ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNIST CHINA OF ALTERNATIVE LEVELS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1962
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
SECRET
2 2 2
Current Support Brief
CIA/RR CB 62-77
No. Pages 6
17 November 1962
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNIST CHINA
OF ALTERNATIVE LEVELS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY
IN THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05M2-'--- 01003A001400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
Alternative levels of military, operations in the Sino-Indian conflict
and their probable impact on the Chinese Communist economy are con-
sidered in this paper. A second paper is in preparation that will examine
in more detail the logistic and operational problems involved for China in
the conflict and provide a more adequate basis for estimating some of the
limitations on the feasible size and scope of the Chinese military effort.
17 November 1962 CIA/RR Cfi 62-77
S-E-C-R-E-T
Page 1
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
S-E-C-R-E-T
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON COMMUNIST CHINA
OF ALTERNATIVE LEVELS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY
IN THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT
The economic impact on Communist China of the Sino-Indian border
conflict depends, of course, on the extent of acceleration in the level of
military activity. This paper therefore indicates, in broad terms, the
probable range of the economic costs to China on the basis of three alter-
natives: (1) that China will not increase the size of its military forces now
in the Tibet Military Region (about 100, 000 men); (2) that China will in-
crease its military force in the Tibet Region to about 170, 000 troops in
combat units and about 130, 000 garrison troops, a level believed to be
feasible with existing transport facilities in the area; and (3) that China
will increase transport facilities within I year sufficiently to support
about 300, 000 troops in combat units and about an equal number of gar-
rison troops in the Tibet Region. In estimating the size of the combat
forces that can be supported in Tibet, it has been assumed that the troops
actually fighting are supplied each day with the tonnages that would be re-
quired under full combat conditions. From available reports it is clear
that full-scale combat is not taking place daily. Under present conditions,
therefore, this assumption overstates the supply requirements.
Under the first two alternatives the military equipment, supplies,
and support facilities required could be provided by the Chinese Com-
munists without external assistance (apart from normal trade), and the
drain on the Chinese economy would be relatively small. If under the
second alternative, however, increased petroleum imports were not
obtained from the USSR or other foreign sources, serious shortages
would appear in domestic POL supplies. The third alternative would re-
quire a considerable diversion of military forces from other areas; would
involve nearly one-third of the total truck inventory in China; would re-
quire a, large increase in imports of motor gasoline, spare parts, and
perhaps some types of military equipment; and would involve a road-
building effort of major proportions. This third alternative would not
17 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-77
Page 2
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
stop the present efforts of the Chinese to stimulate economic recovery
but would make the efforts to achieve economic recovery considerably
more difficult.
1. Maintenance of Present Strength
If the Chinese Communists contain the conflict within the limits
of their troop strength now in the Tibet Region, the economy would have
no major difficulty in supplying their present military operations. The
30, 000 troops in combat units* and the 73, 000 garrison troops could con-
tinue to be furnished with equipment, ammunition, food, clothing, and
POL from domestic sources without diverting more than minimal re-
sources presently used by the civilian economy. This military force re-
quires about 7, 500 trucks for logistic support and an additional small
number for operational use, or a total of less than 10 percent of the
present military truck park in China. The requirements for motor gaso-
line are 370 tons** per day for logistic support and a maximum of 90
tons for operational use by combat and garrison units, or a total annual
requirement of about 170,000 tons,*** representing about 10 to 15 per-
cent of the availability of motor gasoline for both military and civilian
uses in China in 1962. (Aviation fuel requirements for air transport,
which are believed to be very small, are discussed in 4, below. )
2. Increase to 170, 000 Troops in Combat Units
It is tentatively estimated that Chinese transport capabilities in
the Tibet Region are adequate to support about 170', 000 troops in combat
The term "troops in combat units" in this paper refers to standard
Communist Chinese infantry divisions or elements thereof engaged in
continuous operations. The supply requirements for combat and gar-
rison units presented in this paper are tentative estimates made by
this Office and are based on material prepared by the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army.
Tonnages are given in short tons throughout this paper.
