SOVIET RYAD COMPUTER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Soviet R YA D Computer Program
Secret
ER RP 73-15
August 1973
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A 99 9015 9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
WARNING
This document contains inforniation affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Classified by 015319
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category SB(1) (2),(3)
Automatically declassified on
Dote Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 20005;C~P79T01098A000100150001-9
SOVIET RYAD COMPUTER PROGRAM
Summary
1. The Soviet Union's computer development
program is in serious trouble. For some years,
Moscow has been pushing its RYAD program -- a series
of third-generation computers -- in an effort to
meet the country's enormous data-processing re-
quirements. The program, however, is at least
three years behind schedule, and large-scale pro-
duction is not likely for several years.
2. By modeling RYAD computers after the IBM
360 series, the USSR hoped to save both time and
money and make use of the large stock of IBM soft-
ware. Although the concept was sound, the program
has been hampered by shortages of high-quality com-
ponents, out-of-date production and testing tech-
niques, and absence of effective direction and
coordination.
3. The USSR, lacking a solid technological
base, persuaded Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, and Poland to de-emphasize their
own computer plans and help develop some RYAD
models. These countries, and the USSR, are now
testing prototypes of a few of the models. Only
the smaller RYAD models have reached limited-series
production or the customer-testing stage. The
Soviet Union has the sole responsibility for pro-
ducing the two largest RYADs, which are roughly
comparable with IBM's powerful 360-75 and 360-85.
These Soviet computers, however, require special
integrated circuits that are being produced in the
USSR only experimentally.
4. Although no firm target was ever announced,
the USSR apparently was counting on producing from
3,000 to 5,000 RYADs per year by 1975. Probably
25X1A only a few hundred machines will be produced in
that year. Moscow has recognized this fact and has
abandoned plans to phase out production of the
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publica-
tion are welcomed. They may be directed to
of the Office of Economic Research, Code 143,
Extension 6901.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000//ffii179T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/153FCIA MP79TO1098A000100150001-9
MINSK-32 -- an obsolete second-generation computer.
Indeed, output of an improved MINSK-32 is scheduled
to reach 900 units annually by 1975. These
machines will be the foundation of the automated
management systems to be set up during 1973-75.
5. Additional Western help will be a critical
factor in determining how fast the Soviet Union
can mass-produce a reliable set of RYAD models.
The United States, France, the United Kingdom, and
Japan already have supplied machinery to Manufac-
ture key RYAD components. Despite COCOM regula-
tions, the USSR has acquired much Western tech-
nology and machinery to produce integrated cir-
cuits. Nevertheless, without additional Western
aid, the USSR will find it difficult to mass-
produce RYADs during the next plan period (1976-80).
Moscow now is seeking to purchase complete auto-
mated plants for the manufacture of integrated cir-
cuits, magnetic tape and disc packs, disc drives,
magnetic cores, and printers. Selected purchases
of large machines for high-priority uses and an
interest in Western computer programs for indus-
trial applications also can be expected.
"And this is the heart of our computer center."
Approved For Release 2000/05/~~,E;C~I-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 20001U5PI1 &A-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
Discussion
Introduction
6. A new family of third-generation computers,
called RYAD, was recently displayed at the Perma-
nent Exhibition of National Achievements (VDNKh)
in Moscow. These computers had been scheduled for
wide application in industry during the Ninth Five-
Year Plan (1971-75). The RYAD program, however,
is in deep trouble. This publication discusses the
program, its goals, progress, and problems and
assesses the prospects for RYAD production through
1975.
Background
7. Soviet computer production has increased
very rapidly since 1960 -- about 32% a year* --
and the USSR is currently the world's third largest
producer of computers, after the United States and
Japan. By US standards, however, the Soviet in-
dustry is still small; output of digital computers
was about 1,300 units in 1972, compared with more
than 20,000 in the United States and about 3,000
in Japan. A comparison of computers in use is
even more striking: about 8,500 digital computers
in the USSR and more than 100,000 in the United
States. The Soviets have imported about 200 com-
puters from the West and probably less than 100
from Eastern Europe.
8. Soviet computer systems differ from those in
the United States and in the West in several impor-
tant respects. All Soviet computers currently in
series production are second-generation machines
(fitted with transistors). Although some transis-
torized computers are still made in the United
According to official data on the ruble value
of output. Computer production in the USSR is in-
cluded under the heading "Means of Computer Tech-
nology" (Sredstva Vychislitel'noy Tekhniki), which
includes spare parts for computers, peripherals,
and possibly non-computer hardware such as calcu-
lators. The extent to which ancillary output may
distort the actual growth in output of computers
cannot be determined.
Approved For Release 2000/05 Wi -RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 8ti 1- 'P79TO1 O98AOOO1 OO15OOO1-9
States, most Us production consists of third-
generation machines using integrated circuits (ICs).
Computers with integrated circuits are generally
faster and more reliable than transistorized models
and can be built in much smaller sizes and, in the
United States at least, at greatly reduced cost.
9. Most Soviet computers are "scientific"
machines. Design has been optimized to handle
numeric inputs (numbers) rather than alphanumeric
inputs (letters, symbols, and numbers). Therefore,
Soviet computers are most efficient in engineering
applications. Most US computers are general-purpose
machines designed for data processing but useful
and efficient in engineering applications as well.
