THE SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY OF 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01018A000600030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1964
• Content Type: STUDY

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GEOGRAPHIC SUPPORT STUDY
THE SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY OF 1962
CIA/RR GS 64-6
March 196+
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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THE SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY OF 1962
CIA/RR GS 64-6
March 1964
Office of Research and Reports
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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THE SING-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY OF 1962
For the second time in this century (the first was in 1915) an initial
step has been taken toward an over-all settlement of the border between
Outer Mongolia and China. In Peking on 26 December 1962, envoys of the
respective regimes signed the newly drafted Boundary Treaty Between the
People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Mongolia.* The
treaty provides for the establishment of the Sino-Mongolian Joint Boundary
Survey Commission to survey the entire border and set up boundary markers.
Any potentially serious issues that may have been involved in the prelim-
inary talks have been rendered inconspicuous in the treaty itself, which
appears to be little more than a working paper that provides an ostensibly
temporary settlement. Much local confusion remains to be resolved. The
treaty does not bind the two countries to any specific time limit within
which the necessary surveying and mapping is to be undertaken. The
likelihood that final demarcation will actually be accomplished, however,
is greater now than in 1915 because the respective regimes apparently are
more stable and have better mapmaking facilities.
* For translations of the version released in Peking in the Jen-min
jih-pao for 26 March 1963, see JPRS 18,618 (15 Apr 63), JPRS 118,730
Errata; 17 May 63) and Current Background, No. 707 (American Consulate
General, Hong Kong, 9 Apr 63 . All three documents are UNCLASSIFIED.
For a translation of the version released in Ulan Bator in the newspaper
Unen on the same date, see JPRS 19,729 (17 May 63), UNCLASSIFIED.
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General Comments
An examination of the description of the border in translations of
the Chinese and Mongolian versions of the treaty reveals no obvious
imbalance of valuable territorial gains, although "paper" losses were
greater for the Chinese, whose original claims were less reasonable.
The areas affected by delimitation of the previously undefined border
are reported to total 70,000 square kilometers (27,000 square miles).
Of the 17,000 square kilometers (6,600 square miles) that were "in
dispute," about 12,000 square kilometers (4,600 square miles) reportedly
were awarded to Mongolia and the remainder to Communist China. The
document records, apparently, the best delineation of the border that
was possible in terms that could be agreed on at short notice by using
existing maps and without recourse to further field surveying. It
appears to confirm in a general way much of the status quo ante, and in
several sectors it eliminates Chinese claims that obviously were vague
and apparently somewhat irrational.
The locations of the several hundred boundary points that are men-
tioned in the first article of the treaty are not adequately known. To
locate them definitively, Article III establishes the Joint Boundary Survey
Commission and authorizes a complete survey of the boundary. Article II
identifies certain matters of potential local controversy -- the demar-
cation of the boundary where it follows a river or stream, the deter-
mination of ownership of existing islands or those that might appear, the
joint use of water from boundary rivers or from wells.and springs on the
boundary line, and the joint use and management of boundary roads under
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arrangements to be determined later -- and on these points records agree-
ment in principle between the contracting parties. The fourth and final
article provides for ratification of the treaty, which took place on
26 March 1963 at Ulan Bator.
In the fourth article the statement that the Chinese and Mongolian
texts are equally valid takes a great deal for granted. Article I of
the treaty actually, presents not one but two descriptions of the border,
which have been combined into a single statement. Each country has
given. precedence in the text to its own preferred description of each
boundary point, followed in parentheses by the alternative description
that is preferred by the other country. An examination of the two descrir-
Lions thus combined in Article I suggests that the maps and surveys put
forward by the two sides to support their respective views often disagreed.
More often than not, for example, the Mongolian and the Chinese versiono
differ in their selection of both place names and elevations of border
points. Neither text gives any locations by compass bearing or coordi-
nates. Some selected border points are given by distance and direction
only, usually (but not always) in relation to another point or to a terrain
feature such as a height of land. The distances that are mentioned, however,
are short and are stated only to the closest 50 or 100 meters.* They pro-
bably are meant to be no more than ground directions for the survey group
to follow.
