CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100440001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 20, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO 39
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date. APR 2 0 i951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3.
Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A"
items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet
Communist intentions or capabilities
other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
49161.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B" USSR. MacArthur Episode Unlikel to Affect Co rom ;se in, Korea. A Soviet
official in Western Europe has allegedly commented that he dis-
missal of Gen. MacArthur represents a victory for the "peace" farces .and
(2) will not make possible a compromise unless US forces leave Korea,, A
solution on other terms is impossible as both the USSR, and Communist
China would have no valid argument to give their people. The Soviet official
stated that the present unfavorable position of Chinese troops in Korea
25X1 A is transitory but that the entry into Korea of trop s now in training,
z Although
NMENT
will change the picture. CQ
this may be only a personal estimate of Sino-Soviet intentions., the pre-
sent military trend in N. Korea tends to support the report. Should the
USSR and Communist China wish to negotiate regarding Korea,, the dismissal
of Gen, MacArthur might afford. a convenient opportunity on which to peg
such negotiations without "losing .face." However,, Soviet propaganda
reaction to MacArthurts dismissal indicates that no such move is con-
templated at this time.
"B" EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Vice Premier J kova DiffaMj1 1. According
to Albanian emigre circles in Rome? Vice Premier Tuk Jakova was accused
of anti-Sovietism at a meeting of the presidium of the Central Committee
of the Albanian Workers Party (Communist) held on 19 and 20 March,, At
the meeting Jakova was allegedly charged with negli.gence,,, collaborating
with anti-Communist resistance since 1946., protecting the clergy and
releasing known anti-Communists from prison. It is reported that Jakova
admitted all the charges and was subsequently relieved of his posts as
Vice Premier and chief of the Soviet-Albanian. Cultural Union. He is
reported to be in prison together with former Minister of Justice Manol
Konomi., and OP cadre director Theodor Rebo who are charged with diso-
25X1A
25X1 A beying orders and protecting spies. The same report fore casts a wide
s read purge of the Albanian Communist Party
Im CO lT: The Tench Minister in Tirana has reported that Jakeva was
among those in the Communist hierarchy who disagreed with Shehu over the
implementation of the harsh law against terrorist activities decreed on
26 Feb. (See OOI Daily Digests of 31 Mar and 2 Apr 51.). For more than a
year rumors have been in circulation that Jakova was in secret contact
with the Tito government,
"A" POLM. Anti-Soviet Incident in. Stettin,, The US Emb in Warsaw has received
a report, from two reliable sources of a riot in Stettin on 9 Apr 1951
following the street killing of two Polish civilians by a Russian officer?
As a result of the killing,, a crowd immediately began collecting and stoned
the Russian,, who,, after killing three more Poles, sought refuge in a nearby
cellar. The crowd demanded that Polish militiamen present shoot the :Russian.,,
but the militiamen refused. The crowd then became incensed,, shouting that
1.
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the militiamen could and did use their arms against Poles but could not
even against a Russian murderer, To prevent the crowd from attacking the
Russian officer, the militiamen fired into the air., with the result that
the crowd attacked them., killing at least three militiamen and wounding
others. The demonstration was finally quelled by the Army which surrounded
the area and arrested some two thousand persons. The US Lrio pointed out
that because of the complete control exercised by the Polish authorities
through fear and suppression no rumors regarding this incident are current
in Warsaw.. (S Warsaw 820, 19 Apr 51). CC d This incident, if it
actually happened, is indicative of the bitter hatred by the Poles of the
Russians and their Communist tools in Poland. Previous reports of popular
unrest and labor difficulties in Stettin have been received,, (See OC.I
Daily Digest of 28 Mar 51).
"B" Emigration of Jews to Israel Stopped. The Israeli Charge d4Affaires
in Warsaw has been informed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
that the Polish Government will no longer permit, the emigration of Polish
Jews to Israel. The reasons advanced for this decision were Poland's
manpower needs for the Six Year Plan and Israelts alignment against
Poland in the present tense international situation. According to the
Israeli Charge, Polish Government officials desire to retain a strong
Jewish community in Poland which they hope to transform into a loyal
Communist bloc. Until 12 Feb 1951 when the last emigrants were permitted
to depart for Israel, approximately 28,000 Jews out of an estimated
65,000 had migrated to Israel from Poland. (S Warsaw 821, 19 Apr 51).
