DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500020022-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 28, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENOI
(IFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIATES
28 September 1956
MENT NO
NO IN CLASS. 0
SWF MEMORANDUM Nat, 78.56 o DEC
lgLASS. CHANGE'
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN TIE UNION OF souni AFRICA-Nen REVIEW DATE:
- AIM HR 702
DATE: *Va. REVIEWER:
g
1. After reviewing the situation in the Union of South Africa
In the light of developments over the past few years, the staff feels
that the conclusions of NIE42 ("Probable Developments in the Union
of South Africa," published 20 October 1952) remain basically sound.
/f the need were to arise in the near future for a South African
estimate, it woUld? in our judgment, parallel in general the findings
of NIE-72. In this memorandum we wish to point out some placee where
NIE42 would need revision.
2/
2, Trends in Party Stren ir As forst:gat in NIE-72, after
winning the 19 3 election, the Nationalists took steps to place the
supremacy of Parliament beyond conatitutional checks and otherwise to
increase their domination of South African politics and government.
They "packedliths Supreme Court, and enlarged the membership of the
Senate frOm 48. to 89 in order to have a two-thirds majority in both
houses of Parliament. These atepa paved the way for constitutions/
amendments and legislation designed to strengthen their political
1/ Thin memorandum has been coordinated with 0/CI at the working level.
Party strength:: in Parliament
(Jay 1956):
House of At:00_2W.
Senate
Nationalist
94
77
United
51
8
National Coneervative
6
0
Later
5
0
Representatives of Natives
3
4
Liberal
0
Union Federal
0
42.1111?1.61?RIMINIONC.
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position and to advance their racialiat and discriminatory policies.
The Nationalists are well-disciplined* at least in Parliament; their
strength and solidarity appear to have been fully maintained in
Parliamentary sessions since 1953. The United Party opposition* on
the other hand* continues to be hampered by ineffective leadership* a
conflict between its liberal and conservative factions* and inability
to create an alternative program to that of the Nationaliat government.
The prospects for the smaller parties -- Liberal and Labor* which oppose
racialist policies* and National Conservative and Federal* which are
splinter groupa from the two main particle ...continue to be very dimo
The strength of the Nationalists* the weakness of the ndis-United
Partys,' and the inability of the four small parties to enhance their
mass appeal indicate that the Nationaliste will go on to win the next
general election, (scheduled for 1958) and prohsbly remain in power for
another five years thereafter'
30 Race Relations. Relations between the dominant white minority
of three million and the eleven million Natives* Coloreds' and Asiatica*
have continued to deteriorate ? In the last Parliamentarysesaion the
Nationalists were almost oboes/sod with racial matters* and a very large
percentage of the bills enacted were direoted against the non-ftropeanso
Nationalist policies have increased the resentment of the non-Europeans*
and in particular the Coloreds* who were placed an a aeparate electoral
roll and lost the right to sit on the Cape Provincial Council? Formerly
frieze:11y toward the Europeans* or at least far less hostile then the
Natives and Asiatics* the Coloreds are apparently now convinced that
the future lies with the nonEuropeans. The leaderahip of the latter
has become more bitter than ever* and we still believe* as N142 pointed
out* that increasing racial tension should expand the opportunities for
Communist exploitation* although Communist influence remains insignifi-
cant thus faro
40 Despite the professed Nationalist "ideal', of complete
territorial separation of whites and nonaEuropeans (a theid)* the
government's policies have been limited to maintenance of white supremacy*
repressive educational and trade union measures against the nonAuropeans0
and social and residential segregation in those European rural and urban
areas where Native a* Coloreds and Asiatics are employed. The Nationalist
politicians* as opposed to certain clerical and academic theorists*
realize that the South African economy is based on nonZuropean
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labor and will require increasingly larger numbers of skilled natives
for continued development. Aoreover, some Afrikaner as well as
English-speaking businessmen are new pressing the government not to
disturb the economic franework hy any foolhavie venture of enclosing
all Natives in reserves* While the Nationalist government has under-
taken some measures to improve the Natives' lot, both in the reserves
and in white urban and rural areas where filitives are employed, the
prospects are that white supremacy and the need for Native labor will
continue to guide the Nationalists' policies, with improvement of the
Natives' situation only a minor consideration. A trend toward more
moderate thinkin, within the Dutch Reformed Church has resulted in
renunciation of the alleged seriptural basis for apartheid, but neither
the Dutch Church nor the few liberal Nationalists in the universities
are likely to challenge the principle of white domination in the fore-
seeable future.
