SOCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN COMMUNIST CHINA THROUGH 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 22, 1955
• Content Type: IM

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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SOCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN COMMUNIST CHINA
THROUGH 1954
CIA/RR IM- 409
22 April 1955
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 791, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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C T M T n
FOREWORD
This memorandum is one of a series of periodic reviews of the
program of the Chinese Communist government to extend its control
over agricultural resources and production.* It assesses the
effects of the program on agricultural production and gives various
measurements of the extent to which the government has carried out
the most important phases of agricultural socialization. The assess-
ment of the effects of the program as regards agricultural production
are qualitative. This description of the government's problems, how-
ever, is informative about the future outlook of the agricultural pro-
gram and indicative of the general rate of economic development.
The word socialization is used as a general descriptive term for
all phases of the Chinese Communist agricultural program. Socializa-
tion of agriculture thus covers activities as diverse as land reform
and the organization of"state and collective farms. The description
of these activities applies only in a general way. The actual ex-
ecution of the program varies widely from place to place at any given
time.
* This memorandum supersedes CIA/RR IM-386, Developments in the
Socialization of Agriculture in Communist China 7 May 54,
SUS ONLY.
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Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Accomplishments in 1951+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
a. Agricultural Producer Cooperatives . . . . . . . . 5
b. Mutual Aid Teams . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
c. Advanced Socialized Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
d. Miscellaneous State Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Agrarian Policy in 195+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1+. Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5- Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Agricultural Producer Cooperatives . . . . . . . . 13
b. Mutual Aid Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
c. Advanced Socialized Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . 11+
6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 14
Appendixes
Appendix A. Tabular Summary of Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives in Communist China . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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Page
1. Number of Agxicultural Producer Cooperatives in Communist
China, 1951-54 and 1954, 1955, and 1957 Pans . . . . . . . 6
2. Proportion of Peasant Households in Communi {st China
Organized in Mutual Aid Teams, 1950-54 .1. . . . . . . . . 7
3. Agricultural. Producer Cooperatives in Co ist China, 17
by Administrative Region, 1951-54 . . . . . . . . .
4. Agricultura=_ Producer Cooperatives in Communist China,
by Administrative and Provincial Region, 1954 Plan, l9:14, 17
and 1955 P:-an . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I
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CIA/RR IM-409
(ORR Project 21.453)
T n m
SOCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN COMMUNIST CHINA
THROUGH 195
Summary
The socialization of agriculture in Communist China** is designed
to establish a favorable balance between the extension of economic and
political control and the advancement of agricultural production. Be-
cause the agricultural sector of the Chinese Communist economy is still
the largest single producer of the national wealth, the success or
failure of the socialization program may well be the determining factor
in the development of the long-range economic plan to convert Communist
China to an industrial nation.
Although the socialization program made great organizational pro-
gress during 1954, it had an adverse effect on agricultural production.
A number of variables, particularly the weather, cause fluctuation in
the production of agricultural commodities, and the specific effects of
the socialization program cannot be isolated. It is probable, however,
that peasant resistance to government pressures toward socialization
and defective organization and management of many of the Agricultural
Producer Cooperatives were responsible in some measure for the over-all
decrease in Chinese Communist agricultural production.
In 1954 the Chinese Communist socialization program was charac-
terized by a reversal of the "soft-line" policy followed in 1953?
Probably because the 1953 harvest failed to increase according to plan
and because there was apparent in some areas a tendency to re-establish
the old capitalistic attitudes and relationships, the government pur-
sued a "hard-line" policy throughout 1954. This policy was reflected
in various resolutions and decrees instructing the Party cadres to
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 March 1955-
** The term Communist China as used in this memorandum includes the
22 provinces of China proper, the 6 provinces of the area called
Manchuria, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It excludes the
Autonomous Region of Tibet.
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increase promotion of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. This promotion
was intensive throughout the crop season and. was given priority over
the important tasks of grain and tax collection.
By the end of 1954 the number of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives
had increased to 260,000 from the base of 15,000 existing at the end
of 1953. The number of agricultural households in the cooperatives
reached 4.7 millicn, compared with 270,000 at the end of 1953. The
number of Mutual Aid Teams* at the end of 1954 his not been reported,
but official announcements claim that 56 percent of the total agri-
cultural households in Communist China were orga ized in Mutual Aid
Teams, compared with 43 percent at the end of 1953.
Because of the rapid growth of Agricultural oducer Cooperatives
in 1954, the Chinese Communist government has ra sed the goals of
original socialization plans for 1955, 1956, and 1957. The program now
calls for 600,000 cooperatives in 1955, 1.5 million in 1956, and 3 mil-
lion in 1957. If these goals are reached, more than 50 percent of all
agricultural households in Communist China will ~e organized in
Agricultural Producer Cooperatives by the end ofd 1957?
