JAPAN: WORLD'S LARGEST SHIPPING INDUSTRY FACES GROWING PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01098A000600090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Japan: World's Largest Shipping Industry
Faces Growing Problems
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ER RP 75-30
November 1975
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JAPAN: WORLD'S LARGEST SHIPPING INDUSTRY
FACES GROWING PROBLEMS
1. Japan, in the '70s, has become the world's leader in seaborne trade.
Heavily dependent on imports of raw materials, and having an active policy to
maximize the carriage of its seaborne trade by its own ships, Tokyo has fostered
the rapid development of the Japanese fleet. Although Japan maintains the world's
largest nationally owned fleet, its share of world shipping is being eroded,
particularly in liner trades.
2. The current slowdown in world trade has added to Tokyo's problems,
although Japan has not suffered as much as other maritime nations. About 2%
of Japanese-flag ships have been idled, compared with about 8% of the world fleet.
Nonetheless, Japan's shipping profits have plummeted from last year's record high,
and the entire industry is trimming costs while appealing to Tokyo for
counterrecession measures. The Ministry of Transport already has revealed a ship
disposal plain to be initiated next spring and additional aid seems likely.
3. Foreign-flag ships will continue to expand their share of Japan's trade.
Japan's merchant fleet will retain, into the next decade, however, its preeminent
position among the fleets of the world, and its major shipping companies are likely
to become fewer and stronger.
4. Japan, almost exclusively dependent on overseas sources of raw materials,
is the world's leader in seaborne trade (see Figure 1). Seaborne trade reached a
record 676 million metric tons in 1974' - more than 20% of the world total --
of which nearly 612 million tons were imports and 64 million tons were exports
(see Table 1).In 1974, record volumes of petroleum (5.2 million b/d), iron ore
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcomed. They may
be directed to of the Office of Economic Research, Code 143,
Extension 5741.
STATINTL
November 1975
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Lumber 2,361
Copper 3.140
Barley and 6,794
wheat
Soybeans 3,240
Iron ore 141,953
Aluminum 479
Crude oil 237,942
Nickel 21
Phosphate ore 3,846
Japan: Selected Imports
as a Share of Consumption, 1974
99%
(142 million tons), and coal (64 million tons) were imported. These imports
accounted for nearly 16% of world oil trade and about two-thirds of international
iron ore and coal shipments.
Maritime Policy and the Growth of Shipping
5. Tokyo historically has promoted a maritime policy to minimize its
dependence on foreign ships and to earn additional foreign exchange.
2
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Japan: Share of World Trade
World seaborne trade
(million metric
tons)
2,312
2,605
2,699
2,866
3,190
3,200(est.)
Japanese seaborne
trade (million
metric tons)
425
508
539
562
652
676
Japanese share of world
seaborne trade ton-
nage (percent) 18.4 19.5 20.0 19.6 20.4 21.1
Value of world seaborne
tirade
(billion US $)
Value of Japanese share
of world seaborne
trade (billion US $)
Value of Japanese share
of world seaborne
trade (percent) 5.9 6.2 7.0 6.9 6.4 6.5
6. Under this program, Tokyo has extended long-term loans for new ship
construction, provided a number of tax incentives to shipbuilders and ship
operators, and granted interest differential subsidies to close the gap between rates
extended by the Development Bank of Japan and those charged by commercial
banks. In 1973, assistance to the maritime industry reached nearly $800 million.
Almost 27 million deadweight tons (DWT) of the 41 million tons built for Japanese
owners during the recent six-year (1969-74) fleet expansion program have been
built with such assistance. The interest differential subsidy program - $3 billion
in payments since 1964 - was discontinued in March 1975, however, as the gap
between interest rates in Japan and other major shipping nations closed and earnings
of Japanese shipping companies were considered sufficient to finance expansion
internally.
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7. In 1964, Tokyo sanctioned the amalgamation of nearly 100 companies
into the Big Six (Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Mitsui OSK Lines, Kawasaki Kisen,
Yamashita Shinnihon Kisen, Japan Lines, and Showa Kaiun) to reduce competition
and multiplication of services. Tokyo obtained company cooperation by offering
various forms of financial assistance; most important were moratoriums on interest
charges for outstanding loans and aid for new ship construction. The Big Six --
together with their 63 affiliates -- own 80% of Japan's merchant tonnage.
