent AA
gun sites, other than World War II ones in disrepair, na-r-e beou observed by
the MA. A plan is apparently underway to ring budapest aatnM installations
since all new perimeter barracks hold a prepanderanee of AA troops and equip-
ment. The Military Attache estimates that liawg,,,,,rtau AA, its are not yet in
an advanced state of training, although reeent lndLoaM.oto p(3-_-.;; to an ac-
celerated training schedule. A net of air waning along the
Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers. An air defense and eommnnaear,ions center is
reportedly near completion in Budapest and c:Ity-mrf_&) wrfialfh%-:Ii siren-alarms
are being repaired and tested. There are peL-Jint that nesidential
and industrial air raid shelters are being sla3ily pu'; in or1r Housemasters
are reportedly being instructed to use 'World Ntfay XI air r.in :reof,7,ives for
guidance and the Communists are calling on ',:he ppu:ace to -Ai',iotake civilian
defense measures. The Military Attache has obtlei no Ilec/t preparations
to date, nor does he knaw of the dispersal of Luil_stz.Lal or g7enamental
installations. (S MA Budapest 2551, 13 Jun ,5).
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"Cw POLAND. Withdrawal of Repatriation Mission From Germany Protested. US
Embassy. Warsaw reports that the Polish Government has protested a HICOG re-
quest that the Polish Repatriation Mission in the US Zone of Germany be with-
drawn by 15 June. The Poles claim that the US action is illegal and deprives
Polish citizens-taAGermany of any opportunity to return home. The Polls note
concludes with the notice that the mission will be recalled as of 15 June.
(CrWarsaw 962, 13 Jun 51; R FBIS, 14 Jun 51). COMMENT: The Polish note is
characteristically propagandistic and will undoubtedly be used to smear. US
motives toward Poland. There is no longer any practical need for a full-time
Polish Repatriation Missiowin the US-Zone of Germany, sin, only 410 persons
were repatriated in 1950, and 27 through 11 May 1951.
"B" YUGOSLAVIA. Mrs. Roosevelt To Attend Yugoslav-Sponsored Peace Conference.
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt is reported to have accepted anftnvitation to attend
the Yugoslav PeaceConference provided it is deferred until October.
Ambassador Allen in Belgrade has learned that the Yugoslays are greatly
pleased with Mrs. Roosevelt's acceptance. CR Belgrade 1898, 13 Jun 51).
COMMENT: The Yugoslav Rational Committee for the Defense of Peace, which is
sponsoring the conferenee, has invited representatives of non-Cominform organ.
izations interested in creating an effective international peace movement to
counter the Soviet World Peace Movement. The Conference was originally
scheduled for September in 3,agreb. The presence of Mrs. Roosevelt at the
Conference will a44 greatly to the prestige and prospects for success of the
,1
meeting.
US Warns of Dan ers in Establishment of Albanian Refu ee Committee. The
Department has =formed Ambassador A len in Belgrade that the recent es ablish-p
merit of an Albanian refugee committee in Yugoslavia runs counter to basic US
interests in the area. Ambassador Allen has been instructed to point out to
the Yugoslav Government that, if the activities of Albanian exiles in the West
are likely to provoke a Soviet DICOre against Yugoslavia, as the Yugoslays al-
lege, the danger is obviously much greater when suchAotivity is sponsored by
the Yugoslays themeelves. The US Government is therefore concerned over the
possibility that Yugoslav creation of an Albanian exile organization may 25X1A
heighten international tensions in the area.
13 Jun 51). COMMENT: As late as 12 lane a Yugoslav ForoignOffice official
reiterated to Ambassador Allen his government's concern regarding 'Western
support of resistance activities in Albania, on the grounds that disturbances
in Albania would give Bulgaria an excuse to intervene under the Bulgarian-
Albanian Mutual Assistance Pact. The recent increase in Albanian refugee
activities in Yugoslavia tends to support thejoelief that Yugoslavia is
presently more concerned with the extent of 70tern activities in Albania
than with Soviet-Satellite armed intervention in support of the gotha regime.
aBt: Borba Denies Yugoslay. Aid to Rational Communists in Greece. The official
Yugoslav Party newspaper Borba has bitterly denied a recent article by a US
correspondent that the Yugoslays are striving to create a national Communist
Party in Greece. Borba compares the article with Cominform allegations that
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the movement for independence of the Italian Communists was a result of the
"conspiratorial and plotting activities of Yugoslavia." Borba claims that
it does net know if a movement similar to the one in Italy eants in Greece,
but acknowledges that it may since there .re forces in the workers' movement
throughout the world which oppose "subjectiop to a hegemonistic policy."
