FRANCE AND AFRICA*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030044-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: March 18, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMAT"
18 Mara 1957
STAFF MJRANDUM NO. 15'57
St1BJECT t France and Africa*
1? One of the pri ry topics raised by Premier Vole r during
his recant visit in the US was the French concern with E,uaP.
This theme of creating new relationships between the two continents
in order to preserve European Influence In Africa is receiving fresh
emphasis as the French contemplate their ehmiken world powor position
and the current threats to their remaining overseas possessions.
Over the past few years France has lost Indochina, Tunisia,, and
Morocco, engaged in an increasingly bitter and costly struggle against
Arab nationalism in Algeria, and faced minor but growing unrest In several
parts of French "Black" Afar.
2. To combat this trend, the French are seeking to bolster their
international standing by developing thee resourees and aiding the polit-
ical evolution of overseas France. Thus during the past year a new
economic organization of Saharan areas has been charted,, a relatively
liberal political program has been formul.et ed for French Black Africa,
French Togoland has been given the status of a limited republic, and
France has won a tentative agreement from her frosctive partners in
the European Common I rrket for contributions to the development of the
French overseas territories=, However, France confronts a number of
interrelated problems which could preclude realisation of the Eurafrtca
concept; foremost among them are the burgeoning French economic diffic u=:-
ties and the Algerian conflict.
3 The unfavorable character of the North African scene is
obvious. The situation in French Black Africa, on the other hand
cannot be gauged with much accuracy at present; the tendency In the
absence of comprehensive data is turd either undue alarmist speeula,tion
The substance of this m ndum has been discussed with OCI,
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or equally unfounded complacency. Apparently much of the current
confusion stems from the very consid3ration of the French political
program (embodied in the Loidre) which is expected to go into
effect this spring. The forehanded French action by its nature has
elicited expressions of political opinion from large numbers of Africans
who previously had little interest in political affairs. Passage of
the decrees through the French rarl iament has been accompanied by full
debate, with the result that talk of regional self-goverment, internal
autono -, and even of independence has been prevalent in many hitherto
tranquil areas of Black African,
4. Coupled with the stir caused by the Lot-cadre has been the
impact of such West African developments as the creation of Ghana and
the "self-governing Republic of Togoland a" Moreover, in December the
other French UN Trust Territory in Africa, the Gameroons, held pops ar
elections for a territorial assembly which has since participated in the
formulation of a now statute granting a limited measure of self-govern-.
ment. It is unlikely that the French West and Equatorial territories
will long respect the distinction between their status and that of the
trust areas.. There are also growing indications that events in North
Africa are having a substantial effect on the territories south of the
Sahara.
5, However, despite the changed political atmosphere in French
Black Africa over the past year, there have been few acts of violence
against the French, and no African :le ,der of real promint,nce has de-.
mandesd independence from France.. On the other hand, there are indica-
tions that the current leaders are losing influence to more extreme
nationalists who will not be placated by moderate French political and
economic program. Meanwhile, many of the present native leaders appear
agreed that the T oi.-hare will provide as much of a political advance
as their people can ndle now, and that French economic aid is a vital
element in that progress. Their future attitudes probably will be
largely determined by (a) the manner in which the French implement the
new decrees, and (b) the ability of France to provide continuing large-
scale financial support. The record of French administrators in
This is the usual term for the Overseas Reform Act of June 1956, an
omnibus bill authorizing: (a) certain electoral changes and creation
of cabinet-type councils in the overseas territories; (b) new statutes
for French UN Trust Territories; and (c) the drafting of numerous
decrees, 13 of which now under discussion are designed to speed the
evolution toward greater local autonomy.
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implementing the policies of Paris in Indochina and North Africa, as
well as the complex nature of the decrees, does not cause us to be
sanguine on the first count,
b. On the second count, in attempting to use the resources of
their European partners to develop the African territories, the French
are admitting their inability to support even present requirements
for development funds in Africa. The trite observation that France in
overextended has lost none of its force during the. partial prosperity
of the last two years. Indeed? a basic cause of the present tenss
economic situation is France's inability to continue to support its
current and long overdue internal expansion because of competing claims
on its resources resulting from the Algerian conflict, the Suez issue,
and the high investmont rate in Africa.
7. Under present political and economic conditions it is equally
difficult to see how the French government could either slough off any
one of Its overseas commitments or support them all without very sub-
stantial external financial assistance. Nor is this current situation
solely an extraordinary one resulting from the abortive Suez intervention.
The French balance of payments and budget deficits were causing alarm
prior to the Suez crisis; they have mushroomed in recent months, even
though the impact of Suez has not been as severe as the French originally
envisaged.
8. In any ease, France's onrushing economic difficulties are
likely to have a seriously adverse effect on the Eurafriea scheme,
The French government has as yet done little to alleviate the problem
in terms of internal measures to reduce the budget deficit and the flow
of imports. A continued failure to reduce excess internal demand is
likely to result in French backsliding on its commitments to the OED
trade liberalization program, In that sventp the projected Common
Market Treaty might not come into being in the near f`utur+e, if at all.
Moreover, it to possible that even if the treaty were ratified, the
French might not be able to contribute their share to the common
developassent fund for the overseas territories without paring their
current expenditures,
9. In addition to its contribution toward France's economic
woes, the Algerian conflict operates in other ways Inimical to the
Eurafrics Idea. It has done much to sabotage France's efforts to create
new and mutually satisfactory relationships with independent Morocco
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and Tunisia, which persist in giving material and diplomatic aid to
the Algerian rebels. French credits to both countries have been held
up and probably will not be released until defense arrangements accept-
able to France can be negotiated; this issue in turn is likely to depend
on progress toward an Algerian settlement. The US has thereby been
placed in an awkward position with respect to the Moroccan bases and
to its policy of supplementing rather than supplanting French aid, the
amounts of which cannot at present be determined. If the Algerian
problem continues to bedevil. French-African relations over the next
several months, the US is likely to be faced with serious problems on
both defense and aid questions.
10. Another damaging aspect of the Algerian struggle with regard
to the Eurafricwa idea is that Algeria is the basis of the Saharan
economic scheme. The bulk of the mineral wealth of French Africa
consists of oil, iron, copper, and manganese which have been discovered
in commercially exploitable quantities in Algeria and Mauritania. The
latter area is now the scene of scattered small raids by Moroccans who
may be receiving official encouragement from their government, even
though it has not as yet formally announced Its sweeping territorial
claims to Mauritania,, Spanish Sahara, and a portion of Algeria,.
11. Finally, the French virtual declaration of war against Arab
nationalism, provoked by Nasser's aid to Algeria, complicates France's
relations with most of its African territories as well as with Morocco
and Tunisia. The ledgers of the two latter states are not favorably
disposed toward Nasser, but they are compelled to join other Arab
nations in inveighing against the Increasingly close French connection
with Israel. The saw sentiments appear to prevail in the Moslem areas
of French Black Africa.
12. In am,, we believe that recent events with respect to Algeria
and the French economy indicate that the pace of African developments
adverse to France is likely to be somewhat faster than we would have
estimated a year ago. Moreover,, it seems likely that France will
soon be faced with a choice between stringent deflationary internal
measures and an Algerian settlement on terms which might provoke a
violent reaction among Frenchmen on both continents. There is an even
chance that the French will attempt to avoid this dilerma by seeking
US aid of the dissensions recently extended to Great Britain, On the
other hand, we do not wish to depreciate the French penchant for post-
poning decisions until it is too late. In any event, the future of the _
Eurafrica policy does not appear bright:?
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