SOVIET MILITARY FORCES OPPOSITE IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500130022-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 7, 1980
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R000500130022-2
7 February 1980
DDCI Briefing
Soviet Military Forces Opposite Iran
I. Soviet military forces in the Transcaucasus Military
District opposite northwestern Iran appear to be upgrading
their level of combat preparedness in case a decision is
made to intervene in Iran. A force of two or three
divisions, sufficient to occupy and hold the Azerbaijan
region, could be ready in about two weeks or less.
A much larger force sufficient to occupy and hold the oil
fields in the south would have to be drawn from other areas
of the USSR as well as the Transcaucasus and would require
considerably more time to prepare.
A. Some low-strength divisions in the Transcaucasus MD.
have received new modern equipment since late December,
and several have engaged in higher-than-normal levels
of field training.
1. The size of the units involved and the "people
intensive" nature of the activities noted suggest
that some reservists have been called up for
training.
.2. Similar activity occurred in the.-low-strength
divisions opposite Afghanistan late last summer.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R000500130022-2
NATO SECRET
 NATO SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R000500130022-2
B. We have no evidence at present of a substantial
callup of reservists, the buildup of logistics
stocks near the border, or the augmentation and
positioning of motor transport units.
1. Activity of this nature, as well as the
establishment of the necessary command and
control structure, occurred about two weeks
prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in December.
II. Nearly all major military units in the Turkestan Military
District opposite northeastern Iran have been committed
to Afghanistan.
A. It is conceivable that the Soviet forces could
concurrently invade Iran from western Afghanistan,
where the terrain is easier. Such a move would,
however, leave thei'T very long supply line open to
attacks by both the Iranians and the Afghan insurgents,
and would require additional logistical preparations
in the region.
B. Although the activity noted in the Transcaucasus MD coul
be for the committment of forces to Afghanistan, the
proximity to the Iranian border of most of the forces
noted active and the apparent Soviet concern over
the situation in Iran make this less likely.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R000500130022-2
 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R000500130022-2
1. One tactical air fighter bomber regiment which
was moved from Transcaucasus to the Turkestan
MD in December has now returned to its homebase
opposite northwestern Iran.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R000500130022-2
NATO SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R000500130022-2
FORM USE PREVIOUS
5-75 101 EDITIONS
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R000500130022-2