Borba reiterates the Yugoslav position that it does not meddle in the internal
ITTiTrs of Other Communist parties but can only serve as an example for the
progressive forces in the international workers movement. CR FBIS, 14 Jun 51).
COMMENT- A Yugoslav Foreign Office official has professed to Ambassador Allen
his disbelief in any possibility of the development of a national Communist
Party in Greece. Ambassador Peurifoy in Greece has reported, however, that
Yugoslav diplomats there are in close contact with Greek leftists interested
in establishing such a party
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
086
ISRAEL. Prime Ministar Stressas Egypt's Importance in Obtainkag
Arab-Israeli Peace Agreements. According to US Ambassador Davis
in Tel Aviv, Priie Minister RenmEmrion recently informed Harold
Hoskins of the Department of State that Israel's most important
policy objective is the maintenance of peace and that Israel con-
siders Egypt as being the key to the situation. Bew.Gurion stated
that he regarded Egypt as the leading country of the Arab States
and a nation that would dare to change its current policy toward
Israel. For this reason Ben-,Gurion said that he planned to do
everything possible to persuade Egypt to take the lead in making
peace, though he deplored the reactionary nature of the Arab govern-
ments generally. Mr. Hoskins told Ben-,Gurion however, that he
believed the Israeli Premier had an exaggerated opinion of Egypt
25X1C and that Israel might better look to Turkey for cooperation in
APP
IIIIIIIIIIII1Egypt has agreed to the settlement of P .
obtaining improved Arab?Israeli relations. Meanwhile
refugees w1n
Sinai, provided that Israel aErees to compensate
the refugees. (C Tel Aviv 8002 June 51;
25X1A COMMENT: 1041:41614,4pd the other Arab natis
in reaching an armistic agreement with Israel after the 1948
Palestine hostilities, the present time does not seem an auspicious
one for any action on part in seeking a final pea0e settle-
ment with Israel. 11:....:-laostility toward Israel at present has
been shown in two ways: ) Egypt as well as the other Arab
countries is seriously' concerned over Israel's actions in regard
to the current Syrian-Israeli border dispute, and (2) Egypt has
shown a continuing determination not to lift the Suez Canal traffic
restrictions against shipping bound for Israel even though the US,
the UK, France, and several other Western nations have objected to
the lack of complete freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. An
Israeli-Egyptian agreement on the refugee question also does not
seem likely, since the two countries have widely differing views
on how much compensation Israel should give to the refugees and on
when such compensation, if any, should be made.
*Y.k_t_tIA. Syria AmtgAroused Wer Is_aeli Aptivktv in Demilitarized,
Zone. The Secretary-General of the Syrian Foreign Office has
registered a vigorous protest with the US Legation in Damascus over
Major General Riley's (Chairman of the UN Truce Supervision Organiza-
tion) action in giving the Israelis permission to resume drainage
operations in the Hnleh demilitarized zone. (See OCI Daily Digest,
11 June 51). The Secretary-General heatedly insisted that this
action was a direct violation of the recent UN Security Council
resolution and intimated that the Syrian Army might resort to
direct action. (C Damascus 724, 12 June 51). COMMENT The UNSC
resolution aimed at strengthening the authority of the UN administra-
25X1C
25X1A
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tion in Palestine. It did request a cessation of drainage activity
until satisfactory local arrangements had been made. Rileygs
authorization for work to continue inside the demilitarized zone on
Israeli land, not on Arab-owned land, may incur the resentment of
the Arab countries generally. It has been reported that e Arab
Chiefs of Staff have decided to give Syria armed help in case
25X1C hostilities develop over the drainage issue.