Cam.: Since last July the Polish Goverment has unofficially restricted
Jewish emigration to Israel, not even permitting professional men such
as doctors and engineers to leave. This announcement by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs puts the official stamp on a policy which was already in
effect,
"B" YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavs Brand Satellite Prevocaticlns as Soviet-aDireete to
Belgrade Radio,, citing the growing wave of satellite notes and border
provocations, charges that these incidents are being instigated by the
USSR to create the impression that Yugoslavia is conducting an aggressive
policy in the Balkans. A second ulterior motive of the Soviet Union,
according to Belgrade Radio, is to make use of the situation within
Albania, which is being exacerbated by agents of reactionary Albanian
emigres and their imperialist friends in the West.. in order to exert
pressure on Yugoslavia. The radio broadcast reiterates the Yugoslav
stand that these machinations against Albania create a pretext for armed
aggression against Yugoslavia. R FBLS, 19 Apr 51). CGMIT- As. the
recent series of diplomatic notes and border incidents has developed,
Yugoslav propaganda organs have increasingly stressed that these prorvo-
cations are not isolated acts., but are part o.' a concerted Soviet-directed
anti-Yugoslav campaign. Yugoslav efforts to pin-_,)oint each of these
incidents as part of an overall campaign are probably intended to prepare
the Yugoslav people for any eventuality., as well as to justify the
acceptance of arms aid from the West.
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"Bn Q,zech Closing Yugoslav Consulate in Bratislavia and their ?wn in
zap Teb, The Czechoslovak-Govt is closing its Consulate in Zagreb on 1
May and has demanded that the Yugoslav Govt close its Consulate in Bratis-
lavia by the same date. In a note dated 18 April the Yugoslav Govt has
announced that it will suspend the work of its consulate in Bratislavia
on 1 May, but protests this action as a new expression of Czechoslovakia's
hostile policy whose aim is to bring about further worsening of relations
between the two countries. (R FBIS, 19 Apr 51). CO MNT: The Czechoslovak
Consul General was withdrawn from Zagreb in Dec 191+ and the Consulate
has been operated since that time by one clerk. The Czechoslovak Govt
recently demanded that the French Consulate in Bratislavia also be closed,
The Czechoslovak action is not only another provocative action against
Yugoslaviag but is another step in the program to reduce non-Soviet influence
in Czechoslovakia.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C" AFGHANISTAN. Prime Minister's Visit ii Washin M. An extensive program
for the entertainment of the Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmoud, has
been arranged for the days he will spend in Washington, beginning 20 April.
(R State to Kabul 257, 1$ Apr 51). COMMEENTs Although the Prime Minister
is visiting Washington unofficially, the attention given him will un-
doubtedly have favorable repercussions in Afghanistan.
"B" PAKISTA. Little Hope for Early Solution of Afghan-Pakistani Di,sput_.
Colonel Shah, Pakistan specialist in Afghan affairs, upon return from
Afghanistan where he had. been discussing Afghan-Pakis`}tani relations,
informed US Embassy that no progress had been made. Colonel Shah feels
that most of the tribal Afghans are fanatical Sunnis, more interested in
the Kashmi.r situation than in the maintenance of the present Kabul regime
(which has been advocating Pushtoonistan). Colonel Shah, a Pathan him-
self, reportedly feels that the GOP should subsidize Afghanistan, admit-
ting that it could not be depended upon to solve the problem but that it
was the best immediate compromise. (C Karachi 972, 1$ Apr 51 - See also
OCI Daily Digests, 26 Mar and 6 Apr 51). COMMENT: The US Government in
early November offered its good offices to help promote a settlement
between the two countries. Pakistan has insisted that in any conference
with Afghanistan the Pushtoonistan issue would not be included on the
agenda, its position being that the tribal areas which were part of India
before partition are automatically part of Pakistan. Afghanistan has
insisted that Pushtoonistan be discussed. The opinion of most neutral
observers is that, while both Pakistan and Afghanistan have been at fault
in the frontier dispute, Afghanistan bears the major onus for the present
situation, due chiefly to its intransigency and its anti-Pakistan propa-
ganda in the tribal areas. It has long been suspected, moreover, that the
Indian Government has either directly or indirectly supported Afghanistan
obstinancy in this matter. Obviously any attempt on the part of Pakistan
to subsidize the Afghan Government or any elements inside Afghanistan
would be precarious and would probably produce unfavorable repercussions;
consequently, it is anticipated that the dispute will remain unsolved.