The maps that are appended to the treaty are stated to be in Chinese and
in Mongolian and are at the scale of 1:1,000,000. At such small scale, it
* Measurements in the treaty and throughout this report are given in the
metric system.
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would be impossible to resolve minor differences. To gain greater corre-
spondence of the local data that are presented in the two proposed delin-
eations, maps at larger scales or suitable aerial photography would be
needed. If there is no other basis for agreement than that which is
stated in the treaty, then grounds for local controversy remain and may
engender dispute. Some undisclosed substitute for suitable maps, possibly
aerial photographs that were mutually acceptable, may have served as the
actual basis for agreement on the identification of selected border points.
Such photographs would have provided the reference points that are men-
tioned in the treaty and that would have been impossible to locate on the
1:1,000,000 maps appended to the treaty. It is difficult to conceive of any
other way in which the two countries could achieve agreement on the selec-
tion of border points despite the lack of agreement on names and elevations
for most of the points along the entire border.
Official maps are not available in Washington, but other maps used in
conjunction with the text of the document suffice to locate many of the
points that are identified in the treaty by name, by elevation, or by both.
Of the several hundred points that were mentioned in the treaty as being in
agreement, about 60 have been identified within reasonable limits of proba-
bility. These 60 points form the basis for this assessment of the new
border treaty. More points were identified in those sectors where the pro-
posed new border follows the old border as defined on Soviet and US maps
than in those sectors where it appears to have been revised.
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Detailed Comments
West of the 92d meridian, in the region of the Altai Mountains and
on the eastern fringes of Dzungaria (see Sector A on Map 39198), the
Chinese have surrendered their extensive "paper" claims of recent
years and seem to have adopted the border roughly as it appears on
the 1958 edition of the standard Soviet series of hypsographic maps at
the scale of 1:2,500,000.
The area of eastern Sinkiang between 91+? and 960 East (Sector B),
which the Chinese Communists in recent years have assigned to Mongolia,
reverts to China according to the new treaty,
Between 960 and 1100 East (Sector C) the border apparently follows
closely the boundary that is shown on Soviet maps. This sector includes
the area north of 0-chi-na Ho (Etsin Gal), where the boundary passes
within 16 kilometers north of Gashuun Nuur (Chia-yen Hai) and apparently
near the 1,000-meter elevation. (Soviet and US maps differ on elevations
in this area.)
For an airline distance of slightly more than 550 kilometers between
110? 30' and 116? East (Sector D) the border alignment cannot be firmly
ascertained from the text of the treaty. West of the international
highway and railroad in the Erh-lien -- Dzamiin UUde zone, the Mongolians
may have yielded territory that lies north of the border as now shown on
Soviet maps. The only points that could be identified in this zone lie
within the northernmost stretch of 15 kilometers. The new border appears
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to run parallel to the highway and railroad for a few kilometers but not
for the entire 80 kilometers shown on Western maps. It is likely that
the border depicted on Soviet maps to the east of the railroad is still
valid generally but not in detail, The Chinese claims in this area
were depicted vaguely and probably have been eliminated.
The rest of the border (Sector E) extends eastward from 1160 East to
a prominent peak and from there runs generally northward and westward to
the Siberian border. This sector of the border has been redefined selec-
tively and appears to represent a combination of segments of the various
preexisting claims. Buyr Nuur (Pei-erh Hu), a lake near which in the
past there has been occasional border friction, apparently has been
redivided between the two countries. The larger part probably remains in
Chinese hands. For the most part the boundary east and southeast of the
lake now tends to follow streams in accordance with the earlier Chinese
claims instead of following the cross-country lines that are shown on
Soviet maps.
The border extends a bit farther eastward than it has been shown pre-
viously on any map. The easternmost point is the prominent peak that is
mentioned above, and the problem of its identification is typical of some
of the problems encountered in the study of this treaty. On Soviet and
US maps the peak is shown at approximately 46039'N-119055'E, but it is
not named, and no elevation is indicated. The name Bogd Uul, which is
given to this peak in the Mongol version, means merely "Holy Mountain," and
this is not very specific. Soyoldz Uul (So-yUeh-.erh-chi Shan), the name
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which is given to the peak in the Chinese version, means "mountain at the
corner point." The only mountain bearing this name appears on a map of
questionable reliability, on which it is located 42 kilometers west-
southwest of 46?39'N-119?55'E. The confusion of names is immaterial, how-
ever, if, as seems likely, the mountain is uniquely conspicuous in the
surrounding region and if it can be identified on aerial photographs. In
accepting this peak as a border point, the Chinese Communists have relin-
quished some territory on the west-facing slopes of the watershed, but
have apparently gained territory on the northeastern bank of the Halhaiin
Gol (Ha-lo-hsin Ho, Ha-la-ha Ho, Halhyn Gol, Khalkhin Gol).