"A" INDIA. Communist Plans to Disru t Shipping.
25X1C
25X1C the Indian Communist Party s panning
- to infiltrate the Indian merchant marine and other maritime organiza-
tions in order to boycott US ships and goods. The Communist pro- ee.
gram envisages efforts to blow u US ships calling at Indian ports.
(CMS Officials Only,
COMMENT; Plans Of this type have been reported at intervals since
late 1949. At present there are relatively few Co mists among
Indian maritime, port, and dock personnel, and their only recent
significant achievement has been a slow-down of work at the Calcutta
docks during late 1950. 25X1C
"B" SOUTH ASIA. o thward Exte sion o Co ist Chinese Frontiers.
In Se t Mber 1950
25X1C
Chinese troops were man a n-
ing military pas s an were co uc ?ng patrols in the Kink, Mintaka,
Khunjerab, Sbimshal, and Shaksgam areas just north of the main
Karakorum mountain range and well within territory usually considered
to belong to Pakistan. Earlier, in June 1950, a Chinese patrol had
been reported as occupying a position near the Karakorum Pass in
Kashmir, some 50 miles due south of the Sinkiang border; from which
it was routed by 4 force of Indian Ghurka troops. (C Karachi Deep.
16639 14 ate to Karachi 76 7 A.ug 500 S Karachi 136,
9 Aug 50; 25X1A
29 Sept 50) COMMENT; In view of the common Communist policy o
extending jurisdiction over unsettled or undemarcated border areas
until met by determined opposition, it is anticipated that the
Chinese will eventually attempt to obtain de facto control of frontier
regions in eastern regions in eastern Kashmir, northern India; Nepal,
.Sikkim, and Bhutan not actually occupied by Indian and other troops.
"C" INDONESIA. Justice Minister Resians, Mohammed YarOYA, Minister of
Justice, resigned his cabinet post On 14 June as a result of wide-
spread police and governmental criticism for his amnesty of 900
. prisoners (only 200-300 were released before the Indonesian Govern-
ment cancelled the amnesty) (S Djakarta 1753, 14 JUDO 51).
COMMENT; Yamin's resignation removes a disturbing and extremely
radical influence from the Indonesian Cabinet.. He is highly un-
stable and, in the past, has cooperated with Communist elements in
- the country.
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1110 INDOCHINA. Armed Against
A Vietnamese who has been closely associated with the Cao Dai
politico-religious organieation in South Vietnam told Minister
Heath that Colonel Tr nh Minh The, Chief of Staff of the Cao Dal
armed forces, and 29500 cif his troops have marched from Vietnam
into Cambodia'by way of protest against the policies of the Tran
Van Him Government. Colonel The is reported to have stated that
he will return to Vietnam only under a "national unio ? government
of the sort which is advocated by Heathes informant. Heath observes
that Colonel The is reputedly the real brains of the Cao Dal military
And that this development, if tree, is nrather alarming. (S Saigon
22239 14 June 51), MIV1EN Cao Dal leaders have been bitter at
their exclusio from the cabinet formed by Tran Van Hint in February
this year. The action of Colonel The (which s been reported in
the press) does not alter his anti-Viet Minh position and has
W4110 military significance. It is important, however, as an
indicator of the rather extreme ne mires which Tram Van Hun, through
his rigorous press control and police surveillance, has forced dis,
eatisfied elements to adopt.
"A" PHINA. Chinese Comet Donatisen!qmpalargains Momentum, The
Chinese Communist prop ganda campaign to secure popular "donations"
for the purchase of please, artillery, tanks, and other heavy equip-
is gaining momentum. In the last week, broadcasts have given
extensive publicity to the donation movement, citing the contribu-
tio s by workers, peasants and industrialists in all sections of
the country. According te the 1 test announcement, the donation
drive will continue for the next six months, and contributions may
Te made eith r in lump sum or in a series of time payments. The
names of contributors and the mounts contributed are to be published
in local newspapers. CR 1IS9 14 June 51). OMMENTs The campaign
for donations to purchase heavy equipment is currently serving the
Communists as their major propaganda vehicle of the "Oppose America
and Aid Korea" movement. It is particularly noteworthy that the
Communists plan to continsee the drive for at least six months -- an
indiction that the populace is being conditioned to accept a long
campaign in Korea rather than an early truce. The donation drive,
like the vigorously-preseed bond drive of last year, will also
see to withdraw cash from circulation and thereby help counter
the inflationary pressures resulting from heavy war expenditures.