10. In performance and reliability, most Soviet
computers are obsolete by US standards. For ex-
ample, the MINSK-32,,perhaps the most widely used
Soviet computer for data processing, has an average
speed of about 25,000 operations per second, has
a maximum internal memory capacity of 64,000 words,
and can operate, on the average, only 20 hours
before failure. Data processing computers currently
available in the United States operate at speeds
of several million operations per second with mega-
word (million-word) memories and can run trouble-
free for several hundred hours.
11. Soviet computer peripherals -- tape drives,
printers, card readers, etc. -- are greatly in-
ferior to their Western counterparts in quality,
design, and performance. Peripherals and supplies
(tape, paper, and cards) are a major cause of in-
service failure of computer systems and a matter
of urgent concern in the USSR.
12. Finally, Soviet computer software systems
are primitive by US standards. Generally the
Soviets lack transferable high-level languages,
application programs, and efficient operating sys-
tems software for most of their computers.* In
the United States, both computer software and hard-
ware are developed by the manufacturer for the user
High-leve languages such as FORTRAN have the
special merit that almost anyone can be trained to
write a program; operating systems are software
programs that operate the computer.
Approved For Release 2000/05/1a;EC A-- DP79TO1 O98AOOO1 OO15OOO1-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05A%C'E~ATRDP79T01098A000100150001-9
as an integrated package; in the USSR the user is
forced to develop much of his own software. Be-
cause Soviet computers are rarely identical, soft-
ware developed at user facilities is of limited
or no value to other users, even to those employing
the same model computer.
13. Early in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-70),
Soviet planners recognized the need for more ad-
vanced general-purpose computers and more efficient
software and peripherals for processing economic
data. Although no official announcement was ever
made, A.A. Dorodnitsyn of the USSR Academy of
Sciences indicated to US businessmen in late 1967
that a decision had been made to build a family of
modern third-generation machines (RYADs). From
Dorodnitsyn's remarks and other information, it
was apparent that Moscow hoped to modernize the
entire Soviet computer industry relatively quickly.
General Aspects of the RYAD Program
14. The RYAD program is the USSR's first major
effort to produce a family of computers designed
specifically for economic and data processing
applications. The RYAD series is a direct copy of
the IBM 360 series machines; technical character-
istics of RYADs and IBM 360 computers are compared
in Table 1. A comparison of RYAD and other Soviet
computers is given in Table 2.
15. The decision to copy IBM, strongly opposed
by some who felt it degrading, had two distinct
advantages. By using a proved design, the Soviets
hoped to avoid costly development programs and
reach large-scale production more quickly than
otherwise would be possible.* The IBM 360 series
program was the most successful effort ever under-
taken to develop a family of computers that, though
differing in size and capabilities, were mutually
The task of copying may have been aided by the
clandestine acquisition of embargoed 360 series
computers and association documentation. This
probably decreased the time and effort needed to
achieve a Soviet prototype, but the availability
of the hardware for inspection does not reduce the
effort needed to go from the laboratory to mass
production.
Approved For Release 2000/05/ iDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 sW1MT01098AO00100150001-9
Technical Specifications of Selected RYAD and IBM 360 Series Computers
Add Timel
(Microseconds)
Memory Cycle Time2
(Microseconds)
Input-Output Rate3
(Kbytes5 per Second)
Storage Capacity4
(Kbytes)
IBM 360-20
58
3.6
160
4-32
ES6-1010
200
1
140
8-64
IBM 360-30
40
1.5
400
16-64
ES-1020
25
2
200
64-256
IBM 360-40
12
2.5
800
32-256
ES-1030
6.5
1.25
700
128-512
IBM 360-50
4
2
1,200
128-512
ES-1040
1.4
1.35
1,300
256-1,024
IBM 360-65
1.3
0.75
1,200
256-1,024
ES-1050
0.65
1.25
1,300
128-1,024
IBM 360-75
0.8
0.75
1,300
256-1,024
ES-1060
0.5
0.6
1,300
256-2,048
1. Time required to execute one addition.
2. Time required to read and restore a specified number of bits.
3. Maximum speed of input-output operations.
4. Number of units of addressable internal storage available.
5. Kilobytes. A byte is a basic unit of memory used to form words.
6. Yedinnaya Sistema (unified system).
Technical Specifications of Selected RYAD
and Other Soviet Computers
1. Time required to execute one addition.
2. Time required to read and restore a specified number of bits.
3. Number of units of addressable internal storage available.
4. Estimated.
Add Time]
(Microseconds)
Memory Cycle Time2
(Microseconds)
Storage Capacity3
(Kbytes)
URAL-11
20
154
4-16
URAL-14
20
294
16-64
URAL-16
10
9
128-512
MINSK-22
12
24
4-8
MINSK-32
25-34
5
16-64
ES-1020
25
2
64-256
BESM-6
1.1
2
16-64
ES-1050
0.65
1.25
128-1,024
Approved For Release 2000/05/1 & P,CiA j pP79TO1 O98AOOO1 OO15OOO1-9
 Approved For Release 2000/0&V&?k-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
compatible. Subject only to hardware limitations
on speed and memory size, programs designed for
any model in the series can be run on all other
models. Soviet computers generally are not com-
patible with. each other. The Soviets also hoped
to make RYADs compatible with IBM 360 machines,
since this would give them access to a large IBM
library of systems software and applications
programs. The USSR could also supplement domestic
production by importing IBM machines and compatible
peripherals manufactured by IBM and other Western
firms.
