THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIERS OF CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01018A000100080001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIERS OF CHINA
Frontiers with Kashmir and India from Afghanistan to Nepal
CIA/RR-G-8
Office of Research and Reports
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ONFIDENTIAL
CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II, The Sinkiang-Tibet--Kashmir Frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Physical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. Permeability of the Frontier Area: Transportation
Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tO
D. Population Distribution and Agriculture
E. Hunza and Nagir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
F. Ladakh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
III. Western Himalayan Sector of the Border . . . . . . . . . . . . +l
A. Physical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B. People and Their Economic Activities . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C. Political Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
IV. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Appendixes
Appendix A. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix B. Sources and Evaluation of Sources . . . . . . . . . . `D3
1. Evaluation of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2. Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4
0NF E Y'T1AL
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Figure 1 - The Qara Chukor Valley, Taghdumbash Pamir
Figure 2 - A typical panorama in. the Karakoram Range
Figure 3 - The Bili Gorge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 4 - The Saser Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 5 - Shearing sheep along the banks of Karnali River,
Taklakot, Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 6 - Leh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 7 - Terraced fields near Baltit in the Hunza Valley
Figure 8 - Barley field and farmhouses outside Tikle.kot,
Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 9 - The Sutlej Valley immediately northwest of
Manasa:rowar Lake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1.0 - Laden goat going south from Tibet, valley of the
Dhauli River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure :_l - The LipuLek Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure :_2 - Milam, Goriganga Valley, India . . . . . . . . .
Figure 13 - Mt. Kailas, Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 14 - Taklakot mandi (market), Tibet . . . . . . . . .
Maps
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Southern Boundary of China: Afghanistan to Nepal
(CIA 12128) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
......... 68
India and Pakistan: Internal. Administration
(CIA 12935) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 68
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THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIERS OF CHINA*
Frontiers With Kashmir and India From Afghanistan to Nepal
Summary
The southern frontiers of Sinkiang and Tibet form a zone of tension
between Communist China on the one hand and Pakistan and India or, the
other. The manner in which this tension is influenced by various factors
peculiar to the frontier region -- topography, vegetation, climate, the
culture and economy of the frontier peoples and their political history
-- is discussed in this report. The segment of the frontier covered ex-
tends from the eastern tip of Afghanistan to the northwestern corner of
Nepal.
The frontier region lies amidst some of the most elevated and rugged
mountains on the face of the earth. Rugged terrain, arid climate, and
extreme altitude combine to create inhospitable living conditionE~ and
difficulties in travel. The population is comparatively sparse and is
concentrated in the stream valleys. The limited agriculture is F;enerally
carried on here by means of irrigation. The majority of the population
is engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, but transfrontier trade
is of paramount importance to certain groups among the inhabitants. With
respect to physical conditions and the means of making a living, the
frontier region is more like the Tibetan plateau and other portions of
Central Asia than it is like other parts of India and Pakistan. No major
invasion routes cross this region, but routes crossing the many passes
are important for trade, local warfare, and pilgrimages to Buddhist and
Hindu shrines in or near the frontier region. The Chinese Communists are
improving the approaches to the frontier region from their side by build-
ing roads and establishing airfields. The Indians and the Pakistani have
done the same from the southward to a somewhat lesser extent.
The boundary is indefinite throughout the entire frontier region,
and there have been conflicting territorial claims and occasional clashes
between frontier officials. China maintains long-standing claims to the
territory north of the Karakoram Range in Kashmir. In recent years,
Chinese Communist troops from Sinkiang have penetrated the portion of
Hunza north of the Karakoram. Before the mid-nineteenth century, it was
customary for local Tibetan officials to exercise jurisdiction in a nar-
row belt of territory southward from the crest of the Himalaya in what is
now Uttar Pradesh, and it is rumored that the Tibetans have recently
tried to reestablish their authority here.
* Members of the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State,
read the manuscript before publication and made valuable suggestions.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The peoples of Hunza, Nagir, and Baltistan are Muslims, as are
the majority of the people of Pakistan, under whose administration they
now are. In other respects, however, they differ from the surrounding
peoples. Most of the population of Ladakh and Spiti are Tibetan :In
language and culture and Buddhist in religion. The monastic system of
the lamas has a strong hold in these areas, and Lhasa is the center of
their religious and intellectual life. Tibetan influence is also strong
in Chamba and Lahul. Tibetan and related dialects are still spoken in
Baltistan and the border districts of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh
states among peoples that have lost many other aspects of their Tibetan
culture and, except in Baltistan, have adopted the religion and customs
of the Hindus.
In general the frontier region is one of a deficit economy, and out--
migration is continuous. Except in a few areas such as Hunz=i, land owner-
ship is concentrated in the hands of the monasteries or other large holders,
and a large percentage of the actual cultivators are tenants who are always
in debt to landlords or grain merchants. Attempts by the Srinagar Govern-
ment of Kashmir at a redistribution of land in Ladakh antago:aized the
powerful Buddhist clergy but apparently did not bring permanent relief to
the peasants. Transfrontier trade, which is of especial importance to
the town of Leh in Ladakh and to the Bhotia and related groups in Himachal
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, has been disrupted by the Communi,3t take-over
in Sinkiang and Tibet. Each of -three important classes of t:ae frontier
society -- the clergy, the peasants, and the traders -- has Its own
reasons for being dissatisfied with current economic and political condi-
tions. The region appears to be susceptible to the campaign of infiltra-?
tion and propaganda that the Communists are now conducting. Insofar as
this campaign is intended. to detach frontier districts from :[India and
Pakistan and add them to China, it would seem to have the be,-it chances of
success among the peoples of Tibetan culture.
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The frontier between China on the north and the Indian Subcontinent
and Burma on the south extends for approximately 3,200 miles through some
of the highest and most rugged country on the earth's surface. At the
western extremity, where it separates Sinkiang and Tibet from the Jammu
Kashmir territories controlled by Pakistan and India, this southern fron-
tier of China lies in the area of the Kun Lun, Karakoram and Ladkh Ranges;
at its southeastern extremity, where it separates Yunnan from Burma,
the border crosses the Yunnan and Shan Plateaus; in the central section,
where it separates Tibet and Sikang from India, Nepal, and Bhutan., the
frontier extends generally along the crest of the Great Himalaya Range.
Except for the southeastern end and a short segment between Tibet and
Sikkim, there has never been a demarcated boundary, and most of the region
is only partially explored and surveyed. Although the frontier region
possesses characteristics of both the Chinese and the Indian-Pakistani-
Burman territories, it is a distinct region, differing in many respects
from both these larger regions.
In this frontier region, culture, national economy, and political
control overlap; and types of culture differ from one section to another.
Several of the groups have strong cultural orientations toward Tibet;
others are oriented toward India. Although some of the groups profess
the Hindu or Moslem religions, they differ in other important respects
from the major cultural groups of India or Pakistan. Still other inhabit-
ants of the frontier region are primitive tribes, entirely unlike the
cultural groups on either side of the frontier. In Northern Burma the
pattern of cultural distribution is intricate, resembling that of adjacent
parts of China, Indochina, and Assam. Since the frontier region is backed
on the Chinese side by the high and inhospitable Tibetan and Pamir table-
lands and the rugged Yunnan highlands, it is crossed by no major avenues
of invasion or migration. For many centuries, however, a considerable
amount of trade has crossed the mountain barriers. This trade has been
of benefit to its areas of origin and destination on either side Df the
frontier region, and the frontier peoples have gained a large portion of
their living from the trade by serving as carriers and middlemen.
Throughout most of their history the peoples of the frontier region
have been free from the yoke of strong central authority from either the
south or the north, even though states on either side have maintained
conflicting territorial claims and upon occasion have made their power
felt in the border highlands. The Manchu Empire and the successor Chinese
Republic claimed wide areas southward of the crests of the border mountains.
in some cases down to the lower foothills or plains of India and Burma.
Local officials of southern Tibet also frequently exercised jurisdiction
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beyond the crest and down. onto the southern slopes of the Himalaya in
certain areas. On the other hand the British in India gradually pushed
their control northward to the zone of the mountain crests.
The frontier region has now acquired additional importance as mark-
ing the limit, for the time being at least, between the Communist world
and the free, non-Communist world. From 1911 to 1950, the Chinese Central
Government was weak and in no position to assert its authority over out-
lying areas. Now, however, the Chinese Communist regime has extended
its power over Tibet and other southwestern areas adjacent to the frontier
zone. The frontier peoples are being subjected to Communist propaganda
and to other forms of pressure from north of the border. Although the
Chinese profess willingness to negotiate with the Indians regarding
border questions, the aim of the Communist campaign appears to be (1) the
subversion of the existing state and national governments in India and
(2) the detaching of certain of the frontier areas from India and Pak-
istan in order to add them to the Chinese dominions.
The present report considers one segment of this frontier as a, zone
of tension between Communist China on the one hand and Pakistan and India
on the! other. The segment covered extends from the eastern tip of
Afghanistan to the northwestern corner of Nepal. This segment falls
naturally into two sections -- (1) the Sinkiang and Tibet frontier with
Kashmi.r* and (2) the frontier between Tibet and the Indian. states of
Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. The first is considered
in Section II of this report and, the second in Section III. The report
discusses the natural features of the frontier area -- topography, hydrog-
raphy, vegetation and climate -- particularly as a barrier to communica-
tion and as a place for human habitation. The cultures of the different
groups of frontier peoples are considered from the standpoint of their
orientation toward the Chinese-Tibetan sphere or the Indian-Pakistani
sphere, or their independence of such orientation. The character of
the transfrontier trade and its importance to the border peoples is con-
sidered. The history of territorial. claims and the present extent of
actual control by the different states is discussed, as are also the
basic factors of the region that favor or hinder Chinese Communist penetra-
tion. No attempt is made, however, to predict the success or :failure of
such penetration.
The term "Kashmir" is used in this report to denote the entire state of
Jammu and Kashmir, except where otherwise specified.
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iII. The Sinkiang-Tibet-Kashmir Frontier Area
A. Orientation
The Sinkiang-Tibet--Kashmir frontier area extends from the crest
of the Great Himalaya Range northward to the crest of the Kun Lun flange
and from the western edge of the Hunza River Valley southeastward to the
Shipki Pass, the Pangong Tso (lake), and the Aksai Chin Basin. Through-
out this area, both the natural landscape and the pattern of population
distribution are similar. The area, however, is inhabited by several
different ethnic groups and is divided among several regions, each with
its own separate historical existence. To the northwest are Hunza and
Nagir and to the southeast is Ladakh, which in turn is divided into
Baltistan on the west and Ladakh "proper" on the east.
B. Physical Setting
The Sinkiang-Tibet--Kashmir frontier area lies in the great
Central Asian highland region that extends from eastern Tibet to Soviet
Central Asia and Afghanistan. In its Kashmir and Tibetan portions, this
highland is crossed by several ranges of mountains trending roughly
parallel to the Himalaya and the Kun Lun. The highland is narrover in
the Kashmir section farther east, and the mountain ranges are accordingly
closer together (see map CIA 12128). In the Kashmir section the principal
mountain ranges between the Great Himalaya and the Kun Lun are from south
to north the Zaskar, the Ladakh, the Karakoram, and the Aghil -- the last
continuing north into Sinkiang as the Muztah Ata. Associated with the
main ranges are shorter ridges and outliers. Continuing eastwarc into
Tibet and having the same general trend as the Kashmir ranges are the
Kailas, Pangong, and Chang Chenmo, as well as a number of other mountain
chains. At the northwestern end of the Great Himalaya stands the peak
Nanga Parbat (elevation 26,660 feet). West of the meridian of this
mountain, the ranges change their direction from southeast-northest to
southwest-northeast and extend into Afghanistan as the Hindu Kush and
the Hindu RAJ. The region of the Pamirs, lying to the north of the
Hindu Kush and embracing parts of China, Afghanistan, and the Soviet
Union,is characterized by mountain ridges separated by broad valleys.
Most of the ridges and valleys have a general east-west alignment, but
the Taghdumbash Pamir of Sinkiang and its flanking ranges, the KIrebet
Sarykol'skiy and the Muztagh Ata, trend roughly north-south (see Figure
1).
The frontier area lies mainly within the watershed of the Indus
River, but it extends northward into the drainage area of the Tarim
Basin of Sinkiang, and to the northeast it includes the interior lake
basins of the Pangong Tso and the Aksai Chin. The Indus and its tribu-
taries have cut deeply into the Central Asian highland and for considerable
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Figure 1. The Qa.ra Chukor Valley, Taghdumbash Pamir..
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distances flow through deep gorges. The gradient of the Indus River from
the Tibetan frontier to the point where the river enters the Indo-Gangetic
plain is fairly steep, but towards the source of the river in Tibet the
gradient is much gentler. The tributaries of the Indus in the Kashmir
frontier area also have steep gradients. In some places, however, the
Indus Valley is an alluvial plain several miles wide, in which the river
is a braided stream flowing among marshy islands; these wide stretches
alternate with gorges, where mountain spurs close in upon the river and
the stream is a narrow torrent. Smaller streams in the area, such as
the Hunza and the Shyok, are also bordered in places by relatively wide
areas of valley floor.
Both the general elevation and the relative relief* along the Sinkian
Tibet--Kashmir region are great. In the Great Himalaya Range of Kashmir,
areas of considerable size are over 18,000 feet in elevation, and several
peaks are over 20,000 feet. The principal passes across the chain range
in elevation from 11,580 to over 17,000 feet. The Zaskar and Ladakh
ranges are rugged mountain masses only slightly lower than the Great
Himalaya. In general the Karakoram Range is the highest in the frontier
area, and on its slopes lie some of the most extensive icefields outside
the polar regions (see Figure 2). Some eight peaks in this range attain
elevations of over 25,000 feet, and the mountain K2 (Mt. Godwin Austin,
28,250 feet) is the second highest in the world. The relative relief is
greater in Kashmir than in most other parts of the Central Asian Highland.
Thus, in the locality of Nanga Parbat where the Indus makes the sharp
turn from a northwesterly to a southerly direction, its bed is at an
elevation of about 4,000 feet,,or more than 22,000 feet below the peak of
the mountain, which is some l4 miles away. Above Tashigong, Tibet, on
the other hand, where the Indus flows at an elevation of about 1+,000
feet, it is only about 10,000 feet below the highest peak in that general
vicinity.
Although the main range of the Karakoram is the loftiest in Kashmir,
it forms a major drainage divide between the Indus Valley and the Tarim
Basin for only about half of its length. Most of the water parting between
the.Hunza and the Shyok Rivers to the south and the Tash Kurgan and
Yarkand Rivers to the north lies on the north side of the main Karakoram
Range, and considerable parts of the Hunza and Shyok Valleys are cn the
Central Asian side of the great Karakoram peaks. The principal passes
into Sinkiang -- such as the Karakoram, Mintaka, and Shimshal -- are
located on the line of the water parting. 1, 2, 3/**
* Relative relief, as used here, means the vertical distance from the
low points in the valleys to the high points on the mountains.
** Numbers refer to citations in Appendix B, Section 2, Sources.
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The arid climatic conditions of the frontier area resemble those of
adjacent parts of Central Asia. The monsoon winds, which control the
precipitation of the subcontinent, bring less rain to the western Hima-
laya than to the eastern. Such moisture as is brought by the monsoon to
the Kashmir area is deposited mainly on the Himalayan Ranges or to the
southwest of them. The frontier areas to the northeast of the Himalayas
receive little or no benefit from the moisture-bearing monsoon. The pre-
cipitation at Leh, caning in the form of rain and snow, is only about 3
inches a year; this station is probably typical of other points in the
valleys. In the mountains, precipitation occurs mostly as snow and ap-
pears to be heavier.