8. The recent downturn in world demand for shipping has sparked renewed
interest in government assistance. Japanese shipowners are facing a sharp drop in
profits, and contract cancellations and a dearth of new orders threaten shipbuilders
with serious idle capacity. Both groups have appealed to Tokyo for tax relief,
new subsidies, and other aid, which the government is likely to grant.
9. Tokyo's active maritime policy has given Japan the world's largest
merchant fleet under the flag and ownership of one nation.' The fleet totaled
60 million DWT at the end of 1974, 12% of the world merchant fleet and a sharp
increase from the 9.4 million DWT fleet in 1960 (see Table 2). One-half of the
Table 2
Japan: Growth of the Merchant Fleet'
Million Deadweight Tons
Type of Ship
1960
1965
1968
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Total
9.4
16.7
29.2
39.1
44.9
52.3
57.3
60.2
Tanker
2.4
7.0
11.8
16.0
19.3
23.2
27.7
30.7
Bulk carrier
0.7
2.9
8.8
13.2
15.9
19.4
21.0
21.2
General cargo
and container
6.1
6.3
8.2
9.5
9.3
9.2
8.2
8.2
Other
0.2
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.1
2. The Japanese fleet is overshadowed in tonnage terms by Liberia's flag of convenience fleet, which totaled
112 million DWT at the end of 1974. However, Japan's fleet is a truly national fleet under the control
of Japanese shipping companies, while Liberian-flag vessels are owned by a number of different sources and
are registered there for a variety of tax and cost purposes.
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fleet consists of tankers (most of which are larger than 100,000 DWT), 35% are
bulk carriers, and general cargo freighters, including container ships, make up the
remainder (see Table 3).
10. The Japanese fleet is one of the most modern in the world. Nearly 90%
of the ships are less than 10 years old, compared with about 60% of the world
fleet. Less than 1% are 25 years old, compared with 48% for the US fleet and
6% for the world fleet. Japan, along with the United States and leading European
maritime nations, has pioneered in the automation of ship operations. Nearly 300
Japanese ships -- mostly tankers - now have unmanned engine rooms and use
computers for navigation.
11. Rising crew costs have been a major factor in Japan's declining
competitiveness. Seamen's wages, which represent 60% of Japanese operating costs,
increased 45% over the past two years and now rank second only to American
maritime wages. This cost pinch is greatest on small- and medium-size ships engaged
primarily on relatively short hauls, the so-called "near-sea trades." The share of
cargo for Japanese-flag trampers and liners in these trades has declined rapidly
for several years.
12. Rising costs of Japanese crews have made charters of foreign ships more
attractive. Whereas the ratio of owned to chartered ships in the Japanese fleet
controlled by the Big Six was 60 to 40 in 1970, the ratio was reversed by 1974
to take advantage of lower operating costs enjoyed on foreign flag charters. Since
Japanese-owned ships built under government subsidies are prohibited from
operating under foreign flags, Japanese owners often sell ships abroad under
charterback agreements. Another chartering practice is to arrange construction of
ships at Japanese yards for foreign owners and with foreign financing, but to the
specifications of Japanese operators who will eventually charter the new ships for
10 or more years. Such arrangements account for nearly one-fourth of Japan's
charters.
13. Competition from other developed maritime nations is a persistent
problem, stemming mainly from the improved efficiency of foreign liner services
through the introduction of container ships, which Japan was slower in adopting.
As Japan expanded its container fleet, foreign shipowners continued their
expansion, particularly on the lucrative North Pacific route, and excess capacity
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grew, pushing load factors on Japanese container ships closer to unprofitable levels.'
Foreign competition in liner service has particularly concerned Japan because liner
operations account for about one-fourth of Tokyo's maritime earnings.
114. LDC efforts to expand their national fleets and gain a larger share of
their own seaborne carriage pose another problem for Japan. In certain trades the
LDCs have been undercutting Japanese rates for some time. LDC moves toward
cargo preference legislation under the umbrella of the United Nations Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences will compound the competition facing Japan. Such
legislation generally provides that at least 40% of trade be carried on a country's
own ships, leaving 40% for the trading partner and. 20% for third-flag ships. Tokyo
has not opposed the Code, since it feels it is so vague that a variety of interpretations
are possible and that it reflects an inevitable trend among the LDCs. Tokyo also
believes that it can negotiate bilateral agreements with many LDCs to reduce the
impact of cargo preference legislation. Nevertheless, such legislation threatens to
reduce the share of LDC trade carried on Japanese ships.