RC" INDONESIA. Masiumi-PNI Coalition Probable. Mohammed Roem, a key Masjumi
Moslem Party leader, told US Ambassador Cochran that so much ground for
agreement exists between the Masjumi and the Indonesian Natiopal Party
(PNI) that it should be possible to form a coalition government at an
early date. He said that views of the two parties are so similar on most
issues that the policy of the prospective government would differ little
from that of the last one,which was formed by the Masjumi. Roem confided
that President Soekarno is responsible for some of the remaining differences
between the two parties, since it is he who has prodded the PNI to insist
upon a denouncement of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The MasJumi
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.prefers to await the- report of a special government mission currently study-
ing Netherlands-Indonesian relations before committing itself to a definite
position on the issue. (C Djakarta 1458, 19 Apr 51). COMNfENTs Upon the
failure of Sartono of the PNI to form a cabinet, President Soekarno
appointed as joint cabinet formers the chairmen of the Masjumi and. the PNI.
Support of both parties--which are the two largest in Indonesia-mis essential
for the formation of a stable government.
"A" CHINA. USSR Ranks Foremost in China's 1,950 Foreignrae3e. A Peiping broad-
cast of 8 April announced that Communist China's foreign trade in 1950
was several times greater than in 19/,+9 and that the USSR was the principal
trading partner of China. According to the broadcast, nearly a quarter of
China's total foreign trade in 1950 v-as with the USSR, as compared. with
only 8 percent the previous year. (C FBIS9 Far Eest Information Abstracts
from Rodio Broadcasts, 16 Apr .41). COMENTg Independent sources confirm
the high level of Communist Chinas foreign trade in 1950 - estimated at
between US$l billion and US$11- billion. Even allowing for the higher
price level in 19509 this total compares favorably with the value of China's
foreign trade - US$700 million - under the National Government in the
peak post-war year of 1947. Although its foreign--commerce in 1950 was
still mainly with the West, China has, like the Fastexn European satellites,
come to depend increasingly on the USSR as a market and source of supply.
This orientation of China's trade toward the USSR has been promoted by a
crr.r3it e rnement in February 1950 and by subsequent barter arrangements.
25X1X
"C r' A l o, od Sino-Soviet Treaty. forwards a
sum: ,ar?y of a purported Sino-Soviet treaty allegedly ssgnecx by Molotov and
MAO Tse-tung in December 1950. The principal points relate to (1) "acqui-
sition of all Southeast Asia" by Chinese forces under Soviet direction;
(2) "occupation of all Korea," using satellite forces if necessary; (3) 25X1A
Soviet provision of 3000 aircraft, plus -naval craft and other materiel;
(4) assault on Taiwan, at Peiping's discretion; (5) occupation of Kowloon
25X1X portion of Hong Kong; and (6) completion of arrangements for above program
by end of ugust 1951. notes that "source warns that a fake
treaty as ,,repared and permitted to leak out." whereas this treat,y is
"believed to be genuine."
C0 ENT: Alleged copies of secret Sino-Soviet treaties have been periodi-
cally provided by Chinese (principally Nationalist) sources for years;
they have invariably been proven or judged spurious. Such documents--
usually compilations of plausible rumors--gain credence from the presumed
existence of unpublished Sino--Soviet agreements relating to their respective
roles in the 'liberation, of Asia and in preparing for global hostilities.
Source's ' arning" demonstrates his awareness of the volume of earlier
fabrications, but lends no greater credibility to his own version, It is
regarded as most improbable that any such source will be in a position to
provide a "genuine" copy of top-secret Sino-Soviet agreements.
