TERRITORIAL AND SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEMS OF THE ARCTIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01018A000300020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1960
• Content Type: IR

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? 31
TERRITORIAL AND SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEMS
OF THE ARCTIC
CIA/RR GR 60-1
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. D
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March 1960 CLASS. CHANGED TO: S
NEXT REVISW DATE: ~
AUTu. uR 'fn n
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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CONFIDENTIAL
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This material contains information a..>`ecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage. laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and. 794, the ,rans-
mission or revelation of which in any r.anner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited y law.
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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
TERRITORIAL AND SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEMS
OF THE ARCTIC
CIA/RR GR 60-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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Mf tol
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Limits of the Arctic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Arctic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. Strategic Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
D. Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
E. Sociological Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II. Patterns and Problems of Territorial Jurisdiction . . . 8
A. Development and Status of Main Political Patterns 8
B. Sector Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Territorial Seas and Exclusive Fishing Zones . . . 12
D. Installations on Floating Ice . . . . . . . . . . . 14
E. Air Space . . ? ? 15
F. Politico-Legal Status of US Arctic Bases in Foreign
Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
III. Special Problems With Jurisdictional Implications . . 17
A. Conceptional Disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. Inspection Zones, Demilitarization, and Inter-
nationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. East-West Cooperation in Arctic Research . . . . . 19
D. Arctic Warming Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
E. Arctic Use and Testing of Scientific-Military
Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
IV. Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A. Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B. Outlook for Resolving Jurisdictional Problems . . . 21
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Appendixes
Appendix A. SZpplementary Information . . . . .
1i Strategic Areas . . . . . . . .
21 Military and Scientific
Developments . . . . . . . . .
Appendix B. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . .
Appendix C. Source References
Maps
Bathymetric Map of the Arctic Basic
(Unnumbered)
Soviet Landin Sites in the Polar Basin
(27375) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet Drifting Stations in the Polar Basin
(27669) . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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23
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24
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27
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29
Following Page
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31
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31
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31
Territorial Sea and Sector Claims in the Arctic
(28214) . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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TERRITORIAL AND SOVEREIGN'T'Y PROBLEMS
OF THE ARCTIC
Summary
The Arctic, consisting mainly of a large, ice-covered sea and the
lands bordering it, occupies a pivotal position in the midst of the
major centers of world population and production. Currently the Arctic
is important as a buffer between the USSR and the NATO countries, as a
source of raw materials, as future living space, and as an area vital
to the scientific investigation of physical phenomena of the earth. The
USSR has long led and apparently still leads the world in Arctic re-
search and development because, among other reasons, much of its land
area and its only long coast lie in the far north. Recent scientific
and technological advances such as improved aircraft, intercontinental
ballistic missilesy'and atomic submarines capable of launching missiles
permit man to move and take hostile action in the Arctic in ways not
previously possible. This new operational freedom has reduced the ef-
fectiveness of the Arctic as a buffer area and has made the region a
critical military zone in which both the USSR and the NATO countries
have spent large sums on offensive and defensive installations. At
military bases on both sides of the Arctic, high standards of alertness
are maintained and much dependence is placed on electronic warning de-
vices. The improved means for moving about freely within the Arctic
and the resulting increase in the danger of incidents have caused gov-
ernments in the northern hemisphere to look anew at the limits of po-
litical control in the area and to weigh such matters as the limits of
territorial seas and airspace, the meaning of sector claims, and the
legal status of installations on floating ice. To alleviate the prob-
lems of the Arctic, "open skies" zones and schemes to demilitarize and
internationalize the area have been proposed, but efforts to adopt
plans of this type have thus far failed, largely because of the inabil-
ity of the major powers to agree on inspection arrangements. Although
the recent treaty providing for nonmilitarization of Antarctica insured
by inspection might be pointed to as providing a precedent, arriving at
a workable inspection plan for the Arctic will be a vastly more compli-
cated problem.
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I. Background
A. Limits of the Arctic
Astronomically, the Arctic is the north polar region bounded on
the south by the Arctic Circle (66?30'N). Although the Arctic Circle
is suitable for marking uniformity in length of daylight, it does not
conform to major natural boundaries involving climate, oceanography,
or vegetation. Because certain of the natural limits conform reason-
ably well among themselves, it seems most feasible to define the bound-
aries of the Arctic in climatological terms. The isotherm of 50?F for
the warmest month, provided also that the mean temperature of the cold-
est month does not exceed 32?F, has been found to be a suitable basis
for delimiting the Arctic (see map above). Generally, the isotherm of
50?F coincides with the northern limit of tree growth. Bordering the
Arctic is the sub-Arctic region, which is a zone of transition to mid-
dle latitudes. The sub-Arctic is defined as having average summer
temperatures exceeding 50?F for a period not longer than 4 months,
and a mean temperature not exceeding 32?F in the coldest month. Be-
cause the two regions merge into each other, it is virtually impossible
to consider the activities of man in the Arctic without including at
least part of the sub-Arctic. The territory covered in this study will
therefore include the entire area north of the isotherm of 50?F for the
warmest months, with the limitations noted above, and such portions of
the sub-Arctic as the discussion requires.
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B. Arctic environment
The Arctic region takes in the margins of two continental land
masses that nearly enclose a central water body, the Arctic Ocean,
which consists of two deep basins separated by a submarine ridge (see
Bathymetric Map of the Arctic Basin, following p. 31). Most of the
water flowing into the Arctic Ocean from the North Atlantic passes
between Svalbar and Norway, whereas the outflow passes mainly between
Svalbard and Greenland and to a smaller extent between Greenland and
the Canadian mainland. 11* Arctic-Pacific water exchange is negligi-
ble, being rest icted by the shallow channel through Bering Strait.
The Arctic Oceaa has a permanent cover of slowly circulating pack ice,
which in summer; retreats sufficiently to permit navigation along bor-
dering coasts f~r a season varying from a few weeks to 3 months. Two
important excepjions are (1) the waters along the north coasts
Greenland and the northernmost Canadian islands, which are not
ble at any timel and (2) the sea approaches to Murmansk, which
open to shippin~ all year as a result of the warming influence
of
naviga-
are
of the
Broad, mudd' flats are characteristic of much of the coast fring-
ing the Arctic Ocean, especially the USSR and Alaska sections; but the
coast also incl des areas of low, barren. rock hills and deeply indent-
ed fjords as we l as conspicuous mountain peaks. The largest icecap
in the Arctic cvers all of Greenland except the rocky coastal mar-
gins; smaller recaps are found in Svalbard and Franz Josef Land and
in Labrador. Mountain glaciers are common except in the European USSR
and western Sib4ria. The principal rivers that flow into the Arctic
Ocean (six in the USSR, one in Canada) are ice-free only in the late
summer.
Most Arctic areas have a mean annual precipitation of less than
15 inches, of which two-thirds is likely to fall as summer rain. The
amount of wintei snowfall generally decreases from south to north,
and some Arctic islands are almost free of snow in winter. 2/ The
blowing and dri~ting of snow during the .Arctic winter, however, im-
pedes both surface and air travel. Fog often blankets the sea and
nearby coasts it summer. Many climatological and glaciological signs
point to progre sive warming in the Arctic during the last century.
The determination of whether this constitutes a short-term trend or a
major climatic hange is an important scientific objective.
The scarce lant life of the Arctic lands has a distinct north-
south zonal arrangement. In the extreme north is the treeless tundra
For serially; numbered source references, see Appendix C.
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region characterized by vegetation consisting of lichens, mosses, and
clumps of grass in sheltered places and by much barren soil or rock.
