POOR QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR CONTRIBUTES TO FUTURE PROBLEMS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01003A001800050003-4
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 6, 2000
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 24, 1963
Content Type: 
BRIEF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T01003A001800050003-4.pdf1.93 MB
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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01800050003-4 CONFIDENTIAL Current Support Brief POOR QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR CONTRIBUTES TO FUTURE PROBLEMS CIA/RR CB 63-87 24 October 1963 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01800050003-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01800050003-4 This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01800050003-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001800050003-4 C -O-N-F-I-D-E -N- T-I-A-L POOR QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR CONTRIBUTES TO FUTURE PROBLEMS The poor quality of construction in the USSR has long been recognized by Soviet authorities to be a significant problem. Recent eyewitness re- ports by qualified Western observers and surprisingly candid articles in the Soviet press provide fresh insight into the nature of this problem and indicate that the USSR is increasingly aware of the need to improve the materials and technology of construction. Poor construction practices will force the Soviet authorities to make larger outlays for repair and maintenance or to allow buildings to deteriorate and be withdrawn from service earlier than would be normal for well-built and well-maintained structures. Poor construction also gives foreigners a very unfavorable impression and creates a measure of discontent among Soviet citizens. On the other hand, projects of highest priority in the Soviet construction program -- that is, projects of major importance to the development of key industries and advanced weapons systems - - generally would be of relatively good construction, at least functionally. Criticism by US Delegation The delegation of US construction men who made a 10, 000-mile tour of the USSR this year surveying industrial, hydroelectric, housing, high- way, and subway projects characterized Soviet construction as being of generally very poor quality. * The delegates, although aware of the pain- fully unattractive appearance of the monotonous, poorly built structures, were more concerned with making an evaluation of the quality of the basic construction. One delegate stated that with few exceptions the con- struction which the delegation was shown by the State Committee on Con- struction Affairs (Gosstroy) would not pass inspection in the US. The quality of materials, skill of labor, availability of power tools and modern The photographs in Figure l and 2 (following p. 2) are typical of the quality of construction at some of the sites chosen by the USSR to show the US delegation. When the delegates departed from the planned itinerary, they found some construction that was even worse. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001800050003-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001800050003-4 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L equipment, supervision on site, and quality control were all criticized. The delegates were critical of the basic structure (foundation, walls, and roof), which would require extensive repairs in the future. They did not think, however, that the structures themselves would collapse because of deficient engineering or workmanship. On the other hand, they were harshly critical of the finish (especially outside and inner wall surfaces and flooring) and the plumbing and wiring, contending that the work was so poor that a great deal of expensive repair work and replacement would have to be done in order to maintain the build- ings in proper operating condition. In sharp contrast to this general characterization, however, was the view of the delegates that a few high-priority projects which they saw were well executed. The Bratsk hydroelectric power project and the Irkutsk aluminum plant, for example, were rated as relatively good. Clearly these projects reflect the work of well-trained engineers, good designers, and competent organizers and managers, and they demon- strate that Soviet builders have the capability to perform creditable work on almost any kind of selected project. The lack of depth of such a capa- bility, however, is apparent from the observations of routine industrial and civic projects and housing, where the quality of construction decreases in approximate proportion to the decrease in priority. This judgment is consistent with that of earlier delegations, which concluded without reservation that Soviet construction was unbelievably poor. The harsher judgment by previous groups probably is the result of their exposure being limited mainly to housing construction and to the early stages of research and development programs. The 1963 delegation, on the other hand, had the advantage of a schedule :tilling for exposure to a far broader array of construction, including a number of high-priority projects. In addition, the 1963 delegation profited from the improved international relationships, for their Soviet hosts were much more willing to satisfy spontaneous requests to see projects that had not been included in the schedule. Thus the most recent judgment of US construction men is based on wider observation but nevertheless agrees with earlier judgments. C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001800050003-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01800050003-4 Thermal Electric Powerplant Under Construction at Kona- kovo, Kalininskaya Oblast. Note the disorderly house- keeping practices; the use of precast rather than poured-in-place concrete footings; and the failure of the reinforcing bars of the column to match those of the footing, making it difficult to weld the bars together. Thermal Electric Powerplant Under Construction at ona- kovo, Kalininskaya Oblast. Reinforcing bars do not match, and most of them do not even meet, making it im- possible to weld the footing to the column properly (it is the usual US practice to pro- vide an overlap equal to 20 times the diameter of the bars; in this case the bars were 1-1/2 inches in diameter). Thermal Electric Powerplant (TETs 21) Under Construction at Moscow. View from the top of the boiler; note the uneven joints of the precast concrete wall panels, a result of in- attention to details in cast- ing the panels. Figure 1. Illustrations of Faulty Construction practices at KonakOVO and Moscow, USSR ~pproved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01800050003-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12: CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01800050003-4 Cancer Research Center Under Construction at Leningrad. Mortar joints are not filled and pointed, thus allowing moisture to collect be- tween the bricks where the freeze-thaw cycle will cause damage to the exterior wail. tote also the large batch of mortar dumped on he ground and the piles of rejected bricks -- further evidence of shoddy workmanship and sloppy housekeeping. Precast Concrete plank in Tashkent. The precast concrete wall panel has an uneven surf ace and rough edges, a result of improper con- crete mix and dirty forms. Road Under Construction ac Bratsk. Woocir forms and crude screen.