The winters of the border area are rigorous, the four winter months
having a mean temperature below 320F at Leh. Clear skies and bright sun
are common in winter, however. The mean temperature in July is 63?F.
The diurnal range in temperature is large. The glaciers and snow fields
of the mountains are fed by snow and sleet storms that occur not only in
winter, but also occasionally during other seasons. The lower limit of
perpetual snow varies with locality from 18,500 feet to 20,000 feet in
elevation. During the summer thaw the streams become swiftly flowing
torrents that impede travel and often overflow and destroy valuable
agricultural land. 1, 4, 2/
The slopes of the Himalaya from 5,000 feet to about 10,000 or 12,000
feet are covered with a temperate mountain forest of oaks, pines, deodars
(Cedrus deodara), spruce, fir, and beech. In the drier parts especially,
the forests are often found on the northern slopes, where the snow lies
longer and the moisture is not evaporated so quickly as on the southern
slopes, which are likely to be bare. Progressing northward from the Hima-
laya the mountains and valley flanks are increasingly barren of vegetation.
Grass suitable for rather scant pasturage is found in the mountains in
the zone near the snow line and in other localities where moisture is
available. On the valley floors of the larger streams are poplars and
willows, many of which have been planted; shrubs and grass grow in the
marshy areas adjacent to the streams. In the western portion of the Indus
Valley, where the elevation is from 4,000 to 9,000 feet, there is con-
siderable variety in the types of trees and shrubs, but in the upper
portion of the valley and in the high lake basins near the Tibetan frontier
the vegetation becomes increasingly sparse and stunted. 5, 6
From the standpoint of physiography, climate, and vegetation the
Kashmir frontier area belongs more to Central Asia than to the Indian
Subcontinent, to which it has been attached politically for over a cen-
tury. The frontier area lies behind the Himalayan Ranges, which form
the frontier for most of India to the east; and, like Tibet, it is con-
siderably higher in elevation than the Subcontinent. With respect to
the alignment of mountain ranges, the Kashmir frontier area appears to
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be a western extension of the Tibetan Plateau. It lies far inland from
the monsoon winds that :influence the climate and vegetation of most of
the Subcontinent. Yet this area has peculiarities that distinguish it
from adjacent parts of Central Asia. The rugged terrain and narrow,
deep valleys of the Indus watershed are in sharp contrast to the broad,
flat-bottomed valleys and basins of the Pamirs and Tibet. The Indus
Valley, in its lower and more sheltered portions, is somewhat more hos-
pitable than the Tibetan Plateau and the Pamirs.
C. Permeability of the Frontier Area: Transportation Routes
The Tibetan Plateau and the several parallel mountain chains
of Kashmir together form one of the most effective barriers to human
movement on the face of the earth. These areas have been both unattrac-
tive and difficult of access to would-be invaders from the steppes of
Central Asia or the more remote! central portion of China. Generally
speaking, India has been protected from major inroads on its northern
Himalayan frontier; the principal invasions and migrations into the Sub-
continent from the land side have been by way of the northwest, where
the passes lead more easily to India from the Central Asian grasslands.
Nevertheless, there have been small-scale migrations and military ex-
peditions, as well as tirade of considerable importance, across and within
the barrier region throughout history. Movement across the Himalaya,
the Karakoram, and the :Kun Lun has not been large in absolute terms,
but it has been sufficient to serve the sparse population of the barrier
region. Factors contributing to the barrier quality of the highland,
in addition to its great width, are the ruggedness of the routes, the
closing of the passes during the long winter season, the scarcity of
food and fuel and the inability to secure them in the extensive unin-?
habited areas, and the extreme altitudes that cause exhaustion to man
and beast and mountain sickness in persons who are unacclimated.
The principal routes are confined to the stream valleys and the
passes at the heads of the valleys. The only means of transportation
possible are by horse or donkey, yak, sheep (which not only are pack
animals but also form a travelling food supply for the humans), goat,
or human porter. In the narrower valleys and gorges the most feasible
paths in the low-water season of winter are over the ice of the streams
or along the dry stream beds. In summer, when most of the travelling is
done, however, high water often forces caravans to ascend the steep
valley flanks. Precipices and steep slopes of loose rock debris, where
the going is vary difficult, are numerous. On or near some of the high
passes the way is impeded by glacial tongues; at a few points, as in
Hunza, glaciers descend even across the main valley trails., Maintenance
of permanent trails is impossible vender such conditions. During the
season of cold weather, often :Lasting from November to June:, the passes
are blocked by snow and ice, and sometimes snowstorms are encountered
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even in summer. On some routes -- as across the Bara Lacha Pass in the
Himalayas into southeastern Ladakh or across the Karakoram Pass --
travelers encounter no habitations for days or weeks, and food and some-
times even fodder must be carried by the caravan. On such routes, which
lie for the most part above 15,000 feet, fuel is very scarce, consisting
mostly of animal dung or the low dama bush. Campsites must be carefully
selected with reference to fuel supply and grazing for the animals. The
rate of animal mortality for caravans travelling some of these routes,
especially across Karakoram Pass, is very high. Entire caravans, in-
cluding men and beasts, have at times perished on the Karakoram route.
7, 8, 9/
The Kashmir frontier area is accessible from Chinese territory by
three important routes. Two of these pierce the Karakoram barrier
from Sinkiang and the third follows the Indus downstream from Tibet.
At the northwest end of the frontier area, one of the routes extends
from Kashgar up the valley of the Tash-Kurghan River and crosses the
Karakoram at the Atabad-Gulmit Gap, where the Hunza River flows through
the range. The route then continues down the Hunza to Gilgit. From
the Atabad-Gulmit Gap eastward to the Saser Pass and the Shyok Valley,
the Karakoram is a wall of rock and ice with no important breaks. The
Muztagh Pass, leading to a branch of the Shigar Valley, was negotiable
at one time but is now blocked by glacier ice. Small parties might
possibly make their way through this central portion of the Karakoram,
however. The second route leads from Kashgar and Yarkand via the Kara-
koram Pass, the Shyok River, and passes across the Ladakh Range to Leh.
The third route runs from Gartok, Tibet, down the Indus to Leh.
The Kashgar-Gilgit route crosses the water parting between the
Yarkand and the Hunza Valleys by any one of four alternate passes --
the Kilik, Mintaka, Khunjerab, and the Shimshal. The first two are
the passes most generally used. The route from the Taghdumbash Pamir
south via the Mintaka Pass is easier to traverse than that via the
Kilik Pass, which has very rough boulder-strewn stretches. Although the
Kilik has no steep gradients and is used more frequently in summer,
the Mintaka is shorter, has less snow, and can be used in winter, spring,
and autumn, as well as in summer. The Mintaka is never closed except
during snow storms. Between 19+1 and 1947, mail was regularly carried
by runners from Gilgit to Kashgar across this pass, and a considerable
amount of caravan traffic formerly passed over the route. Southward
from Murkushi the route continues all the way to Gilgit -- a marching
distance of approximately 150 miles that can be traversed in 12 stages
of about 12-1/2 miles a day. From Murkushi to Baltit alone requires
7 marches. This stretch covers the area of roughest mountains and
includes many dangerous sections, such as the Bili Gorge at the juncture
of the Kilik and Khunjerab Streams (see Figure 3). Another difficult
section is at the Batura Glacier, where the track varies from week to
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Figure 3. The Bili Gorge, looking south from the junction
of the Kunjerab and Kilik Rivera. Note the pack animals
on the narrow trail winding around the spur in the right
foreground.
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week. Here a lightly loaded pack pony under average conditions requires
1-112 hours to cross a 1-112 mile stretch, with no assurance that the
animal will not slip into a glacial pond and drown. It is often necessary
to use yaks. A jeep road has now been built from Chalt to Gilgit, a
distance of 32 miles. 10 Since the Chinese Communists came to power
in Sinkiang, it has been reported that they are pushing construction of
a motor road southward from Kashgar, with the intention of extending it
over the Mintaka Pass. In early 1953, the road was reported to have
been completed to a point south of the town of Tash-Kurghan. 11
The Yarkand-Leh route is more important from the standpoint of trade
than the Kashgar-Gilgit route, but it is also one of the most rugged
routes in the world. The distance from Yarkand to Leh is about 600 miles.
The journey from Khargalik, near Yarkand, to Leh requires about 30 days,
and for 20 days the trail runs through uninhabited country. The Karakoram
Pass is not the most difficult one on the route, but from both directions
the approaches, requiring successive marches at high altitudes, take their
steady toll of life. Southeast of the pass are the Depsang Plains, where
the land is soft and spongy until July and ponies may get mired. Con-
tinuing its course the route crosses the main Karakoram Range by the Sasex
Pass (elevation 17,480 feet, see Figure 4) and the Ladakh Range by the
Khardung Pass. Glaciers must be crossed in traversing both these passes.
The Khardung Pass is believed to be open, at a maximum, from late June
to November,, but it can be forced earlier by driving yaks through the
snow. It is necessary for ponies to travel over the Khardiang unloaded.
An alternate route over the Ladakh Range is by way of the Digar Pass to
the southeast of the Khardung. The Digar Pass is blocked less often and
is passable for coolies. The Yarkand-Leh route is feasible for caravans
of considerable size -- one consisting of 75 animals and 30 men traversed
it in 1949 -- but it would be extremely difficult for very large parties
to traverse this route. 8/*
The Gartok-Leh route differs from the two others discussed because
it parallels a major river and is aligned with the mountain ranges in-
stead of across them. The gradients along this route are therefore much
less steep than those along the routes into Sinkiang. Portions of the
upper Indus Valley are fairly wide, but in other places (for example,
the area known as Rong, some distance above Leh) the river flows through
wild and forbidding gorges. A branch of this route extends from Rudog
in western Tibet, via Chushul, to Leh. The Gartok-Leh route is a segment
of the important Lhasa-Leh route.
In addition to these main transfrontier routes, several others should
be mentioned. Two trails, one extending westward from the Kashgar-Gilgit
* Information on routes was derived principally from Source 7.
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Figure 4. The Saser Pass. The caravan men are spreading
felt pads to prevent the pack animals from sJpping.
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route in Hunza and another from Gilgit northwestward, converge upon the
Baroghil Pass, across the Hindu Kush Range in northerp Pakistan. From
this point, other trails extend through the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan
and across the narrow strip of Afghan territory into the Soviet Union.
A lateral route inside the frontier area connects Leh, Skardu, and Gilgit
along the Indus and Gilgit Rivers.
Several routes connect the frontier area with the main portions of
Pakistan and India. One route in Pakistan connects Gilgit with the North-
west Frontier Province by way of the Babusar Pass (elevation 13,690 feet)
and the Kunhar Valley. This route is traversable by jeep. Another but
more difficult route into Pakistan continues down the Indus from Chilas.
11 Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, is connected with Skardu on the
Indus by two routes -- (1) by way of the Burzil Pass over the Great Hima-
laya and (2) by way of the Zoji Pass (elevation 11,580 feet) and the Dras
and Indus Rivers. The main connection between Srinagar and Leh branches
southeastward off of the Zoji Pass route at Kargil and reaches the Indus
River at Khalsi. The distance of 240 miles from Srinagar to Leh formerly
required about 16 days of travel, but it is now possible to make this
trip in 7 days, since the Indian army has built a motorable road for part
of the distance. J The only direct connection between the Kashmir -
frontier area and India proper is from Leh southward across the Bara Lacha
Pass to Mandi; this route is closed by snow for a large part of the year,
but it is of considerable military and commercial importance, neverthe-
less.
The Kashmir frontier area has long been an important region of transit
between the adjoining regions in spite of its severe environment. Before
the Communist conquest of Sitkiang and Tibet and the fighting between
Pakistani and Indian forces in Kashmir, Leh was an important port of entry
between Chinese territories pnd the Indian Subcontinent. In summer, cara-
vans brought goods to Leh from Sinkiang by way of the Karakoram Pass and
from Tibet by way of the Indies Valley and Rudog and exchanged them for
items from India, which were carried back to the Chinese territories.
Goods from India in transit to Sinkiang and Tibet were brought in over
the Barg Lacha route from the south or the Zoji route from the Vale of
Kashmir. There was also considerable local trade with points in Ladakh
and Baltistan. Wool is one of the principal items of export from Tibet
(see Figure 5). Data from the wool trade illustrate the relative importance
of Leh in the total foreign commerce of Tibet. It is estimated that of
the total normal production of Tibetan wool, 10 percent (over 2,000,000
lbs.) is exported eastward to China, 15 percent (over 3,000,000 lbs.)
is exported to India via Leh, 45 percent (over 9,225,000 lbs.) is ex-
ported to India via Kalimpong, and the balance is consumed locally. 13/
Thus, Leh holds a place of some importance in the export trade of Tibet.
Most of the trade of Sinkiang, on the other hand, is with the Soviet
Union. Before World War II, India accounted for only about 5 percent of
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Figure 5. Shearing j3heep along the banks of the Karnali
River near Taklekot, Tibet.
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the Sinkiang trade, but most of this trade was by way of Leh. Consider-
able trade with Sinkiang found its way over the Hunza Valley route, but
it was much less important than the Karakoram route to Leh.
The Kun Lun and the Karakoram barriers have served rather effective-
ly to shield Kashmir from invasion from the north, whereas parts of the
frontier area have been invaded from the south or east on several occa-
sions. Conversely, the frontier peoples have at times expanded outward
to the north and east. Probably the only large-scale military incursion
from the north came during the sixteenth century, when the ruler of -
Kashgar sent an army across the Karakoram that penetrated into Kashmir
but was defeated by the climate when it attempted to invade Tibet. The
ancestors of the present ethnic Tibetans of Ladakh and Baltistan pene-
trated the area from the direction of central Tibet to the east, and
Ladakh has been invaded from Tibet on several occasions in more recent
times. On the other hand, the kings of Ladakh ruled over a large por-
tion of the territory that is now western Tibet for several centuries.
Most of the successful military expeditions into the region from
the seventeenth century to the present have been from the south, although
there have been several expeditions from the direction of Tibet. In the
1680's, an army of the Mogul emperor of India entered Ladakh to counter
an invasion from Tibet. During the period 183+-41, Zorawar conquered
Ladakh and Baltistan for his master, Gulab Singh, ruler of Jammu. After
subduing the frontier region, Zorawar imprudently attempted to conduct
a winter campaign in Tibet but was defeated and killed near Gartok in
18+2. The armies engaged in these various expeditions were not large,
in spite of the claims of some of the old chronicles. The army despatched
by the Mogul Empire to save Ladakh from the Tibetans, for example, was
said to have numbered 600,000 by Mogul historians, but modern writers
place the figure at nearer 6,000. Zorawar commanded a force of ahout
10,000 upon his first invasion of Ladakh in 183+, and the whole comber
of men available to the Ladakhis during this war was probably between
15,000 and 20,000. A Tibetan or Tibetan-Chinese army of 3,000 attempted
unsuccessfully to conquer Ladakh after Zorawar was defeated. During the
Indian-Pakistani fighting over Kashmir, a small Indian force crossed the
Himalaya from Mandi in early 19+8 to prevent Leh from falling into Pak-
istani hands, and in November .19+8 the Zoji Pass route from Leh to
Srinagar was taken from Pakistani irregulars by Indian troops. 12, 14+,
15/
Living at the gap in the Karakoram Range and near the Mintaka and
other passes opening down into the Tarim Basin, the people of Hunza
were in a position to descend to either side of the mountain barrier.