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"C" CHINA. UK Korean Forces to Garrison Ho Ko . The announcement that
Hong Kong's 28th Brigade would replace the l.'i.7th Commonwealth Brigade in
Korea and that the 27th would return to garrison Hong Kong is considered
as an indication that no increase in local forces Is expected in the near
future, The relief in Korea was scheduled to take place, by battalions,
between 19 April and 9 May, While the return. of the 27th will provide
Hong Kong with battle seasoned. troops, the possibility exists that morale
and disciplinary problems will arise because the 27th had earlier expected
to return to the UK, and because it will now garrison an area surrounded
by Chinese, a people with whom they have recently been in combat, (S
Hong Kong, Joint Weeka 15, 13 Apr 51). CODR ENT: A recent statement by
Maj. Gen. Evans, commander of Hong Kong land forces, expressing complete
confidence in ability of present forces to "meet and obliber-ate" any
Chinese ground attack, suggests the possibility that reinforcements for
the area are not considered necessary at, this time, 25X6
25X6
states
that (1) the Chinese Communists are making preparations for seizur?e of
Nationalist-held islands off Chinese coast, but have no concrete plans
for either ground, or air attacks on Taiwan at this time; (2) a paratroop
exercise took place recently in North Manchuria; (3) 60% of Red troops in
Tibet have been withdrawn and sent to Yunnan's Indo-China border and to
Manchuria; and. (4) by Soviet advice, the number of students in military
universities is rapidly being increased in preparation for organizing
special divisions which, when necessary, will participate in military
ventures outside Korea under a "volunteer" label, (S Hong Kong 3058,
18 Apr 51). COMMENT: Attacks have long been anticipated on certain off-
shore islands still. held by the Nationalists. There; have been several
reports of paratroop activity in Manchuria and China proper. The shift
of the 18th Army Group from the Tibetan area to Korea has been confirmed.
The above is the first report received on organization specifically of
students into "volunteer" divisions.
"A" KOREA. Jets Reported in North Korean Air Force. An Air Force operational
summary reporting clashes on the Sino-Korean border between UN and Communist
aircraft on 16 April, states that two of the MIGs engaged in the air
battle had North Korean markings "consisting of a red star encircled by
a red band, and a blue band as the exterior circle." (S FEAF Tokyo AX
6431, 17 Apr 51), COMMENT: This is the first observation of MIGs with
North Korean markings; heretofore it has been believed that all jets in
combat in this area were flown by the Chinese Communist Air Force (and.
possibly by Soviet pilots),
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
t'C" GERMANY. Berlin Communist Party Censured. US representatives in
Berlin -report recent signs that the east German Communist Party
(SED) is dissatisfied with the performance of its Berlin branch
The SED paper Neues Deutschland has detailed various "weaknesses"
of this branch-- particu ar y in west Berlin, charging it with
(1) insufficient propaganda work, (2) failure to exploit the
grievances of workers and citizens, and (3) retreating before the
"war mongering" prevalent in west Berlin. The organization was
especially censured for holding its meetings in east Berlin, when
it is allowed to hold them in the western sectors without reporting
to the police or obtaining special permissions (C Berlin unnumbered,
11 Apr 51). COMMENT: This is the first recent indication of SED
dissatisfaction with its Berlin branch and comes in the wake of
recent purges within the west German Communist Party.
"B" FRANCE. Communists Retain Control of Railway Unionists. The Com?-
munist-doming e General Labor Con e era ion (CGT is maintaining
its strong position among national railway workers judging from
a recent election which gave CGT candidates two-thirds of the votes
cast. Non-Communist union leaders believe wage discontent explains
the CGT's ability to retain labor's support despite increasing worker
distrust of CGT political activity. (R Paris 6354, 19 Apr 51),.
COMMENT: Support for CGT delegates is not an accurate gauge of
ommunlst strength, particularly in the railways where the CGT was
unable to secure decisive support even in the course of the major
1948 strike campaign.