The southern limit of the tundra is near the 50?F summer isotherm. To
the south, greater warmth in summer supports many species of grass,
widely spaced shrubs, and scattered small trees as well as lichens and
mosses. Farther south, this zone, which includes a large part of the
northern sub-Arctic, gives way to dense coniferous forest. 3/
Animal life is relatively abundant in the Arctic in spite of the
harsh environment. Caribou (reindeer), muskox, hare, and lemming
abound, along with the carnivores that feed on them -- fox, wolf,
lynx, bear, and members of the weasel family. Along the shores of the
Arctic Ocean and on the polar icepack are millions of seals, which in
turn are hunted by the polar bear. Walrus and whales are also present
but in smaller numbers. In the sea are flounder, cod, herring, char,
and mollusks; and the rivers and lakes support whitefish, trout, and
salmon. The tundra is the breeding ground of numerous birds such as
geese, ducks, gulls, auks, and petrels. J
Mans adjustment to the Arctic can follow either of two.courses:
the environment-adapted way of life of the Eskimo or a synthetic en-
vironment pattern based mainly on supplies imported from the middle
latitudes. Even with the best of imports, however, people conditioned
to the middle latitudes face formidable problems in adapting them-
selves and their ways to the Arctic. Critical among the problems are
those of adjusting to the limitations that extreme cold and strong
winds place on human activity. Adapting to the Arctic's great season-
al and diurnal variations in the length of daylight, twilight, and
darkness is also difficult. Another major problem for human occupance
is the permafrost (permanently frozen soil), which underlies all Arc-
tic lands except southern Greenland and most of Iceland. Permafrost
hampers construction activities of all types and presents particularly
serious problems in the fields of water supply, sewage disposal, and
transportation. Other factors retarding the activities of man are the
extensive areas of marshland that exist in summer and the hordes of
insects that breed in them.
C. Strategic Role
The northern hemisphere, of which the Arctic forms the center, is
the homeland of 90 percent of the human race and the site of most of
the earth's productive capacity. This pivotal position of the Arctic
was of little practical importance until reliable means were devised
for using the short trans-Arctic routes between developed areas far-
ther south. Improvement in long-range aircraft (followed by the cer-
tainty that successful intercontinental ballistic missiles would be
developed) provided the necessary means of communication and brought
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the central position of the Arctic into new focus. The march of sci-
ence and technology is continually adding new facets to the focal role
of the Arctic and is at the same time reducing its importance as a
buffer.
Many of the basic physical relationships of the earth that can be
investigated c my in the Arctic have acquired direct and indirect mil-
itary importance, and it is to be expected that this trend will con-
tinue, making~it increasingly difficult to separate the Arctic's stra-
tegic and sci4ntific roles. Such relationships include, for example,
weather and c .imate, geomagnetism, ionosphere and the propagation of
radio waves, and oceanography of the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent
seas.
Appreciation of the Arctic's strategic role has led the USSR and
the US to devElop extensive Arctic military installations, both offen-
sive and defensive, the latter involving radar facilities and support-
ing communications arranged to form warning networks. In the Soviet
Arctic the heaviest concentrations of military installations are now
located at the{ eastern and western ends, the areas nearest to non-
Soviet'territoky. In general, the same pattern is repeated in the
non-Soviet Arctic.
D. Economic Development
The economy of the Arctic is based mainly on extracting and proc-
essing mineral, fish, furs, and timber (the last being largely a
product of reg.ons immediately south of the Arctic proper) and on
smaller fabricating industries. Arctic products, for the most part,
move to middle latitude markets by sea and to a lesser extent by in-
land waterways{ land routes, and air.
Economic activity in the Arctic other than the survival economy of
aboriginal peo les is basically constricted between limited opportuni-
ties for profit and the high cost of importing food, fuel, and other
necessities, which, in short, have created a synthetic environment.
In many cases, however, the weighing of profit and loss is distorted
by direct and Indirect subsidies that Arctic economic activities re-
ceive from the mother countries -- subsidies motivated by consider-
ations of strategy and long-range planning.
Except in urine products, the Arctic apparently will never be
important as a?surplus food-producing area, but such food as can be
produced locally is of great significance as an influence on economic
development inother fields. For example, proximity to an area that
could supply half the food needs of a mining community might mean the
difference between profit and loss in the exploitation of a mineral
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deposit. Considerable effort is being directed toward the development
of crops and livestock that have been raised successfully in some
parts of the Arctic. There is no apparent reason why an expanding
Arctic population should not be able to produce its own fresh foods,
at least in summer, and some of its requirements in winter wherever
sufficient heat can be generated. 5/
Throughout the Arctic, great dependence is placed on radio for
communication, although the network of land lines is fairly well de-
veloped in the western portion of the Soviet Arctic. If the limits
of the Arctic are strictly interpreted, only one port in the region --
Murmansk, USSR -- is served by a railroad connected with continental
systems. However, a number of ports along the margins ofelhek Arctic
proper have continental rail connections, notably A
Narvik, Norway; and Churchill, on Canada's Hudson Bay. The oAlaskan
nly by
ports of Seward, Anchorage, Cordova, and Skagway are
local lines. In the Soviet Arctic, railroads and roads are limited
to the relatively populous west; in the east, there are no railroads
and roads are virtually nonexistent. The north-south trend of rivers
and mountains has retarded construction of east-west land routes in
the USSR and accounts in part for the emphasis that nation has given
to development of the Northern Sea Route. Roads are also scarce in
the non-Soviet Arctic, except in northern Norway. Canada's current
"develop the north" program includes road-building and railroad-build-
ing projects that will greatly improve land transportation in the
northlands. 61 The sled, drawn by dog, reindeer, horse, or tractor,
still has a significant role in the movement of man and his goods in
the Arctic. Tractor-drawn sled trains are likely to increase con-
siderably in importance. Inland waterway transportation is of con-
siderable importance in the Soviet, Canadian, and Alaskan portions of
the Arctic, but its possibilities are limited by short navigation
seasons. Air transportation has helped open up previously inaccessi-
ble Arctic areas, and most important centers are now served by civil
air lines. The cost of moving freight by air, however, still puts
sharp limits on the use of aircraft as a means of commercial trans-
port. Only a fraction of the potential for intercontinental civil
air routes across the Arctic can be realized in the present politi-
cally divided world. Routes now flown include Copenhagen-Los Angeles,
Copenhagen-Alaska-Tokyo, and Paris-Alaska-Tokyo..
E. Sociological Factors
The population of the Arctic, although now extremely sparse, seems
certain to increase in the next 50 years as pressure on the resources
of more favored lands becomes more intense.
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Over 1 million people now live in the Soviet Arctic north of the
tree line. Mbst of them are concentrated in the large port cities of
the Euro can 4rctic, such as Arkhangelsk (265,000) and Murmansk
(226,000), an4. in mining centers of the central Arctic, such as Norilsk
(106,000) and'Vorkuta (55)000). Populated places of less significance
include smaller mining towns, river ports, and military establishments.
Large areas ir4 the Soviet Arctic are still uninhabited, however, ex-
cept for small bands of indigenes. 7/
Even the mjost populous sections of the non-Soviet Arctic, such as
northern Norway and Iceland, cannot compare in population density with
the most high developed sections of the Soviet Arctic. The wholly
immigrant pop ation of Svalbard consists of some 2,700 Soviet and
1,000 Norwegiai nationals. Greenland has a population of some 28,000,
widely dispersed along its coast. In Canada, about 10,300 indigenes
and 800 whites live in scattered settlements along the Arctic shores.
The population of Arctic Alaska, totaling about 12,000, is also widely
scattered. In Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland the amber of
persons statio4ed at military installations is sizable.