The juxtaposition of two descriptions of the same border is at the
root of the formidable complexity of Article I. Typically, in the Chinese
version, the preferred Chinese rendition of a Mongolian place name (with
an elevation stated in some` instances) is followed in parentheses by the
Chinese rendition of a different Mongolian place name (and a different
elevation, if any). The parenthetical information is the same description
of the point as was put in a preferred position in the Mongolian version.
The Mongolians have followed the same editorial practice but have reversed
the order of the entries.
The border point that is cited at the end of Paragraph 15 and again at
the beginning of Paragraph 16, in both versions, provides an example of
the textual rearrangement that results from this practice. The Mongolian
version reads: Tsagaan Nuuryn Oboo (Bumbatyn Oboo); the Chinese version
reads: Pen-pa-t'ai-yin Ao-pao (Ch'a-kan-no-erh Ao-pao . . . ). The
complexity is compounded when the points of reference themselves are dif-
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ferent. For example, the point that is cited at the end of Paragraph 18
and the beginning of Paragraph 19 is called Pa-yen-hu-shu [Sayan Hushuu]
by the Chinese but no elevation is given. The same point is unnamed by
the Mongolians, who described it simply as a point about 4 kilometers west
and somewhat north of the Jargalant Uhaa Oboo [Chi-erh-chic-lang.tTu-hua
Ao.pao], at an elevation of 1,296.6 meters. The only assurance that the
points that are described actually are identical is the fact that both
descriptions are contained in both versions of the treaty and that Article
IV states that both versions have equal validity.
The reader may find in the treaty one or two elevations for each point
or none at all. He may find one or two place names of Mongolian linguistic
origin -- each of which is transcribed twice, once directly from the
Mongolian and once from the Chinese transcription -- or he may find none
at all. Thus the range of choice in interpretation of the text of the
treaty is very wide indeed. If all this duplicative information is equally
valid, then the over-all validity of the unreconciled information in the
treaty is questionable.
Further evidence of failure or inability to reconcile data used in the
treaty is suggested by analysis of the 27 points that begin and end the 26
paragraphs of Article I.* Those that have been identified appear to be
easily located reference points that could be used to terminate segments
of the boundary. Their prominence in the text suggests that they are the
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principal points of reference in the treaty and that they set the limits
within which discrepancies or unresolved claims pertaining to intervening
points should be reconciled. In only 15 instances, however, do the eleva-
tions preferred by the two parties agree. In only 8 instances do the name
preferences agree. In 8 instances both the preferred names and the pre-
ferred elevations disagree, and the basis for agreement on selecting these
points as points is not stated.
The anchor point atthe western end of the boundary (see Map 39198)
is important because of its primary location in any delineation of the
boundary. In both the Mongolian and the Chinese versions the elevation
of this point is given as 4,050 meters. If the peak that is mentioned in
Paragraph 1 is the same as the one at the trisection of the Mongolia-
USSR-Sinkiang border (49?08'N-,87?45'E),* which is shown on a recent Soviet map
as being 4,355 meters above sea level, there is an unexplained difference
in elevation of 305 meters, or about 1,000 feet. On available maps, it is
impossible to identify the western anchor point with reference to the
highest elevation of the mountain that is mentioned in the text, for
which the Chinese prefer the name of K'uei-t'un Shan or Huyten Uul, and
the Mongolians prefer Taban Bodg Uul or T'a.-pen--po-ke Ta-wu-la. The
Chinese call the associated mountain mass simply the A-erh-t'ai Shan-mo,
or Altai Mountains, whereas the Mongolians prefer.a more proprietary
designation, the Mongol Altayn Nuruu, or Mongolian Altai Mountains. The
two countries also qualify somewhat their agreement on the anchor point
* Location given in an official gazetteer. The location on AMS:Series
1301, Sheet NM 45, is )+901O'N-87?47'E.