"B" AUSTRIA. WFTU Transfers Its Headquarters to Vienna. The Communist-
omminated World Fe .rat on o ra e Unions WFTU has decided to
transfer its headquarters from Paris to Vienna- following the recent
ban by the French Government on further Paris meetings. The Federation's
secretariat declares that Vienna was chosen for its favorable location,
and for the "cordial welcome which the Austrian workers are;sure to
give the Federation." The Viennese Communist paper calls the develop-
ment a "great distinction" and "moral aid" for Austrian workers who,
it is sure, will do all possible to show themselves worthy of the
high honor. (U Vienna 2388, 19 Apr 51). COMMENT: Transfer of this
Communist-front organization to Vienna may ma e additional. difficulties
for the Austrian Government, already under pressure from labor, which
is restive over economic conditions and open to exploitation by. the
local Communist Party.
"C" ITALyo Communist Move to Force Resignation of the Government Defeated.
On 17 Apr
De Gasperi Government receive a vo e OT confidence
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from Parliament, 308 to 150 with 18 abstentions. The Chamber of
Deputies' debate concerned the constitutionality of the Prime Minister's
appointment of pro-tem Cabinet ministers to replace the three Saragat
Socialist representatives who recently resigned. The Monarchists,
neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement and anti-Communist Unitary Social-
ists (PSU) abstained from voting on the Togliatti motion which
criticized the Government for not resigning at the time and called
for Italy's withdrawal from the NATO. These parties, the Liberals
and perhaps even some Christian Democrats reportedly would have sup.-
ported another motion, presented by the philo-Communist Nenni Social-
ists (PSI), which was not put to a vote. This motion merely declared
the Cabinet rearrangement unconstitutional and thus would have amounted
to a vote of censure. (R Rome 4722, 18 Apr 51; R FBID, 17 Apr 51.,
18 Apr 51; U NY Times, 18 Apr 51). COMMENT: The support which the
PSI motion found among deputies of t Fe -non--Communist parties outside
the Government is indicative of the increasing resentment of these
parties at what they regard as high-handedness on the part of De Gasperi's
Christian Democrats. The possibility of some Christian Democratic
support for a vote of censure is consistent with recent evidences of
dissension within the party. US observers report diminishing support
for the Christian Democrats and -a growing anti-clerical feeling among
the general population which may; show up in the farm of absenteeism
from the polls at the forthcoming municipal elections u
~Eor
"B" SWITZERLAND. Swiss Construction of Centurion Tanks to Fill IM ' tait
efense -Gap. The British, Foreign -0 ice as in ormed- a US Embassy
o .ficial that the Swiss have been authorized to manufacture Centurion
tanks under license. (S State Desp 4644, 30 Mar 51), C0181ENTs For
many months the Swiss have been trying to obtain approxim=a e~yy five
hundred up-to-date tanks. The acquisition of Centurion tanks by the
Swiss army will overcome one of the most serious weaknesses in Swiss
defenses. The decision by the Swiss to manufacture7-,their on tanks
indicates that the Swiss have given up hope of obtaining this weapon
from the US.
''C" CHILE,' Communist Party Purge. A high-ranking member of the Communist
Party of Chile (PCCh) stated that a purge is being carried out
by the Central Committee, and that many. names are "on the list'". The
purge began following discovery of a movement-reportedly led by
Luis Reinoso, important and trusted party member in charge of
organization and labor matters which was directed against PCCh Secretary
General Galo Gonzalez. One Santiago radio commentator claims that
the purge is a result of a "strong Titoist movement", and a party
member" has remarked that nationalism has taken "strong root in Chilean
Communism". The Central Committee is investigating, the youth element,
"which is considered to be the principal focus of rebellion aimed at
exerting pressure on the Committee to change its underground policy".
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25X1A
Several members including Reinoso have been expelled. CO1v NT: The present purge may reflect
the existence of a hardening, bu as yet unmeasured, opposition to'
Gonzalezts leadership and policies,-which have evolved in the past
year. Reportedly the PCCh Political Commission recently decided to
25X1A seek new blood to replace many old-timers. Dissatisfied Communist
elements have.included some old-line militants who, displeased
generally with the Gonzalez leadership, have been concerned with
national problems, a group of Trotzkyites, and anarchists who favor
positive direct action. Past information has indicated that the
Communist youth generally has supported Gonzalez. It is possible
.that the present tendency for many party leaders .to demand strict
fulfillment of better defined instructions after a year of vacillating
policy has caused disgruntled elements to collaborate in a movement
which may.have influenced segments of the Communist youth.