16. The Soviets planned to put RYAD into
series production in 1970. This enormously complex
undertaking involved the concurrent development of
several areas of technology that were poorly de-
veloped in the USSR in 1967. Integrated circuits
were not being produced serially, nor were multi-
layer printed circuit boards,* which, together
with integrated circuits, are the fundamental
building block of third-generation computers. The
magnetic disc technology, essential for all RYAD
models, was only in early stages of development.
To help meet the program's challenge, the USSR
turned to Eastern Europe.
Role of Eastern Europe
17. RYAD became a CEMA-wide program under
Soviet leadership and control in late 1968, when
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
and Poland reluctantly agreed to cooperate with
the USSR in the joint development and production
of RYAD computers. These countries were already
using Soviet computers and were not anxious to
increase their dependence on Soviet computer sys-
tems. The East Europeans strongly opposed coopera-
tion because they already had computer development
programs that were tailored to their special needs.
The commitment to purchase RYADs was especially
troublesome for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland, since they had licenses to produce
Western style computers that were not compatible
with RYAD. Eastern Europe was first given respon-
sibility for developing software and peripheral
used or mounting and interconnecting the ICs.
Approved For Release 2000/ ARP,IA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/156:1I-RDP79TO1098AO00100150001-9
hardware. By 1970, their role was expanded to
include producing central processing units as
well.*
18. The East European computer industry is
quite small. Poland, with the largest, has pro-
duced only about 500 computers during the past 10
years. Nevertheless, capability to produce ad-
vanced design computers has improved markedly in
recent years through the acquisition of Western
computers and computer-related technology. Poland
has built prototypes of a medium-sized third-
generation computer (ODRA-1305) based on British
design and has developed a minicomputer (K-202)
based on UK technology acquired illegally. Bul-
garia allegedly has acquired French technology to
produce integrated circuits for calculators and
Japanese technology to manufacture magnetic tape
drives. Hungary and East Germany are manufacturing
a few third-generation process control computers
based on imported components. Poland soon should
have the best capability to produce integrated
circuits in Eastern Europe, having acquired an
integrated circuit production facility from France.
Czechoslovakia manufactures ICs in small quantity
based on clandestinely acquired US technology.
Models: Characteristics, Uses, Producers,
and Prices
19. The RYAD program will have six basic com-
puter models referred to, interchangeably, as the
ES or R series. In ascending order of complexity,
they are the ES-1010, ES-1020, ES-1030, ES-1040,
ES-1050, and ES-1060:
The ES-1010. Smallest of the RYAD
series, the ES-1010's memory and low
processing speed restrict its useful-
ness to simple engineering tasks,
teaching applications, and limited
process control and data processing
operations. It can serve also as a
satellite processor for larger RYAD
computers in preparing input data or
controlling peripherals.
*_ The central processing unit includes the main
memory and arithmetic circuitry.
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 S Fp79TO1098AOOO100 150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/0IA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
The ES-1020. Having about the same
speed as the IBM 360-30 computer and the
Soviet MINSK-32, the ES-1020 will be
used for data processing or engineering
problem-solving at the enterprise level.
The ES-1030. Several times faster
than the ES-10 YO and having a memory
twice as large, the ES-1030 is about
equivalent to an IBM 360-40. It will
be used in medium-sized enterprises.
. The ES-1040. According to claimed
specifications, the ES-1040 is a large
computer, roughly comparable with the
IBM 360-50. It is large enough to accom-
modate multiprogramming and time sharing
and will be used by production associa-
tions or regional computer centers for
complex economic and scientific problems.
The ES-1050. Faster than the ES-1040
but having the same maximum memory size,
the ES-1050 is the counterpart of the IBM
360-65. It is to be used for planning at
the Republic or All-Union level.
The ES-1060. With a planned speed of
2 million operations per second and a
maximum memory of 2 million bytes, the
ES-1060 compares with the largest IBM 360
computers. It will be used at the highest
levels of government for the most demanding
planning, economic, and scientific (e.g.,
weather prediction) problems.
About 150 models of the approximately 20 basic
types of peripheral machines will be produced in
the USSR and in Eastern Europe for use with RYAD.
Some types -- magnetic disc storage systems, video
terminals, plotters, and alphanumeric optical
readers -- are not yet in production in the Soviet
Union, while other peripherals currently in pro-
duction will be redesigned and improved substan-
tially for RYAD use.
20. All RYAD models, except possibly the
ES-1010 minicomputer and the ES-1040, are under
development in the USSR. The very largest machines,
Approved For Release 2000/OCRJ-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 Blpl?~EP79TO1098AO00100150001-9
the ES-1050 and ES-1060, are being developed ex-
clusively by the USSR and the others jointly with
Eastern Europe. Hungary is building the ES-1010
with the help of a licensed French design* that
has been modified extensively to meet RYAD compati-
bility standards. The ES-1020 is Bulgaria's re-
sponsibility, although versions with greater speed
but smaller memories are being developed in East
Germany (ROBOTRON-21) and in Czechoslovakia (ZPA-
6000/20). Poland is developing the basic model of
the ES-1030, and Czechoslovakia is designing a
modified version -- the ZPA-6000/30. East Germany
is the only country working on the ES-1040. The
principal development production centers for RYADs
in the USSR and Eastern Europe are shown in Table 3.
21. The prices available for two RYAD systems
are surprisingly high. The ES-1030 is priced at
about 900,000 rubles ($1,242,000).** The ES-1050
is priced at 3.5 million rubles ($4,830,000).**
For comparison, rough counterparts in the IBM
series -- the 360-40 and 360-65 -- cost about
$250,000 and $1.7 million, respectively.
