CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005400070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 8, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 November 1960
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State Dept. review completed
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aQOUME'NT IN-CLASS.
NO waga a O'GGAsSIFIEU /
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'Urij Ok.~sty 04TH
1~0 JUN 1980
.
DATE..
- -- REVIEWER,
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Thailand--Sarit statements welcoming
Soviet economic approaches may stimu-
late Thai leftist groups to greater activ-
ity.
Ceylon may increase trade with bloc in
order to conserve sterling and to provide
an economic parallel for its neutralist
foreign policy.
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West Berlin Mayor Brandt still hopes for
Berlin access guarantees from East
German regime in return for renegotia--
tion of interzonal trade agreement.
Chile--Leftist demonstrations result
in new violence.
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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the USSR at prices below the world market level and an in-
I I. ASIA-AID RICA
Thailand- USSR rime Minister Sarit's recent state
-
men s wf~e com n-g Sc viet proposals for economic relations
were probably intended primarily to underscore Bangkok's
complaint that neutrals receive better treatment from the
US than does a "committed nation" like Thailand. Never-
theless, Sarit's statements may stimulate leftist and
tralist elements in Thailand to greater activity
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Ceylon - Sino-Soviet Bloc: Government officials in
Colour o foresee a significant shift in Ceylon's foreign. trade
in the next few months, probably resulting in expanded eco-
nomic relations with the bloc at the expense of the sterling area.
According to press reports, these officials ascribe the new
trend to the Bandaranaike government's determination to check
the recent drop in Colombo's sterling reserves and to give
Ceylon's neutralism in international affairs an economic par-
allel. Among the steps already taken or planned by Colombo
to diversify its trade are purchases of sugar and gasoline from
crease in barter trade with Communist China.
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III. THE WEST
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West Berlin: jIayor Brandt has informed American offi-
cials in Berlin that he is at a loss to understand Chancellor
Adenauer's apparent decision to take no action at this time to
resume negotiations for an interzonal trade agreement. Ade-
nauer. is reportedly anxious to avoid doing anything which
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Alessandri government's stabilization program.
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against the wage policy being followed in the conservative
C7ould disturb the recent, apparent improvement in rela-
tions with the USSR. Brandt, on the other. hand, feels that
the cancellation of the old agreement has had a salutary ef -
fect on the East German regime, and he is still hopeful. of
obtaining an East German guarantee of access to West Ber-
lin as a precondition of a new trade agreement. He fears
that with the passage of time, East German eagerness for
a renewal might be reduced by success in finding alternate 25X1
sources of suPply for needed industrial ood
cagm . k,urtner vioience nroxe out in Santiago during
the laE-or demonstrations called on 7 November to protest
the killing of at least two workers by the national police on
3 November. The governmenthad previously put troops in
Santiago on an alert status and seems fully capable of pre-
venting violence from getting out of hand. Leftist elements,
which seem to be more aggressive than at any time in the
past three years, had called the 3 November demonstrations
8 Nov 60
nor,
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Thailand Receptive to Soviet
.prime Minister Sarit's statement on 2 November that
Thailand is prepared to enter closer commercial relations
with the Soviet Union and to accept Soviet aid for economic
development was clearly intended to underscore Thailand's
complaint that "neutral" nations receive more US aid than a
"committed nation" such as Thailand. Nevertheless,it will
serve as an encouragement to the small left-wing and neutral
elements in Thailand for increased political activity. These
groups have been under severe government suppression for
the past two years
Cover the past year, Thailand has become increasingly
dissatisfied with its relations with the United States and un-
certain of the defensive value of SEATO. The. Thai Govern-
ment has charged that US PL-480 grain sales in Asia have
undermined Thailand's foreign exchange position. Most re-
cently, Thailand has felt that SEATO's handling of the Laotian
crisis has been inadequate and that Thailand must rely pri-
marily on. itself in the event of Communist attack. There is
no current intent in Bangkok to make significant changes in
foreign policy but, if the state of restiveness continues, Thai-
land may ultimately move toward a more neutral position.
