SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN ENCHANCED BY THE ARRIVAL OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01003A002100050001-2
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 13, 2000
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 1, 1964
Content Type: 
BRIEF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T01003A002100050001-2.pdf567.48 KB
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` SE ed For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 ~~ FOREIGN DISSEM Current Support Brief SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN ENHANCED BY THE ARRIVAL OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS CIA/RR CB 64-59 September 1964 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 S-E-C-R-E-T SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN ENHANCED BY THE. ARRIVAL OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS 25X1 B 25X1 B 25X1 C Recent evidence suggests that a new arms agreement -- the first since 1959 - - may have been signed by Afghanistan and the USSR (see the chart). Two types of Soviet missiles were observed in Kabul's Independence Day mili- tary parade on 23 August: the SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) and what is described as an antitank missile (probably the Snapper or Swatter. surface-to-surface missile, a wire-guided tactical system). Moreover, the purchase of a squadron of MIG-21 supersonic jet fighters and several An-12 turboprop assault transports may follow. Although Afghanistan is now striving to adhere to a more "correctly neutral" foreign policy than it has been following recently, the delivery of such advanced weapons systems presumably will enhance further the Soviet military presence in that country. 1. New Equipment the delivery of 12 SA-2 missiles and 6 antitank missiles from the USSR to Afghanistan was completed,/Subsequently this armament was featured in Kabul's Independence Day military parade, where it elicited general surprise from the foreign repre- sentatives presenlj .6his public display of a;"prestige" item probably was designed to serve a dual purpose: (1) to influence Afghan govern- mental and military figures during the period prior to the approval of the new consitiution and (2) to project a hardier military image to those foreign representatives viewing the parade. These missiles probably were purchased by the military mission led by Defense Min- ister Khan Mohammad Khan, which traveled to Moscow in late June. Other advanced weapons systems probably were discussed and pos- sibly were agreed to at that time. In particular it appears likely that Kabul will urchase a squadron(probably 10 to 16 aircraft) of MIG-21 jet fighter' as well as 4 or 5 An-12 assault transports.'-Officers trainees The delivery of MIG-21's to Afghanistan has been rumored for the past 2 years, An earlier report stated that the USSR would provide two squadrons of MIG- 21's [footnote c.ont.inued on p. 2] S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 25X1 C Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79To1003AO02100050001-2 S-E-C-R-E-T 25X1 C 25X1 C were being selected in March 1 64 to go to the USSR for training in MIG-19 and MIG-21 aircraft. Although the MIG-19 probably figured in Kabul's earlier plans, the dissatisfaction with the plane of other recipients in the Free World probably is known t the Afghans, and it is doubtful that any will be purchased. If it is ncluded in the new agreement, the portion dealing with aircraft pos ibly could be valued at more than $20 million at list prices. 2. Tactical Implications Afghanistan is the fifth country of the Free World to be furnished SAM's by the USSR. _= An analogy with other recipients permits an esti- mate of the eventual size of Afghanistan'-s- program. To defend Kabul, at least three SAM firing battalions and one technical support battalion would be required. This program is valued at ab ut $10 million. Con- struction and training requirements will push an operational readiness date 2 or more years into the future. No estimat is possible on the size of the inventory of Snapper or Swatter missiles. The BRDM amphibious combat reconnaissance vehicle is the launcher used for the missiles, and to date Kabul has not received any of these vehicles. Purely in terms of equipment, the MIG-21 fighte s would provide an enormous increase in performance from the obso ete MIG-15's and MIG-17's currently comprising the Afghan air force. Likewise, a serious air transport deficiency would be ameliorated by the acquisi- tion of the An-1.2 assault transports. The new ac uisitions eventually would boost the over-all Afghan air defense capability immeasurably. When operational, they probably would discourag in some degree the alleged intrusions of Afghan air space by Pakistani aircraft. Because of the general ineptitude of the air force, howeve , this enhanced air defense capability probably will not be realizedwi hin the next 2 years. If such numbers of aircraft ever were con- sidered, however, they have been reduced. An 11 -18 turboprop pas- senger transport has been mentioned as a possibl purchase, but it would not military application. The UAR, Indonesia, India, and Iraq also have received this ad- vanced type of weapon. Recently, Iraq canceled i s SAM program and transferred to the UAR the equipment already delivered S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T 1003A002100050001-2 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100050001-2 S-E-C-R-E-T 3. Other Implications Although the present Afghan government appears to be striving toward a more correct form of neutrality than the former Soviet- leaning regime under Prime Minister Da'ud, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan continues to be firmly establishe/The Afghan armed forces have been reorganized, largely through advice of the Soviet military aid mission, which has been working on the problem since Marshal Sokolovskiy's visit in October 196 .- !n November 1963 the Ministry of National Defense opened an army staff college in Kabul organized and staffed entirely by Soviet personnel. Although there is no evidence that the USSR is in any better position to exert leverage on the governmental elite than it has been since the inception of mili- tary aid in 1956, the potential for influence appears to be increasing significantly. Addition Soviet technicians will be required to train native personnel in Afghanistan, and more Afghan trainees probably will be sent to the USSR for instruction, in addition to the large number already there e The purchase of this complex and expensive equipment, however, will pose problems for Kabul. The assimilation of the advanced weapons systems will require a higher level of technical competence than has been demonstrated thus far. Furthermore, the limited skilled manpower available in the country will be increasingly strained by the establishment and operation of advanced weapons facilities. Finally, although the, *financial details of the new agreement are not yet known, any increase in indebtedness will generate additional diffi- culties for the Afghan government in meeting its already large mili- tary and economic debt obligations to the USSR. Analysts Coord: 25X1A 25X1A S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100050001-2 25X1 B CHINA Qzil Qafaf IL ~ 1 ih h a Sh ,if arg 44 J Sherif Sari N1 Pul i Khum RA ALPINDI PAKISTAN r-- Approved For Release 2000/05/1 :?E@FIRDP79T01003A002100050001-2 r- AFGHANISTAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES EQUIPMENT UNITS Medium tank 220 Self-propelled assault gun 18 Personnel carrier 62 Artillery piece 600 Jet bomber 58 Jet fighter 125 Other aircraft 92 SA-2 missile 12 Antitank missile 6 GROUP I EXCLUDED ARC AUTOM-C D-GRA-0 Approved For Release 2000/05/123B=RDP79T01003A002100050001-2 . NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 i Analysts: I/P0 ``Project 41. 5176) Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100050001-2 25X1A St/P/.RR - Control Section Control Sheet Series Number CIA/RR CB 64-59 Date of Document September 1964 _ Co2y No= Recipient ....,., scour' i,.~... Excluded from automatic dongrading and decipcsiticatloll 34 DAD RR 82 25X1 PO 24j.S~p 64 172 PO 11 173 St/P _ 29 Sep 64 1.7 4-.._ OCR 175 176__ --~ 177 178 181 1 18 3 184 - 186 187 .- . d . 188 ~. _ ~~ ___... ..._ _.~ .~ 18 9 190 - 6 191 192 - 194.._ 196 - 229 Filed in St/P/C 29