22. The high RYAD prices reflect the. high
costs of prototype production. The price of the
ES-1050 seems low relative to that of the ES-1030,
suggesting that the bigger models in the RYAD
series may be subsidized. The price of the
ES-1050 is about four times that of the ES-1030,
whereas, for IBM, the price of the larger model
is about seven times the smaller one.
23. Until production costs decline with ex-
panding production and unless the USSR's State
Commission on Prices decides to cut prices, some
users of computers will find RYAD prices non-
competitive with those of existing second-generation
machines. V.M. Glushkov, a leading Soviet computer
authority noted that: "some third-generation
(RYAD) computers with the same capacity as the
MINSK-32 will cost several times more ... until
comprehensive measures are implemented to insure
comparable prices, second generation computers
must be used extensively." In fact, the ES-1030
Possibly the MITRA-15, developed by Compagnie
Internationale pour 1'Informatique.
** At the official rate of exchange.
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CCI -RDP79TOI 098AOOO1 OO15OOO1-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/4ZDP79T01098A000100150001-9
USSR and Eastern Europe: Facilities for RYAD Production)
Country and Model
Facility/Location
USSR
ES-1020
Bulgaria
ES-1020
Czechoslovakia
ES-1020 A2
(ZPA-6000/20)
ES-1030 A2
(ZPA-6000/30)
East Germany
ES-10212
(ROBOTRON-2 1)
Hungary
ES-1010
Poland
ES-1030
Brest Electrotech-
nical Plant/Brest
Minsk Computer
Plant (Ordzhon-
ikidze)/Minsk
Yerevan Experimental
Computer Plant/
Yerevan
Moscow Computer
Plant/Moscow
Penza Computer
Plant/Penza
Unknown
ISOT/Sofia
ZPA/Cakovice
ZPA/Cakovice
ROBOTRON/Dres-
den
ROBOTRON/Dres-
den
Videoton/
Szekesfehervar
1. Assembly of central processing units.
2. Modifications of RYAD models.
Possibly, several dozen units have
been built. Apparently converted for
computer production.
Development, testing, and proto-
type production. Full-scale production
of RYADs has been delayed owing to con-
tinued production of MINSK-32s.
Development, testing, and proto-
type production. May be preparing for
production. This plant's previous
production of NAIRI computers may
have been shifted to the Baku Radio
Plant.
Prototype production. Planning to
fabricate five prototypes during 1973.
Apparently preparing for production.
Still in design phase. A prototype
has not yet been produced.
A few models have been assembled using
imported components.
A prototype reportedly has been
produced.
Under design.
Several units reportedly have been
produced.
Development, testing, and prototype
production.
Preparing for production. A few proto-
types have been built.
Development, testing, and prototype
production.
Approved For Release 2000/05VU-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/f kDP79TO1 098AO001 00150001-9
costs three times as much as the MINSK-32 (320,000
rubles); the ES-1020, which has roughly the same
computing power as the MINSK-32, will cost an esti-
mated 600,000 rubles, nearly twice as much.
24. In addition to a much higher initial pur-
chase price, the RYAD, because of its complex
hardware and software, will require the user to
employ more people with higher skills. This means
higher operating costs. At three times the ini-
tial cost and many times the operating cost, an
ES-1030 would need to perform several times as
much work as a MINSK-32 to be competitive. RYAD
computers, which cost more to buy and maintain
than MINSK-32s, will probably encounter "buyer
resistance," especially from smaller facilities
where the technical capabilities offered by the
MINSK-32 are adequate.
Production Goals
25. No official plan for production of RYAD
computers has been announced. The 1971-75 Plan
provides only that the USSR will "put into series
production new systems of electronic computers
based on integrated circuits."
26. There is much evidence, however, that gen-
eral objectives for RYAD production in 1971-75 do
exist. After a prototype had been tested success-
fully in 1971, the Soviets began to talk optimis-
tically. The Deputy Chairman of the State Planning
Commission, M.Ye. Rakovsky, stated that 12,000 to
15,000 third-generation computers would be produced
in 1971-75. The Soviet press reported that more
than 10,000 third-generation computers would con-
stitute the base of the automated systems of man-
agement to be set up.* Other sources said that the
total number of computers of all types in use in
the USSR would increase from 7,000 in 1970 to 25,000
in 1975 -- an increase possible only with large-
scale production of RYAD or other third-generation
Avtomatizirovannye Sistemy Upravleniya (ASUs).
Several such systems have been developed by and
for a few large plants. The heart of these sys-
tems is the "information-computer center"
(Informatsionni -V chislitel'ni Tsentr -- IVT)
w ich typically includes one or more computers
for data processing.
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 5RII~RP79T01098AO00100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/0?1~ &-RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
computers or with massive imports.* Soviet com-
puter industry officials also told a US consulting
firm that the USSR would have 35,000 RYADs by 1980.
Another aspect of the RYAD program calls for a huge
training effort to provide skilled programmers,
systems analysts, and technicians. During 1971-75,
about 160,000 computer specialists will be trained,
including 50,000 systems analysts. That number of
trained specialists, based on US experience, would
be sufficient to maintain about 15,000 RYAD sys-
tems.** Together, these statements suggest that
the Soviets hoped to be producing 3,000-5,000 RYADs
annually by 1975.
Cost of the RYAD Program
27. RYAD is a costly program in terms of both
expenditures and manpower. The cost of developing
RYAD (hardware and software) was estimated by
Academician Dorodnitsyn in 1967 at 10 billion
rubles ($13.8 billion),*** although the USSR's fi-
nancial burden has been reduced to some extent by
Eastern Europe's participation in the program.