The cultures of aboriginal Arctic peoples are gradually giving way
to the technigies of middle latitude civilizations, and examples of
yesterdays way, of life, which was entirely adapted to environment,
are now rare. With the mixing of cultures has come considerable ra-
cial mixing, and in many areas the line between aboriginal peoples and
immigrant peoples is hard to draw. 8/
II. Patterns and Problems of Territorial Jurisdiction
A. Developnent and Status of Main Political Patterns
Six countries hold jurisdiction over the lands of the Arctic re-
gion: the, US (Alaska), Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway,
and the USSR. they acquired title in various ways: by discovering,
laying formal c4aim to, and effectively occupying previously unknown
lands; by conquest, cession, and purchase; and, in the case of Iceland,
by grant of inr7pendence f
rom a former mother country
Most A
ti
.
rc
c
powers govern their northern territories from a distant capital, dele-
gating local res[ponsibility through a variety of governmental forms.
Within the Arctic realm, only Iceland is completely independent.
The entire A 'ctic region includes only two international land
boundaries: US (Alaska)-Canada and USSR.-Norway. The most recent
change in land b~Oundaries in the Arctic occurred in 1944 when Finland
ceded the Pechena (Petsamo) area to the USSR, thereby giving the USSR
and Norway a common boundary. Extension of this boundary through ter-
ritorial seas in the Varangerfjord area was the subject of a 10-year
dispute between Norway and the USSR that was not resolved until 1957. 91
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Lines of allocation drawn through the sea to divide the islands,
rocks, shoals, and, in some cases, territorial waters of one country
from those of another are not numerous in the Arctic. If the Varanger-
fjord line noted above is excepted, there are only three such lines of
allocation: (1) the US-Russian convention line of 1867 through the
Bering Strait; (2) the line dividing Greenland from Ellesmere and
other Canadian islands, a median line apparently without treaty basis,
which is shown on official Canadian maps but not on Danish maps; and
(3) the Svalbard treaty line of 1920, which encloses the islands of
the Svalbard Archipelago. None of these lines is now in dispute.
Existing Arctic sovereignty patterns are not currently being con-
tested actively. In recent years, however, disputes have arisen over
fishing rights and the limits of territorial waters, the latter being
challenged mainly because of fishing rights. The meaning and scope of
Canadian and Soviet sector claims has also been questioned (see Sec-
tion III B, p. 18). New scientific-military developments having
Arctic application, such as the atomic submarine, have not yet given
rise to disputes, but they have caused governments of the Northern
Hemisphere to look anew at Arctic sovereignty limits and to consider
such matters as the legal status of semipermanent installations on
floating ice, Arctic demilitarization schemes, and the possible need
for an international treaty law keyed specifically to conditions in
the Arctic.
The machinery through which governmental authority is exercised in
Arctic lands varies greatly in type and structure from country to
country. Iceland is an independent republic with a long democratic
tradition. Greenland, formerly in quasi-colonial status, became an
integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark in 1953. To date, however,
the effects of this constitutional change have been more theoretical
than real. The Arctic lands of Canada take in the northern extremi-
ties of two provinces (Quebec and Newfoundland) and parts of two ter-
ritories governed by commissioners. Many governmental functions in
the Canadian Arctic are exercised directly by departments of the na-
tional government. Alaska officially became the forty-ninth state of
the US on 3 January 1959. Some time will elapse, however, before
state governmental machinery is able to exercise all appropriate func-
tions. Soviet Arctic lands fall wholly within the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the largest of the 15 Soviet
republics. The breakdown among minor administrative units is to some
extent of a dual nature: a series of subunits drawn chiefly to serve
economic and administrative ends and a series that conforms to ethnic
patterns. 10/ Local autonomy, where established, is more form than
fact; authority belongs to the highly centralistic Communist Party.
In Norway the continental Arctic lands fall entirely within the north-
ernmost province, Finnmark, and are administered along democratic
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lines. Norway also administers, under special arrangements, Jan Mayen
Island and the Svalbard Archipelago. The unusual sovereignty status
and related governmental arrangements applicable to Svalbard warrant
special mention;
Norway acqured Svalbard through a 1920 treaty to which the USSR
is a party. Under this unique agreement, which called for complete
demilitarization, no country (including Norway) may keep under sur-
veillance the activities of the nationals of other treaty signers.
Thus the Sovieto are free to engage in mining and other activities,
including the operation of a fully equipped meteorological station.
The 1944 demandq of the USSR for additional rights in Svalbard were
rejected by theNorwegian Government. Norway's participation in NATO,
however, has added new facets to problems of the Svalbard area. De-
spite an explicit statement that NATO applies to Svalbard only if the
neutrality of the archipelago is violated, the USSR in 1951 strongly
protested Norway's role in NATO, regarding it as a violation of the
demilitarized status of Svalbard. 1
Svalbard ha$ no place in Norway's system of local government.
Norwegian authority in the islands is exercised by a governor, who
has wide powers and reports directly to the Norwegian national govern-
ment. Citizensof the USSR, the only non-Norwegians now in the archi-
pelago in significant numbers, manage their own affairs and have little
contact with th* Norwegians. Strict interpretation of the Svalbard
Treaty would require USSR citizens residing, in Svalbard to apply the
laws of Norway ,nd to use Norwegian tribunals, but this procedure has
not been followed. 12/
Canadian an. Soviet sector claims, the only ones made to date in
the Arctic, hav6 not yet caused serious international disputes, but
they have cast an aura of uncertainty over territorial jurisdiction
within the area. The "sector principle" on which the claims are based
says, in effect that all lands discovered or undiscovered, within a
spherical trian le formed by the North Pole and the easterly and west-
erly limits of country's Arctic Ocean coast, belong to the coastal
state concerned; or that this state should have at least a preferential
right to acquisition.
Canada's sector claim, first set forth in 1925, takes in all is-
lands known or 2pret to be discovered within the longitudinal limits
61OW and 141OW and extending "right up to the pole." 13 In 1928 the
Canadian Government forestalled possible Norwegian claims to certain
areas within th~ Canadian sector by paying the Norwegian explorer
Otto Sverdrup $67,000 "for his services." Norway then recognized the
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claim of Canada to the areas in question but specifically declined to
recognize the sector principle. In 1955, when a Soviet ice-floe sta-
tion drifted into the Canadian sector, there was much discussion in
official Canadian circles about the meaning of the Canadian sector
claim and as to whether the Soviets had "invaded" Canadian territory.
In debates that followed, it was brought out that Canada does not
claim sovereignty in any form over the high seas within its sector. 14
Nevertheless, in official Canadian circles the belief seems to be
fairly widespread that Canada perhaps should and eventually will exer-
cise some sort of sovereignty over the icecap within its sector. This
belief is evidenced by the following comments in a 1954 study of Cana-
dian boundaries:
Senator Poirier's "sector" [the Canadian sector],
therefore, still remains in an indefinite official
state, but it has recently come to take on added mean-
ing with the possibility that large areas of sea ice
may be used as airfields. If this possibility becomes
a reality, then the question of sovereignty over the
ice in "Poirier's sector" will no doubt have to be ex-
amined, for it will have some of the aspects and uses
of dry land. 15/
The Soviet sector claim, apparently inspired by the Canadian, was
put forward in 1926. It asserts Soviet sovereignty over all lands and
islands discovered or to be discovered in the sector from 32004'35"E
to 168049'30"W, except that acknowledged to be foreign territory
(Svalbard). 1 In writing on the decree of 1926., Soviet jurists have
gone beyond a mere claim to land, claiming as "open polar seas" (that
is, seas having a status "nearly identical with that of territorial
waters") all water areas within the Soviet sector. Sri In the opinion
of the Soviet jurists, this gives the USSR exclusive right to the air-
space above such seas. Whether the writings of these jurists should
be viewed as private opinions or-a-s quasi-official statements of Soviet
policy is uncertain. Consequently, what the Soviets actually include
in the claim for their sector is not known. In the late 1920's, Norway
protested the Soviet sector claim because it negated the Norwegian
claim to Franz Josef Land. The protest was not advanced vigorously,
however, and it is now clear that Norway's claim to Franz Josef Land
has been abandoned.