They formerly raided the trade routes and settlements as far as Gilgit
and Baltistan on the south and the Pamir area and the upper Yarkand on
the north. 16 The ruler of Hunza also acquired certain rights in the
Taghdumbash Pamir. Since the accession to power of the Chinese Communists
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in Sinkiang, however, the Communist troops have on occasion crossed the
passes and conducted patrol actions in the upper Hunza Valley.*
Developments of the last Er or 7 years, both political and technical,
may have reduced somewhat the effectiveness of the mountain barrier, but
it is yet too early to say definitely that the barrier has lost its
va:Lue; as a protection to India and Pakistan. The retirement of Great
Britain from India, the partition of the Subcontinent, and the India-
Pakistan dispute over Kashmir have tended to weaken the defenses along
the border at the same time that pressures from the Soviet Union and
Communist China have increased. Probably the Soviet Union or China could
bring much more power to bear on an invasion of this region than could
any of the former states to the north and east. The construction of
motor roads or jeepable tracks and the establishment of airfields tends
to make the border region more permeable.
The building of motor roads in these mountains could probably never
be justified for commercial reasons alone because of the expense and the
comparatively short period during the year that such roads could be used.
Military and political considerations, however, have dictated the road
improvements undertaken in recent years. 17 Since the occupation of
Tibet by Chinese Communist troops, various road- and airfield-construc-
tion projects in western Tibet have been reported. By early 1952, a :road
was said to have been completed from Lhasa to the Lake Manaoarowar area
or Ga.rtok. 18 19 About the same time the construction of a road linking
Sinkiang and western Tibet was reported. 20, 21 Such a road, if it
passed near the northeast corner of Ladakh, would be a diff:cult under-
taking, since it would have to penetrate a wide area of uninhabited,
desolate country in the Kun Lun.
Construction of a road from Kashgar, Sinkiang, to the Mintaka Pass
is reportedly in progress and apparently would not be too difficult, but
the extension of the road southward to Chalt to connect with the existing
jeep track passing through the Hunza Valley to Gilgit and south through
the Kunhar Valley (thus forming an invasion route almost across the great
barrier from the Tarim Basin to the Pakistan plain) would be hazardous,
and the maintenance of such a road would present many problems. 11/ North
of Chalt this projected road would have to pass through the narrow Hunza
Valley, where the maintenance of even the pack trail is difficult as a
result of precipitous slopes and glacier ice. If the Chinese should
complete the proposed roads in western Tibet and southern Sinkiang, it
would facilitate their control of these hitherto loosely-held regions
* The history o Hunza interests to the north is considered in greater
detail in Section II-E..
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and would increase the effectiveness of Chinese pressure on Ladakh and
the Gilgit Agency.*
Work is under way, according to report, on an airfield on the plain
near Lake Manasarowar, and Russians are said to have helped select the
site. 22/ No regular air service had been established in Tibet as of
late 1952, however. 23/
Meanwhile, Pakistan and India have not been idle. The building of
the jeep track from the Kunhar Valley of Pakistan to Gilgit and from
Gilgit to Chalt and the improvements on the Srinagar-Leh route made-by
the Indian army were referred to above. A Pakistan air transport service
connects Peshawar with Gilgit and Skardu, and an Indian air service con-
nects Srinagar with Kargil and Leh. The Leh airstrip is said to be the
second highest in the world. 12/
In summary, the mountain barrier, inaccessible to large movements
of population, has often been penetrated on a local scale. Trade across
the barrier forms one of the principal bases of the economic life of
Ladakh, and to a lesser extent is important to Hunza. The mountain and
plateau wall has protected India from major invasions from the north,
but military campaigns involving only limited numbers of men have been
conducted within and across the barrier region, and portions of the
border area have been conquered and held by forces from the outside at
various times., Most difficult to penetrate from the military standpoint
has been the Karakoram Range, but the peoples to the south of this range
have always been exposed to flank attack from the east. As modern trans-
portation penetrates the area, the mountains will become somewhat less
effective as a barrier, but the harsh environment of this greatest
mountain mass in the world will not be easily overcome.
D. Population Distribution and Agriculture
Since the northwestern portion of the border region is both
arid and mountainous, the pattern of human settlement has characteristics
of desert and highland. Areas of permanent habitation are confined almost
exclusively to the stream valleys and, within these valleys, to so-called
oases of relatively level land with access to a water supply from the
surrounding heights. The principal population areas are the valleys
of the Indus, Gilgit, Hunza, Shigar, Shyok, Dras, and Zaskar Rivers. The
mountains on either side of these streams comprise most of the area and
are almost uninhabited. Eastward from the Hunza Valley, the area between
the Karakoram and the Kun Lun Mountains (including the upper valley of the
* Consideration of possible Soviet penetration into the Gilgit Agency by
way of the Wakhan Corridor is beyond the scope of this report.
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Yarkand River and the Aksai Chin lake basins) is also largely devoid of
population. Very sparsely inhabited areas are also found along the
eastern borders of Ladakh..
The principal areas of settlement and agriculture are in the
wider portions of the Indus Valley, of which the vicinities of Leh and
Skhrdu are examples (see Figure 6). Alluvial fans have beeti formed at
points where glacier-fed tributary streams descend into the main valleys.
Many of the oases, with their irrigated and terraced fields, are found
at these points because water from higher altitudes is available. The
settlements are generally :Located near the edge of the valley rather than
along the main river. Some canals have been dug to conduct irrigation
water from the Indus, but generally the main river is not tapped as a
source of water because it flows at a lower level than that of the
alluvial valley floor and the inhabitants do not have facilLties for
lifting the water. Along the narrower portions of the Indus and its
tributaries, there is very litt:Le level land. Here the valley floor
slopes rather steeply from the river to the foot of the precipitous
mountain flank. Settlements are scattered, and cultivation is possible
only if the fields are terraced. Nevertheless, small isolated communities
are found in the Indus Valley, even in the least accessible gorges
where the mountains close in upon the river. 24
Because of the mountainous terrain and the aridity, cultivable
land is at a premium. The farmers have developed considerable skill in
the laying out of irrigation canals and terraced fields. Where necessary,
water is conducted for long distances from mountain torrents to the
fields, which requires the construction of stone aqueducts across the
face of steep cliffs. In some =Localities, steps are taken to 'preserve
the snowfall by the creation of "artificial glaciers" high up In the
lateral valleys, thus assuring a supply of water for irrigation In late
summer when it is most needed. Terrace walls, laid out more or less
at right angles to the slope of the land, are also made of stone. The
small field on the upper side of a terrace wall is either graded level
by the farmer, or the dirt is allowed to wash down against the wall
until, in the course of several years' time, the land becomes level
(see Figure 7). Terraces are constructed during the winter, On level
land where terracing is not required, the fields are laid out in geo-
metrical patterns defined by the course of irrigation ditches and.
bordered by stone walls or rows of poplar, willow, or fruit trees. 21+,
25/
The principal crops of these valleys are barley, whea,, buck-
wheat;, millet, peas, beans, potatoes, mustard seed, turnips, and a con-
siderable variety of fruits. Barley forms the basis of the principal
foods and drink -- parched barley, barley cakes, and beer. Of the fruits,
apricots are most important, forming one of the principal items in the
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Figure 6. Leh, looking south from the palace roof.
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Figure 7. Terraced fields near Baltit in the Hunz:.L Valley,
looking eastward.
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diet; but apples, peaches, pears, plums, grapes, pomegranates, and mul-
berries are also raised. Walnuts are produced in some localities. At
elevations below 10,000 feet, it is customary to raise two grain crops
a year, barley and wheat being sown in early spring and millet and buck-
wheat in later summer. Animal dung is used for manure, but dung for use
on the fields is often at a premium, since it is also used as a fuel.
To supplement the dung, human excreta mixed with dirt is also used. The
soils thus inadequately manured are kept in cultivation for a succession
of years without lying fallow and without much attempt at rotation. Con-
sequently, the yield of cereals, which is about sevenfold, is not large.
Even though the amount of good grazing land is negligible, sheep, goats,
and a small type of cattle are raised to supply wool, milk, and fats.
The dzo, a type of ox produced by the crossing of yak and cow, is used
for plowing. In some places, lucerne is raised for forage on hillsides
that are not valuable enough for other crops. The animals are kept in
the villages in winter and are herded up into the hills for grazing in
summer. By late summer, pastures are dry and forage is very scarce. At
such times, dry leaves and even the bark of the willow tree serve as
fodder. 261 Willows and poplars serve multiple purposes. They provide
the principal lumber for house construction, and they are planted for
ornamentation.
The agriculture of this frontier region is akin to that of
Sinkiang, Tibet, and other parts of Central Asia. With their irrigation
agriculture, the oases of the Indus and its principal tributaries are
in many ways small replicas of the larger and richer oases at the foot
of the Tien Shan, Kun Lun, and Alai in Sinkiang and Soviet Central Asia.
Lying at a higher altitude, however, the variety of crops grown is not
as great in the upper Indus watershed as to the north. In this respect
the upper Indus is more like Tibet. The cultivation of barley, buck-
wheat, wheat, and a number of fruits is carried on in the'river valleys
of Tibet under climatic conditions somewhat similar to that of the Indus
Valley (see Figure 8).
The "states" of Hunza and Nagir are at the northern extremity of
the territory administered by Pakistan. Hunza occupies the upper portion
of the watershed of the Hunza River and is bisected by the Karakoram
Range; Nagir lies mainly to the south of the river and southwest of the
mountain range. Each state is a little autocracy ruled by a Mir. The
origin of the states and their people is obscure, but the two royal
families derive from a common source and claim that their ancestors came
from Baltistan to the southeast some 600 years ago.
The principal element in the population speaks the Burushaski
language, which is believed to be unrelated to any extant tongue. There
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Figure 8. Barley field and farmhouses outside
Taklakot, Tibet.
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are about 32,000 Bushuro (Burushaski speakers) in the two states and
scattered in adjacent areas; westward, in the Yasin Ilaga of Gilgit Agency,
is a group speaking Wershigwa`r, a variant form of Burushaski. In the
western and southwestern portions of both states, a sizable minority of
the population speaks Shin-a, the principal language of the Gilgit Agency.
In one or two of the valleys opening into the Hunza Valley from the west
is a Wakhi-speaking group related to the inhabitants of the Wakhar Cor-
ridor of Afghanistan. 27, 28/ Although the Wakhis form a separate and
distinct group in Hunza, there has long been considerable contact between
the Wakhis and the Bushuro. There are a few Bushuro in the WakhaiL, and
the wife of the present Mir of Hunza is related to the Afghan governor
of the Wakhan.
The centers of population of Hunza and Nagir are in the central
Hunza Valley west of the Ata-bad-Gulmit gap, where the river flows through
the Karakoram Range. The two capitals -- Baltit and Nagir -- are located
here, and the best land is in this vicinity. The land in the Shitnshal and
Khunjerab Valleys to the east of the Hunza River is the home of only a few
shepherds and outcasts. North of the Karakoram the Hunza Valley is more
elevated, narrower, and less hospitable to agriculture than to the south.
In this area, Misgar is the most important of the few settlements.
Although the majority of the inhabitants of Hunza and Nagir speak
the same language and have approximately the same social institutions,
observers have noted certain differences in temperament between the
Hunzakuts and the Nagirkuts. The former are happy and cheerful, whereas
the latter give the impression of somberness and depression. The in-
habitants of Hunza are also said to be more energetic and skillful as
farmers than their neighbors to the south. 27
In common with most of the peoples under the administration of
Pakistan, the inhabitants of Hunza and Nagir belong to Islam, but they are
not of the Sunni sect, which is dominant in Pakistan proper. Nagir and
a belt of territory south and east of Hunza is inhabited by Muslims of
the Shia sect. Hunza forms part of a region in which the inhabitants
belong to the Ismaili (Maulai) sect of Islam. This region extends west-
ward into other parts of the Gilgit Agency and northward into Afghanistan,
the Tadzhik SSR, and the Taghdumbash Pamir of Sinkiang. The Hunzakuts
were converted to the Ismaili sect from Shiaism only about three genera-
tions ago. The Ismailis owe spiritual allegiance to the Agha Than, but
the Mir of Hunza acts as the Agha Khan's representative in the frontier
area. Formerly the Mir collected a tithe on behalf of the Agha Than not
only from his own people but also from the Sarikolis of the Taghdumbash
Pamir and the small group of Bushuro living in the Wakhan. Possibly some
of the amountF collected remained in the hands of the Mir. The small
group of Sarikolis in the extreme southwestern part of Sinkiang is com-
posed of settled cultivators. They are coreligionists of the Hunzakuts,
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but they speak an Iranian tongue and are in other respects unrelated to
the Hunzakuts. Within recent years the Sarikolis have ceased t'1o pay the
tithe to the Mir. The Hunzakuts are also unrelated to the other principal
groups of southwestern Sinkiang -- the nomadic Kirghiz and the oasis-
dwelling Uighurs. 9, ?zl
The Maulai of Hunza are fairly liberal in their interpretation of
religious duties, religious observances, and prescriptions, all. of which play
little part in the life of the people. The Shia of Nagir are ,.somewhat more
strict, but even they appear to lack the fervor characteristic of large
portions of the Sunni community. 'It has been suspected that some Pakistan
officials desire to settle members of the Sunni sect in these northern, areas
where the population is considered spiritually unreliable by tl:hLe officials.30/
Shut up in their mountain fastness near the meeting pa..ace of five
Asiatic states, the Hunzakuts have a strong consciousness of and pride in
their own group, accompanied by a tendency to look down upon some of their
neighbors. They have been forced to subordinate their state in matters of
"foreign affairs" to more powerful groups, first on one side of the Karakoram,
then on the other; but in domestic matters they have been left very much to
themselves. After the 1840's, Gulab Singh (the founder of the state of Jammu
and Kashmir) and his successors gradually increased their hold over the
area now in the Gilgit Agency. Responding to the Russian advance in Central
Asia, the British became interested in the Gilgit region.. Following the
decision of the central government of India in the 1890's to exercise a
more direct control in the Gilgit region, the Gilgit Scouts were organized
as the major local defense force. At the same time the Mir of Hunza with
the aid of his retainers was held responsible for maintaining law and order
in. his territories and for defending them from incursions from the north.
However, the Gilgit Agency, including the two states of Hunza and Nagir,
continued to be part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the two states
paid an annual tribute consisting of a small piece of alluvial. gold to the
Maharajah of Jammu-Kashmir through the British agent at Gilgit. The
Maharajah's government'. in turn sent gifts to the Mirs in acknowledgment of
the act of fealty. 31/
The Chinese claims in the Hunza-Nagir and adjacent Pamir areas
are of long standing, dating from the period of the Manchu dynasty, if
not earlier. The Mir of Hunza formerly sent annual tribute of gold dust
to the principal Chinese official at Kashgar and received presents of
silver, silk, teacups, tea, or cloth in return. About 1935, the tribute
was estimated to be worth about 110 and the presents to the Mir about X1+0.