This cost is equivalent to that of building and
equipping three plants the size of the Kama Truck
Plant, the largest heavy truck plant in the world.
In the United States, the counterpart IBM 360 pro-
gram was developed at an estimated cost of $5 bil-
lion.
28. Although the RYAD program is large, the
program's manpower requirements seem astonishingly
high. According to Soviet sources 300,000 people
are involved in the program in the USSR and Eastern
Europe. By comparison, only about 172,000 people
were employed in the entire US computer industry
in 1972. RYAD's manpower requirements probably
Besides the RYADs, the USSR is developing
third-generation computers for process control in
industry. That program, called Aggregatnaya
Sistema Sredstv Vychislitel'noy Tekhniki ASVT)
centers on the M series of computers -- M-4000,
M-5000, M-6000 -- now claimed to be in the early
stages of production.
** In the United States, three programmers are
needed at the user facility for each IBM 360 sys-
tem, and one is needed at the plant for every
three systems.
*** At the official rate of exchange.
Approved For Release 2000/05?1 ]kRDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 51 AW-P79T01098A000100150001-9
will be cut back sharply when RYAD moves out of
development and into large-scale production. In
the United States a labor force of 25,000 could
produce 3,000 small RYAD systems annually, in-
cluding components (integrated circuits and memory
cores) and all the peripherals needed for a stand-
ard configuration.
29. Although manpower needs may fall, the tran-
sition to large-scale production of RYADs will
strain the production capacity of the Soviet com-
puter industry. The estimated requirements for
electronic components and peripherals to support
an annual production of even 3,000 RYADs of the
simplest type (ES-1020 and ES-1030) in a standard
configuration are large relative to current Soviet
capabilities. This situation may be seen in the
accompanying tabulation.
Required
for 3,000 RYADS
Estimated 1972
Soviet Output
Integrated circuits
(million units)
50-60
30-40
Ferrite memory cores
(billion bits)
6
2
Magnetic disc units
(thousand units)
10
Negligible
30. In addition, at least 2 million square
feet of floorspace would be required to assemble
the central processing units alone -- more than
half of the estimated floorspace in the eight
Soviet plants known to be major producers of these
units. The largest computer assembly facility in
the USSR, the Minsk Computer Plant, has about
500,000 square feet of floorspace, an amount suf-
ficient to produce about 750 RYADs annually. To
produce 3,000 ES-1020s per year, the USSR would
need four plants the size of the Minsk Plant just
to assemble central processing units; to produce
5,000 RYADs annually, the requirement for floor-
space would be about two-thirds larger. Only two
facilities -- the Minsk Computer Plant and the
Brest Electrotechnical Plant -- have been asso-
ciated definitely with the manufacture of central
Approved For Release 2000/05/1 ,%JA PP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05 6R4U-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
processing units, and the main item of production
at Minsk continues to be the MINSK-32. The Brest
plant may become the major producer of the ES-1020;
its size is unknown.
Progress and Problems
31. Reportedly, "several dozen" RYAD computers
have been built in the USSR and a few have been
installed in user facilities. Several more have
been built in Eastern Europe. No RYAD model is
being produced in large quantity, however, and the
program as a whole is at least three years behind
the schedule originally announced by Academician
Dorodnitsyn.
32. The ES-1010 (the smallest variant) is being
tested in Hungary, and according to the local press
will go into production before the end of this year.
By 1975, Hungary plans to manufacture 100 to 150
units a year. A prototype of the ES-1020 was
fabricated by the USSR as early as 1970 and passed
acceptance tests in 1971. The "first batch"
reportedly was delivered to customers in early
1972 when series production was said to have
begun. Subsequent information indicated that the
ES-1020 was being redesigned at the Minsk Computer
Plant, and in December 1972, Gosplan Chairman
Baybakov implied that production would begin in
1973. Although this model was still undergoing
acceptance testing by a small number of users in
mid-1973, the ES-1020 probably is now in limited
production.
33. In Eastern Europe, Bulgaria was the first
to exhibit a prototype of the ES-1020 -- at the
Plovdiv Fair in late 1971. Czechoslovakia claims
to have built a successful prototype of its version
of the ES-1020 (the ZPA-6000/20 intended mainly
for internal use) and said that production might
begin in 1973. East Germany's version of the
ES-1020 (the ROBOTRON-21, also designed primarily
for internal use) is behind schedule too, although
a few units have been built and installed.
34. Little is known about production of the
more advanced RYAD models. The ES-1030 has been
"recommended" for production in the USSR, and
Poland claims to have produced a working prototype.
1 A
Approved For Release R"
LrT
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 SEtI FDP79T01098A000100150001-9
Czechoslovakia's version of the ES-1030 is still
in the design stage. East Germany may have built
two experimental models of the ES-1040. The two
largest RYADs, the ES-1050 and ES-1060, require
special integrated circuits that are only in exper-
imental production in the USSR.* The USSR has
built a prototype ES-1050 and plans to produce
five more experimental ES-1050s this year; the
ES-1060 is still in the design phase.