115. International monetary fluctuations are also affecting the Japanese
shipping industry. Because most of Japan's international contracts are denominated
in dollars, both shipbuilders and shipowners have been hurt by the yen's
depreciation since 1971. At the same time, expenditures, denominated in yen, have
been sharply increased by domestic inflation.
16. Foreign ships have steadily increased their share of Japan's rapidly
growing trade, from 53% in 1969 to 61% in 1974. This has been a major factor
in Tokyo's widening shipping deficit, which reached a record $2.1 billion in 1974 --
up from $1.4 billion in 1973 (see Figure 2). Shipping with the United States and
Western Europe accounted for the deficit, while a positive balance was maintained
with the LDCs because Japanese shipping companies handled much of the latter's
trade with Japan. LDC moves to develop their own national fleets, however, will
tend to reduce this surplus.
Japanese Shipping and the Current World Recession
17. The structure of Japanese shipping controls and the persistent raw
material needs of the Japanese economy have been crucial in cushioning the impact
3. on the North American routes, there are more than 130 container ships in addition to Japan's 25 ships,
and there are plans to add another 30 non-Japanese ships. Additional Pressure in the Far East is coming
from the Soviet Union, which is bringing a number of container ships on line in 1975. The Soviets already
have cut into Far East liner services by undercutting conference rates in the area.
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Figure 2
Japanese Foreign Trade: Shipping Account Deficit,
Tonnage, and Loading Shares
Million US $
0f
Shipping Account Deficit
-3.000 1 I I I I 1 1
1968 69 70 71 72 73 74 652
Tonnage and Loading Shares
Million metric tons 539
508
of the economic slowdown on the Japanese maritime industry. Most of Japan's
fleet remains operative; only about 1.2 million DWT -- about 2% of the fleet --
has been idled, compared with about 8% of the world fleet.
18. The Japanese fleet is little involved in cross-trading - trade between two
foreign countries - and is therefore not as vulnerable to the current slowdown
8
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in world trade as are nations such as Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, whose
fleets are heavily engaged in such trade. Less than 20% of Japan's shipping revenues
are derived from cross-trading, compared with about 90% in Norway.
19. Although the world tanker market is severely depressed, Japan's tanker
fleet has not suffered to the same extent as tanker operations in other countries.
Most of the tonnage owned by Japanese companies is on long-term charter -- 3
to 10 years - to Japanese or major foreign oil companies, assuring continued
operations. In contrast, several Greek and Norwegian owners have been hard hit
because of extensive dependence on the volatile spot (single-voyage) market. This
market has been thrown into chaos by the drop in world petroleum trade.
Nonetheless, in the first nine months of 1975, about 15% of Japan's tanker tonnage
took Persian Gulf single voyage charters, often at less than break-even rates. This
development is largely attributable to the requirement that crews of Japanese ships
be paid in full, even if their ships are laid up.
20. Japan's shipping industry (lid well in 1974 despite its declining
competitiveness and a general slowing in. world trade. Japanese trade reached record
levels in 1974, enabling the Big Six to earn record profits of $261 million.
Nonetheless, the retrenchment in world. trade was felt. Profits of the Big Six for
the last half of the fiscal year ending 31 March 1975 were down 45% from the
first-half level. Moreover, the volume of Japan's seaborne imports -- which were
nearly 10 times as great as export volume last year - fell sharply in the three
quarters after September 1974 as petroleum imports declined. Consequently, the
volume of seaborne trade for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1975 was 12 million
tons less than the calendar year 1974 total. All signs point to a further decline
in Japan's seaborne trade.
21. Meanwhile, Japan's tanker fleet continues to expand. Nearly 4 million
DWT of tankers are on order for the Japanese fleet through 1978, with nearly
1 million DWT scheduled for delivery in the last half of 1975. Most of the 1975
deliveries are unchartered. In the past, new ships without charters were negligible,
as Tokyo required shipowners to obtain charters before providing construction
subsidies. The government did not press this requirement last year, however, raising
the specter of increasing overcapacity and losses.
22. To check the rapid growth of surplus shipping, the Ministry of Transport
in July drastically tightened its restrictions on the construction of Japanese-flag
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ships. Because of reduced raw material requirements and the prospect of increased
dependence on nearby sources, such as oil from China, Japan's shipowners have
reduced earlier estimates of the size of Japan's fleet in 1980 from 80 million DWT
to around 73 million DWT.