32/ The Chinese apparently considered that the Mir of Hunza held both
the territory in Taghdumbash Pamir and in the upper Hunza Valley as a
vassal of China, but the British and the Mir took a different view of the
matter. It is also reported that at one time the Chinese sent official
emissaries to Baltit to accord recognition to a new Mir. 31 The state
of Nagir also paid "tribute" to the Chinese, but within recent decades --
until the rise of the Chinese Communist regime -- the Chinese do not
seem to have advanced a serious claim to Nagir as a result. 33/ Chinese
maps, published under both tlae Nationalist regime before 1911.9 and the
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Communist regime since that date, show a southwestern boundary for China
that coincides with the southern boundary of the Wakhan Corridor, extends
thence southeastwards generally along the crest of the main Karakoram Range,
crosses the Karakoram Pass, and then follows approximately the northeastern
watershed line of the Shyok Valley to the eastern border of Ladakh -- line
A on map CIA 12128. This line, if it became an actuality, would place
northern Hunza above the Atabad-Gulmit Gap in Sinkiang but would leave the
most populous part of Hunza and all of Nagir within Kashmir. East of Hunza
the line would follow roughly the water parting between the Indus, the Tarim,
and the Aksai Chin, thus including within China the uninhabited upper Yarkan.d
Valley and interior basins of Aksai Chin.
The Mir of Hunza maintained a counterclaim in Sinkiang. The
Mir formerly claimed that territories to the northward of the Kilik and
Mintaka Passes in the Taghdumbash Pamir and to the eastward in the upper
valley of the Yarkand River belonged to him. For over two and one-half
centuries, tribesmen from the present Hunza area had enjoyed grazing
rights, granted by the Chinese, in the Taghdumbash Pamir. 34+ With the
permission of the Chinese the Mir collected a yearly tribute or grazing
tax from the nomads in the Taghdumbash area northward to a point near
Tash-Kurgan, 32 and in addition his own people used these grazing lands.
The Chinese tolerated this Hunza privilege probably because they claimed
suzerainty over a part of Hunza itself, but the Mir and the British ap-
parently considered that the tribute to the Chinese was paid only with
respect to the Taghdumbash Pamir and not with respect to any part of
Hunza proper. 31 The Chinese did not acknowledge any Hunza rights in
the Yarkand Valley.
The claims of the Mir of Hunza formed the basis for the widely
held belief that the territories of India and Russia adjoined eac=J1 other
to the north of the Qara Chukor Valley of the Taghdumbash Pamir. This
was not the view held by British officials in India or Russian officials
to the north,. however. The narrow Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan was
maintained as a buffer between British and Russian power, and the northern
boundary of the Wakhan was laid out in 1895 in such a manner that its
eastern end would adjoin Chinese territory. 35 China was not a party
to the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1895 and, ,judging from Chinese maps,
has never fully recognized Afghan sovereignty over the Wakhan strip or
Russian sovereignty over the Pamir area to the north. Most Chinese maps,
including some published under the Chinese Communist regime, show the
Wakhan and the Russian Pamir area as part of China, although they indicate
the boundaries as indefinite (see line A on map CIA 12128).
In the 1930's the Chinese-Hunza relationship was strained, and
the Chinese disputed all of the territorial claims of Hunza. In the
period 1930-34, civil war in Sinkiang caused the British to maintain
temporarily several military posts to the north of the Kilik and Mintaka
Passes.. With a strongly anti-British and pro-Soviet government installed
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in Sinkiang about this time, the claims of the Mir to the nort1l of the
passes became a source of embarrassment to the British Indian Government.
About 1935 the British persuaded the Mir to abandon his claims in the
Taghdumbash Pamir in return for territorial compensation southward in
Kashmir. At the same time, he was advised to cease nis annual remit-
tances to Kashgar. The Chinese, however, refused to give uzp their
claim to Hunza. 31,36/
The Hunzakuts and the British at various times had intermittent
connections with the territory along the upper Yarkand River and its
western tributaries -- the Oprang 'rilga, the Muztagh, and the Raskam.
This area, crossed by the important Karakoram Pass trade routes from
India to Sinkiang, was raided by the Hunzakuts in the 1880's, and the
nomadic Kirghiz inhabitana were driven out. Desiring to p::-otect the
trade routes and also counter ]possible Russian influence i1:L Hunza, the
British despatched a small expedition under Sir Francis Younghusband,
which explored the upper Yarkand region and penetrated Hunza proper.
37/ The activities of the Hunza raiders were finally stopped when the
British extended more effective control over the area in 1891.
Activities such as those of Younghusband appeared to the British
to give them a shadow of claim to the upper Yarkand Valley (see lines
B and D on map CIA 12128). In 1899, on the other hand, the Government of
India forwarded a note to the Chinese Government proposing the adoption
of a boundary line running, with minor exceptions, along the crest of
the Muztagh -Karakoram Range. The Chinese Government did nct reply to
the note.
In the late 1920's, Hunza tribesmen of the Shimshal Valley also
cultivated land to the east and north of the Shimshal watershed but were,
often in danger of being driven out by the Chinese frontier guards before
they could harvest their crops of barley. In 1938 .the Chinese even at-
temped to molest Hunza herders Inside the Shimshal Valley in an area con.-
sidered by the British to be clearly a part of Hunza. The Mir simultane-
ously gave up hip claims to the area east of the Shimshal and to the Tagh-
dumbash, thus accepting as the northern and eastern limits of Hunza a line
corresponding approximately to :Line C on map CIA 12128. 31:, 36/
The problem of Hunza has been characterized as falling more with-
in the sphere of Soviet-Pakistani relations than Chinese-Indian relations.
36/ This arises from (1) the close Soviet association with Sinkiang and
7) the offer of accession to Pakistan by the Mir of Hunza following the
partition of India in 1947. After the end of World War II the hold of
the Central Chinese Government over Sinkiang, always rather tenuous, be-
came even weaker. The present Chinese Communist Government in Sinkiang
is reported to be under -the close control of the Soviets or Chinese agents
of the Soviet Union. If the Sinkiang Communist forces come under the direct
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control of the Soviet Union, the separation of the Indian Subcontinent
from Russian power on the north by a narrow wedge of Afghan and Sinkiang
territory, which had been an objective of British diplomacy for roughly
half a century, would be nullified by Soviet hegemony within Sinkiang
itself.
Regardless of whether the control of Sinkiang rests with the
Soviet Union or with the Chinese Communists, the pressure on Hunza from
the direction of Sinkiang has been increasing since 1950. In that year,
Communist forces penetrated into northern Hunza by way of the Ki''?ik,
Mintaka, Khunjerab, and Shimshal Passes. Pakistani forces, which were
supposed to guard the frontier, maintained only one small post at Misgar,
considerably south and west of the line of these passes. A party of
British officers preparing to survey the Shaksgam Valley to the east of
the Shimshal Pass was withdrawn by an agreement between the Mir of
Hunza and a representative of the Pakistan Government in order to prevent
provocation of the Chinese. By the following spring, the Pakistan govern-
ment seemed willing to consider that the de facto boundary should run
along the water-parting line between the Hunza and its tributaries and
the Yarkand and its tributaries. The four passes would be on this line,
and to the east the line would continue along the crest of the Karakoram
Range (see line C on map CIA 12128). 38/ The eastern frontier of Nagir,
lying amidst the Karakoram peaks and the Hispar glacier, was not so
susceptible to penetration. The Mir of Nagir did not worry about. Chinese
incursions and had even abandoned his old penal colony at the village of
Hispar near the frontier because of a lack of irrigation water.
During 1952 and early 1953, the Chinese Communists became more
active in the border region. The Pakistani and Indian consular offices
in Sinkiang were forced to close, presumably to prevent any intelligence
of Chinese intentions or activities from reaching Pakistan or India.
39/ The road southward from Tash-Kurghan was in process of construction
T'see pages 13 and 18) and several parties of Chinese military engineers
had come south of the Mintaka and other passes to survey possible routes.
This penetration caused the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Zafruilah Khan,
to state publicly that the frontiers of Pakistan had been violated by
the Chinese Communists. 40 Pakistan, absorbed in territorial disputes
with both India and Afghanistan and having many pressing internal problems,
however, has not wanted to antagonize Communist China. Since 1950, there-
fore, Chinese pressure on Hunza has caused Pakistan and the Mir of Hunza
to accept, at least temporarily, a frontier along the line of the four
passes, which excludes territory at one time claimed by the Mir or by
British India. Chinese patrols have been active even south and west of
this line in an area that had been claimed by China for a considerable
period but hitherto had been under the control of Hunza or the British.
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The Hunza?.Nagir region has a deficit economy. Most of the people
are farmers, yet agriculture is very precarious in the narrow, steep-sided
valleys and under the arid climatic :regime. The small amount of arable
Land available is not sufficient to support the increasing population, and
about all the suitable land on the steep slopes has been converted into
new stairstep terraces. Food supplies gathered in the summer and fall, are
often exhausted by the end of the winter. "Starvation sprir.Lgtime" is the
term applied to the period after the barley bread and dried apricots
have been consumed and before the new crop has come to harvest. At this
time the farmers are forced to subsist on dandelion and turnip greens and
similar forage gathered from the mountainsides. 2J To supplement their
meager living from farming at home, the Bushuro at various times engaged
in brigandage, raised crops and grazed their flocks in the territory to
the north and east of the watershed, sold supplies to passing caravans,
exploited the alluvial gold deposits of their streams, or migrated
temporarily to more populous areas to seek employment. Some: of these
sources of income are now denied. to them, and the problem of making a
living, always serious, has become critical.
In the nineteenth century the Hunzakuts were notorious highway
robbers. They gained a large portion of their living by plundering the
caravans that plied the neighboring trade routes and by selling the
horses, camels, and human captives in other parts of Central. Asia. They
also .raided Gilgit and the nearby mountain tribes. The British put an
end to this, and the caravan trade was carried on in peace in the areas
under British control. The Mir of Hunza was paid a subsidy in lieu of
his former returns from loot.. Another resource of value to the Mir and
the people was the grazing and hay-producing lands of the Taghdumbash
Pamir? When the present Mir gave up his claims in this area in the
1930's, a source of revenue was lost, but the British granted the Mir
a Jagir (estate) in Gilgit and Matamdas and increased his subsidy in
compensation for the lose. As a partial relief for population pressure
in Hunza, a colony of Hunzakuts was settled on the estate and a new ir-
rigation channel developed. 3V This did not alleviate conditions to
any great extent, however. In contrast with many other parts of India
and Pakistan, there is no great concentration of land ownership in
Hunza and Nagir. The two Mirs own relatively large holdings that are
worked by tenants, but most of the farmers own their own small plots.
In spite of this, there is not enough land for all. Approx:'_mately
1,200 young men leave Hunza each year to seek temporary empaoymernt in
the Punjab. During the years of peace on both sides of the frontier,
Hunza derived some benefit from the traffic on the Kashgar-Gilgit route
-- from tolls charged the caravans and supplies sold to them -- although
very :Little of the trade had its origin or destination in Hi=a. Since
the Communist triumph in Sinkiang, most of the trade from the north has
been cut off, thus depriving Hun.za?of another source of income.
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Hunza's economic difficulties and its forward position render it
vulnerable to Communist propaganda and to military incursions from the
north. / The Pakistan Government has done little to relieve Hunza's
economic difficulties. Although it has expanded the Gilgit Scouts and
improved their military equipment and supplies, it has not attempted to
build up military posts at the border. The Pakistan Government has also
tended to alienate the Mir of Hunza, who feels that he is being treated as
of little account and that the possibility of using his men to help guard
the passes is being disregarded.
Proposals have been made for increasing the amount of cultivable
land, instituting programs of technical assistance, and developing mineral
resources, but little has been done to date. Some quarters in the Pakistan
Government hoped that new irrigation works could be built and even that
hydroelectric projects could be undertaken. The concept of large-scale
undertakings in this remote region is perhaps visionary, one observer
remarking that it is doubtful if more than two or three small new villages
could be established in Hunza and Nagir as a result of the installation
of even the most elaborate modern irrigation works. 30 The hand-made
irrigation systems now in use seem to be best adapted to the region, but
it is doubtful whether they can be profitably extended to many new areas.
Since there is a possibility that the Gilgit Agency may be connected with
Pakistan proper by road, the prospects for commercial fruit raising in
various parts of the Agency are being explored. Geological explorations
have also been undertaken. The institution of a technical assistance pro-
gram has been proposed to encourage small-scale village industries such
as wood carving, leathercraft, and weaving. An American who lived for a
time in Hunza undertook such a program on his own initiative, but the
results of his work have been subject to conflicting reports.
$unza and Nagir, located on one of the two principal corridors
through the Karakoram rampart, are of primary importance in the defense
of northern Kashmir and northern Pakistan. For over two decades these
states, especially Hunza, have been under intermittent pressure t'rom
north of the border. This pressure has been especially great since 1950,
after the Communists had come to power in Sinkiang. Hunza has been forced
to give up claims to territory or to other rights north and east of the
Hunza River watershed, and its own territory has been invaded. Nov comes
the threat to its security posed by the projection of a motor road south-
ward across the Mintaka Pass. The ability of Hunza to withstand this
pressure has been weakened by the deterioration of its economy and the
inability of Pakistan to render much assistance, either military or
economic. Hunza and Nagir might possibly be overrun and conquered by the
Chinese Communists, but whether or not the people of the two states could
be induced by propaganda and subversion to join Sinkiang would be con-
ditioned in part by the fact that they are unrelated, except in religion,
to any cultural groups in Sinkiang, and by their long habit of independence
from close control by any outside power.
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I:!. Ladakh
The Ladakh Frontier District may be divided into two subregions:
(1) the somewhat more prosperous mercantile, agricultural and pastoral
eastern part, which roughly corresponds to the Ladakh and Kargil tehsils
(minor civil divisions); and (2) the-poorer, exclusively agricultural and
pastoral western part, known historically as Baltistan and corresponding
to the Skardu tehsil. Eastern Ladakh, the first of these two subregions,
is at present under the administration of the India-oriented Government
of Kashmir. The total population. of this subregion is about 90,000, the
majority of whom are Muslim in religon. There are nevertheless somewhat
more than 40,000 Buddhists in the entire Ladakh Frontier District, most
of whom are concentrated in eastern Ladakh. The Lamaist form, of Buddhism
practiced here is identical with that of Tibet, and the Ladakhis speak
a dialect of Tibetan. So similar to the Tibetan is the culture of eastern
Ladakh that the subregion has been known variously as Western Tibet,
Second Tibet, and Little Tibet. Western Ladakh, the second cf the two
subregions (referred to hereafter as Baltistan), is in the portion of
Kashmir under Pakistani control. The total population is about 106,000.*
The Baltis are Muslim in religon, but they speak a dialect of Tibetan
similar to that of eastern Ladakh and are similiar to the Ladikhis in
other aspects of their culture. Balt:istan also is sometimes termed Little
Tibet. Eastern Ladakh has for many centuries been. strongly under the
influence of the main part of Tibet, but the Tibetan influence in Baltistfin
has not been quite so strong.
Like the people of Tibet proper the eastern Ladakh people are
divided into a group of settled cultivators and pastoral nomads. The
Ladakhis, properly so-called, are settled on the oases of the river val-
Leys from a point above Dah to the general vicinity of Chutnatang on the
Indus, as well as on the upper Shyok, the Nubra, the Zaskar, and the south-
eastern tributaries of the Dras. The Champas, a group of tent-dwelling
pastoral nomads, inhabit the higher valley of the Indus, the Chang Chenmo
Valley, a portion of the Shyok Valley, and the basins of the Tso Morari
and the Pangong Tso. In summer they migrate to the upland pastures of
the Ladakh-Tibet border area with their flocks and herds, and in winter
they camp in the more sheltered valleys near the bodies of water. The
herds of the Champa range over a rather wide area, but their total
number is comparatively small. Except for the fact that they are nomadic,
the Chainpa appear to be much like the settled Ladakhis in language and
religion; they are also similar to the nomads of the adjacent parts of
Tibet. Several groups of Muslim Baltis have settled among the L;ad?ikhi
population, notably along the Indus near Leh. The town of Leh contains
a mixed population, some 1lements having descended from unions between
* Population statistics are from Sources .12 and 28.