LMoscow's recent overtures to Bangkok to establish closer
relations were timed to take advantage of Thai dissatisfaction
with US aid policies. Sarit''s responsiveness to the move rep-
resents a gain for Moscow in its long-term efforts to induce
Thailand to adopt a more neutral positi6:1
LIn recent broadcasts to Southeast Asia, the USSR has
sought to intensify Bangkok's feeling of isolation in a neutral-
ist Southeast Asia with. sharp reminders of the hazards im-
plicit in such military alliances as SEATO. A 20 October]
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(article in Sovetskaya Rossiya, which reflects the theme of
Moscow's propaganda.. coverage of the Laotian. crisis, charged
that SEATO plans to intervene in Laos with troops based in
Thailand and urged .Sarit to recall the "recent U-2 and RB-47
provocations" and the consequent dan er. to all nations that ac-
cept American military assistance-3
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Soviet Bloc
A considerable increase in Ceylon's economic rela-
tions with the Sino-Soviet bloc apparently is planned as
part of the Bandaranaike government's general effort to
overhaul the island's trade system and to begin work on
foreign-assisted projects which have gathered dust dur-
ing the past year of political upheaval. The anticipated
increase in exchanges with the bloc, which is not likely
to be large in terms of percentage of total trade, is
likely to be made at the expense of the sterling area; the
bloc and sterling areas until now have accounted for about
8 and 50 percent of the island's total trade, respectively.
The intended shift appears to be motivated by Colombo's
desire to apply its neutral foreign policy to the economic
as well as the political field.
Negotiations are under way with Soviet officials in
Colombo for the direct purchase of petroleum products;
such products now are imported and distributed exclusive-
ly by a Western consortium. Colombo has also contracted
recently for 9,000 tons of sugar from the Soviet Union.
Project reports for two Soviet industrial schemes planned
under the Ceylonese-Soviet $30,000,000 loan agreement of
1958 were recently submitted to the government; actual
construction probably will be soon. Finance Minister Dias
Bandaranaike plans an extensive "shopping" tour early next
year to discuss further aid offers in Moscow, the East Euro-
pean satellites, and Peiping.
Ceylon's intentions concerning economic relations with
Communist China will become more apparent in December
when Peiping's team arrives in Colombo to negotiate next
year's protocol to the two countries' second rice-rubber
agreement (1958-62). There are indications that Ceylon is
ready to resume or even raise the level of trade which ex-
isted before 1959, when the rice-rubber exchange was re-
duced, particularly in view of the snags recently encoun-
tered in Ceylon's rice negotiations with Burma, the island's
other main supplier. Colombo probably will also begin utiliz-
ing Peiping's $15,750,000 grant extended in late 1957; the
government reportedly has invited a Chinese team to the is-
land to reopen negotiations for a textile mill offered under the
grant in 1958 and rejected a year later.
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Leftist Violence in Chile
Renewed violence broke out in Santiago on 7 No-
vember as hundreds of workers clashed with police
during the funerals of victims of demonstrations four
days earlier.
On 3 November, demonstrators protesting the
wage policy of the conservative Alessandri govern-
ment's stabilization program attacked the national
police and injured ten. The police fired into the crowd,
killing twc -including one reported Communist-3and
injuring about 50.
On 7 November, several persons were injured as the
police tried to prevent the funeral procession from
passing through the center of the city, according to
press reports. As a result of a 24-hour strike called
by the leftist Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCH),
the country's only important labor federation, , workers
halted buses and streetcars, and most of Santiago's stores
were closed. The government had previously decreed a
state of emergency in Santiago Province, and it seems
capable of preventing violence from getting out of hand.
Leftist elements, which appear to be more aggres-
sive than at any time in three years, sponsored the 3 No-
vember demonstrations. The demonstrations followed the
inflammatory, antigovernment speech of Clotario Blest,
president of CUTCH and a Socialist who usually follows
the Communist line, at a labor meeting protesting Ales-
sandri's recent withdrawal of wage readjustment legisla-
tion. The bill would have raised wages by 10 percent in
partial compensation for a 40-percent increase in the cost
of living since January 1959. The Chamber of Deputies had
sought to triple the increase.
Blest stated, "The working class should rise up in
arms and repudiate this government:' In an allusion to
Fidel Castro, he said, "Chileans should have their own
Sierra Maestra."
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
`}" `? The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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