WON
Phinese Nationaliptgramellm:IajjagrIa_US-UK 4ranansaa
111._tvysa- Accor, Commenting on reports from London that a compromise
has been reached between the US and the UK which would exclude
Nationalist China from eigning at multilateral J panees Peace Treaty,
the Chinese Nationalist roreign Ministeritntiated-thet "whatever
form the treaty may eventually take, the Chineee Government cannot
accept any discriminatory arrangements regarding its participation."
(C Taipei Reuters Ticker, 14 June 51). COmll NT: Similar face-
establishing declarations have emanated from other Nationalist
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officials* Actually, it is believed that the Nationalists are
already willing to concede tacitly that their chances of participet.,
ing in a multilateral peace treaty are exceedingly slim*
KOREA. Possible Trap In,Pvonggang Area. The Far East Command
believes it is a "strong possibility" that the enemy is attempt-
ing to draw UN forces into a trap in the Kumhwa-Pyonggang-,Chorwon
complex. The unopposed movement of two small task forces on 13
Jima from Kumhwa and Chorwon to Pyonggang is not yet considered
conclusive evidence that the enemy has abandoned the area. Air
sightings have revealed numerous well-prepared and occupied enemy
positions on both sides of the triangle, particularly in the com-
manding terrain to the east. If the enemy is unable to close a
trap by driving toward the center of the triangle, his strength
along the legs of the talangle may at least deny use of the area
to UN forces. (St DA-FECOM Teleoon 4826, 15 June 51).
4MM. &-9.L..._sn2za_P.gAicdrjuase of ornpericaiierjaaneseNavai
qtilmita. The Japanese Government has requested SCAP's approval
for a contract between the National Bulk Carriers Inc. and the
Japanese Government which provides for the lease o the former of
land and ,the lease or purchase of equipment belonging to the ex-
Japanese Naval Shipyard at Kure. The American concern plans to
build at least four 40,000 ton steel tankers, which would be 10,000
tons larger than any present tanker. Pointing out the strategic 25X1A
advantages to the US and the economic advantages to Japan, the
Department of State has queried Ambaasador Dulles relative to
possible adverse effects on the peace treaty.
June 51). COMMENT: Equipment at the Kure naval base has been
designated for reparations. Although the Japanese have been authorized
to utilize reparations equi nding the peace treaty, this is
believed to be the first instad in which it would be utilized
arect37 non-Japanese. The JAranese undoubtedly hope by this
contract to establish a pattern whereby its excess shipbuilding
capacity can be utilized rather than dismantled, as desired by
the UK and part of the Commonwealth. In view of the UKts known
attitude toward Japan's shipbuilding competition, it is not likely
to favor this type of arrangement which would keep Japan's ship-
building plant intact*
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
GERMANY. Allied High Commission Instructa BerlintCommandants on Soviet
TI-Tacre7Ileetainee-6-317-617W7Cune
UemmissiOn HICOM) agreed on the latest measures, to be-taken against
recent Soviet interference with west Berlins?vital export, trade with the
lest* HICOM has forwarded the text of a letter which is to be sent on
15 June by each of the Allied commandants in Berlin to Soviet authorities,
.repeating an earlier protest against the Soviet export restrictions and
suggesting that the restrictions be withdrawn pending negotiations recom-
mended by,the'Allies between. Allied and Soviet experts. .At the same time
HICOM agreed to give the commandants discretion to take in their respective
sectors "certain trade and commercial measures" which mould indicate the
seriousness with which the Allies viewed the Soviet restrictions and at
the same time cause as much inconvenience and disruption as possible to
the economic life of the Soviet sector of Berlin and East Germany. The
HICOM plans to consider further countermeasures on.. 21 June. ? OS Bonn 945
and 946, 14 June 51) COMMENTg The AIlied.commandants in Berlin had
originally recommended to HICOM the -immediate application of counter-