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Ladakhi women and Kashmir or Sinkiang merchants, Dogra troops, arid other
foreign sojourners. 6, 2)+
The Tibetan-speaking Baltis are centered in the Skardu Basin,
which extends along the Indus for about 18 miles and is from 2 to 5
miles wide, as well as in the tributary valleys of the lower Shyok, the
Shigar, and several smaller streams. They are also found along the
Indus to the northwest for a considerable distance beyond the Skerdu
Basin and to the southeast as far as the vicinity of the cease-fire line
separating the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled areas. The Baltis were
converted to Islam from Buddhism several centuries ago. They profess the
Shia form of Islam, in contrast with the Sunni Islam of Pakistan proper.
The small valleys leading northward to the Indus from the Deosai Moun-
tains and the upper Dras Valley around the town of Dras are inhabited
by Dards (Brokpas), another local group, most of whom have been converted
to Islam. This area of Dardic speech and culture is an outlier of the
large one in Dardistan, farther down the Indus in the Gilgit Agency.
A group also termed Dards inhabits the Indus Valley around the town of
Dah -- to the north and south of the junction with the Drs River. Much
of this area is rugged canyon country, rarely visited by outsiders. Al-
though the people speak a Dardic tongue, they claim to have a separate
religion that is neither Islamic nor Buddhist. In reality, they appear
to be Buddhists. The cease-fire line runs through or near the transition
zone between Islam and Buddhism. 24+
In Buddhist Ladakh, as in Tibet, religion plays a large :part
in the lives of the people. Visible evidence of this is found in the
landscape, in the form of the numerous mani (prayer) walls, chortens
(religious monuments), and monasteries, both large and small. The con-
trast is striking between Ladakh, with its many religious structures,
and Baltistan, where about the only religious structures currently in
use are the small village mosques. The congregations of lamas in the
monasteries of Ladakh are the official bodies of the Buddhist religion.
In the life of the ordinary Ladakhi layman the lama functions in many
capacities -- as priest, oracle to be consulted in the ordering of
one's daily affairs, magician for the propitiation of evil spirito,
physician, banker, and landlord. Nearly every family has at leaiit
one son who is a lama. Women also take holy orders, but the practice
is not as prevalent as among the men. The two principal sects of lamas
are both represented in Ladakh. In the red-hat sect, which is the more
ancient, the lamas are allowed to marry; in the yellow-hat or reformed
sect, to which the Dalai and Panchan Lamas of Tibet belong, the lamas
must be celibate. The most famous monastery in Ladakh, Himis, is located
in a side valley near the Indus about 25 miles southeast of Leh and
belongs to the red-hat sect. The lamas of Ladakh must go to one of
the several large monasteries near Lhasa and to one of the two lamaist
academies in that city for their higher training, since there are no
appropriate institutions either in their own country or in western
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Tibet. Every year a number of lamas leave Ladakh for training in central
Tibet, where they may remain for 10 or more years. Probably all the lamas
in higher positions in the monasteries of Ladakh received their education
in Tibet. The Buddhist hierarchy of Tibet is also very influential in
the selection of.the rinpoche or head lama of each monastery. According
to Buddhist belief, the head lamas are reincarnations of earlier notables.
When a, head lama dies, he must be replaced by a baby boy who is his
authentic reincarnation. This selection is made after consulting the
oracle at Lhasa. ?L1_2_ ++
Before the tenth century, Ladakh was a part of the empire of
Tibet, but since that time it has either been independent of or only
nominally subject to central Tibet. On the other hand, Ladakh itself
was at one time the center of a state of considerable importance in
this part of Central Asia. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, this kingdom, with its capital at Leh, extended from the
vicinity of the Dr:s River eastward into modern Tibet to a point about
three-fourths of the way from Mesnasarowar Lake to Shigatse. Near the
end of the seventeenth century the kingdom was attacked by an army
from central Tibet, and in order to secure assistance from the Mogul
Empire in Kashmir and India the king promised to become a Muslim and
send an annual tribute to Kashmir. The Tibetans, however, again at-
tacked Ladakh and conquered its eastern territories. The eastern
frontier of Ladakh was then placed in the vicinity of the Pangong Tso
and, although undefined as a boundary line, has remained in approxi-
mately the same location. to the present. The treaty establishing this
border also provided that the king of Ladakh should send a mission once
every 3 years to Lhasa, the spiritual capital of Lamaism, with pres-
ents for the clergy. Stated amounts of gold, calico, cotton cloth,
and scent were to be delivered for the Dalai Lama. In return, a trade
mission was to be sent every year from Tibet to Ladakh with 200 loads
of brick tea. These provisions have continued in force, with few
alterations, until recent times. 14 The presents to the Dalai
Lama were considered, at least by the Ladakhis, as recognition of his
spiritual authority only, not as tokens of political subjection. 24
Thee hrmies of Gulab Singh, founder of the State of Jammu ant Kashmir,
conquered Ladakh and Baltistan during the period 183+-41. The king
of Ladakh was allowed to retain his rank and one village as an. estate,
but the country came under the direct administration of the Kashmir
Government. Before the nineteenth century, Baltistan was generally divided
into many petty states, each centering on one of the valley oases, but
portions of it were occasionally under the influence of the Kingdom of
Ladakh. During one period, however, the ruler of Ska-.rdu conquered surround-
ing territory, including even Ladakh. After Baltistan was added to the
dominions of Gulab Singh, the petty rulers, like the king of Ladakh, re-
tained their titles but were stripped of any real authority.
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Since Ladakh came under the dominion of Kashmir, the approximate
location of the frontier with Tibet has been known fairly accurately by
the local inhabitants and the caravans crossing it. One group of nomads
has been recognized as belonging to Ladakh and another to Tibet. However,
since there is no defined boundary line and since the region is very
sparsely inhabited, informal crossing from one Jurisdiction to the other
has probably been fairly common. 24+ Patrolling of the boundary was lax
on the part of both Kashmir and Tibet. Since the Chinese Communists have
taken over Tibet, however, they appear to have tightened the control by
Lhasa over the western border region of Tibet. The Indians, on the other
hand, have placed most of their small force near the cease-fire line with
Pakistan or to the north along the trail to Sinkiangb but they have not
attempted military occupation of the Tibetan border area. From time to
time, there have been disputes along the frontier. In 1918, for example,
a Tibetan official removed a Kashmir subject and his flocks from grazing
grounds that Kashmir claimed as part of Ladakh. 36 During the last
several years Kirghiz nomads, who may have come down from Sinkiang into
western Tibet, have penetrated eastern Ladakh. In the summer of 1952,
armed Tibetans infiltrated Ladakh, a development that caused the govern-
ment of India to prepare a protest to the Chinese Communist Government.
~3
The majority of the people of Ladakh are peasant cultivators
or herders, but in contrast with Baltistan and Hunza-Nagir, trade is also
an important activity in Ladakh, centering on Leh (see Section II-C).
Traditionally one of the most important items of trade has been the
pashmina wool from the goat. The wool was brought from Tibet, Sinkiang,
and the Champs districts of Ladakh to Leh, where it was hand-cleaned
and forwarded to Kashmir or other parts of northern India for final
processing. Other types of wool for carpetmaking have also been exported
from Tibet. Within recent years the United States has been one of the
principal ultimate consumers of Tibetan wool. Other items of export
from Tibet to Leh have been borax and brick tea, which is as important
an article of consumption in Ladakh as in Tibet. Manufactured goods
are sent to Sinkiang and Tibet from Leh. Other products exchanged with
Tibet have been silk, woolen goods, carpets, hides, fruit, grain, and
furs. 12, ! Various foodstuffs such as barley, dried apricots, salt,
rice, and butter are traded locally. During the period of British
ascendency in India, an attempt was made to foster trade over the
northern passes between Kashmir and Sinkiang. Russian territory on
the west, however, was much more accessible to Sinkiang, and the Russians
secured most of the Sinkiang trade. Thus, in the 1930's, India accounted
for only about 5 percent of the external trade of Sinkiang. Yarkand
merchants nevertheless sold wool, raw silk, carpets, and course cotton
goods in Leh and bought manufactured goods from India. Indian merchants
invested in caravan loads of chaxas, a narcotic something like marijuana,
which they imported from Sinkiang. In the 1930's, this drug traffic is
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said to have accounted for !-2 percent of the Indian imports from Sinkiang.
29/
The caravan traffic was carried on by foreign merchants, who
also conducted the trade in the several serais (market places) of Leh.
The role of the Ladakhis in the trade was to supply ponies and yaks and
to hire out as porters on the caravans. In this way, peasant farmers
hecured cash to supplement their poor living from the soil. At some
places along the routes, it was also customary for the peasants to rent
out pasture land to passing caravans. Baltistan lies off of the cara-
van tracks and derives no direct benefit from the trade. Since the
peasants of Baltistan must live off the soil, which is poor in all but
a few favored spots such as the Shigar oases, they make very little
above a bare subsistence. In consequence, Baltistan is a region of
seasonal out-migration, the men hiring out as coolies in other parts
of the border area or in the Punjab. Formerly, they also emigrated
temporarily to Sinkiang to find work.
The conflict between Indian. and Pakistani forces in. Kashmir
and the Chinese take-over in Sinkiang and Tibet caused almost complete
cessation of trade in Ladakh -- particularly between Ladakh and Sinkiang
-- after 1948. Later, trade between Tibet and the Subcontinent revived
somewhat, but the Chinese are making great efforts to provide a market
for Tibetan wool and to replace India as Tibet's chief customer for
this commodity. Because of the political uncertainties of the time,
the regular third-year mission from Ladakh to Lhasa, schedu:Led for
1950, did not take place. Plans were made by Kashmir to send the
mission in each of the two succeeding years, but the plans were not
carried out. The caravan was again planned for 1953. The regular yearly
caravans from western Tibet to Ladakh have continued as usual. 4ri,_ j
During the period when the Communists were gaining ascendency in
Sinkiang the only traffic from the north over the passes down into Ladakh
consisted of refugees fleeing from the new regime. The market places in.
Leh were almost deserted.. The arrival of units of the ;tndian army during
the Indian-Pakistani fighting compensated in part, however, for the lost
caravan business. Porterage for the army, labor on roads and defense
works, and service in the newly created Kashmir militia at :Least partially
replaced the caravans as sources of cash income. l2
The problem of land redistribution has come to the fore in
Ladakh in recent years. The operation of several social institutions --
fraternal polyandry, primogeniture, and monasticism -- have maintained
the concentration of landownership in comparatively few hands. An estate
customarily descends to the eldest son, but it is maintained intact for
the benefit of the whole family. All the sons remain together in one
household, join in marriage to one wife, and enjoy the proceeds and share
in. the management of the estate. Conversely, if there are no male heirs,
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several sisters may remain together and marry .a common husband, who
becomes heir to the estate. Monasteries are supported mainly by the
revenue from their lands. Monastic estates have become very large over
a long period of time through donations from the faithful. Until
recently, as a result, Ladakh had a relatively small number of land-
owners and a large body of landless tenants or share croppers. The
landless peasants, not having enough capital to support their opera-
tions throughout the year, are generally forced to borrow food and other
supplies in the winter. After the harvest, these loans are repaid in
the form of grain at interest rates ranging up to.25 percent. Monasteries
and grain merchants are engaged in the loan business. 9/
The population of Ladakh remains fairly stable, but because of
the rigors of the environment very little new land can be put in cultiva-
tion to relieve the poverty of the average peasant. Restrictions on the
increase in the amount of arable land have not been caused entirely by
nature, being in part the result of the conservatism of the Ladikhi
farmer. The making of new fields and the construction of irrigation worke
must be approved by the local community as a whole, and the desire to
prevent encroachment of cultivation on communal pastureland often restrairic
individuals from bringing more land into cultivation. 26
The present government of the Indian portion of Kashmir is com-
mitted to a program of land redistribution for the benefit of the peas-
ants. Ladakh tehsil has some 30,000 acres of cultivated land, of which
the monasteries own about 9,000 acres. By mid-1951, it was claimed that
most of the non-monastic land, formerly owned by 21- large holder;), had
been distributed to new peasant proprietors. Reportedly, the former
large owners were left with about 22-1/2 acres each, whereas the new
owners possessed an average of 2 acres apiece. Such small peasant hold-
ings appear to be in line with the amount cultivated per family in the
past, and the acreage is now rent-free. In spite of this, the living
to be gained from such small holdings would not appear to be adequate.
The lamas were influential enough to prevent a redistribution of monastic
land, arguing that if the land was taken away from the monasteries they
would have no means of support other than possible government subsidy.
12 The effects in Ladakh of any program the Kashmir Government may
have had for reforming the system of agricultural credit are not known.
There are signs, however, that at least some of the peasants are dis-
satisified with the present status of church lands and the system of
credit imposed by the monasteries and the merchants. In at least one
instance, villagers have petitioned authorities for a distribution of
monastic lands, and a recent demonstration was accompanied by violence
against money lenders. ~7 It appears, therefore, that the partial
redistribution of land has not solved two of the basic economic prob-
lems faced by the peasant -- the problems of enough land to till and
of securing adequate credit to conduct village operations without be-
coming overburdened with debt.
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The Buddhist hierarchy in Ladakh is faced on the one side by the
government of Kashmir, whose innovations in the frontier territory seem
to have brought to light a certain discontent with the ascendency of the
monasteries over the economic life of the country, and on the other side
by the possibility of infiltration from Communist-dominated Tibet. Con-
sidering; the paramount influence exercised by the church of Tibet over
that of Ladakh, it would appear that the Chinese Communists might be in
a position to extend their away over Ladakhi Lamaism if they succeeded
in gaining control of Tibetan Lamaism and converted it into an. apparatus
for political domination of the country. Even if the Ladakhi hierarchy
should remain free from such domination, the Communists might exploit
the latent discontent of the peasants. In the spring of 1952, rumors in-
dicated that Communist agitators from western Tibet had crossed into
Ladakh. 48/
The disturbances of rF;cernt years have been blamed on "outsiders,"
but these seem to have been persons who came in with the Kashmir-Indian
administration rather than Communists. Kausahak Bakula, the lead lama
of Spitok, is the principal spokesman for the Ladakh hierarchy and the
most important political figure in the country. In the spring of 1952,
he criticized the Kashmir Government for alleged discriminatory prac-
tices against Ladakh and for not allowing greater representation for
the frontier area in the Kashmir -legislature. He pointed out that Ladakh
was linguistically and culturally different from most of the :remainder
Of Kashmir, and requested that Ladakh be granted autonomy undr Kashmir or
that Ladakh accede to India directly as an area independent of Kashmir.
On other occasions the Lama, however, has expressed his uneasiness at
the proximity of the Communists in Tibet. His statements probably in-
dicate the alarm with which the hierarchy views the reforms instituted by
the Kashmir Government in Ladakh and the suspicion with which the Ladakhis
in general view the alien but dominant Kashmiri.
The nature of the Chinese threat to the frontier territories of
Lad'.kh differs somewhat from the threat to.Hunza and Nagir. In the case
of Hunza and Nagir, a territorial and boundary-dispute of long standing
was inherited by the Chinese Communists; in the case of Ladakh, boundary
disputes are of minor importance. The only dispute of consequence is that
regarding the vacant lands north of the Karakoram Pass; along: the frontier
with Tibet, the disputes over territory were minor, even though the boundary
was not defined. The Chinese have made no claim to territory in Ladakh.