The organizational plans for 1955 through 17 probably will be
fulfilled. The pressures of organization throughout the planting and
harvesting seasoner, however, are likely to have a further disruptive
effect on production. Apparently the Chinese Communist government
has considered th:.s probability and is willing to accept the con-
sequences in return for greater control ove:^ agricultural production.
The ultimate :success of the socialization pr
China appears somewhat doubtful. There are sev
the present time constitute real obstacles to a
balance between the extension of economic and p
the advancement o:' agricultural. production -- p
stimulated by organizational pressures which ig
of the means to p:'ovide adequate agricultural m
rapidly increasing requirements in the face of
creasing agricultural production.
ogram in Communist
ral factors which at
hieving a favorable
litical control and
asant resistance
ore incentives, lack
chanization, and
static or slowly in-
* The formation .:)f Mutual Aid Teams is a preliminary step toward the
organization of Alricultural Producer Cooperati-%tes .
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Although the Chinese Communist government ultimately may be faced
with serious economic problems stemming from the failure of agri-
cultural production to keep pace with socialization, at the end of
1954 the disruptive effects of the socialization of agriculture did
not constitute an actual deterrent to aggressive action.
1. Introduction.
The government of Communist China regards the collectivization
of agriculture as the solution of the agrarian problems of the
country. In 1951, while land redistribution was still in progress,
it became clear that "land reform" was merely a tactical stage in
the transition from a private peasant economy to the complete
socialization of agriculture. To avoid the opposition which would
be the natural reaction to an abrupt and radical institutional
change, the Chinese Communists planned a process of transition
through several stages. These stages in the socialization process
are as follows*:
a. The initial step is land confiscation and redistribution,
commonly termed land reform. This step was completed in Communist
China in 1953-
b. The second step is the formation of Mutual Aid Teams.
These are generally of two types: the temporary Mutual Aid Team,
based on labor exchange during peak working seasons, and the perma-
nent Mutual Aid Team, characterized by a combination of farming with
subsidiary rural occupations, the adoption of simple production plans
for the entire team, elementary divisions of labor, and the owner-
ship of a certain amount of common property.
c. The third step is the reorganization of production by the
formation of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. These cooperatives
* A detailed discussion of the stages appears in an memorandum. / (For serially numbered sourcereferences, isee
Appendix B.)
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are formed from Mutual Aid Teams deemed to hal
high to permit the transition. In essence the
tive use of land and labor in production. All
of land is retained, the management of land aj
duction are unified. Returns to individual m
their labor contributions and on the amount o:
cooperative.
d. The fourth step is collectivization
tionwide scale -- on the pattern of collectiv
the collective, private and individual c:aims
the collective holds title to the land, and t
for his labor.
e standards sufficiently
y are a form of coopera-
hough private ownership
d the planning of pro-
mbers are based both on
land they ho:Ld in the
of agriculture on a na-
farms in the USSR. In
to land are forfeited,
peasant is paid only
In 1953 they socialization program experie iced considerable growth,
with. emphasis placed on the development of Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives, and, to a lesser extent, on th continued rdevelopment
tes
of Mutual Aid ''earns . During Agricultuxal a
increased from 4,000 to 15,000 units,* and tual Aid Teams increased
from 8.3 million to 10 million. 2 At the e 4d of 1953 the number of
peasant households organized was-Li-3 percent of the total number of
agricultural households in the country.**
The social:Lzation policy of the Chinese Communist government
during 1953 wa; noted for its indecisiveness It was apparent that
the drive for the adoption of socialized agr cultural farms was pro-
ceeding on a trial-and-error basis; the pace adopted at any given
time varied with the success in meeting phys cal obstacles such as
floods, drought, famine, and the like and ps chological obstacles
such as the tendency shown by leading cadres to overestimate the
peasant's enthusiasm for socialization. Peasant opposition to the
organization cf Agricultural Producer Cooperatives posed the problem
of how much pressure should be used in forciig the peasants to join
the cooperatities. This problem became an i ortant policy matter
within the Chinese Communist Party. During he first half of 1953
the campaign to organize Agricultural Producer Cooperatives was pushed
intensively. In July 1953, however, the Party issued instructions to
its cadres to slow down in order to ease rur l tension and. to consoli-
date the existing units. Less than 5 monthe later, the
slow down was reversed. In December 1953
See Table 1, p. 6, below.
* See Table 2, p. 7, below.
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Chinese Communist Party announced that the organization of Agri-
cultural Producer Cooperatives would be speeded up again. This
was the beginning of the government's "hard-line" policy toward
socialization -- a policy which was continued throughout 1951-.
2. Accomplishments in 19511..
a. Agricultural Producer Cooperatives.