The US, Denmark, and Norway have not made Arctic sector claims and
do not recognize such claims or the sector principle. Iceland has no
basis for a sector claim, because the easternmost point of Greenland,
to the north, extends farther east than any part of Iceland.
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In its extensive scientific investigations on the Arctic icecap,
the USSR has not treated the claimed or unclaimed sectors of other
countries as inviolate. Conversely, it is noteworthy that the USSR
apparently did not protest on any of the several occasions in the
1950's when US-manned ice-floe stations circled into the Soviet sector.
Non-Soviet jurists have sharply criticized Arctic sector claims,
indicating that the sector principle has no basis in international
law. 18/ Proponents of the principle, however, claim among other
things that their theory is merely a variation of a common theme in
the evolution of boundaries. 19/
C. Territorial Seas and Exclusive Fishing, Zones
The territorial seas of Arctic countries present a number of prob-
lems, some of which are unique to the northlands, whereas others are
Arctic manifestations of world problems of long standing. The key
problem of the. latter type is the lack of international agreement on
the width and method of delimiting territorial seas. The USSR claims
a territorial sea 12 nautical miles in width; the US and Canada, 3
miles; Norway and Denmark, 4 miles; and Iceland, 4 miles plus an ex-
clusive fishing zone 8 miles wide. The Soviet territorial-sea claim
is confused by~(1) the Soviet sector claim and (2) the claim that
certain seas along the Soviet Arctic coast have the status of internal
waters -- the Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian Seas and part of the
Chuckchee .Sea. 20/ (See Map 2821+, following p. 31?)
Coastal states have exclusive fishing rights in their territorial
seas. Any seaward extension of their limits, either directly or by
means of special zones such'as Iceland's, curtails the fishing rights
of other countries. Non-Arctic countries that have long been depend-
ent on northern waters for major portions of their fish supplies are
not prone to take curtailment with equanimity. A world trend toward
broader territorial seas and exclusive fishing zones was given impetus
by the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, wherein Norway's method of
fixing the bas:line for measuring its territorial sea was approved by
the Internatio al Court of Justice. ' The Norwegian method involved
the drawing oflstraight base lines connecting outermost points on the
coasts and islands rather than the use of an irregular base line fol-
lowing the sinuosities of the coast. Effects of the trend are demon-
strated by the current dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland
regarding the letter's liberally drawn exclusive fishing zone, a dis-
pute which the USSR has been quick to exploit by propaganda and other
means. There are indications that Iceland's position or a modifi-
cation of it may be upheld eventually, but whether settlement in Ice-
land's favor will ward off or invite similar disputes in other Arctic
fishing areas ]remains to be seen.
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The 1958 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference failed to agree
on a uniform width for the territorial sea but did adopt rules cover-
ing the drawing of the baselines that separate internal waters (no
innocent passage permitted) from the territorial sea (innocent passage
permitted). Much freedom in the drawing of baselines is still left to
coastal states, however, particularly those with deeply indented or
island-bordered coasts. The 1958 Law of the Sea Conference also fail-
ed to lay down regulations on "historic waters." This question, which
was referred to the UN General Assembly for special study, is impor-
tant since it offers coastal states wide grounds for new and extensive
claims. 22 The Soviet claim to internal-waters status for seas along
its Arctic coast seems to be based in part on a "historic waters" ar-
gument. 23 Also noteworthy is the fact that Canada claims Hudson
Strait and Hudson Bay as internal waters on historic grounds. 21+/ A
second UN Law of the Sea Conference, scheduled for March 1960, will
attempt to resolve problems that the 1958 meeting left unsolved.
Should international agreement be reached on the width of the ter-
ritorial sea and related problems, application of the rules to the
Arctic will not be simple. In many Arctic areas, ice makes it diffi-
cult to fix the location of the shoreline, thus compounding the un-
certainty for those attempting to define territorial waters and for
navigators attempting to observe limits that have been defined. In
general, international legal practice has accepted the principle of
ignoring "temporary" ice coverage in delimiting territorial waters but
of taking cognizance of "permanent" ice formations such as shelf ice
or tongues of glaciers that project into the sea -- that is, treating
such projections as land. / The distinction between permanent and
temporary coastal ice has its uses and is fairly easy to apply where
temporary ice is involved. The permanent category, however, presents
problems such as determining whether the ice in question is indeed
permanent and dealing with "coastline" changes resulting from the wax-
ing and waning of ice. Theories as to how territorial seas should be
delimited in regions of permanent shore ice have had few tests because,
in areas where such ice occurs, the need for pinpoint definition of
territorial-sea limits has been negligible. The Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone adopted by the 1958 Law of the
Sea Conference makes no provision for ice, either permanent or tempo-
rary. It is noteworthy, too, that in preparatory work for the 1930
Hague Codification Conference the problems presented by permanent ice
along a coast were dismissed as not ripe for regulation. 26/
To date, disputes over territorial seas in the Arctic, as well as
over exclusive fishing zones, have focused mainly on fishery questions.
However, the advent of the atomic submarine, which vastly increases
possibilities for freedom of movement by sea in the Arctic, sets the
stage for problems of a new and more ominous type. Atomic submarines
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are uniquely suitable for collecting data in the Arctic and are cur-
rently being used for this purpose. Near the uncertain limits of
Soviet and nonSoviet territorial seas, this activity holds a poten-
tial hazard for serious international incidents. Clear, agreement-
backed definition of territorial-sea limits might alleviate the hazard
somewhat. On the other hand, it may be felt -- possibly on both sides
of the Arctic that, for the present, neat legality in the matter of
territorial-set definition would accomplish little and might even
prove disadvantageous by closing data-collecting doors that both sides
would rather keep open.
D. Installations on Floating Ice
The Soviets pioneered in the development of techniques for landing
aircraft on smooth ice floes of the Arctic Ocean and in 1937 estab-
lished the first ice installation to be occupied on a long-term basis.
Since then, seven additional Soviet drifting-ice stations have been
manned for periods long enough to warrant calling them "semipermanent,"
and many other landing sites have been occupied briefly (see Maps
27375 and 27669, following p. 31). Not until 1952 did the US man an
ice-drift station on a long-term basis, and the total icecap effort of
the West to date apparently has not matched that of the USSR.
To date the drifting of Soviet-manned ice floes into the non-Soviet
Arctic sectors (claimed or unclaimed) and vice versa has caused no
incidents or diplomatic protests, although the US and the USSR period-
ically reconnoiter each other's drifting-ice stations from the air. 27/
On or about 11 November 1959 a British newspaper reporter flying from
Alaska in a chartered aircraft (presumably US or Canadian) attempted
to land at Soviet drifting-ice station North Pole-8. The station per-
sonnel waved the aircraft off and blocked the airstrip with vehicles
and oil drums. At the time of the landing attempt the location of the
drifting-ice station was reported as 78?N-176?W, or about 800 miles
south of the North Pole, a position wel_ within the Soviet sector
claim but near its eastern limit. Apparently this was the first time
an aircraft of Western registry, either military or civil, had at-
tempted to land'at a Soviet drifting-ice station. 28/
The legal status of installations on floating ice has long been
cloudy. International law, insofar as it has spoken to the problem,
seems to regardtice installations as somewhat akin in status to ships
on the high seas. 29/ Some drifting-ice stations, both US and Soviet,
have been abandoned for periods of varying length and then reoccupied.