smeasures, including stoppage of 411 shipments from the Federal Republid
.and west Berlin to eastern.GerMany and east Berlin, The commandants have
not as yet indicated the nature of countermeasures whiOh they will now
apply in response to the HICOM directive. They have estimated, however,
that the Soviet interference, .if continued, will result by 420 June in the
complete stoppage of at least 75% of west Perlints exports to the Federal
RepUblic. -
"C" AUSTRIA, Soviet Response to Eviction of patriation Mission* In seeming
relaTition f6r-Tiie o8jn?f Erepriation mission
from the US zone, the Soviet.elehent, in Austria is curtailing approvals
of grey passes permitting U$ personnel from Vienna to tranSit the Soviet
zone en route to the Semthering Pass and the British zone, Of 61,US passes
submitted for approval this week, only 15 have been approved. There is
nu pattern to the Soviet denials, and US personnel known to Soviet officials
have had no difficulty in obtaining passes. A US representative expects
to see the chief of the Soviet, military division of the Allied Council on
15 June to demand the reasons for the Soviet pass denials, (S Vienna 30)46,
14 June 51) COMMENTg The Soviets were expected to retaliate for the
ejection of their mission (see (DCI Daily-Digest for 25 May 51)0 in past
.Situations, Soviet retaliatory actions have been abandoned after a time,
? usually encouraged by Western counteraction.
"C"
FRANCE. Communists Irritated by Poster Campaign. The official French
ComarunistW?etY7'rC7YC12TFr?lumanitefound it necessary two days ago
to answer editorially the latest in a series of antiCommunist posters
by which a young French politician is combatting PCF propaganda* Jean-
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Paul DavicPs "Peace and Freedom" campaign pinpoints its propaganda effect
in various social categeries A:nd appeals to various identifiable.suscepti-
bilities. HUmanite7s open reaction suggests that David is successfully
exploiting -a7F3,64..;arida field which is proving embarrassing to the Cam-
muniSts. (C Pars 77279 13 June 51) COMMENT Although. Daclid refuses
political backing and claims that his argra7urce of funds is individual
donations, since last fall he has flooded France with tracts, stickers
pamphlets, posters, a radio program, and most recently, newspaper ads for
a contest to determine -the PCF leaders most likely to be liquidated if the
USSR takes exer France. The sly humor with which he ridicules the PCF has
caught the French imagination, and the Communists are particularly perturbed
because he has turned againt them a technique which they themselves have
used so suceessfUlly.
"C" FRANCE/POTAND. Poles intransigent on. Strategic Items for Coal in Trade
WoUlations. The French ,-who need between-1V and-rinfiar7Ual
Yrom Poland() will refuse to furnish certain types of ball bearings,
despite Polish insistence for the inclue,ore of ball bearings in exchange
for coal or any agreement at all. Furthermore, the quantity of Polish
Goal to be sent will be determined by the am=nt of bearings programmed.
The French so far have successfully resisted Polish demands for molybdenum
and nickel, altheugh they propose inoluding some aiumdriam. (S Paris 7777,
14 June 5j) COMMENTs The DS Government earlier infolmed the French Govern-
ment that it ,f1=id'7:44ply coal through ECA if Poland remained adamant and
negotiations broke down. However, the French would be reluctant to see
their trade channels with Poland broken for fear that ths would result
in the Poles not paying their $15 million deet to France.
"C" ITALY. Italian Prose Comments on Election*. The Italian press generally
-4YeZa tairaaiMaDa7Ei;EFET7iiTINATthe recent local elections!,
remains considerable. Messaggero (independent) says the relative numerical
sauccess of the $coial-CommunistZThshows the economic-eoeial problem is
strongly felt, the menses are in a state of expectation, old methods must
he reviewed". Another independent, Mbmente Sera, commentsg "The Christian
Leihocratie Party remains at the center of IEalih polal life but has
been given indications which it cannot ignore without dangerous risk".