23. Japan's powerful associations of shipowners, shipbuilders and seamen4
have been conferring among themselves and with government representatives to
work out self-help measures as well as proposals for government aid. These
negotiations have produced some signs of softening in the requirement of the
seamen's unions that a full crew be paid for laid-up Japanese-flag ships.
24. Counterrecession measures that ship operators are pressing for in the
FY 1976 national budget include the extension of tax relief legislation due to
expire in March 1976, the establishment of profit and depreciation funds to smooth
out fluctuations in ship earnings, and steps to reduce surplus tonnage. Although
the government has been decreasing its support of shipping as the industry
prospered, it may continue recent aid programs and introduce new ones unless
economic recovery accelerates.
25. The Ministry of Transport, for example, recently announced its intention
to begin buying up surplus Japanese ships in the near-seas trades next April with
the beginning of the new fiscal year. An estimated 60 ships of about 2 million
DWT would be purchased and sold abroad over the next 3 years. This move results
from the JSA's conclusion that Japanese operators have no alternative but to
withdraw completely from the transport of logs from South Asian ports. Resale
of these ships to Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations wishing to expand
their fleets will be sought through subsidized credits.
26. To alleviate a growing surplus of Japanese-flag tankers, the JSA has also
proposed that an unspecified number be used temporarily to supplement a planned
expansion of petroleum stockpile capacity. The reserve plan - overseen by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) -- calls for the expansion of
national petroleum stocks from a reserve for 60 days to a 90-day supply by 1980.
The planned increment in reserves, 222 million barrels, is equivalent to nearly
28 million DWT of tanker capacity. Although most of the planned increase will
be in land-based storage, several considerations favor the use of some surplus
Japanese tankers for static storage:
4. The Japanese Shipowners Association (JSA), the Ship Builder's Association of Japan (SAJ), and the
All Japan Seamen's Union (AJSU).
10
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? The government is already committed to aid the expansion of petroleum
storage capacity.
? MITI may attach some urgency to prompt implementation of the plan,
as a hedge against either further petroleum price increases or the
possibility of another disruption of OPEC supplies.
? For operators of Japanese-flag ships, the cost differential between lay-up
and continued operation is minimal because of their obligation to pay
full crew costs even when a ship is laid up.
27.. On the major problem of the high cost of Japanese crews, idealism is
yielding to pragmatism. Ministry of Transport officials now are unofficially
encouraging some shipping companies to employ chartered ships under flags of
convenience.
28. Japan's shipping industry faces a difficult period of readjustment. De-
mands for large wage increases by the powerful seamen's union and encroachment
by foreign fleets will continue to be major problems. Ship-owning firms that have
committed themselves heavily to long-term charters at fixed rates and tanker oper-
ators whose charters expire during the current recession will be particularly hard
pressed. But their diversified operations and large financial reserves are likely to see
the Big Six through. Optimists foresee full recovery in 2 to 3 years; pessimists sug-
gest 5 years in the absence of unexpected, massive government support.
29. We believe that Japan's position as the world's leading seaborne trading
nation will be maintained. Some industry sources foresee further reorganizations,
leading to a greater concentration of strength under the Big Six. Tokyo bankers
believe that Japanese shipping will weather the recession better than their major
European competitors and emerge in a stronger international position.
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DATE OF DOCUMENT
November 1975
NUMBER OF COPIES
160
NUMBER IN RC
COPY Y
RECIPIENT
DATE
SENT
RETURNED
1
D DI
6 Nov 75
2-6
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FORM 2353
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 co pp
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External dis.sem - see attached
10 Nov 75
81-99
Filed in St/P/C
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10 Nov 75
97-99
Thomas M. Poerstel, Export Trade Service,
19 Nov 75
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ved For Release 000105115: CIA-RDP79T01098A000600090001-1
Distribution List for E!!. RP 75-30, Japan: World's Largest Shippin;
Faces Growing P oblenji.s, Navember 1975 (FOUO)
Sf ATINTL^
III
Intelligence Agencly I
n Hall Station I
oward
:can Surveillance
tland Road
Maryland 20390
enter
Lee Brady
:ean Surveillance Center
tland Road
Maryland 20390?