Whether legal title to supplies and equipment is retained while drift-
ing stations are unattended is a moot question. Thus far, there ap-
parently has begin no test case in connection with Soviet- and US-man-
ned drifting stations. On. the broader question of whether occupation
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of ice floes conveys any sort of permanent sovereignty, the answer of
international law seems to be "no." Bbhmert, a German legal authority,
wrote in 1938:
In that case [use of an ice floe as an air base
or scientific station] sovereignty over such a floe
would exist as long as the state authority was actu-
ally exercised. If the base were given up., the ter-
ritory would thereby be relinquished. 30/
Although Bbhmert makes light of the idea that scientific and re-
lated activities on the Arctic icecap might convey sovereignty, the
USSR may conceivably someday point to its numerous icecap landings and
drift-station tracks as evidence of effective occupation. Such evi-
dence might be advanced, for example, in an effort to broaden recog-
nition of the Soviet sector claim.
Since World War II the USSR and the NATO countries have developed
relatively inexpensive equipment that will, when placed unattended on
ice floes, automatically report meteorological and ice data by radio.
Under favorable conditions, such stations might remain active for
months. 31/ To date, use of unattended equipment in the Arctic has
not given rise to international disputes, but the basic question of
ownership of unattended equipment on the ice outside territorial wa-
ters remains unanswered. As long as automatic reporting equipment
handles nothing but weather and ice data, it probably will not cause
jurisdictional problems. However, other types of automatic reporting
equipment -- for example, early warning devices and submarine detec-
tion equipment -- may now or in the not-too-distant future be in use
on the icecap. Use of such equipment could lead to delicate incidents
or open disputes.
E. Air Space
Some Arctic air-space problems are merely polar-area manifestations
of broad patterns of East-West disagreement, whereas others are in some
respects unique to the far north. Underlying most problems of both
types is the great sensitivity of the USSR about the security of its
borders, accompanied by the desire to keep alien influences as far as
possible from them.
The USSR, unlike other Arctic countries, is not a member of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and does not endorse
its principles. The USSR attempts instead to restrict international
air commerce in such a manner that it will yield them one-way advan-
tages, a policy most non-Communist countries counter by denying air
outlets to Soviet aircraft. Thus, direct air commerce between the
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free and Communist worlds is comparatively light and in the Arctic,
nonexistent. As long as this impasse exists, little of the potential
for transpolar air routes can be realized. 32/
The Soviet sensitivity regarding the frontier holds within it the
danger of incidents involving hostile action against Free World air-
craft, both military and civil. To date, apparently, only one such
incident has occurred within the limits of the Arctic -- the shooting
down in 1955 of a US Navy "Neptune" patrol plane near St. Lawrence
Island, southwest of Bering Strait. The incident reportedly occurred
on the US-Russia Convention line of 1867 but was 20 to 30 miles from
the nearest Soviet land. Although the convention line was drawn mere-
ly to divide between the US and Russia scattered islands, islets, and
rocks in seas"not well known in 1867, the USSR seems to have treated
the line as if it marked the seaward limit of Soviet territorial wa-
ters and air space. The US protested the "Neptune incident" strongly,
claiming that the plane had at no time violated Soviet air space. The
USSR, in reply, claimed a violation but tacitly admitted to error by
expressing regret and offering to pay half the damages, an offer that
was eventually accepted. 33
The Arctic area in which disagreements over air-space limits might
cause incidents includes most of the area along the 1867 convention
line and the full sweep of the Soviet sector claim. How seriously the
"exclusive ai-space" feature of the Soviet sector claim should be
regarded is a'imoot question. If the writings of Soviet Arctic special-
ists such as V. Lakhtin are taken at face value, exclusive air space is
definitely claimed. 3L/ On the other hand, US military aircraft sup-
plying drifting-ice stations and conducting ice reconnaissance have
penetrated the Soviet Arctic sector on many occasions without causing
incidents. In April 1958, however, the USSR submitted to the UN Secu-
rity Council a note calling for "urgent measures to put an end to
flights by Un3?ted States military aircraft armed with atomic and hydro-
gen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union." 35/
The US countered this move by proposing an Arctic inspection zone.
The only transpolar route now being flown by civil air lines is
the Europe-Alaska-Japan route flown by the Scandinavian Airlines Sys-
tem (a Danish-Swedish-Norwegian consortium) and by Air France. In
flying across the polar area, both airlines deviate from great-circle
courses in order to avoid Soviet territory. To date, no incidents
have occurred.`
The Soviet sector claim is sometimes cited as a reason why exten-
sive transpolar flying by civil aircraft of the West may not be possi-
ble in the foreseeable future. 36/ This interpretation, however, is
somewhat misleading. The Soviet Arctic coast forms a broad are that
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partly encircles the pole. A line connecting the ends of the arc
would take in the bulk of the Soviet sector claim. Thus, the air
space within the Soviet sector claim -- free or otherwise -- will have
virtually no importance to commercial aviation of the West until air-
craft are permitted to fly over the coast itself.
F. Politico Legal Status of US Arctic Bases in Foreign Countries
US military bases in Canada, Greenland, and Iceland pose poten-
tially complex jurisdictional and policy problems. Despite careful
handling of relations with host countries, some of the people within
these countries feel that the presence of US bases is an infringement
of their independence. Legally, sovereignty over base areas is re-
tained by the host countries, but the agreements with these countries
have not yet been put to severe tests in the Arctic, and the agree-
ments themselves offer potential grounds for many misunderstandings.
Possibilities for discord are augmented by the current stage of tech-
nological development, in which equipment becomes obsolete quickly and
host governments cannot always be completely informed regarding work
underway on new weapon systems. The USSR is keenly aware of the poli-
tical problems presented by US bases on foreign soil and misses few
opportunities to aggravate them, as in the case of Iceland.
III. Special Problems With Jurisdictional Implications
A. Conceptional Disagreement
A basic clash of conceptions underlies many current problems of
political control in the Arctic. According to the long-standing view
of international law, the Arctic Ocean outside a "reasonable" terri-
torial-sea belt has high-seas status, regardless of ice mantle. Op-
posed to this is the view that the Arctic is a unique region so dif-
ferent in important ways from the rest of the world that it requires
special adaptation of laws to deal adequately with its problems.
The US, Norway, and Denmark adhere to the first point of view, as
also does Canada -- but with some leanings toward the second concept.
The second point of view has been put forward in the quasi-official
writings of Lakhtin, Vyshnepolsky, and other Soviet Arctic experts.
The Soviet Government has not followed up these writings with official
decrees; but, on the other hand, it has not repudiated them. 38/
There seems to be a tendency in the West to take the Soviet view
lightly, even though its keynote -- the unique character of the Arctic
-- actually seems to have been reinforced by recent developments. For
example, the Arctic Ocean, unlike any other area of similar size on
the earth's surface, has many characteristics of both land and sea.
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The Arctic ocean can be navigated to some extent by surface vessels
and, with lit-le restriction, by atomic submarines, yet land vehicles
are used on i-s surface to construct airfields and semipermanent in-
stallations.
B. Inspection Zones, Demilitarization, and Internationalization
Because of, the role of the Arctic as a buffer between sharply
divided blocs? consideration has been given to various types of spe-
cial status foFr the area -- ranging from "inspection zone" through
"demilitarization" to "internationalization." Details of the differ-
ent schemes that have been advanced vary, but all point toward estab-
lishment in the Arctic of mutually acceptable safeguards against
surprise attacc. It is generally accepted that agreement on an in-
spection arran ement must come first and that, until such an agreement
is reached, discussion of demilitarization or internationalization
schemes is poi.tless. Thus, to date, proposals applicable to the
Arctic have focused mainly on the inspection aspect, but no inspection
or related arr4ngements have been agreed upon.