"B" CUBA. Encouragement of Soviet Orbit Individuals to Return to their
Homelan . e Sovie mega ion in Habana is showing considerable
interest in obtaining the names and addresses of individuals who
have Soviet or satellite connections and who are planning to return
to their respective countries within the Soviet Orbit. Reportedly
financial help is being offered to these individuals. Those persons
who plan to return from Canada, Alaska, and Mexico are of special
interest in this campaign. Upon return to their homeland, they are 25X1A
25X1 A COMFNT: Some of these individuals would
ation about their respective
f
f i
orm
n
undoubtedly prove a r ounta~n rea o
y of them sympathetic with the Communist cause could,
Man
ies
t
l
.
r
coun
after proper indoctrination within the Soviet Orbit, return to their
former countries of residence in the Western Hemisphere to carry out
Soviet intelligence and other objectives.
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4916I a--
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
APR 2 0 1951
Not for dicneraination outoide 0/01 and OINHI
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
20 A lMil 1951
UK Willing to Concede To Soviet on Agenda, The UK Government feels
that "if an agreed agenda can only be obtained at the price of concessions
to the Soviet government, which in (the UK) view are harmless, then these
concessions should not be refused", according to a written exposition of
the British position by the chief of the UK delegation. The UK holds that
even if the Soviet position we3e accepted on initial listing of German dis-
armament and on the order for discussing reduction and level of armaments,
Soviet propaganda would be unable to deflect the Western powers from con-
tinuing their declared policies. Western concessions should be presented
in a group to the Soviets to see if agreement could not thus be more quick-
ly reached. Only if such a move failed could the UK even consider adopting
a "split agenda" between Soviet and Western proposals. In a later discus-
sion, the UK delegate expressed his view that greater harm to the West
would ensue from the breakdown of the talks than from adoption of a Soviet-
slanted agenda. The French and US delegations continue to oppose this
British approach. (S, S/S Paris 6328, 19 Apr 51; S, S/S Paris 6337,
19 Apr 51). COIIENT: This is the clearest statement yet presented of the
UK position, which regularly has minimized the importance of the order of
items on the agenda.as compared to the demand of the British public opinion
for an effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union through the convening
of a Foreign Ministers' Conference.
"B" Possibility USSR Considering Breakdown. of Meeting. The Chief of the US
delegation suggests tentatively that the Kremlin may now be debating the
fundamental question of whether or not to continue the conference. Ambassa-
dor Jessup notes that in this case the standard Soviet procedure would be a
violent propaganda blast from Gromyko in the near future which would make it
plain that. there was no hope of agreement while asseiting Western responsibili-
ty for the deadlock. Mr. Jessup suggests that the Soviet Government might
then propose the Five Power Conference (i.e. including Communist China)
which has received such increasing prominence in Communist propaganda.
(S, S/S Paris 6346, 19 Apr 51) o
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1C
"C" CHINA. Soviet Atomic Energy Program in Sinkiang.
claims that 1 10,000 tons of equipment has arrived EattIM11iforr es ab
25X1C lishing an atomic energy plant,(2) Pontecorvo, an atomic scientist who has
been missing from the UK since February, and several Soviet atomic scien- 25X1A
tists are at Tihua, and (3) the Soviets are making a determined search for
uranium in Sinkiang Province. Meanwhile, according to a rumor reported from
Trieste, Pontecorvo is allegedly directing the building of a uranium concen-
trating plant in Czechoslovakia.
25X1A COMMENT: Pontecorvo&s present activities are no
reliably known but he is presumably working for the USSR atomic energy pro-
ject. It is doubtful that the USSR plans to build an atomic energy plant in
Sinkiang. Its program in that remote province will more likely be limited to
the development of Sinkiang as a source of uranium ore. The equipment. mention-
ed by the MND may be used in connection with Soviet plans to mechanize the
mining of uranium in Sinkiang, where low-grade deposits are known to exist.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"B" FRANCE. Serious 7bnsion in Relations with the US, US Ambassador Bruce in
Paris reports the imminence of a