>,~# The environmental factors in Tibet (terrain, altitude, and weather)
have been taken into account in estimating both the capability of the
transport routes and the gasoline requirements.
17 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-77
Page 3
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
units and. 130, 000 garrison troops. The Chinese would require about
36, 000 trucks to supply these troops and would need an additional num-
ber of trucks for operational purposes. The total number of trucks
required would be less than one-half of the Chinese military truck park
and less than one-fourth of their total serviceable military and civilian
truck inventory. The consumption of motor gasoline for operational
and support uses would be about 2, 200 tons per day, or an annual rate
of about 800, 000 tons, representing 55 percent of the availability of
motor gasoline in China for all purposes in 1962. The Chinese would
be required to increase their imports of POL and of spare parts for
transport equipment; the value of these increased imports is tentatively
estimated at $30 million, representing about 2 percent of total Chinese
imports in 1961. If the Soviet Union should refuse to increase exports
of motor gasoline to China, it is likely that the Chinese -- in order to
avoid serious POL shortages -- would try to obtain at least a part of
their requirements from other sources, such as Indonesia, and also
would make some adjustments in their civilian economy to meet the
increased military demand.
3. Increase to 300, 000 Troops in Combat Units
It is possible that the Chinese Communists, with a major pri-
ority effort, could increase the size of their military force on the Sino-
Indian border to about 300, 000 troops in combat units and approximately
the same number of garrison troops after 1 year by increasing logistic
capabilities in the area. About 2, 400 miles of road would have to be
improved or newly constructed, at a cost of approximately $120 million,
which would represent a major construction effort in the Tibet Region
and would require priority allocation of labor and supplies. More than
5, 000 miles of road would have to receive augmented maintenance, in-
cluding improved and newly constructed roads, at a cost of at least
$5 million. Construction equipment, as well as some construction
materials, would need to be diverted to Tibet from road-building proj-
ects in other parts of China, although this diversion would not prevent
the Chinese transport system from meeting the essential requirements
of the civilian sector. At least 300, 000 workers would be required for
the road construction and for the augmented road, maintenance, and it is
17 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-77
Page 4
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
believed that the Chinese Communists would try to obtain a large part of
this labor force from Tibetan and Chinese civilians already in Tibet and
also would use garrison troops for construction work as much as possible.
After completion of the improved road system it is possible that
about 300, 000 combat troops could be supported in the border regions and
that about the same number of garrison troops could be supported else-
where in the Tibet Region. This military force would require nearly one-
third of the total truck park in China. The requirements for motor gaso-
line would be more than 1 million tons annually, an amount nearly equal to
the total motor gasoline available in China in 1962, including imports. A
large increase in ammunition, small arms, and military equipment would
be required to supply the combat troops. At the present time, there is
ample unused capacity in the Chinese economy that could be used to meet
most of the demands of this increased military force over the next year
or two (except for POL), although some restrictions on the civilian
economy would be necessary as a result of the added military effort. It
would be necessary for the Chinese to increase substantially their imports
of POL and spare parts and, to a lesser extent, of military equipment. It
is believed that these increased imports may cost about $100 million
annually and that if the Chinese were to finance these increased imports
through regular trade, they might be forced to reduce other imports by
as much as 10 percent. In addition, the increased activity -- military,
road-building, and industrial. -- necessary to support this third alternative
would require increased expenditures of human energy and p-re.sumab1-y
some increase in the consumption of food.
Although it is believed that the Chinese may have the capability
to increase their military force in the Tibet Region to the size indicated
in this third alternative, the strains that would be encountered in supply-
ing the necessary POL and in maintaining the transportation facilities
would argue against it. Furthermore, if the Chinese should deploy
300, 000 troops in combat units against India, it is probable that they
also would use combat aircraft, which would add greatly to the cost of
the military effort and create difficulties throughout the economy.
17 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-77
Page 5
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
Requirements for Aviation Fuel
It is assumed in this paper that combat aircraft would not be in-
volved, except perhaps in isolated instances and in very small numbers.