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in the east. The Mongolians in their version call it the 645.0-meter
elevation point of Tarbagan Dahyn Oboo, whereas the Chinese call it the
645.5-meter point northeast of TTa-erh-ken-no-erh, or Targan Nuur. It
appears that locations of only a few points along the entire border are
known accurately. These points probably are the major peaks and the
anchor points at the two ends of the border. For the segments between
these few known points, the Chinese Communists and the Mongolians
apparently have attempted to reconcile two sets of data that are only
partially reconcilable.
Recent progress in the establishment of an independent capability for
accurate surveying facilitates the Chinese Communist commitment to partic-
ipate in a new survey. The Chinese Communists probably can now establish,
for the first time, the precise locations of points along the Sino-
Mongolian border by using their own first-order triangulation net, which
is based on the Peking datum. (Nationalist Chinese surveying was based
on the Nanking datum.)
Evaluation of the long-range prospects for future accord or dispute
over territory would be facilitated by the acquisition of more detailed
maps of the border areas. For the present, it appears that: (1) some
territory in the west was exchanged -- the Chinese claims to the Mongolian
portions of the Altai range-were abandoned, the border in the Baydag Bodgo
mountains apparently was fixed at the ridge line, and part of the Gobi
Desert northeast of Hami was recovered by China; and (2) some territory
in the east also was exchanged -- Mongolian claims to territory northeast
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of Halhaiin Gol were abandoned in lieu of an extension of the border
eastward to the main ridge of the Greater Khingan Range. It also appears
that some readjustment was made, probably a reduction in length, in the
stretch of border that formerly paralleled the Trans-Mongolian Railroad
for 85 kilometers; and that there was a substantial surrender of ambitious
but unjustified Chinese claims along the rest of the border.*
The stated details on which the treaty is based may be quickly super-
seded as a basis for Sino-Mongolian border relations or they may con-
ceivably have to stand for an extended period. Pretexts for haggling
about any part of the border undoubtedly can be found if it is the inten-
tion of either party to be disagreeable. Final accomplishment of the
boundary demarcation will depend to a large extent on the tides of inter-
national politics and internal developments in the respective regimes.
Technical factors pose no inherent obstacles to completion of the planned
survey, but a vast amount of detailed mapmaking remains to be done.
* See map attachment (CIA Map Library Call No. 1+8086; UNCLASSIFIED) to
portrayal of former claims along the border.
for a schematic
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CEN. RA.L INMLMENCE AGENCY
Geography Division, ORR
Project Initiation Memorandum
Project No. 60.2216
28 December 1962
1. Subject of Proposed Pro~ectx Assistance to Office of Current
nt,e igence.
2. Statement of Problems As an outgrowth of the transfer to OCT of
OBI a sa s Research Division and of changes in the world scene, we
anticipate increases in OCI business. Most of this will involve
cases in which Geography Division analysts are called on to
provide informal assistance by answering spot queries and pro-
viding substantive advice on matters within our competence.
Singly, no one of these cases requires a significant expenditure
of D/GG time; collectively, they will represent a significant
bloc of manhours. More substantial requests will be separately
reported on and approval sought.
3.
Regsners OCI.
4.
Responsible Anal stsi
All analysts, all branches.
5.
Completion Datcr Continuing.
6.
Comments.- This project initiation memorandum is mainly to
facilitate record keeping, and compares with similar "umbrella"
projects for odd services to ERA, ONE, and OSI.
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19 i qA- P79T 1Q B, Q 001-2
Title of Report -M0NG0~TT iiT BOF R TREATY OF 19 Date March 1961~
Li"'f`fC
s ationj/
Report No. CTS GS _.6 P 60.2116E-_ Control OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Requester OCI (originally)__
Analyst/Branch GGZF Graphics Map 39198
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1 - 3 To Ch G for ODD/I and AD 1 March 64
11-5 ONE
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To St/P/C for dissemination per attached list
29 and 31 thru 39
17 March 64
2b
GG/F
27
Circulated in D/GG
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28
St/P/G
30
40
D/GG
Remarks:
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