IRAN AND THE SOVIET UNION: SEEKING MUTUAL ADVANTAGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500160001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1980
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For R 1eatseqMARIW LOWNW&000500160001-2
- f&~,
4jr
TOP SECRET UMBRA
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESE N CH - ANALYSIS: DECEMBER 20, 1980
1. ;IRAN AND THE S^"^^"' "' ' SEEKING MUTUAL ADVANTAGES
Iran's'willingness to expand its economic links with Moscow
illustrates a pragmatic st_Leak in the Iranian Revolution. It also
fits well with Soviet plans to curry Iranian favor by being forth-
coming on economic matters, while trying to convince Tehran that
Moscow is not a threat to Iran-or-the Revolution. The Soviets are
unlikely to make significant progress in improving political
relations, .however, at least as long as they follow present
policies in Afghanistan.
.. Tehran appears to believe that its economic and political
relations with the Soviet Union can be separated. Iran's political
attitudes are summarized by a declaration that it supports
"neither East nor West," by its continued condemnation of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and by Khomeini's general hostility
to communism.. The Soviets, however, have not been vilified to
the degree that the US has.
Tehran has been willing to put aside ideology in its
economic dealings with Moscow:
--Soviet economic advisors are still working in the
Oountry;
- new transit agreement has been ratified;
--The Russian bank has not been nationalized (other
foreign banks have);
Iranian. purchases of Soviet goods have increased; and
--On natural. gas., the issue is not whether Iran should
$ell gas,. but one of price, a. problem which probably will
be resolved.
In the coming months, the. Soviets will continue to try to
strengthen their economic position in Iran. Concurrently, Moscow
will try to convince Tehran that the issue of Afghanistan is
inseparably linked to "imperialist" machinations in the region and
that the Brezhnev Persian Gulf proposals and the May 14 Afghan
peace plan offer a comprehensive framework in which all of the region
problems can be solved.
This Soviet effort is not apt to achieve clear or positive
results. Moderates such as Bani-Sadr'and Ghotbzadeh seem fearful
of Soviet intentions and concerned about the strength of the Tudeh
Party The hardliners also have their. doubts about Moscow's inten-
tions, but they have not binned the Tudeh Party paper and are
willing to let Tudeh members ride their coattails. Both sides are
viiii gpp gv gtei s~gg2Ibs1s$ : t4-RDDB etR0 b01e61~tb5.