One of the :'most concrete proposals to date was that placed before
the UN Security Council on 29 April 1958 by the US. It called for an
inspection zone that would include (1) all territory north of the
Arctic Circle belonging to the USSR Canada, the United States (Alaska),
Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; (2j all territory of Canada, the
United States,fand the USSR west of 140?W, east of 160?E, and north of
50?N; (3) all of the remainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula; and (4) all
of the Aleutian; and Kurile Islands. 39/
The proposal was advanced as a desirable prelude to disarmament
rather than as disarmament itself. In many countries, the "first step
toward disarmament" aspect had strong appeal; and the belief was wide-
spread that the'plan would reduce tensions and build international
confidence. 40/1 The plan, however, was vociferously rejected by the
Soviets who claimed, among other things, that it was merely a scheme
to aid the int4ligence-collecting activities of the West.
Since April!1958 the inspection-zone proposal has been restated a
number of times!by Western spokesmen, with a few variations but no
basic change in'the original concept. For example, the offer made by
Prime Minister Iiefenbaker of Canada to Khrushchev in 1959 stated that
"He [Khrushchevl can inspect any area in Northern Canada which he
designates as boing used for aggressive purposes by the United States
provided he lets us inspect all areas in the USSR within the same
latitudes." Ll The recent signing of a treaty providing for nonmili-
tarization of Antarctica insured by inspection may provide opportunity
for proposing a !somewhat similar arrangement applicable to the Arctic.
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C. East-West Cooperation in Arctic Research
Over the years, direct cooperation between the USSR and other
countries with Arctic research interests has been slight, and in
matters as ublication of findings the USSR has been anything but open
handed. 42 / Soviet participation in the Arctic phase of the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (IGY), 1957-58, represented a noteworthy
break in this pattern. In those portions of their over-all Arctic
program that were announced as part of the IGY program, the Soviets
showed the cooperation required within the concept of the IGY. A
complete inventory of Soviet-released Arctic IGY data is not yet pos-
sible., but it is believed that the USSR will release data strictly
Al-
within the limits of its stated program and IGY agreements. L3/
though the USSR's past record of cooperation in Arctic research is not
too promising, some countries, particularly Canada, have looked hope-
fully to inter-Bloc scientific cooperation in the Arctic as an anti-
dote to the hostile atmosphere that pervades the area. The argument
is advanced that cooperation involving, for example, exchange of
experts might be an effective stepping stone toward Arctic inspection
arrangements (see Section III B) and eventual demilitarization or
internationalization. To this end, Canada has repeatedly proposed
USSR-Canada exchanges of Arctic data and experts but, until recently,
without evoking a response. In 1959, however, while visiting the US,
Khrushchev indicated that he would consider increased Canada-USSR
exchanges of Arctic knowledge. 111/ Whether anything will come of this
hint, lightly dropped, is still uncertain. A change may be imminent,
but past Soviet performance gives little reason to see in joint Arctic
scientific activity an open road to rapprochement.
D. Arctic Warming Schemes
Plans for warming the Arctic Ocean are still in a highly conjec-
tural stage, but the advent of atomic power takes some of the compo-
nent ideas out of the fantasy class. Several methods of bringing
about the desired warming have been considered -- the diversion of
rivers to reduce salinity, ocean current diversion, mechanical and
nuclear destruction of ice, and speeding the melting rate of ice by
spraying it with dark substances or chemicals. If implemented on a
.large scale these and similar schemes would pose complex political
problems since their influence, favorable or otherwise, would not stop
at national boundaries. 45/
The USSR is vitally interested in warming the Arctic and would
gain much from a successful plan. An approach recently given con-
siderable attention in the Soviet press proposes that warming be ac-
complished by building a dam across Bering Strait and manipulating the
interoceanic water. exchange. Western scientists who have considered
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the several variations of this scheme generally have taken a dim view
of it, claiming that many years will elapse before hydrometeorological
knowledge is far enough advanced to permit sound assessment of the
effects. P. Borisov, the principal Soviet advocate of the Bering
Strait scheme, estimates the cost of the dam at about $17 billion. 46/
Since 1955 the=Bering Strait scheme has been the subject of numerous
articles in Sokriet publications, mostly glowing accounts of the bene-
fits with few technical details. Lately, a few dissenting voices have
been raised byfSoviet scientists. 47/ Whether more Soviet scientists
would object ii print if given the opportunity is uncertain.
Although e`idence is not strong enough to rule out the possibility
that Soviet scientists are considering the Bering Strait scheme at
least semiseri usly, it seems possible that the scheme was selected by
nonscientists or publicity emphasis because certain features have
propaganda value.
E. Arctic ;Use and Testing of Scientific
-Military Devices
To date, the use and testing of scientific-military devices in the
Arctic does not; seem to have caused acute problems, although the po-
tential for disputes and disagreements that such activity presents is
considerable.
The USSR ha tested many nuclear devices in the Arctic in the vi-
cinity of Novaya Zemlya, a testing area to which it turned as newer
and more powerful weapons were developed. 48/ This testing caused
considerable corpcern in the countries of northwestern Europe, and
press accounts 4eported that fallout over Scandinavia increased sig-
nificantly. 49/
In April 1919, a brief, frenzied search was made for the nose cone
of a US missile that may have come to earth in the Svalbard area. Al-
though there was; considerable newspaper speculation as to whether the
container had fa .len into Soviet hands, the incident did not reach
critical proport'ons. It does, however, point to a type of problem
that could becomo more common as missile and earth-satellite activi-
ties increase. 5L 51~
Western and Soviet electronic measures and countermeasures in use
and being developed for use in the Arctic hold some possibilities for
dispute. Such activities as experimentation with radar-deception
techniques, the transmittal of misleading navigation signals, and
certain types ofmonitoring and jamming of communications could cause
incidents. Thatk~electronic measures and countermeasures figure impor-
tantly in plans for the Soviet Arctic is evidenced by the operations
of Soviet "trawlekrs" off Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland, and Norway.
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It has been fairly well established that some of these craft are
Soviet Navy auxiliaries whose primary purpose is the collection of
electronic intelligence. 52/
To date, the electronics "war" has been largely a secret conflict
receiving little open discussion. International jurisprudence does
not and, to a considerable extent, cannot speak directly to the fast-
changing problems presented by electronics.
Prospects
A. Trends
Technological advances of the last 15 years have greatly improved
prospects for the use and development of the Arctic, and there is no
reason to believe that the progress of the next 15 years will be any
less revolutionary. Strategic and scientific considerations, popu-
lation pressure, and a northward-pushing quest for food and raw mate-
rials -- particularly minerals -- seem certain to draw the Arctic
region increasingly into world affairs. The environment-adapted way
of life of the aboriginal peoples seems headed for extinction. The
rich fisheries of the Arctic are likely to decline in importance if
conservation measures are not applied. Although the development of
such measures might encourage international cooperation in the Arctic,
it could just as easily lead to disputes. The full potential of
trans-polar commercial air routes cannot be realized in the present
two-world political atmosphere. The great interest of the USSR in
Svalbard and northern Scandinavia has long presented and will continue
to present a delicate situation worthy of careful monitoring. Arctic
warming schemes pose complex legal, military, economic, and psycholog-
ical problems between East and West. Inherent in the use and testing
of scientific-military devices in the Arctic is a considerable poten-
tial for disputes and incidents. The same is true of the flying by
NATO aircraft near the doubtful limits of Soviet air space. The
presence of US Arctic bases in foreign countries creates problems that
the USSR will continue to exploit. Because the importance of Arctic
data to science seems certain to increase, Soviet attitudes toward
sharing or withholding such data will warrant close study since both
may serve as indicators of scientific trends.
B. Outlook for Resolving Jurisdictional Problems
Many of the territorial and related problems of the Arctic are
rooted deeply in East-West distrust, and the likelihood that they can
be eliminated any faster than the distrust itself seems slight. Of
the many Arctic problems, those pertaining to territorial seas, sector
claims, and air space now seem to be most critical because they cast
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uncertainty over long lines of NATO-USSR contact. 53/ Also potentially
troublesome is the question of the legal status of installations on
floating ice. These installations seem to call for new legal concepts;
but the development of such concepts may weaken the high-seas status
of the Arctic ~nd strengthen the Soviet concept that the region is
unique, calling for special frames of reference in international law.