The Christian Democratic papers claim a viotory, but their coalition partners,
the Republicans, point out that the numerical strength of the Communist
tdoc has mot diminished. The Communist press claims a general leftward
-17.mnd and urges that both the Governmert,and its poliey must be changed.
The Communists point to victories in Taranto and Brindioi (a few of the
spring elections were held in southern Italy) as proving that "the South "
Wants deeds, not words". (P Rome 56939 13 June 51) COMMENT2 The Com-
munists undoubtedly expect to make further gains in eeonOZZally depressed
southern Italy, most of whose loca elections will be held in the fall.
Although traditionally conservative and religious, the southern farmers
se- no inconsistency in rema-lneing fim Catholics and at the same time voting
for the economic benefits offered by Communism.
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"C" SPAIN. Lead Shipment to Soviet Orbit Continue. US EMbassy Madrid
jotsIhaiThanish Coi?re7rnmant officials re6ently oy,dered a large lead
producer to ship 700 tons of lead to Swiss and Liechtenstein firms
buying for Czechoslovakial. account. Two hundred .tons, (ingots) have
already been. shipped. The remaining 500 tom (sheets) are due to leave
the latter part of June?- but the private producer is d.ela;Ting action on
this order in the hope of avoiding shipment. The Embassy comments that
these are the first such shipments of which it has been informed for almost
two months and that during that period,, lead exports had virtually ceased
pending evidently futile Spanish. Government efforts to merange a possible
.barter. deal with the DK for 'Copper. (S Madrid Joint We'eka Noo 493 8 June Si)
comm in March 1951, 500 tons of lead, belle?ved to have bc...ien part of
'6,77n ton order? were shipped to Antwerp for a Liechtenstein consignee
and for -probable transshipment to Czech.oslovaki-a. (See (DCI Daily Digests,
20 Mar 5i 21 Apr 51.) Five hundred tons of these new shipments may represent
the secorkd p&rt of the 1,000 ton order. Spaziish export, poliey is governed
by . the principle of securing the best return possible, either in. goods or
hard. currency.
"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Government Embarried; by Criticism of Administration of
riTIFiElfrerinam-AMTEFINTIMYre70?reiR.FiVI-Tffe-75317:77.37,76?riTalaa71-7?roved
go?emb-rriserfig?TETI-7.e7liT. in early 1950,, Tehekadi. Kham?
regent of the Bamangwa.to tribe in Bechuanaland Protee,:,orate., has called
?in li.,1nck,n for a full Judicial inquiry into the BK s. admiaf?stration of the
Protectorate and of the manner in which he and his nephew, the reigning
ehiefD we:re banie:h.ed at that Mine. This move P:t1,1.cr.*,,,id the refusal of the
Commonwealth Office to permit him to return to his tribal lands
as a pTivate citizen. Pointing. out that the High Carml.st:ni territories
of Beekre.a7eAland,, Swz.iziland and Bascland ar& .b.a OraY Briti3b. African
dependenole8 with no local or legislative councils.? Tehededi requested
particluDxr that responsibility for Bechuanaland be transferred to the
Colonial Office-instead of remaining with t;.o.a Commonwealth Relations',Ofe
ficeHOils:) aleo h,a?mdles relations v6 .0-I th.e neighbor?c,:ig ':Ixi.ririn:Lyn of south
ckfriea, the same Vines his nephew Seretse Khama. has asked to be allowed
return? -41..th his English wifa, to BechuE:na2?xuid as chief for a trial
period* (V London TitileS9 6 june ani 8 June 54) COW:Mu Since th.e
declared of' TITETIK. Government is ,to :protectniafe 'interests and
develop local Tesponsi,bility .tin:.ou,ghout the Afrir;a1.1 derJendenc ie 3 , Tshekedi S
cxiticisms are recognized by infornied British opinion as :having some jUsti-.7
fication. It. is also rElcognized that the Colonial, Office, .frIth. its broad
experience to. dealing with dependent territorier, is much better qualified
than the Commonwealth. Relations Office .to administer Br.,.:::i.huanaland. On the
other hand, the highly race-conscious Union of South Africa, which strongly
opposes the :presence of a native chief with a white- wife in a neighboring,
territory, has long-standing claims for the incorporation of the High Com,.
mission territories into the Union? and its Nationalist, govenrnent has been .
actively pressing these claims recently. .Any attempt by the UK to conciliate
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African native and domestic British opinion on the points raised by
Tshekedi mould appreciably worsen already poor UK relations with the
present Union Government.