Aside from military action, any forward movement by the Chinese in this
direction would probably depend upon their ability to infiltrate the
lama:ist organization or to exploit latent discontent with economic con-
ditions on the part of the peasants. Any attempt to absorb eastern
Ladakh and Baltistan into Chinese territories might be accoml.ani.ed by
the plea that kindred Tibetan peoples were being "liberated." Such a
plea might have some weight with the Buddhist Ladakhis. The Muslim
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Baltis and Dards, who outnumber the Lada.khis by a considerable margin,
might feel little kinship to the Tibetans, but at the same time their
feeling of identity with the Pakistanis would not be strong. The Com-
munists might exploit the differences between the Shia and Sunni sects,
as well as cultural differences, in order to drive a wedge between the
Baltis and the Pakistanis.
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III. Western Himalayan Sector of the Border
A. Physical Setting
From the southeastern corner of Ladakh to the northwestern corner
of Nepal the undefined Tibet-India border parallels the Great Himalaya
Range. In this area the streams flowing down to the Indo-Gangetic' plain
from the Tibetan Plateau have cut the great rampart of the plateau into
an intricate pattern of peaks and ridges, between which the strew valleys
are deeply incised. In the numerous isolated valleys of this mountain
zone dwell a group of peoples that display characteristics of botch the
Hindu culture of the plains and the Tibetan culture of the plateau but
are distinct in many respects from both. Until the British conquest,
these peoples were organized into a number of petty states and, in some
areas, were under the domination of Tibet. Under independent India the
mountain belt is divided, from northwest to southeast, among the states
of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh.
The mountain belt many be divided into four parallel zones:
(1) the zone immediately to the northeast of the plains, including the
comparatively low Siwalik Range; (2) a zone varying from 40 to 60 miles
in width, containing peaks ranging from 6,000 to 15,000 feet in elevation
and including "hill" lands behind the Siwaliks and the spurs extending
southward from the peaks of the main range; (3) the main range, or the
Great Himalaya, containing the snowy peaks with elevations generally
over 20,000 feet; and (4) the zone including the water-parting range
between the rivers that flow directly toward the plains and the r=evers
that flow in the trough of the Tibetan Plateau to the north of the
Himalaya, the highest elevations of this zone being about 4,000 feet below
the peaks of the main range. This water-parting range is considered by
some authorities to be a southeastern extension of the Zaskar Range of
Ladakh, and is so treated on the accompanying reap (CIA 12128). l/
The northwestern part of this mountain belt lies within the
Indus drainage basin and the southeastern portion within the Ganges.
The Sutlej River, tributary to the Indus, has its source near Lake
Manasarowar in Tibet, flows northwest along the north side of the Zaskar
Range, then cuts across the mountain belt from east to west before enter-
ing the Punjab Plain (see Figure 9). With this exception, all the streams
have their sources in the Zaskar and flow generally south or southwest,
crossing the axis of the Great Himalaya. The great snowy peaks such as
Badrina.th (23,190 feet) and Nanda Devi (25,645 feet) are, therefore, not
part of a continuous ridge but stand out as isolated mountains, or groups
of mountains separated by the deep transverse valleys of the rivers
flowing from the Zaskar Range down to the plains. Southeast of the place
where the Sutlej cuts across the mountain belt, each of the great peaks
or groups of peaks has as its pedestal a ridge that is aligned parallel
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Figure 9. The Sutlej Valley immediately northwest of Manasarowar Lake.
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to the transverse valleys and that extends southward from the Zaskar to a
point somewhat south of the great peaks. To the north of the Sutlej cross-
ing the distance between the Great Himalaya and the Zaskar Ranges is roughly
50 miles, and the interval is occupied by the valley of the Spiti River, a
trans-Himalayan tributary of the Sutlej. To the south of the Sutlej cross-
ing, the distance between the Great Himalaya and the Zaskar narrows to be-
tween 20 and 30 miles. Several passes cross the Zaskar Range at or near
the heads of the transverse valleys. These include the Mana, the Niti, the
Kungribingri, and the Lipulek, which range in elevation from over 16,500
feet to 18,300 feet, and several others not shown on the-accompanying map.
A pass of a different type is the Shipki, which is at a much lower eleva-
tion (15,400 feet) than the others, being located in the gap where the
Sutlej crosses the Zaskar Range. The boundary is considered by the British
and the Indians to lie, in most places, along the axis of the Zaskar Range
and at the points where the passes cross the range. 1 49, 50
The climate of the first two zones of the mountain belt -- the
"hill" region -- is only slightly different from that of the plains of
India. A cold season with relatively little precipitation lasts from
October to March, a dry hot season from April to June, and a season of
monsoon rain from July to September. The Great Himalaya Range limits
the influence of the monsoon climate here just as it does in Kashmir to
the northwest. On the south side of the range the luxuriant vegetation
produced by the monsoon type of climate extends up to about 12,000 feet,
and the line of permanent snow lies at about 15,500 feet. On the north
side of the great peaks the sequence of seasons is generally the ;;ame as
to the south, but the climate is much drier and cooler. Between the Great
Himalaya and the Zaskar, however, there are considerable local differences
due to differences in elevation. The valleys that open to the southward
receive the influence of the seasonal moisture-bearing winds; places lying
at higher elevations or behind the peaks receive much less precipitation.
Approaching the crest of the Zaskar Range the amount of moisture brought
by the monsoon is less and less, and only a few showers are received in
the "rainy" season. To the north of the Great Himalaya the winter is
rigorous. From mid-November to mid-April, all areas above 10,000 feet
are buried under snow. The amount of snow that falls at this time is
probably considerably greater than in drier Tibet to the north. During
the dry summer the snow line retreats to 18,000 or 19,000 feet, and the
force of the sun's rays in exposed situations is excessive. 50 The
luxuriant temperate forest of the hills southwest of the Great Himalaya
is duplicated to the northeastward only in the lower parts of the valleys.
The deodar, oak, and pine of the lowest elevations in the valleys give
way at higher elevations to fir, spruce, beech, a different species of
pine, and birch. Rhododendron and the dams are also found. Much of the
area northeast of the Great Himalaya, however, consists of outcrops of
bare solid rock or shale slope. 49/ The Spiti Valley is a desolate place,
similar to much of Tibet proper and Ladakh.
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Transportation in the Himalayan border region is primitive, but
almost the entire economy of the border dwellers is dependent upon the
ability to move persons and goods along the narrow pack trails (see Figure
10). Railroads extend to the edge of the plains or into the lower hills
as far as the hill stations such as Simla, Dehra Dun, and Ramnagar. From
the railheads, roads traversable by wheeled vehicles extend for some
distance further into the hills to a few towns such as Almo:a. Above
these towns and across the ranges into Tibet, pack trails a^e the only
routes. In general the trails extend along the transverse valleys and
across the passes in the Zaskar Range into Tibet. The so-called Hindustan-
Lhasa trade route extends along the Sutlej River, across the Shipki Pass,
and continues to Gartok, Tibet, but the trails crossing the other passes
to the southeast of Shipki are of equal if not greater importance to the
local traders of the border region. Along the trails pass the traders,
herders, and peasants in their seasonal migrations from the high mountains
to the plains. No major military expeditions have crossed this portion of
the Himalaya, but trading caravans have crossed the passes curing the
summer months for many generations (see Figure 11). It would therefore
appear entirely feasible for lightly equipped troops to move over the
trails.* The effectiveness of such troops against determined and large-
scale resistance upon reaching the lower hills or the plains would be
problematical. Nevertheless, possession of the area between the Zaskar
Range and the main axis of the Great Himalaya would be of value to the
Chinese or any other power controlling Tibet. It would give them control
of both sides of the passes leading from Tibet into India and would place
them in favorable jump-off positions on the down-hill slope of trails
leading through the lateral valleys down to the plains.
B. The People and Their Economic Activities
Geographically, the hill lands in general are unmistakably part
of India, although lying at the fringes of Indian civilization. Located
here are the famous hill stations such as Simla and Dehra Dun, which serve
as hot weather refuges for people from the plains. The people of the hills
are for the most part Hindus. From the general vicinity of the Great
Himalaya northeastward, however, in the zones of cooler and r.ore arid
climate and higher elevations, the Hindus give way to people who are more
like the Tibetans in ancestry and culture. In general, these peoples
live between the Great Himalaya and the Zaskar Ranges, but they are also
found on the southwestern slopes of the Great Himalaya immediately to the
south of the Kashmir boundary. The zone between the Great Himalaya and
the Zaskar, together with the nearby areas inhabited by peoples closely
akin to the Tibetans, constitutes the real border region between India
and Tibet in this sector.
X-A Tibetan-Chinese army of possibly 12,000 invaded Nepal in 1792 and de-
feated the Gurkhas. The terrain in Nepal is somewhat similar to that in
the area under discussion. 51/
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Figure 10. Laden goats going south from Tibet through the
valley of the Dhauli River.
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One group of peoples related to the Tibetans inhabit tte districts
of Chamba and Lahul south of Kashmir, particularly the latter. The people
are Buddhists, although the Buddhism is said to be considerably mixed with
Hinduism. 52 The dialect of Tibetan spoken is related to Ladakti and
Balti, but the grammar shows traces of Aryan influences from other parts
of India. Lahul was conquered by Ladakh during the great days of that
kingdom, but later came under the rule of Kulu to the south. Lahul lies
on the main trade route connecting Ladakh by way of the Bard Lacta Pass
with the plains of India and is also on a route that leads eastwerd through
Spiti to Tibet. The British acquired Lahul and Spiti in the 184Cj1s in hopes
that the route through Spiti would give them direct access to the western
Tibetan wool-producing areas. Lahul did attain considerable importance in
the wool trade. An annual market was held at Patseo in Lahul, to which
the Changpas of eastern Ladakh and western Tibet and other shephfrd groups
brought their wool. A similar market was held in Spiti. The wool from
Lahul was taken southward to Kulu, where it was eventually bought by down-
country purchasers for the Indian mills. The Kunawaris of Bashahr State,
southeast of Lahul and now included in Himachal Pradesh, acted at. middlemen
for a part of the trade coming south from Lahul. 53, 54/
The isolated valley of Spiti, bordered on the north by Kashmir
and on the east by Tibet, is inhabited by Tibetans. It lies across the
Himalaya from Lahul. The people are Buddhists and speak a dialect of
Tibetan related to that spoken in the neighboring part of Ladakh and to
that of central Tibet. 55/ The several monasteries in the Spiti Valley
own much of the land and absorb a large percentage of the male population
and much of the meager resources of the valley.
One group living in Kunawar in the former Bashahr State and the
Jads of the Bhagirathi River valley in Tehri-Garhwal District of Uttar
Pradesh speak a dialect of Tibetan closely related to that of central
Tibet. Farther down the Sutlej River in Kunawar, however, the people
speak one of the so-called Himalayan dialects, These dialects are classed
with the Tibeto-Burman family of languages but are not actually :similar
to Tibetan. This Kunawari (Kanawari, Kanauri) dialect possesses consider-
able traces of Munda, the family of languages spoken in Madhya Pradesh,
Orissa, and Bengal. 55 The Jads emigrated from Bashahr to the vicinity
of Nilang, and from there have spread down the Bhagirathi Valley.. Because
of the former practice of buying Hindu slave girls from Tehri-Garhwal,
they are considerably mixed with elements from the lower hill districts.
The Jads are migratory traders and cultivators like the Bhotia oj' Garhwal
and Almora Districts of Uttar Pradesh and are included among the Bhotia
by some writers. Their annual cycle of trade and migration is treated
along with that of the Bhotia in paragraphs to follow. Although both Hindu
and Buddhist rites are practiced among the Jads, they also observe cere-
monies of an older local religion. 49 56
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The Bhotia are divided into two groups -- (1) the western Bhotia
who dwell in the valleys leading to the Mana and Niti passes in Garhwal
and the valleys around Milam in northwestern Almora (see Figure 12), and
(2) the eastern Bhotia of northeastern Almora in the valleys tributary to
the Kali. River leading to The Darma and Lipulek Passes. A rough estimate
places their number at about 50,000. 57/ The term "Bhotia." is derived
from the Tibetan name for Tibet (Bod-J11) and is applied by Hindus to
several groups related to Tibetans but living in the confines of the Indian
Subcontinent from Ladakh to Assam. The Bhotia of Garhwal and Almora live
in the tract described above, which is termed "Bhot" by the adjacent Hindu
peoples. The limits of this tract cannot be defined with precision because
there are considerable local differences between the different Bhotia
groups and because, at the southern edges, there is considerable admixture
with the people of the lower hills. Generally speaking, however, the
Bhotias inhabit, as their home base, the valleys that cut across the Great
Himalaya Range, from the points where these valleys intersect the axis of
the range up to the passes leading over the Oskar Range into Tibet. 49/
The western Bhotia of Garhwal speak the so-called Garhwal dialect
of Tibetan, similar to that of central Tibet. The same dialect is also
spoken in portions of the western Bhotia area of Almora, but here the
villages speaking Tibetan appear to be intermingled with villages that
employ the tongue of their Khasia neighbors to the south. This is a Hindi
dialect and is spoken by most of the hill peoples of Garhwal and Almora.*
Among the western Bhcitia of Almora is also a group designated as the Jethora
who speak Rangkas, one of the Himalayan dialects. The Jethora, unlike all
other Bhotia, are settled cultivators, who neither engage in trade nor
migrate with the seasons between higher and lower elevations. The eastern
Bhotia, of the northeastern corner of Almora are divided into three groups
according to location, and a separate Himalayan dialect is identified for
each. However, there seems to be little difference among the three dialects.
The eastern Bhotia are considered to be less civilized than their western
kinsmen and are looked down upon by the latter.
All of the Bhotiq profess the Hindu religion and follow Hindu
customs to a greater or lesser degree. The caste system is present in a
rudimentary form, and certain conventions observed in the interccurse
between the upper and lower castes resemble somewhat those of the orthodox
Hindus of the plains. Their profession of trader conditions the observance
of other conventions by the Bhotia, however. They dine and drink tea with
'Sources 41, 49, 50, and 55 disagree on several points regarding the Bhotias,
such as the exact location of the Tibetan and the Khasia dialects in Almora
and the number and identity of the castes of the Bhotia.. Probably the in-
termingling of the Hindu and the Tibetan elements in the area makes preci--
sion difficult.
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the cow-killing Tibetans with whom they have business dealings, which
many orthodox plains Hindus would not do. For this reason the Hindus of
the plains will not generally eat with the Bhotia. 1411 Greater importance
is attached by the Bhotia to local deities and less to the great gods of
the Hindu pantheon than is the case in the plains. With the exception of
the famous hill temples (mentioned below), the shrines erected by the
Bhotias are of the simplest sort. In the early part of the present century,
vestiges of an older religion reportedly still lingered in the more remote
valleys. 5N The Bhotia practice polygamy and monogamy as do other Hindus.
There is a tradition among the Bhotia that their ancestors were
Rajputs who lived in India at an early period but migrated to Tibet and,
after several generations, returned southward and settled in the Himalayan
borderland.. The tradition is given some support by Chinese and Tibetan
writ'_ngs, which mention the early existence of Rajput colonies in Tibet.
Assuming that the tradition is true, the original Rajput strain must have
mixed with the Tibetan, since evidences of the Rajput strain have disap-
peared in the descendents. In physical features the Bhotia are now much
more like Tibetans than the hill or plains dwellers to the south. 49J
It may be that the eastern Bhotia, the western Bhotia, the Je+,hora, or
subdivisions within these groups, represent different waves of migration.