5. Foreign Relations. NIE42 still adequately reflects the stra-
tegic importance of the Union to the hest. Internal tensions have not
affected the floe of strategic materials to the US and UK0 although we
continue to believe that in the long run Shipment of these materials
will be hampered or even halted when the struggle over white supremacy
erupts into widespread disorders. The Sues crisis msy make the Union's
bases and port facilities extremely valuable even short of general memo
if ships normally using the Canal should be forced to go around the
Cape, NI%-72 has proven correct in stating that for at least four years
the Union mould probably remain unable to meet its commitment to provide
a full armored division for diddle Last defense within three months after
the outbreak of mem. The Union's military forces are still capable only
of maintaining internal security, and there la no indication that the
country will be prepared to meet its commitment in the foreseeable
future*
6. Some of the NIE-72 forecasts regarding the Union's probable
foreign policies, particularly those concerning Africa, 'mill require
revision in a new estimate. The repression of non-auropeaas in the
Union has increased racial animosities elsewhere in Africa& and relations
between the Nationalists and Tropical African native leaders are poor.
However; the prospective emergence of independent Mack states, such as
the Gold Coast, Egypt's efforts! to penetrate south of the Sahara, and th
Union's fear oi Communism have moved some Nationalist leaders to express
interest in improving relations with other areas of Africa. On the other
handl because of public opinion, asp cially that of its Nationalist
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supporters, the Union governeont will be forced to go slow in any
efforta to establish betrar relations with Black leaders and to
negotiate comma defense arrangements against Gotanunism. But the
eationalists will probably attempt to bring about some improvement
in their relations with Black Africa over the next several years,
although their repressive policies toward non-buropeans in the Union
are not likely to be seriously altered in order to realize this
objective.
70 mill also have be be revised regarding the Nationalists'
"hope within perhaps a generation to absorb the ahodesias," The Federa-
tion of Nhodeeia and Nyasaland was created after the publication of
NI]-?2 # and the Nationalists have probably abandoned their former atm of
extending their rule to he Bhodeslas. On the other hands the Afrikaners
maintain their claim to the protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland,
and Swaziland in the face of continued British refusal to cede those
territories.
8. Despite the tendency of many Natiocaliata to isolationism, as
stated in NIE.42, "South Africa's desire for US-UK markets and capitals
it need tor allies, and its fear of Communism will lead the government
to continue to cooperate with the Viestern powers," Relations between
the US and the Union continue to be goods and the US coleys great
prestige in South Afrtea despite differences over the Nationalists'
racial policiee, Although the Afrikaners delight in twisting the lion's
tail by proclaiming their intention to establish a republic:, relations
between the UK and the Union are also goods, particularly in the fields
of econcedams and defense. As a result of south Africa's traditional
antipathy to the jarglish, and its sensitivity to UN criticism-- which
he led the Afrikaners to adopt a general position wgaLnst interference
in the domestic affairs of other countries -- a Union spokesman has
asserted that the nationalization of the Sues Canal was "Egypt's dome:Aim
affair." Nevertheless, despite these and other irritants, NIE-72 appears
to have exaggerated the probability that South Africa will "in time"
replace the Commonwealth tie by a bilateral relationship with the UK.
Although the Nationalists intend to proclaim a republic at an appropriate
times there is no evidence that emotional consieerations will overcome
their realization of the benefits derived from the Commonwealth associa-
tion. hoonomic and defense advantages, fear of Communism mMi of Egypt,
and their desire to establish better relations with the rest of Africa
will probably lead the Nationalists to remain in the Commonwealth -- even
should the Gold Coast and other Black states become members.
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90 Possibil,tofCizele)? NIBen is most obviously dated and
invalid reliZage7TETiitiii0eivof the rale of the Torch Commandoe and
Of the poseibility of divilleare The opposition United Party organised
the Torch Commandos in 195o as a device to arouse and exploit alarm
ever the alleged Nationalist Party threat to constitutional democracy?
NIEen saids "If the Nationalists should min the 1953 election, and it
they should then take steps further to entrench themselves in power,
the danger of armed reaction by the Torch Commandos would be great."
The estimate qualified this danger by asserting that the leaders of.
both parties and influential bueinees interests would exert themselves
to avert oivillear. Although the Nationalists won 'the election e in
1953 and took steps turther to entrench themealves in power, there *as
no need for Afrikaner and English leaders to restrain the Torch Cammandose
Bather than take to the streets, the Torch Oostende* took to the soccer
fields and have ever eine? concentrated on their perSonal liveeee*
fortunes rather than on politics, There is less friction ?
betemon the Afrikaners and English than at any time in recent years.
?
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