35. The delay in the RYAD program is the result
of a number of factors, especially a shortage of
some critical components. The limited output of
high-quality integrated circuits has been shared
with other high-priority claimants, such as pro-
ducers of military equipment and ASVT process con-
trol computers. There are also problems with the
supply of peripheral equipment. Magnetic disc
peripherals, needed for every RYAD installation,
are still in short supply despite years of develop-
ment. The USSR has found too that compatibility
between computers and peripheral equipment requires
close tolerances that are difficult to obtain. In
this regard, the RYAD, like all Soviet computer
projects, has been handicapped by a failure to
apply automated production techniques or computerized
on-line testing technology. Software development
also has lagged. The RYAD program was supposed
to capitalize on the software used in the IBM 360
series, but it has proved more difficult than ex-
pected to adapt IBM software or to modify the RYADs
to handle the IBM software.
36. Above all, the RYAD program is suffering
from the same lack of effective direction, coordi-
nation, and control that has plagued Soviet computer
development over the years. A recent Pravda article
deprecated the duplication in research an the mis-
allocation of skilled labor resources among
scattered institutes, ministries, and departments.
Even so, no single authority, as far as is known,
has been vested with responsibility to bring about
the necessary coordination.
These circuits are emitter-coupled logic (ECL)
integrated circuits rather than transistor-
transistor logic (TTL) devices to be used in all
other models. ECL, which is significantly faster
than TTL, is needed for the very high speeds re-
quired by the ES-1050 and ES-1060 models.
Approved For Release 2000/05/1 %EQJA.PP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05$tRt=RDP79TO1098AO00100150001-9
Western Assistance
37. The West has played a small but crucial
role in the RYAD program. Early in the program a
number of IBM 360 series machines were approved
for export to Eastern Europe and hence became
available for Soviet inspection. In addition,
critical RYAD components are being manufactured
with the help of production machinery acquired,
both legally and illegally,* from firms in the
United States, Western Europe, and Japan. To manu-
facture multilayer printed circuit boards, for ex-
ample, the USSR purchased several dozen precision
spray-etching machines,** mostly from the United
States, valued at about $2 million,~and an unknown
number of lamination presses and numerically con-
trolled drilling machines from the United Kingdom.
The USSR also reportedly purchased two complete
printed circuit manufacturing plants from France.
The USSR now is interested in buying more advanced
US technology and machinery for manufacturing
printed circuit boards.
38. The COCOM embargo has hindered the USSR in
its efforts to acquire technology and machinery to
produce integrated circuits. Still, much US,
British, Japanese, and French equipment has found
its way to the Soviet Union and is being used to
make integrated circuits in Soviet laboratories
and plants. So far the USSR has been unable to
buy complete plants to produce ICs, but inquiries
in the West continue.
39. The USSR also has sought to purchase com-
plete US plants to manufacture magnetic tape,
magnetic disc packs,*** disc drives, magnetic cores,
and printers -- all based on highly automated
(computer-controlled) production and test techniques.
Some equipment to manufacture disc drives has been
acquired from Japan and France.
That is, outside established COCOM embargo
channels.
** Chemical milling machines used to etch out
electrical patterns of printed circuit boards.
*** A recent application by a US firm to export
two separate plants to produce magnetic tape and
disc packs, valued at nearly $50 million, was
denied by the US Government.
17
Approved For Release 2000/05/g1RCiI tDP79TO1O98AOOO1OO15OOO1-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 CIA 79T01098A000100150001-9
Prospects
40. The likelihood that RYAD computers will be
produced on a large scale by 1975 -- several thou-
sand per year -- is poor. No new facilities for
assembling RYAD central processing units are known
to be under construction. Neither does the massive
conversion of existing floorspace from the produc-
tion of second-generation machines appear to be
taking place. To the contrary, the Minsk Computer
Plant, originally designed to produce RYADs, now
is scheduled to continue to produce the obsolete
MINSK-32 in 1973-75. Indeed, these machines are
being improved, and output is scheduled to grow
from 300 units in 1972 to 900 units in 1975. The
MINSK-32 rather than RYAD, according to recent
Soviet press statements, will serve as the basic
machine in the automated systems of management
being set up during 1973-75.
41. Even after 1975, mass production of RYAD
computers will be difficult without substantial
help from Western manufacturers. The USSR can be
expected to press its efforts to acquire machines
and technology for automated assembly of central
processing units as well as other computer-related
equipment and technology. The value of the pro-
duction equipment and technology that the USSR
might import over the next few years could range
from $100 million to $200 million. The Soviets,
however, are not likely to purchase many (several
hundred) IBM computers; the Soviets have stated
emphatically that they are firmly committed to
RYAD and are not interested in large numbers of
used computers.* Any machine imports will be
restricted to high-priority needs for which
Soviet computers clearly are not adequate. These
purchases, however, will involve large expensive
computers for use in complex applications and
could result in sales of several hundred million
dollars during the next three to four years.**
At a recent press conference, D.M. Gvishiani,
Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Science
and Technology, stated: "We are not interested
simply in buying computers, even if credits are
available."
** The USSR reportedly has signed a multimillion
dollar contract with [footnote continued on p. 191
18
Approved For Release 2000/05/159?P79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/1 k DP79T01098A000100150001-9
The USSR would also purchase IBM 360 applications
programs for use with RYADs if these could be
obtained on a single-price no-royalty basis.
Such programs would be especially useful in
fostering increased industrial productivity.
42. The least complex RYAD models -- ES-1010,
ES-1020, and ES-1030 -- will probably be produced
on a small scale in Eastern Europe and the USSR in
1973-75. Small numbers of ES-1040s also may be
produced by East Germany. All these machines are
based on electronic circuit elements that already
are in production. A few experimental production
models of the ES-1050 will be built, although the
most advanced RYAD machine -- the ES-1060 -- may
not even reach the prototype stage.