It. addition to the Bhotia., there are in the border area a considerable
number of inhabitants who came from Tibet proper or whose ancestors a few
generations back came from eastern Tibet. The term Khampa is applied to
this group, and its members are considered temporary sojourners even though
they may have lived in the area all their lives. In the Kali Valley, there
is one village of converts to Islam.
The mountain districts of Uttar Pradesh and the not far distant
area of Mt. Kailas (see Figure 13) and Manasarowar Lake in Tibet are
considered to be holy places by both Hindus and Buddhists. Many of the
Hindu gods are believed to have dwelt in the Indian hills, and a number
of temples have been erected at the scenes of their exploits. Since the
same deities are revered in both the Hindu and the Buddhist religions and
since the hill region was once doninated by Buddhism before it was again
reclaimed for Hinduism, the temples are used by both religions. The temple
of Badrinath in Garhwal, probably originally erected in the eighth century
A.D., is the most famous. It is dedicated to one of the incarnations of
Vishr.LU. Every year, thousands of pilgrims visit this shrine to worship
and bathe in the adjoining; hot sparing, acts which are supposed to gain
particular merit for the devotee. Many also make a circuit of several
other temples in the vicinity on their pilgrimage. Gifts are brought to
the Badrinath temple both by the pilgrims from India and by lama delegations
from Tibet.
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Figure 13. Mt. Kailas, Tibet, showing a possible
landing site immediately below the mountain.
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Mt. Kailas and_ Manasa:rowar Lake are also the objects of pilgrim-
age by persons from India, who make the difficult journey over the Himalaya
and into Tibet by way of the Lipulek. and other adjacent passes. Hindu and
Buddhist writings describe Kailas as the hub of the shaft or.. which the
wheel of the universe rests. Several years ago an airfield was built at
Badrinath. Before the Communists invaded Tibet, some of the faithful
hoped that air service could also be established to Kailas and Manasarowar
so that the rigors of the journey could be lessened for those who could
afford air travel. 41._4q,_ 59/
The trade carried on by the Bhotia and related groups along the
Tibetan border constitutes their most important economic activity, and. they'
are even more dependent upon it than on agriculture for a living. This
trade has been carried on for many generations, although the type and
volume of commodities handled has varied to some extent over the years.
The Bhotia are the exporters, importers, and middlemen for all the Tibetan
trade of this part of India. To Tibet they carry barley, wheat, rice,
manufactured piece goods, utensils, Chinese tea, and other items; from
Tibet they bring salt, borax, wool., coarse Tibetan blankets, sheep, goats,
ponies, and the skins of such wild animals as the snow leopard, lynx, snow
marten, and musk deer.
By customs in force for a long period of time, the Bhotia enjoy
rn monopoly of all- the trade passing into Tibet across their ssection of the
frontier. The Bhotia of any given locality in India are restricted in
their trading operations to specified markets in western T-ib,:et, and indi-?
Vi_dual traders are, in many cases, restricted in their dealings to certain
correspondents in Tibet. Apparently, however, Tibetan trade:-,s are allowed
to cross the passes and bring goods into the border region. The mandi or
market at Takl.akot, Tibet, is one of the more famous, perhaps because it
is on the pilgrim route from India to Kailas (see Figure 14),. The eastern
Bhotia enjoy the monopoly of trade with this place. From the standpoint
of volume of trade, the mandi at Gyanyima, which is frequented by the
Bhotia of Milam and the adjacent areas, is the most important. In former
years, an annual business of about 25 lakhs of rupees (approximately
$525,000) was done here. Other important mandis are at Chhakra, where the
eastern Bhotia trade, and at Nabra, used by the Jads and Bhotia of Garhwal.
Traders from Jad villages, from Bashahr, and some of those from Garhwal
go to a place named Chaprang. All of the Bhotia apparently have the priv-
ilege of trading at Gartok, the summer capital of the viceroy of western
Tibet. A number of mandis of lesser importance are also found throughout
the area. 4l~ _58J
Mandis area held every summer for periods ranging from 2 weeks
to 5 months, at which time the nomadic shepherds of Tibet and Tibetan
dealers meet the Bhotia traders from over the passes. For most of the
remainder of the year the passes are under snow and no trade southward
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Figure 14-. Taklakot mandi (market), Tibet.
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can be conducted. The Bhotia combine their trading operations with their
regime of annual migration in a remarkably well coordinated system. During
the trading season from about June or July to October, the principal men and
the women and children occupy the home villages in the upper valleys between
the Himalaya and the Zaskar Ranges, while most of the men shuttle back and
forth from the villages to the marts in Tibet. The women and children tend
the crops. About October, before snow covers the upper valleys, the entire
villages (except for a few caretakers or old persons) migrate to points
lower down near the foot of the Himalaya, taking with them the trading
goods from Tibet. Here, in semipermanent encampments, are their winter
quarters. During the fall and early winter the men barter the wool and
other Tibetan goods for Indian goods at various fairs that are held in the
middle and lower hills and make side excursions to hill villages to barter
Tibetan salt and wool. The women stay in the winter quarters to weave and
take care of the flocks of sheep, goats, and other stock. As winter advances
the men go farther south to the railheads or even to the ports to secure
goods for the coming season's trade. In the spring and early summer, pur-
chases of grain are made in the hill villages to supplement grain stocks
that were secured farther south during the winter. In early summer, when
the Bhotia make their upward migration, all the commodities intended for
the coming season's trade are transported up to the home villages and stored.
As soon as the passes into Tibet open the annual cycle starts over again.
Sheep, goats, and jhibu (as the cross between the yak and the cow is called
in this locality) are the principal means of transport in all these opera-
tions. 49, 60/ The Jads of Harsil village in the Bhagirathi Valley are
almost exclusively traders, who do not own or cultivate any of the sur-
rounding land. In this locality, there are three groups of annual migrants:
(1) the Hindu peasants and landowners who come in the spring to raise a
crop of hill rice or buckwheat during the short growing season and then
retire southward; (2) the pastoral nomads who take their flocks into the
surrounding alpine pastures during the summer and descend to the lower
hills for the winter., and (3) the Jad traders who occupy Harsil in summer
to conduct the trade with Tibet. 56]
For the Bhotia, agriculture is of secondary importance. Cropland
in the precipitous upper valleys is scarce, and that available is dry and
stony, Irrigation is practiced to some extent. The well-to-do Bhotia,
such as those of Milam, have the plowing done by hired servants; the crops
are sown and harvested mostly by the women and children. The principal
crops are barley, buckwheat, amaranth, turnips, leeks, and potatoes. In
the extreme north, buckwheat only is grown. Sowing is generally completed
by the first week of June, and the crop is ready for harvest about the middle
of September. 1+91 Occasionally, a succession of unusually severe winters
makes crop production impossible in some of the more exposed villages.
Although the Bhotia raise livestock for food, clothing, and transport, they
do not always have enough pack animals and at times must purchase stock
from Tibet or other parts of the highland area.
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C. Political Influences
The Bhotia tract apparently belcnged to Tibet until about the
seventeenth century, although written evidence to this effect seems to he
lacking. At about that time, Garhwal became consolidated under a dynasty
having its capital at Srinagar on the Alaknanda River,* and the Ctiand
dynasty of Almora secured the central and western Bhotia valleys of that-
district. The eastern Bhotia area remained subject to a state in western
Nepal. The Hindu states of the sub-Himalaya region, however, were often
turbulent and weak and unable to hold the frontier areas firmly. The
Bhotia, therefore, acknowLedged the supremacy of states on both sides of
the mountains impartially,- a situation that was no doubt encourag-d by
their trading interests in both territories. About 1790, the entire Bhotia
area was conquered by the Gurkhas, who held it until 1815, when the British
became supreme. Under the Gurkhas the Bhotias were subject to ruinous taxa-
tion on their trade. The indefinite sovereignty status of the Bhotia con-
tinued under the British. Although the British authorities discontinued
the ruinous taxation imposed by the Gurkhas, they claimed the territory
up to the watershed in the Zaskar as part of India. The Tibetans, on the
other hand, continued to claim jurisdiction down to about the axis of the
Great Himalaya. ~9 Local officials in southern Tibet were most concerned
with the exercise of this jurisdiction, the authorities in Lhasa and Pekin;
apparently paying little attention to the claims. That is probably the
reason why Chinese maps show the India-Tibet boundary in this area as ex-
tending generally along the crest of the Great Himalaya, in substantial
agreement with many British and Indian maps, and generally do not indicate
a Chinese claim south of the crest.
Tibetan administration gradually disappeared from the Bhotia
area, but quarrels among the Bhotia continued to be settled in Tibetan
courts until near the turn of the present century, and local officials in
Tibet continued to collect taxes and imposts. The levies included a land
tax, a grazing tax, and a poll tax on certain classes. Some of these taxes
were received at the opening of the trading season by a Tibetan functionary
who came to officiate at the ceremony of opening the pass. A transit duty
of 10 percent and certain other stated import duties were levied at the
first place of call of the Bhotias after they entered Tibet. The Bhotia
villages nearest the passes were exempt from some of the taxes and were
also allowed to collect an import tax from Tibetan traders passing south
into India. The Bhotia apparently were satisfied with these arrangements
since, except for the transit duties levied in Tibet, the imposts were not
burdensome. About the 1870's, the British ordered the Bhotias to cease
imposing the import tax on Tibetan traders. The British found the Tibetans
less accommodating, however. The complacent belief was current among the
*Not to be confused with Srinagar, Kashmir.
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British that western Tibet was entirely dependent upon the grain brought
by the traders from India and that the people of western Tibet would
starve if this trade were stopped. Later the British decreed that no
more taxes were to be paid to the Tibetans, whereupon the Latter stopped
all trade into Tibet. The British found that the Bhotia were as dependent
upon Tibetan trade as the Tibetans were on Indian grain. The Bhotia, at
their own urgent request, were allowed to pay the taxes and resume the
trad.e. _50/ As late as the 1930's and 19140's, the Tibetans continued their
attempts to collect taxes in areas claimed by the British. From 1914 to
1940, for instance, protests and counter protests were issued by British
and Tibetan officials regarding Tibetan occupation and collection of taxes
in a small area of upper Tehri-Garhwal, possibly near Nilans;. 36 By an
agreement of 1904, the British were allowed to station a trade agent in
western Tibet, with headquarters at Gartok, for the 6 months of the trad-
ing season to look after the interests of the traders and pilgrims from
India. The complaint was made that this official was of only nominal as-
sista:ace to the Indians. Traders and pilgrims visiting western Tibet were
often exposed to robbery by bands of Tibetans, who were alternately shep-
herds and bandits, and the British trade agent was unable tc prevent the
brigandage. The condition continued after the British trade agent was
superseded by an Indian trade agent. 1+1
Since the Chinese Communists have taken over western Tibet and
established garrisons at Taklakot and possibly other points near Indian
territory, the old problems regarding the border have been aggravated and
new ones have been added. The activities of the Communists with respect
to the border areas fall into three general categories: (1) reassertion
of the old Tibetan claims to territory and taxes, (2) harassment of the
Indian traders and pilgrims crossing the frontier, and (3) infiltration
of the Indian border areas by Coimnunist agents and propagandizing of the
frontier population.
In 1951 and 1952, Indian newspapers reported that Tibetan offi-
cials and Chinese Communists were penetrating southward from the ZAskAr
passes to collect "tribute" and Lay claim to territory. The Chinese Com?-
muni.sts were said to have put forward a claim in Badrinath on the grounds
that it was once administered by the Toling monastery of Tibet or sent
gifts to the monastery. Tibetan authorities were reported to have extended
their tax collections to a village in the vicinity of Badrin.;nth and Nilang
and to another village in Tehri-Garhwal, as well as several villages in
Almora. One Indian long familiar with the area was inclined, to think,
however, that the activity reported was nothing more than the normal col-,
l.ection of taxes by the Tibetans,. He discounted journalistic! stories
regarding the existence of a Tibetan boundary marker at Balm: Dhunga south
of the Lipulek Pass, and pointed out that prayer flags left 1,,y Passing
Tibetan pilgrims and mani walls erected by them might have been mistaken
for boundary markers. Nevertheless, he suggested that, in areas where
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Tibetan officials were accustomed to come down into Bhotia areas to collect
taxes, arrangements should be made for local Bhotia officials to pay these
taxes in Tibetan territory. There would then be no excuse for the Tibetans
to penetrate south of the passes. Furthermore, if reports of the existence
of boundary stones proved to be true, the Indian recommended that these
stones should be quietly removed. The Uttar Pradesh Government has estab-
lished a border guard and set up a system of permits for persons crossing
the border. 61
Chinese Communist authorities have placed many restrictions on
the Bhotia, merchants and Indian pilgrims entering Tibet. At best, these
are regarded by the Indians as disrupting to the customary method: of
conducting trade and travel and, at worst, as arbitrary and oppressive
measures designed to ruin the merchants. Chinese Communist officers have
entered the trade on their own account. By exerting pressure on the Tibetans,
the Chinese Communist officers have secured a large portion of the salt
and wool trade and, by intimidating the Bhotia traders bringing grain into
Tibet, have forced them to sell the grain below the market price -- thus
causing considerable losses to the Bhotia. Numerous check points were set
up on the trails leading to the mandis and places of pilgrimage, and the
Indians were subjected to delays and humiliating treatment. During 1951,
the Indians were allowed to carry firearms but the next year this privilege
was revoked. Consequently the Indians were forced to go unarmed through
bandit-ridden territory. The Indian trade agent was powerless to ameliorate
this situation. 61 Negotiations between India and Communist China took
place in Peking at the end of 1953 and in early 195+ regarding frontier
relations, and it appeared that India might give up all or many of the
trading priviledges it had previously enjoyed in Tibet.
If the Chinese Communists have antagonized the Bhotia traders,
who represent in general the more well-to-do segments of the frontier
society, they have also set about to woo the ordinary peasants and hill-
men. Communist agents have infiltrated the hill and mountain areas to
spread. discontent and plant the seeds of Communism. They are trained in
Tibet and take advantage of the constant movement of Tibetan peoples across
the frontier to make their journeys. The Communist agents travel into
India in the guise of pilgrims going to the mountain shrines or perhaps
along with Khampa groups, who move about freely in the border area. The
border surveillance set up by Indian authorities appears to have little
effect in stopping the movement of agents. The agents readily make con-
tacts among the several Tibetan or Tibetan-affiliated groups. They exploit
existing friction between landlords and peasants and play upon dissatis-
faction regarding the lack of roads and educational facilities and the
general poverty of the remote hill and mountain areas. It is said that the
propaganda is having considerable success, especially in impoverished
Spiti. The influence of'the propaganda is also being felt in areas nearer
the plain, such as Kulu. At the same time the Indian Communist party has
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established a headquarters at Rampur in Himachal Pradesh. 62, 63, 6/
Indians familiar with the border area have urged the use of more forceful
steps to counteract the Communist; propaganda -- the sending of Hindu
religious men and others familiar with the hill peoples into the region
to conduct a campaign of counter-.propaganda, the establishment of schools,
the building of roads, and improvement in the quality of local administra-
tion.
The establishment of the Chinese Communists in the Tibet-India
border area between Nepal and Ladgkh would place them in a favorable posi-
tion overlooking the plains of India. The penetration of the area by the
Chinese or by Tibetan agents of the Chinese is facilitated by the age-long
habits of circulation of nomads, traders, and pilgrims back and forth acros
the border. The physical obstacle of the great ranges does not greatly
hamper activity of persons of this sort, who are accustomed to live in the
high a=ptitudes and to travel the trails across the passes. Contact with
the inhabitants of the border region is not difficult to establish because
many of the frontier peoples are like the Tibetans in language and customs.