"B" Cabinet Defers Decision on Shi ping Embargo to China.
The Cabinet has deci ed against unila er ac ion o pro 1 1
carriage in British ships of items embargoed to Communish China under
the 18 May UN Embargo Resolution. The Foreign Office states that this
decision indicates Cabinet willingness to consider such a shipping
prohibition further if a proposal for multilateral action were formally
made in the Additional Measures Committee (ANC) of the UN. (S London
6585, 14 June 51) COMMENT: The Foreign Office statement suggests that
the UK may in fact be miffing to adhere to the UN shipping embargo policy, 1
but it is wary of putting the extensive British shipping in Far Eastern
waters at a competitive disadvantage by proceeding unilaterally. The UK
may also believe that too-ready acceptance of the minimal action contemplated
under the UN Resolution would tend to commit the UK in favor of a general
shipping embargo, such as the US has informally urged and officials in the
British Admiralty have reportedly recommended.
nit
25X1A
bENMARK. Government Concerned over Publicity-Regarding East-West Trade.
=Z.:Fief o he economic sec ion o e oreign 0 ice i ormed the
American Embassy in mid-May that the Danish Government was greatly
concerned over the possible consequences to Denmark of making public the
details of the program for restricting East-West trade. He said that the
Government was not only generally apprehensive because of Denmarkgs
extremely vulnerable position in a military sense but VW also specifically
disturbed over possible trade retaliation by the USSR and Poland, He
reminded the DS representative that?in view of the post-war British coal
shortage, Polish coal had assumed vital importance to Denmark. The Danes
have stated, however, that if the other participating countries agreed to
the publicity, Denmark mould concur. (S Copenhagen', Desp. 989, 16 May 51;
S'Copenhagen 967, 12 May 51) COMMENT: Danish fears are given solid sup-
port by the current figure on coal. Danish requirements for calendar 1951
total 6,700,000 metric tons. If Poland mere to stop coal deliveries now,
DenTark would require 2,150,000 tons until October 1952 from other sources*
PANAMA. Pro-Communist Officials in Arosemena Goternment, President
Aliabiagrrosemena EaFIFFinted men withMownnirmrunist sympathies
to four important positions in his new administration. The positions so
filled are Advisor to the President, Minister of Education, Secretary of
the Minist of Education and Manager of the Social Security Bank.
COMMENT: These appointments
have been severely criticized in Parlamas, and President Arosemena has
reportedly admitted that such appointments were a mistake, but so far he
has taken no action toward canceling them. The pernicious effect of the
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'1'
appointment of a pro-Communist as Advisor to the President is enhanced
by the fact that Arosemena is indecisive by nature and greatly dependent
on advice from others, The appointments in the Ministry of Education
could become dangerous if prolonged because Panamanian students, who
have considerable political importance9 are generally chauvinistic and
consequently are susceptible to Communist agitation against "'Yankee
imperialism",
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?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
15 JUN 1951
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.
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CENTR1L INTELIMENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
.15 ;Time 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
P
CHINA. Chinese Communist DL2SA:_en Enroute to Tibe:.Lde3,2gation from
the Central Peoples Governmeot of China to 'Mat reportedly left Peiping
by rail on 15 June and ie expected to arrive in Hong Kong about 20 June.