Mr. J.M. Dunn
Council on International Ecoriomc Policy
Mr. Dick Kahler e"d')
Department of the Treasury
Lunette Waddell
Naval 0 can Surveillance (~entex~
4301 Suitland Road, S_.itland,Ma ylar..d 20390
Charles
Naval In
Code 34
4301 ,ui
Suitl and
Dra.gonette
telligence Support
tland Road
Maryland 20390
STATINTL
Security Agency
Certe r
Fort Meade, Maryland
Mr. Ric
Directo
EB/TT/
Dep artrr
Room 28'
13 cys -- Dc
yard K. Bank
of Office of Maritime A
VIA
ent of State
30, New State Bldg.
partment of State
R/ CC, Rm. 6510, NS
ATO), Copenhagen, Lon
or Ralph Moore, US, Mi8
Brussels
sion to
on, Paris,
~he Hague, Oslo, HongKorg, Djakarta,
cys for Tokyo, Monrovia, and Athens-
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Zambia, Lusaka
Afghanistan, Kabul
Ceylon, Colombo
Cyprus, Nicosia
Egypt, Cairo
,~Mle_ ce, Athens
India, New Delhi
Iran, Tehran
Iraq, Baghdad
Israel, Tel Aviv
Jordan, Amman
Kuwait, Kuwait
Lebanon, Beirut
Nepal, Katmandu
Pakistan, Rawalpindi
Saudi Arabia, Jidda
South Yemen, Aden
Syria, Damascus
Turkey, Ankara
Argentina, Buenos Aires
Bahamas, Nassau
Barbados, Bridgetown
Bolivia, La Paz
Brazil, Rio de Janeiro
Chile, Santiago
Colombia, Bogota
Costa Rica, San Jose
Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo
Ecuador, Quito
El Salvador, San Salvador
Guatemala, Guatemala
Guyana. Georgetown
Haiti, Port au Prince
Honduras, Tegucigalpa
Jamaica, Kingston
Mexico, Mexico City
Nicaragua, Managua
Panama, Panama
Paraguay, Asuncion
Peru, Lima
Trinidad, Port of Spain
Uruguay, Montevideo
Venezuela, Caracas
Approved For Release 2000/6EM-RDP79T01098A000600090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A000600090001-1
External Distribution List for ER RP 75-30, Japan: World's Largest Shipping
Industry Faces Growing Problems, November 1975 (FOUO)
DIR-4G2
Defense Intelligence Agency
Arlington Hall Station
STATINTL
Mr. J. M. Dunn
Council on International Economic
Policy
Melba Howard
Naval Ocean Surveillance Center
4301 Suitland Road
Suitland, Maryland 20390
Francis Lee Brady
Naval Ocean Surveillance Center
4301 Suitland Road
Suitland, Maryland 20390
Lunette Waddell
Naval Ocean Surveillance Center
4301 Suitland Road, Suitland,Marylarid 20390
Charles Dragonette
Naval Intelligence Support Center
Code 341
4301 Suitland Road
Suitland, Maryland 20390
STATINTL
National Security Agency
Fort Meade, Maryland
Mr. Richard K. Bank
Director of Office of Maritime Affairs
EB/TT/MA
Department of State
Room 2830, New State Bldg.
Mr. Dick Kahler
Department of the Treasury
13 cys -- Department of State
INR/CC
Rm. 6510, New State Bldg.
for Embassies in Moscow, Brussels
(for Ralph Moore, US Mission to NATO),
Copenhagen, London, Paris, The Hague,
Oslo, Hong Kong, Djakarta, 2 cys for Tokyo,
Monrovia, and Athens
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A000600090001-1
 RECORD OF REVIEW OF OER PUBLICATIONS FOR SECURITY/SANITIZATION APPROVAL
SUBJECT
-2 ca ~~ P 7 s`_
BRANC E ENIII N
SECURITY REVIEW
SANITIZING INST UCTI NS
ITEM
DATE
INITIALS
REMOVE
UNEDITED DRAFT
25X1A
EDITED DRAFT
DELETE
RELEASABLE TO
GN RECIPIENT
YES
NO
25)(1 C
SUBSTITUTE
REMARKS
;7~ Q
6 1
r /.
,R? OFF
p
25X1 A
~
DSDLETE PREVIDUS
FORM
235$
SECRET
4-70 E D I T I o N S GROUP
Excluded from outomotic
downgrading and declassification
SECRET
 SECRET . -1 A If '7 r - ei-e
Aprros!Prl Fnr R2se 2 _ 00090001-1
PUBLICATIONS SOURC UR Y
USE OF INFORMATION FROM COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Rating forms will be completed for each finished intelligence publication prepared by the DDJI and DDS&T. This is a
must be gathered in a formatted fashion. Therefore, each analyst will complete
machine-supported system and information
the NON-SHADED parts of section I and II of this form. Please type or print legibly. Questions should be directed to
CGAS/HSG, Room 2G 40, x1829 (red) or x5577 (b{ack)?