Discussions of "solving" the territorial problems of the Arctic
generally revotve around two approaches: (1) the achievement of suc-
cessive agreements on specific issues such as territorial seas, and
(2) the achievement of a massive, across-the-board international solu-
tion similar t' that worked out for Antarctica -- the key feature to
be an inspection zone that would include, as a minimum, substantial
sections of the: Arctic lands of the USSR and of the Western nations.
What would be accomplished by following the first approach is open
to question.' Although this approach attacks no basic causes, it might
pave the way for talks on problems of the Arctic. The second or in-
spection-zone approach seems on the face of it to hold promise for
alleviating sole of the problems and perhaps placing others in abey-
ance, as in the: case of territorial claims in the Antarctic. The
arriving at an inspection-zone "solution" for the Arctic, however, will
be a vastly more complex matter than it was for the Antarctic.
Previous efforts to set up northern-hemisphere inspection zones,
either through general disarmament talks or discussions keyed specif-
ically to the Arctic, have come to naught. The Soviet signing of the
Antarctic treaty may have brought the USSR a little nearer to accept-
ance of the inspection principle, as may also the Soviet "package plan"
for a nuclear-t st ban backed by inspection. + On the other hand,
the pace of technology may outmode inspection plans faster than they
can be devised. Thus, many of the dangers and uncertainties that the
Arctic presents are likely to be enduring.
In part, this; approach will be followed by the 1960 UN Taw of the
Sea Conference, but on a world basis, with no special emphasis on the
Arctic as far as can now be foreseen.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
1. Strategic Areas
Although military threats can no longer be confined sharply to
particular points or lines, some areas within the Arctic are of more
than passing military importance. The most significant of these are
described briefly. in the'following paragraphs.
The Murmansk area is the only naval-base area that provides Soviet
vessels free access to the open ocean throughout the 55/ Also
near Murmansk are forward staging areas of the Soviet air force and a
network of important radar, navigational, and communication facilities.
The USSR is much concerned about the north coast of Norway because it
flanks the sea access route to Murmansk and has repeatedly warned
Norway about the "dangers" of allowing NATO bases on its soil.
Svalbard, which is Norwegian territory, is not under the effective
control of either the US or the USSR. This archipelago, however,
occupies a key position because of its flanking location along the sea
route to Murmansk and because of its proximity to both Western and
Soviet bases. The islands have port facilities that could be adapted
to serve light naval craft, a navigation season 5 to 6 months long,
and potential airfield sites. 6/
Franz Josef Land, the northernmost of five Soviet Arctic archi-
pelagos, is important mainly because it is only 1,500 miles from the
US base at Thule, Greenland, and because it is located astride major
great-circle routes between the US and the USSR. 21/ Scientific sta-
tions and at least two airfields are located in the archipelago. The
current military uses of the islands are limited by terrain (ice pla-
teaus), fog, strong winds, and a short navigation season lasting only
2 months.
Greenland. occupies an important position between northeastern
North America and northwestern Eurasia. It is relatively close to
North Atlantic shipping lanes and lies athwart great-circle routes
between the industrial centers of the US and the USSR. The terrain
and climate do not favor large-scale military deployment, but perma-
nent ports, airfields, and electronic facilities have been established
in a number of places. Ports on the southwest coast are ice-free
throughout the year. 58/
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Iceland, afcessible by sea on a year-round basis, is a critical
link between North America and Eurasia. Important great-circle routes
such as that from Moscow to Pittsburgh pass squarely over Iceland; and
from the shore; of Iceland much of the North Atlantic, including Soviet
access waters *etween Norway and Greenland, can be controlled. The
USSR would like to eliminate the US base on Iceland and is attempting
to accomplish this end through propaganda and economic penetration.
Iceland has no armed forces. Currently the enthusiasm of Iceland for
NATO is temper4d by the fisheries dispute with the United Kingdom. 59/
Bering Strait is the only sea link between the Arctic and Pacific
Oceans. It istherefore important to the USSR as the eastern outlet
of its Northern Sea Route. To the Western nations, Bering Strait is
a critical sector of the sea supply route of Dew Line and other Arctic
installations.' The strait is 50 miles wide at its narrowest point.
Near the middle and little more than a :Mile apart are the Diomede
Islands, one oft which belongs to the US and the other to the USSR.
Nowhere else i US territory so close to that of the USSR. Although
military insta lations are not heavily concentrated in the immediate
vicinity of Being Strait, a number of airfields, weather stations,
and other installations are located nearby on both the US and Soviet
sides of the strait. The shallowness of Bering Strait (maximum depth
171 feet) and Of its approaches impedes under-ice movement of atomic
submarines between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific. 60/
2. Military and Scientific Developments
Soviet scientific activity in the Arctic exceeds the combined
activities of the NATO countries and constitutes a phase of the broad,
integrated Soviet attack on the basic physical problems of the earth,
an attack that also includes the study of the Antarctic and other parts
of the world. .'he USSR has charted and scientifically investigated
more than 2 mil ion square miles of the Arctic Ocean and has made
hydrographic surveys within 30 miles of Canada's Arctic islands. 61/
The Soviet research effort embraces the whole environment of the earth
from ocean bottom to upper atmosphere and has economic and strategic
as well as scientific implications. The benefits to shipping along
the Northern Sep Route and to civil air transport are obvious, but the
data assembled gill also be of use in military flying, submarine oper-
ations, and misfile activity. For example, polar weather forecasting
in support of civilian activities could also serve military ends.
Similarly, know edge of underwater topography, sea currents, and ice
movement is essential to submarine operations, and gravity data are
important to lo4g-range missile guidance. The USSR has about 100
polar stations on its coasts and islands and has thus far manned 8
stations on dri'ting pack ice. The importance of the Arctic to the
USSR is illustrated by the fact that the first atomic-powered vessel
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developed was an icebreaker -- the 16,000-ton Lenin, which is now
undergoing sea trial. Vital to all Soviet activity in the Arctic are
the developments in the fields of winterization of aircraft and land
vehicles, special fuels and lubricants for Arctic use, and techniques
for stabilizing permafrost. It is noteworthy, too, that the USSR has
exploded a number of nuclear devices in the Arctic under varied con-
ditions. 62/
Strategic considerations have given impetus to Western efforts to
catch up with the USSR in the understanding of the Arctic environment
and in the technical knowledge required to cope with it. Although
the day of catching up now seems distant, substantial progress has
been made. Many little-known lands and waters have been surveyed, and
such work is continuing in the Canadian and Greenland sectors of the
Arctic in support of construction and maintenance of warning networks
and other installations. A system of weather stations -- US, Canadian,
Danish, Norwegian, and joint -- has been established, and work is
underway on the automatic recording and broadcasting of weather and
ice data. A semimobile nuclear powerplant being developed in the US
for polar-area use may provide a solution to critical problems of
Arctic logistics. 63 The speed and relative freedom with which atomic
submarines can move within the Arctic Ocean make it possible for these
vessels to collect in a short time information that would require years
to assemble by other means. The West's lead in atomic submarines
therefore offers significant opportunities for the collecting of data.