The 15 member group, urder the ieaderehip of CHANG Ching-ye, accompanied
by the six Tibetan delegates to the Peiping negotiations and by eight
other persons assigned to the Chinese Cemmunist Ernhaasy In New Delhi, is
expected to travel by air from Hoeg &rig to Calcutta via Singapore. (3,
SIS Hong Kong 3768, 1$ jun 54. COMI5NTa Both the gover-iments of India
and Tibet have expressed interest in the identit7 of the members of the
above delegation, but as the Dalai Lama hae et1.11 to make any definitive
pronouncement on Tibet's aceeptaeee of '.:he Chinese Commeniet peace terms,
the reception to be accorded this mission ie ullknowm. A report that the
Dalai Lama's brother is new in India where he has contacted United States
officials for authorizatIon to proceed to Washington ae the Da2a4 Lama's
personal representative is a poseible that Tibet may not accept
the Chinese terms and is seeking United States zupport.
jAPAN. YOSHIDAto be Advised the, Nen-Reekr2ctive Chareeter ,IL1.1721Ja_la
Ehinteine4. Ambassador Dulles has requested that Pelme Minister Yoshida
be assured, relative to ij-e US-UK egreement on the Japanese peace treaty,
that while the treaty has unelergeee changes since last seen by Yoshida,
these changes do not relate to matters of major cubetacee. Yoshida is also
to be informed that the US has stood firm and sue scfu1Iy far a treaty that
Is fundamentally liberal, non-restei_etve, and noreepunitiee in character*
0, S/IS London 6554, 13 Jun )1).
IRAN. Outlook for ;roKilop Neeet.iati --ed (floe ,0 The Iranian
Government representativee, according to pTees reports, demanded at their
first meeting with Anglo-Ironton Oil Vionporey regeesentatdves that the com-
pany hand over seventy-five per cent of the profits made since 20 March
beforeihe talks could preeeed. The British Embeesy :In Tehran has stated
that the Iranians have also demanded that'the Company's funds on deposit
in the Bank Melli and the Britleh Bank, amounting to anprolimately 300
million rials (roughly 8-9 million dollars) be turned over at once. In ad-
dition, the Iranians have announced that, all eontract labor of the "ex-AI00",
comprising several thousand British, Indians, and Pakistanis, are now on
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contract to the Iranian Government. Ambassador Grady reports that he
begged Prime Minister Mossadeq to reconsider his present course of action,
halt the provocative acts of goverment representativee in Abadan, and at-
tempt to enter discussions with the British to seek some agreement within
the principle of nationalization; he has told the Prime Minister that any
such ultimetum as that regarding the company's profits would make proper
discussions impossible. Mossadeq replied that he had never contemplated
bolding discussions with the British except in the framework of the nation-
alization law. The Department of State in suggesting that Ambassador Grady
should point out to the Shah the dangers inherent in the Iranian attitude,
characterizing the present Iranian position as not only unreasonable but
designed to remove all hope of negotiations except on terms of complete
capitulation. (U, New York Times, 15 Jun 51;$1 S/S Tehran 3266, 14 Jun 51;
S, S/S Tehran 3283, 14 Jun 51; SI S/S to Tehran 2393, 14 Jun 51). COMMENT:
This Iranian demand--an attempt to implement Article 2 of the 30 April
nationalization law-ecan hardly be acceptable to the British, who have
recognized the principle of nationalization but not the validity of the
specific nationalization law. An additional feature of gloom is the possi-
bility that the tensions being created in the oil area through anti-British
and anti-AIOC propaganda might break into violence and could force either
the British or the Iranians into taking strong action.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"B" BELGIUM. Van Zeeland Plans a More Efficient NATO. In the course of a recent
discussion with General Eisenhower, Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland
who is currently chairman of the North Atlantic Council, expressed doubt
about the effectiveness of the present NATO structare, He agreed with
General Eisenhower that the Deputies appear handicapped by a lack of suf-
ficient delegated executive authority. Van Zeeland outlined a number of
proposals to increase the efficiency of NATO, including a plan to encourage
a European exchange of armaments which would rake maximum Use of European
preiuctive facilities (S, S/S Paris 7748, 13 Jun 51) COMMENT: The unused
European defense produetion potential is one of the chief bottlenecks facing
NATO. The hope of obtaining US equipment and additional US armament through
MDAP is the basis of the general reluctance to place defense orders with
neighboring countries, although a few instaeces of this have occurred. How-
wever, a more fundamental cause of this inertia may well be growing apprehen-
SiOR over financial and economic responsibilities which will fall on each
country he burden-sharing allocations are determined.
SMUT
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