43. The RYADs that are produced are likely to
fall short of Western standards, just as the com-
puters now in use do, despite the RYAD's reliance
on IBM designs. The USSR lacks the newest tech-
nology for testing components, quality assurance
techniques (including zero-defect and other stand-
ardized manufacturing procedures) are only now
being adopted, and the labor force is less skilled
than its Western counterparts. The operational
effectiveness of RYAD computers probably will be
further limited by shortages of external random
access storage devices, display terminals, and
high-speed data transmission equipment.
44. The crash program to increase the number of
systems programmers is likely to fail. Most pro-
grammers are being trained in Soviet universities,
many of which do not even have a computer and none
have RYADs. In any case, 50,000 systems analysts
cannot be trained adequately in universities on an
accelerated basis. In the United States, several
years of highly specialized post-university training
sponsored by computer manufacturers is generally
needed to reach professional standards. As in the
past, trainees are to be "programmer-mathematicians."
The mathematical training, which may have been use-
ful for programming past Soviet computer systems,
IBM for large computers to handle the scheduling
and reservations for Intourist. IBM apparently
has also been chosen to provide the computers for
management and automation of the Kama Truck Plant.
Approved For Release 2000/05/ARCRIAjRDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/155k'bP79T01098A000100150001-9
takes time and is not needed for RYAD's high-level
languages. Finally, to be fully effective, pro-
grammers need in-place training at the user fa-
cility -- training that the USSR does not generally
provide.
45. When the RYAD program finally gets into
high gear, it probably will keep the Soviet com-
puter industry technologically inferior to those
in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
Soviet industrial practices will tend to freeze
the RYAD design and prevent the modifications and
improvements needed to stay abreast of changes in
technology. In fact, the hardware and software
technology embodied in the RYAD design is being
superseded rapidly in the United States. IBM has
introduced an advanced 370 series of computers
that incorporate across-the-board hardware improve-
ments and more efficient concepts of operating
software.
46. Meanwhile, it may take some time for RYADs
to be used efficiently. Technical manuals and
other documentation are not yet available, making
it difficult for the user to choose among the
various RYAD models. In addition, because the
programmers, systems analysts, and technicians
are not being trained on RYADs, many users will
have to rely on specialists who will have to learn
as they go.
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 g IIEJP79T01098A000100150001-9
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Secret
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
 g
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
the DD /I and DDS&T. This is a repared by Rating forms will be completed
nd information must be gathered in apformatted fashion. Therefore, each analyst will complete
machine-supported system a legibly. Questions should be directed to
the NON-SHADED parts of section I and II of this form. Please type or print
1-_ 11 'Sr Yd773 (block).
SECTION I - PUBLILA I IvI~ u i n - _ _
NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF RATER
1"6
0 1
TITLE
(24-80)
vj_ '.t-._RYA -comP erPr'o_gra-
CARD 2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXOXXXXXOXXXXX
JOIN
2
'=TOPICAL CATEGORY
IS W4 %pg*AEFDRM01098A0MQL18PARg -9
USE OF INFORMATION FROM COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN FINISH
/EY NO.
RECORD DATE PUBLISHED PUBLICATION NUMBER
TYPE (9-12)
8 MO Y.
Domestic Politics
International Relations
Economics
Military
Science & Technology
Geography
Biography
LIST SPECIFIC COUNTRIES:
lane and
_8)
REC TYPE
GEOGRAPHIC AREA CATEGORY
USSR
Eastern Europe
Communist China
Other Far East
Near East
South Asia
Africa
Latin America
Western Europe
Czechosi vakiaa? East German
TO BE COMPLETED BY IRS
TOPIC
(11-L2)
AREA
(13-16)
F
se /05/1 (10-13-43)
FORM 3492
OSR I 106_c S
TYPE O OCI "03 02 OER ' -
I 04 OBGI i 06 CRS
SECRET
T OFFICE (specify):
FOR OCI ONLY
CIB PUBLICATION DATE
 For each collection program contributing information to the publication, check only the highest rating that is applicable.
More than one collection program may be rated as Key, Supplemental, or Incidental for each publication. If the source did not
provide any reporting useful in the publication, check the box labeled Not Applicable.
If a single publication treats more than one geographic area and/or topical category and the source mix for each varied
then additional forms must be completed; e.g. India-economics-State and Japan-economics-CS.
Rating categories are defined as follows:
Key-Information from a particular collection program was of such importance that basic conclusions of the finished
intelligence item could not have been reached without it.
Supplemental-Information from a particular collection program was important but not essential to basic conclusions of
the finished intelligence item.
Incidental-Information from a particular collection program was useful or interesting primarily as background but was
used only incidentally in the finished intelligence item.
CARD COL
COLLECTION PROGRAMS
(17)
1. OVERHEAD IMAGERY
(19)
2. COMINT 25X1 B
(21)
3. ELINT
(23)
4. TELEMETRY
(25)
5. RADINT
(27)
6. DEFECTOR RPTS (CSK'S)
(29)
7. CS REPORTS
(31)
8. STATE REPORTS
(33)
9. DOD REPORTS
(35)
10. DCS REPORTS
(37)
11. FBIS PRESS, RADIO & TV REPORTS
(39)*
Translation of Foreign Lang. documents
12. by FBIS, JPRS, etc.
(40)
(41)*
13. Non-USIB Agency Rpts. (USIA, AID, other
such reports)
(43)*
14. Open Literature (professional journals,
US wire ser., items, etc.)