Although the Soviet icecap-research effort has not been matched, US
personnel have occupied stations on floating pack ice. Currently the
US and Canada are cooperating in the exploration of the ionosphere
over the Arctic, using rockets and satellites -- a line of research
expected to improve understanding of the special behavior of electronic
devices in northern latitudes. 64+ Canada's Arctic research plans will
be furthered in 1960 by the addition of a new 3,380-ton diesel-powered
icebreaker to its current fleet of six small icebreakers. J Norwe-
gians and nationals of many other countries have engaged in a wide
range of scientific investigations in Svalbard. Danish scientific
work in Greenland has been directed mainly toward mapping, meteorology,
and geology. Among the Western countries, continuing research is
underway on such basic cold-weather problems as aircraft and land-ve-
hicle winterization; sled-train equipment; permafrost; and the effects
of Arctic cold on fuels, lubricants, explosives, and other materials.
It is possible that Western and Soviet scientific breakthroughs
may suddenly change some long-established concepts as to what is or
is not possible in the Arctic. For example, developments leading to
even moderately effective weather-control techniques would have far-
reaching Arctic implications.
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S-E-C-R-E-T,
APPENDIX B
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The main gaps in intelligence data on territorial and sovereignty
problems of the Arctic concern Soviet plans, intentions, and policy
positions particularly as related to claims (sector, territorial sea,
air space). Also lacking is information on the current Soviet legal
conception of the Arctic ("unique region" versus high-seas status)
and Soviet official views concerning the legal status of installations
on floating ice. Similar information reflecting current Soviet thought
in regard to Arctic inspection-zone and demilitarization plans are also
needed. More information is desirable concerning Soviet scientific-mil-
itary activities in the Arctic, especially Arctic warming and climate-
control schemes.
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APPENDIX C
SOURCE REFERENCES
25X1 C
This study is based on finished intelligence reports, State Depart-
ment despatches and miscellaneous communications, US Air Force reports
and bulletins, US Senate documents, and
publications. Also used as sources were numerous studies published as
unclassified books and pamphlets, articles in periodicals and news-
papers, and standard reference works. The bibliography includes only
selected items used in writing the study.
Evaluations following the classification entry and designated
"Eval" have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other
A - Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B - Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable
1+
- Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "ER" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document. Standard reference works, newspaper articles,
and certain other items not susceptible of evaluation have not been
given an evaluation symbol.
1. Bronner, Finn E. The Polar Regions, RM 58TMP-61, Santa Barbara,
1958, p. 3, U. Eval RR 2.
2. Kimble, G.H.T. and Good, D. Geography of the Northlands, New
York, 1955, p? 70, U. Eval RR 2.
3. Bronner, og. cit., p. 1+. (l, above)
4. Ibid.
5. Bronner, op. cit., p. 6. (1, above)
6. Newman, P.C. What are We Really Doing in the North," Maclean's
Magazine, v. 72, no 23, 7 Nov 59, p. 106-107, U. Eval RR 2.
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25X1 C
7. CIA. CLk/RR-G 59-1, Jul 59, The Soviet Arctic, p. 9-24, S/NOFORN/
8. Kimble aid Good, op. cit., p. 139-186. (2, above)
9. CIA. CIA/RR-GM-6, 15 Apr 58, Coexistence in the Far North:
Recent Norwegian-Soviet Relations, C. Eval RR 1.
10. Armstrong, T. The Russians in the Arctic, Fair Lawn, New Jersey,
1958, p- 117-125, U. Eval RR 3.
11. Mathisen, T. Svalbard in the Changing Arctic, Oslo, 1954, p.
93-98, U. Eval RR 2.
12. Ibid., pd 14-17-
13. Boggs, SW. The Polar Regions, Department of State, 21 Sep 1933,
p. 43-45, U. (unpublished manuscript)
14. State, Ottawa. Dsp. 372, 25 Oct 57, OFF USE. Eval RR 1.
15. Canada, Department of Mines and Technical Services. Geographical
Branch Memoir 2, The Boundaries of Canada, Its Provinces and 25X1C
Territories, 1954, p. 48, U. Eval RR 2.
16. Boggs, op. cit., p. 46-47. (13, above
17.
nordlichon Polarmeer" (Freedom of Aerial Navigation in the Air
Space above the Arctic Ocean), Arehiv fur Luftrecht, v. 8, nos
3-4. Jul-Dec 38, p. 279
U. Eval RR 3
,
.
19. Canada, Department of Mines and Technical Services, off-. cit.,
20.
Implications for Other Nations, p. 1, S. Eval RR1.
22. Alexander, ,L. "The Expanding Territorial Sea," Professional
Geographer, v. XI, no 4, Jul 59, D. 7. U. Eval RR 2.
23.
24. , u1partment o mines and Technical Services, 22. cit.,
p. 47. c15, above)
25. Bbbmert, pp. cit., p. 285. (18, above)
26. Ibid., p. 287.
27. Air, Nort1 American Defense Command. Weekly Intelligence Review,
no 2559,! 19 Jun 59, p. 1-2, S. Eval RR 2.
28. Navy, ONI. ONI Information Report (DIO-9ND, Chicago) 195-59,
16 Nov 5), Soviet Arctic Bases U. Eval B-2.
29. Bb'hmert, cit., p. 2d4-285. (18, above)
30. Ibid., p. 1284.
31. CIA. CIA4R-G 59-1, op. cit., p. 13-95. (7, above)
32. CIA. NIS 6, U.S.S.R., ch III, Transportation and Telecommuni-
cations, sec 37, "Civil Air," Jan 57, p. 6-7, S.
33. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London, v. X, 1955-56, p. 14311,
U.
34. Air. IR-214 55, 23 Feb 55, Soviet Claims in the Arctic, info
1926-54, U.
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35. New York Times, 30 Apr 58, p. 10, U.
36. Air. IR-21 -55, off. cit., p. 1. (34, above)
37. Canada, Department of Mines and Technical Services, op. cit.,
38.
40. Keesing's Cont'mporary Archives, London, v. XI, 1957-58, p.
16166-16167, U-
41. Evening Star, Washington, 4 Nov 59, U.
42. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 14. (10, above)
43. CIA. CIA/SI Significant Aspects of Foreign International
Geophysical Year Research Programs in the Arctic, 1 Mar 5U_1_
p. 1, S. Eva l RR 1.
44. Evening Star, Washington, op. cit. (41, above)
45. United States Senate, 86th Congress, First Session. "Possible
Non-military Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact
on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States," study prepared
by Stanford Research Institute at the request of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, pursuant to S. Res.
336, 85th Cong., S. Res. 31, 86th Cong., No. 2, Sept. 59, p.
20-23, U. Eval RR 3.
46. Evening Star, Washington, 23 Oct 59, U.
47. Evening Star, Washington, 24 Nov 59, U.
25X1 C 48-
49. Facts on File Yearbook, , New York, , v.
50. Washington Daily News, 21 Apr 59, U-
91 Washington Post 23 Apr 59 U.
52. Air, North American Defense Command, off. cit., p. 5-6. (28, above)
53. Wohlstetter, A. "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs,
v. 37, no 2, Jan 59, p. 231, U. Eval RR 2.
54. New York Times, 17 Dec 59, U.
55. Bronner, Finn E. The Atlantic Ocean Environment in Future Warfare
RM 58TMP-60, Santa Barbara, 195d, p. 10 U. Eval RR 2.
56. Mathisen, op.. cit., p. 7-19. (11, above)
57. Armstrong, 2.. cit., p. 60. (10, above)
58. Kimble and Good, op. cit., p. 372-386. (2, above)
59. Mangeot, S. "Iceland's Point of View," Geographical Magazine,
v. 31, no 2, Mar 1959, p. 544-548, U. Eval RR 2.
60. Bronner, op. cit., p. 9. (1, above)
61. Newman, op. cit., p. 108. (6, above)
62. CIA. CIA/RR-G 59-1, . cit., p. 159. (7, above)
63. State. Instruction 1 36 No. A-177) to AmEmbassy Copenhagen,
21 May 59, OFF USE. Eval RR 1.
64. New York Times, 22. cit. (39, above)
65. Newman, op. cit., p. 108. (6, above)
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