If the Chinese use their civil-military air transport fleet to carry sup-
plies to LLasa, they could deliver by air about 240 tons per day over a
period of 1 month, requiring about 5, 600 tons of aviation gasoline and
560 tons of jet fuel (all of which must be imported). Over a sustained
period beyond I month, however, the air transport capability into Tibet
probably would drop by about one-half because of the difficulties that
would arise in maintenance of aircraft.
17 November 1962 CIA/RR CB 62-77
Page 6
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A001400070001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
 Analyst:
^ A/F
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
LARCH A AD REPOR `
rtt .ail'
CIA/RR CB 62-77
t_
17 November 1962
RaFtA nt<
205
207
Recd in St/P/C
Pulled byLLSt/CS for _DD_ I
1-4
O/DD/I
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
1ry16
117
118
119
120
121, 122
123
124
125
126
1x.7
25X1A18 --139
ngrading and
dow
-atV-on declasslticatlon
SE ME
a2ro>TvM ,3~2 q
20 Nov 62
19 Nov 62
17 Nov 62
17 Nov 62
20 Nov 62
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
 I;z /5
/-
o
'Ow~
5'I Sfi/f/2-
air ms i
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO01400070001-8
17JJ(
T040f33A c0070001-8
25X1 A
 SIYBJECT: I pt&MdfercFtel eC=jD/O5 l2s'DR44DIP*Vbi403 @014.
uammic * , i .4'
USVAAO=,i *If. 1 TA y
Copy No. Recipient
1 - O D I - Attn: 7E-32 HQ)
2-3 -NIC )
'2-11 - VV i ill Vvr. saw LOA IH
12-14 - ONE ) D-I-S-T-R-I-B-U-T-E-D B-Y
15
22-30
31
St/CS/RR 2&1-ODDI-
- NSA _ 25X1A
- NSAL
32-200- ORR/St/I/D Distribution
32
33
34
35
36-40
41-46
47-55
56-63
. -..
- AD RR
- DAD/RR
- Ch/E
- St/PR
- D/A (1 ea. br.)
- D/MS (1 ea. br.)
- D /R (1 ea. br; 3-R/FU)
- D/M (1 ea. br.)
- /_ i . _ _ L - . O T /rPV \
73-75 - D/GG r-? 1,
76-79 - St/1 (1 ea. br.)
\
~ QAS
80
- EIC /S 25X1A
81
- St/FM
82
- Analyst/Branch
83
- GR/CR
84
- BR/CR
85
- IR/CR ii 1)i
86
- Library/CR
87
- IPI/CR
88
- VMR A-18
89
- AD/OO
90
- Chief, FDD
91
- CD /00
92-94
- RID/AN Unit 4
95-97
- OSI
98
- OBI
99
- OTR/IS/IP, GC-11 HQ
100
- NPIC/REF, Rm. 502, Steuart Bldg.
101-142
- St/P/C
143
- Commandant Nat'l War College, Ft. Leslie McNair, Attn: Classi-
fied Records Sect., Rm. 26, Nat'l War College Bldg. Wash.25, D.C.
144-154
- ACSI/Army, R. 1D479, Pentagon
155-168
- Navy, Director ONI, Rm. 5B659, Pentagon
169-178
- HQ. USAF, Attn: A'CIN-3D1, Rm. 4$137, Pentagon
179-180
- Asst. Secretary of Defense, ISA, Rm. 3D220, Pentagon
181-184
- USIA, Attn: W. Phelps, IRR/D, Rm. 701, Walker Johnson Bldg.
1734 New York Ave., N. W.
185-196
- State, INR, Communications Center, Rm. 7818, State Dept. Bldg.
'
25X1A
197-198
s, Pentagon
- DIA, Services Division, Publications Sec. Rm.
/ Offe Bld
ti
199-200
ve
- Dr. Neilson Debevoise, NSC, Rm. 365, Execu
g. (f .29d
25X1A Chief, Current Support Staff
RR/St/CS Q/gym 20d{1p7 241003A001400070001-8
S -E -C -R -E -T