Although the Chinese do not have formal claims to territory south of the
Zaskar. Range, local Tibetan officials have collected taxes and exercised
other types of jurisdiction in this area, and the Chinese might use this
as the basis of a claim. Such activities also facilitate the other types
of Chinese-Tibetan penetration of the border area. The Bhotias and the
other groups who depend upon. trade for their livelihood are at the mercy
of the Chinese in Tibet for the continuance of trade. In the past the
traders have sought to accommodate themselves to whatever political groups
exercised control in Tibet or India in order to continue their traffic.
It is possible that they might follow the same principle and attempt to
come to an understanding with the Chinese Communists in Tibet, if sufficiently
hard pressed. On the other hand, the Bhotias are partially F[induized and
would not readily amalgamate with the Tibetans.
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India and Pakistan are vulnerable to infiltration by Communist China
in the border region extending from Afghanistan to Nepal. Although the
great Central Asian Plateau has always hindered any major descent upon
the plains of the Subcontinent from the interior of Asia, the great plateau
and the mountain ramparts that gird it on the south have never presented
insuperable obstacles to medium-sized military expeditions or trading
caravans. The activity of the Chinese Communists in building roads and
establishing airports in southern Sinkiang and western Tibet and the Indian;
and Pakistani construction of jeep roads, combined with the establishment
of air routes, is bringing nearer the day when the greatest of all mountain
masses will be crossed by modern transportation. Since the Chinese Com-
munists are at present more aggressive than the Indians and Pakistani in
the frontier region, they may be the ones who will benefit most from the
development of modern transport.
The British, in their vigorous push northward from the plains of
India in the last century, brought under their sway areas where cultural
influences from the Subcontinent had only a tenuous hold and areas that
were totally unrelated culturally to the Indians. India and Pakistan,
beset with the many problems of becoming established as nations, are now
left with the obligation to govern and defend these areas. The frontier
areas do not, for the most part, feel any great kinship for the Indians
and Pakistanis. At the same time the social and political upheavals that
have taken place on either side of them are making the frontier peoples
aware of maladjustments in their own societies and possibly more critical
of any failure or supposed failure of India or Pakistan to fulfill its
obligations.
The peoples on or near the Sinkiang-Pakistan frontier -- the Bushuro.
Balti, and Dards -- differ from the plains Pakistani in nearly all respects.
They are faced with poverty and overpopulation in their harsh environment
but find that any assistance they can expect from Pakistan is slow to arrive.
The ruler of Hunza, for instance, although he has thrown in his lot with
Pakistan, discovers that Pakistan is unable to prevent Chinese Communist
incursions along his northern frontier or to render his people much as-
sistance in solving the problems of making a living in his overcrowded
valley. The Chinese, who maintain a claim to a large part of Hunza, have
brought intermittent pressure on the territory since the 1930's. In
Tibetan-oriented Ladakh the Kashmir Government, under the influence of
India, attempted to bring relief to the landless, debt-ridden peasants by
a redistribution of the large estates. This action has in part alienated
the Buddhist clergy, who are among the principal landholders and bankers,
without solving the basic difficulties of the peasants. The peasants are
vulnerable to Communist propaganda from Tibet, and the clergy are strongly
influenced by happenings to the hierarchy of the parent church in Tibet.
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A spokesman for the Ladakh clergy has even threatened that, under certain
conditions, Ladakh might secede from :Kashmir and join Tibet.
The groups with Tibetan cultural heritage on the southern fringes
of Ladakh -- in Spiti, LAhul, and adjacent areas -- are being given the
propaganda treatment by agents from Tibet, and the propaganda is reported
to be taking effect. The infiltration of agents from Tibet is facilitated
by the fact that the frontier is undefined and extends through a wild region
difficult to police. Furthermore, the frontier peoples have been accustomed
to pass in both directions across the frontier without much hindrance for
many generations in order to conduct trade and make pilgrimages. Some of
the groups subject to the propaganda campaign are landless peasants who,
like those of Ladakh, must support the weight of the Buddhist monastic
system. The appeal is not confined to the Buddhists, however, but is
directed to all the lower classes of the mountain and hill districts.
In the trans-border trade the Chinese Communists have s. potentially
powerful means of bringing pressure on the frontier peoples. This is
especially true of Leh, which before the upheavals of recent years owed-
a large part of its livelihood to the trade, and among the Bhot_ia and
related groups of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, whose entire way of
life is based on the trade. The Tibetans might attempt to tighten their
hold on the Bhotia by reasserting former claims to jurisdiction south of
the Laskar Range. The Bhotias, who are descendents of Tibetans who have
been Hinduized, have always attempted to keep on good terms with states on
both sides of the border. Complete stoppage of the trade would probably
be as harmful to Tibet as to the border groups of Kashmir and India. Even
a partial disruption of the trade by additional taxes or regulations,
however, would cause distress to the merchants, increase the economic
difficulties of the border areas, and force India to assume an additional
burden in order to -prevent these areas from seeking accommodations with
the Communists to the north.
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APPENDIX A
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The region discussed in this report has been visited on many occasions
by Europeans and Americans, and their writings give a good reconnaissance
picture of the region. Since the region is difficult of access, however,
it has not been subject to intensive scientific study or continuous obser-
vation. Some areas have been studied by many expeditions, whereas others
have been visited by only a few and are much less well known in the outside
world. Hunza, for instance, is a favorite target for explorers in this
part of the world, whereas neighboring Nagir is off the beaten track and
fewer writers have devoted attention to it. Detailed anthropological
studies might serve to modify some of the conclusions reached regarding
the peoples of the frontier region.
Current intelligence information on the frontier region is scanty,
in part because the Indian and Pakistani governments have placed restric-
tions on travel by foreigners since the Chinese Communists have increased
pressure on the area. On the Chinese side of the frontier the Communists
have systematically attempted to block all sources of information.
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APPENDIX B
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources
The principal information for this report was gathered from general
accounts of explorers, scholars, and government officials in the area;
and from special studies in fields such as geology and languages and
reports of American official personnel. Among the older general Teograph-
ical and historical accounts are those of Drew (6), Francke (14), Cunningham
(15), Atkinson (49), the Almora Gazetteer (50), and the Garhwal Gazetteer (59).
Valuable information on Ladakh and Baltistan is contained in the reports
of the Italian expedition of 1913-14 as summarized in the volume by Filippi
(24). More recent general accounts include those of Douglas (9) and Swami
Pranavananda (41), the former being of value because of its discussion of
present economic and social problems. Books by mountain climbers sometimes
yield useful information on the inhabitants of surrounding areas. Murray
(60) is in this category, Among the special studies, the classic account
of the physical geography of the Himalayan region is that of Burrard and
Hayden (1), although greater descriptive detail is available for selected
areas as a result of later physiographic investigations such as those of
de Terra (2). The survey of languages compiled by Grierson (55) is useful
not only for that subject but also for other aspects of culture. D. L. R.
Lorimer (27) and his wife, E. 0. Lorimer (25) have written detailed studies
of the Hunza area -- the former dealing with the Burushaski language and
the latter with the customs of the people. Principal reliance for route
information was placed on Mason (7) and the American Foreign Service
Officer Paxton (8). On the subject of agriculture, Asboe (26) proved
useful. In gdneral the value of reports from American official personnel
is limited by the fact that none of them are stationed in this region
permanently and consequently must rely upon short trips and second-hand
information. In the list of sources, numerical evaluations of individual
citations are given only for intelligence reports from the field. Numerical
evaluations are not given for published works since they are the basic
sources of information on the area.
63
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2. Sources*
1. S. G. Burrard and H. H. Hayden, "Principal Mountain Ranges of
Asia," A Sketch of the Geography and Geology of the Himalaya Mountains
and Tibet, Part II, Calcutta, 1907.
r.. H. de Terra, TTPhysiographic Results of a Recent Survey in Little
Tibet," Geographical Rev-Lew, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 1934, pp. 12-40.
(Map cpposite CC)_.~-
3. Sven Hedin, Southern Tibet Discoveries in Former Times Compared
-- -- ------- ------ -- ---------- with My Own Researches in 1901908, Vol. 4, "Kara-Korum and Chang-Tang,"
Stockholm, 1922.
4. W. G. Kendrew, The Climates of the Continents, New York, 3rd
edition, 1942.
5. L. Dudley Stamp, Asia, A Regional and Economic Geography, New
fork, 1938. -----
6. Frederic Drew, The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories, A Geographical
Account, London, 1875. --- -- -- -- - --
7. Kenneth Mason, Routes in the Western Himalaya, Kashrnir, C, Vol. I,
Calcutta, 2nd edition, 1929.
8. State Department, Unnumbered despatch, Washington, D.C., 1 March
1950, Subject: Travel out of Tihwa. U. Eval. B-1.
9. William 0. Douglas, Beyond the High Himalayas, New 'fork, 1952.
10. Jean and Franc Shor, "At World's End in Hunza," Nat:1on.alGeo-
graphic Magazine, Vol. 104, No. 4, October 1953, pp. 485-518,
-.1.1. State Department Despatch No. 138, Lahore, Pakistan, 16 February
11953. S. Eval. B-1.
Evaluations following the classification entry and designated. "Eval."
have all been assigned by the author and have the following significance:
A
- Completely rel-':able
1 - Confirmed by other sources
B
- Usually reliable
2 - Probably true
C
- Fairly reliable
3 - Possibly true
D
- Not usually reliable
4 - Doubtful
E
- Not reliable
5 - Probably false
F
- Cannot be judged
6 - Cannot be judged
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12. Statesman (Delhi), 29 July 1951. Eval. B-2.
13. State Department Despatch 137, Calcutta, India; 22 September
1950. U. Eval. B-2.
14. A. H. Francke,. A History of Western Tibet, London, 1908.
15. Alexander Cunningham, Ladak, Physical, Statistical and Historical,
London, 1854.
16. Francis E. Younghusband, The Heart of a Continent, New York, 1896.
17. Kenneth Mason, "The Himalaya as a Barrier to Modern Communications,"
Geographical Journal, Vol. 87, No. 1, January 1936, pp. 1-16.
18. War Department General Staff Intelligence Report R-237-`;l, Office
of Army Attache, India, 4 August 1951. S. Eval. B-2.
19. New York Times, 30 March 1952. Eval. B-3.
20. State Department Despatch 510, Calcutta, India, 2 April 1952.
U. Eval. C-3.
21. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report,
India and Nepal, 10 September 1952. Official Use Only. Eval. F-3.
22. New York Times, 22 November 1950. Eval. B-3.
23. New York Times, 26 August 1952. Eval. B-4.
24. Filippo de Filippi, The Italian Expedition to the Himalaya,
Karakoram and Eastern Turkestan 1913-1914), London, 1932.
25. E. 0. Lorimer, Language Hunting in the Karakoram, London, 1939.
26. Walter Asboe, "Farmers and Farming in Ladakh (Tibetan Kashmir),"
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 34, Pt. 2, April 1947,
pp. 1 -192.
27. D. L. R. Lorimer, The Burushaski Language, Oslo, 1935.
28. State Department, OIR No. 5780, Problems of Plebiscite and
Refugee Rehabilitation in Kashmir, 23 December 1952.
29. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the, Inner Asian.
Frontiers of China and Russia, Boston, 1950.
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30. State Department Despatch No. 615, Karachi, Pakistan, 17 October
1950. C. Eval. B-2.
31. "The Sinkiang-Hunza Frontier," Journal of the Royal Central
Asian.--Society, Vol. 38, Pt. 1, 1950, pp. 73-81.
32. R. C. F. Schomberg, Between the Oxus and the Indus,
33. Thomas Hol.dich, The Gates of India, London, 1910.
London,
34. E. F. Knight, Where Three Empires-Meet, London, 189':x.
35. C. U. Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads R-.~lating to
India and Neighboring Countries, Vol. XIII, Calcutta, 1933.
36. State Department., DRN Information Paper No. 253, Chinese Interests
in the Territories on India's Northern Frontier, 8 November 1950. S. Eval.
37. Francis E. Younghusband, Wonders of the Himalaya, London, 192)4-.
38. State Department Despatch No. 1663, Karachi, Pakistan, 14 May
1951. C. Eval. B-2.
39. State Department Despatch 170, Lahore, Pakistan, 7 Apr Li 1953.
C. Eva:L. B-1.
+0. State Department Despatch 188, Lahore, Pakistan, 12 May 1953.
.S. Eva__. B-1.
-l. Swami Pranavananda, Kailas-Manasarovar, Calcutta, 1949..
42. Tsung-lien Shen and Shen-chi Liu, Tibet and the Tibetans,
Stanford, Calif., 1952.
.E7. State Department Despatch No. 681, New Delhi, India, 9 September
1952. C. Eval. B-2.
44. State Department Despatch No. 678, New Delhi, India, 22 September
1950. U. Eval. B-2,.
45. State Department Despatch No. 522, Calcutta, India, 30 January
1953. U. Eval B-2.
11-6. FBIS, Daily Report, India and Nepal, 10 September 19`.52. Official
Use Only. Eval. F-3.
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47. FBIS, Daily Report, India, 21 April 1953. Official Use Only.
Eval. C-3.
48. FBIS, Daily Report, India, 15 May 1952. Official Use Only.
Eval. F-2.
49. Edwin T. Atkinson, The Himalayan Districts of the North-Western,
Provinces of India, Vol. 3, Allahabad, 1886.
50. H. G. Walton, compiler, "Almora, a Gazetteer," Vol. XXXV,
District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Allahabad,
Charles Alfred Bell, Tibet Past and Present, Oxford, 1924.
Alexander McLeish, The Frontier Peoples of India: A Missionary
Survey, London, 1931.
53. H. Lee Shuttleworth, "A Wool Mart of the Indo-Tibetan Borderland,"
Geographical Review, Vol. XIII, No. 1, January 1923, pp. 552-558.
54. C. G. Bruce, Kulu and Lahoul, London, 1914.
55. G. A. Grierson, compiler, Linguistic Survey of India, Vol. 3,
Part 1, Calcutta, 1909.
56. John Tyson, "Himalayan Traders," Geographical Magazine, Vol. XXVI,
No. 3, July 1953, PP. 139-146.
57. A. V. Thakkar, compiler, Tribes of India, Delhi, 1950.
58. Charles A. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland,
London, 1906.
59. H. G. Walton, compiler, "British Garhwal, a GazetteerVol.
XXXVI, District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh,
Allahabad, 1910.
60. W. H. Murray, The Scottish Himalayan Expedition, London, 1951.
61. State Department Despatch No. 1962, New Delhi, India, 11 March
1953. C. Eval. B-2.
62. State Department Despatch No. 2427, New Delhi, India, 7 May 1953.
C. Eval. B-2.
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63. FBIS, Daily Report, India, 1 May 1953. Official Use Only.
Eval. B-3.
64. FBIS, Daily Report, India, 21 April. 1953. Official Use Only.
Eval. F-6. --
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CEYLON
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j9a ~ Approved For Release 1999/09/21 :CIA-RDP79T01018A000100080001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79T01018A000100080001-2
mummFewrtwR
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For. Release 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79T01018A000100080001-2
 CaAl 1t l elease 1999/09/21: CIA-RDP79TO1018A000100 ~ 1-2
Copy No.
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIERS OF CHINA
Frontiers with Kashmir and India from Afghanistan to Nepal
CIA/RR-G-8
May 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^ ~- -----
Cl
E
D
CLASSIFfEb
CLASS. CHANGED TO; 1
AUTH? HR
DATEN~~,.,
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~EllITIAL
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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