SECTION I - PUBLICATION TITLE AND CONTENT
NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF RATER
x'5741
25X1A
FOR OCI ONLY
SURVEY NO.
53
?1-S
TITLE
(24-80)
S I P LP I N G I N D U S T R Y F A E S
-j LH _I~L~C ,td LAN
X
CARD 2 XXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
OFFICE W- I u)
0 2
L 1
TOPICAL CATEGORY
Domestic Politics
International Relations
Economics
Military
Science & Technology
Geography
Biography
LIST SPECIFIC COUNTRIES:
REC TYPE
(7-8)
RECORD
TYPE
GEOGRAPHIC AREA
USSR
Eastern Europe
China
Other Far East
South Asia
Africa
Latin America
Western Europe
TO BE COMPLETED BY CGAS
TOPIC
(11-b2)
08 Owl
09 OPR
70 Treasury
CATEGORY
AREA
(13-16)
9 A00060ofgflnn14
FORM OBSOLETE
` SECRET
12.743492 PREr,a5s
r\If:\7\ 5
 Approved For Release 9COCIM14 S.-MAUREPWSMOSIRA00060 09 001-1
For each collection program contributing information to the publication, check only the highest rating that is applicable. More than one
collection program may be rated as Key, Supplemental, or Incidental for each publication. If the source did not provide any reporting
useful in the publication, check the box labeled Not Applicable.
If a single publication treats more than one geographic area and/or topical category and the source mix for each varied then
additional forms must be completed; e.g. India-economics-State and Japan-economics-FIR's.
Rating categories are defined as follows:
Key-Information from a particular collection program was of such importance that basic conclusions of the finished intelligence
item could not have been reached without it.
Supplemental--Information from a particular collection program was important but not essential to basic conclusions of the finished
intelligence item.
Incidental-Information from a particular collection program was useful or interesting primarily as background but was used only
incidentally in the finished intelligence item. 1 (2) (3) (4)
CARD COL
COLLECTION PROGRAMS
KEY SOURCE(S)
SUPPLEMENTAL
SOURCE(S)
INCIDENTAL
SOURCE(S)
NOT
APPLICABLE
(17)
1. OVERHEAD IMAGERY
(19).
2. COMINT
X
(21)
3. ELINT
X
(23)
4. TELEMETRY
X
(25)
5. RADINT
X
(27)
6. DEFECTOR RPTS (e.g., FIRK's)
X
(29)
7. DDO Rpts (FIR'S)
X
(31)
B. STATE (FSO) REPORTS
X
9. DOD Human Source Reporting
(32)
(a) Defense Attache
(33)
X
(34)
(b) Other
(35)
10. DDO/DCD Rpts (00's)
X
(37)
11. FBIS PRESS, RADIO & TV REPORTS
X
(39) *
121 Translation of Foreign Lang. documents
FBI PRS, etc_ -_ _
X
(40)
(41)
Non-USIB Agency Rpts. (USIA, AID, other
such reports)
X
(43)
Open Literature (professional journals,
US wire ser., items, etc.)
X
F
(45)
*15. OTHER (IMF, OECD, foreign government reports, etc.)
X
KIQ Related Publication: Yes [] No *for Items No. 12, 13, 14, and 15 specify souse of reporting used.
KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTION(S)-klQ
TRA CATIONS: J
Whi
apanese
te-Paper
50
51
52
53
54
55
Present Situation in the Japanese Shipping Industr
NON-USIB AGENCY(S):
1st KIQ #
2nd KIQ #
OPEN LITERATURE:
(56-60)
Shipping and Trade News, Sea Trade, Fairplay
--- --- -
-
OTHER:
DOCUMENT TYPE (61-62)
_
02 GH
06 GR
10 WR SR 1
14 BR
32 NIB
51 IODW
03 GM
07 IR
11 IH
15 TM
53 EIW
04 IM
08 R
12 IB
116 RS
0
5 M 1
09 RA
X
13 RP
63 64
(65-69)
__
(70 7_l_)_
1)
CLASSIFICATION: /7 L Z42F ~-
CLASSIFICATION CONTROLS: None
List DDO FIR's and Defector reports that were key or supplemental informm iNon sources:
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