(45)*
15. OTHER
*For Items No. 1 2, 13, 14, and 15 specify source of reporting used.
(56-60)
TRANSLATIONS: FBIS; JPRS
USIB AG , Y(S):
NON
-
r><
OPEN LITERATURE: soviet C.'ybernet.ic3 Revi6W Rand Corporation
OTHER:
DOCUMENT TYPE (61-62
01 CIB
03 GM
05 M
07 IR
09 RA
02 GH
04
06 GR
08 R
10 Weekly Review-Spec Rpt
63 64
(65-69)
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
I
(
CLASSIFICATION CONTROLS: NFD
List CS Information Reports that were key or supplemental information sources:
NOTE:A ' IdIF&IM t or
 SECRET
an Pillnrl T
RECORD OF REVIEW OF OER PUBLICATIONS FOR StUUKIIY/SANIIILAIIUN ArrKVVA L
SUBJECT ]
V U /
A
BrL117)1222 C -
SECURITY REVIEW
SECURITY
SAN I T I SANITIZINb INSTRUCTIONS
ITEM
DATE
INITIALS
REMOVE
UNEDITED DRAFT
EDITED DRAFT
25X1 Afg ^ ^
DELETE
RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN RECIPIENT
YES
NO
25X1 C
SUBSTITUTE
C 1~ F 3 i S, ~l l2 S .t~ow.s.
'
FORM n~GO OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
4-70 L :JP EDITIONS
s
SE RE
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
 FR RP 73-15, Soviet RYAD Computer Program (S/NFD)
Anal st.
Ap ro /d F se 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79TO1098AO
I)-,- Y1
,a i'0' - 0, Distribution List
0
Ronald A. Finkler
Jeremiah Kratz
Rauer Meyer
tJ
Ralph Piekarz - t
for RYAD Paper
National Security Agency
Institute for Defense Analysis
Atomic Energy Commission,
Division of Int'l Security Affairs
Department of Commerce?
Office of Export Control
Department of State, EB/ITP/EWT
Jean R. Tartter.
George R. Mounts,
Hylan B. Lyons, Jr.
David Elliot
--q Steve Farrar
Ruth M. Davis
r,?-, w- Weiss, Jr.
,, I v, Henry R. Engehausen
6 r)
e
Office of Management and Bu g
National Bureau of Standards L( S'
Council on International Economic
policy
E) sDT_ !S3
Department of State,- SCI
Department of State, SCI/SAM
U~~ a S science FOUndation-1
al Security Council
Miss Joanne Thomas
)
Lt. Col. Frank E. FravelHeadquarters USAF (AFNIAKA)
Fred E. Eichler -) L .-
pproved'F& Rel Me 0,0/ 5 A.
Nation
t
Army Foreign Science and Tech.
Center (FSTC)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DI-6)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DT)
Navy Intelligence Support
Center (NISC)
Foreign Technology Division (TDPT)
Department of the Air Force
IN R/RS G
Department of State
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
P.,t23Q10 A000480 50001-9
 fad.
Approved For Release 2000705/15: - 01-9
CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
SERIES NU BER
C, ? 0 a
CLAS ICATION F T
'? EPOP
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
DATE DOCUMENT
'3
NUMBER OF COPT S
/ 2e)
NUMBER IN PC
COPY Y
RECIPIENT
DATE
SENT
RETURNED
2
/
17 -leg
"P V--
r_ti~t
~v
STATINTL
see ,E
4 :Z>
2
aJ
STATINTL
2065 2353 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001491
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
COPY
NO. (S)
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
 (Project 11. 6381)
Approved- For Release 3 : CIA-RDP79TO1098A000100150001-9
CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 25X1A
DISSEM: 5 Sep 73 NO ELITE
SERIES NUMBER
ER RP 73-15
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
SECRET/NFD
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
35
DATE OF DOCUMENT
August 1973
NUMBER OF COPIES
130 f-qd = / 7d
NUMBER IN RC
COPY
DATE
NO.(S)
RECIPIENT
SENT
RETURNED
172
DDI
5 Sep 73
3
D/OtR
4
AD.D/OER
5 . ",
via O/D/OER 25X1A
'I
6 .'
SA/ER & D/ A/ER
TI
7 ~'
7
Ch'/D/U
8-
DCh/D/U
rr.
9
U/MC
10
s:t/1T 7-
I I
.A Ch / D / I
12
A.DCh/D/I
13
Ch/D/D
''
14
Ch/D/S
''
15
Ch/D/C
16
St``/SD
17
St /
GS
18
,
D/U
19-21
U/MC
22
U/CM
TI
23
U/EE
24
U /RE
TI
25
U /SI
TI
26
U/TD
27
U/SR
TI
28
SA/DCI 7D10
29
D/ONE
it
30
D/IRS
I'
31
Ch/DCD
I'
32, 33
OTR/SIWA 6TATSPEC
I'
34
I'
35
D CRS
TI
36
QRS/ISGZSAIO
IT
37
II
38
D/Oci
TI
39
II
40-50
51
52
IRS HR O s
311 Key Bldg.
TI
II
5 3
P
T'
54-73
External - erl___
OVER
FORM
Afroe 5-. I ~DJ:v1-9Tfl1
2353
2.68
uS ,
AMA 4(la)
 r=Ar%PQ.icrl For RPIPasP 000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9
COPY
A. royar1 For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP79T01098A000100150001-9