According to the resolution of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party published 8 January 1954, the number of Agricultural
Producer Cooperatives in China was to be increased from 15,200 to
35,800 before the fall of 1951-. / Press reports indicate, that this
figure was later increased to 1+5,000. The target figure was exceeded
in the spring of 1954, when a total of about 95,000 cooperatives, in-
cluding 1,7 million peasant households, had been established. This
represented 1.43 percent of the total agricultural households in the
country. By 1 December 1951+, a total of 260,000 Agricultural Pro-
ducer Cooperatives had been established. The number of Agricultural
Producer Cooperatives in Communist China, 1951-54 and 1954, 1955,
and 1957 Plans, is shown in Table 1.*
Progress in the formation of Agricultural Producer Coopera-
tives by the fall of 1951., although rapid, was extremely uneven. The
extent of development coincided generally with the sequence of acqui-
sition of Communist control over the various regions of China.*,* In
Northeast China, North China, and East China, 221+,000 cooperatives
have been reported as being established. This accounts for about
85 percent of the total number of cooperatives in the country. In
South-Central China there are now 21,000 cooperatives, and in North-
west China and Southwest China there is a total of only 16,1+00
cooperatives.
In many localities in Northwest China and Southwest, China,
areas which came last under Communist control and where land reform
has Just been completed, 16,400 cooperatives represent nearly a
fivefold increase over the number in the spring of 1951+.
The number of households organized into Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives as of 1951- still represents only a small fraction of the
Table -1f ollows on p. 6.
See Table 3, p. 17, below.
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Number of Agricultural Producer Cooperati
1951-54 and 1.954, 1955, and 1957 Plans a/
Agricultural
Households in
Cooperat ves
Cooperatives (Thousan
Percent of
Total
Agricultural
Households
1951
4oo J
7 J
N,A.
1952
4,000 5/
72
N.,A.
1953
15,000 /
270 7
N-A.
1954 Plan
35,800 /
644 J
N.A.
1954 Spring
95,000 10
1,700
1.4 12 J
1954 Fall
260,000 /
4,68o
3.9
1955 Plan
500,000 13
10,000 .1
N.A.
1957 Plar.
800,000 15
16,,000
20.0 :U
a. CompE,re with the regional figures g ven in Appendix A.
Regional and provincial numbers for the various years will
not nece.:sarily total to the all-China claims.
b. Based. on an average of 18 households per Agricultural
Producer Cooperative, which appears to be the national
average. The 1955 and 1957 plans :repo telly are based on
an average of 20 households per cooper tive.
c. On t;.ze basis of these statistics t ere were approxi-
mately 1L9 million peasant households n Communist China
during 1954.
d. See Table 3, p. 17, below.
total number of agricultural households in fommunist China. Mutual
Aid Teams account for the major share of the organized peasant house-
holds in the country. I
b. Mutual Aid Teams.
Although the organization of A uric tural Producer Coopera-
tives during 1954 received major emphasis, there was still consider-
able action In setting up Mutual Aid Teams Government announcements
continued to stress the importance of Mut 1 Aid Teams and their
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continued growth and development as the socialistic base for the more
advanced form of agricultural organizations. There is available,
however, little organizational information of a quantitative nature.
It was reported that at the beginning of 1954, 43 percent of all
peasant households belonged to Mutual Aid Teams and that the pro-
portion would be over 50 percent by the end of the year. ly
Another report indicated that near the end of 1954 there were 60 mil-
lion peasant households in Mutual Aid Teams. DI The percent of
peasant households in Communist China organized in Mutual Aid Teams,
1950-54, is shown in Table 2.
Proportion of Peasant Households in Communist China
Organized in Mutual Aid Teams
1950-54
Percent
1950
10
20
1951
20
21
1952
40
22
1953
43
23
1954
56
J
a. Inasmuch as 0 percent of all peasant house-
holds in Communist China were reported as organized
in both Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives, the 4 percent found in Agricultural
Producer Cooperatives (see Table 1) were excluded?
c. Advanced Socialized Organizations.
The complete collectivization of agriculture in Communist
China is still a distant prospect. There exist as yet only 200
"fully socialistic" cooperatives, of which over half were set up in
Northeast China in the winter and spring of 1954. 25 A total of
23 was reported as of March 1953. 26
Very little mention is made of the collective farm, which is
referred to as an "Agricultural Producer Cooperative of higher form."
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 I
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It is at this level that the peasant finally lopes title to his holding,
and the government has been very discreet n pu licizing this fact.
The method by which the Chinese Coirmmnilst Agricultural Pro-
ducer Cooperatives become collective farms makoIs it difficult, to deter-
mine when a cooperative actually becomes filly
the change invol~res a reorientation from e:mpha
to emphasis on returns to labor, it becomes ex
make a sharp distinction between the two socia
spring of 1954, for example, 300 cooperatives
each were reported in North China. 27 The us-
per cooperative averages from 20 to 30. In an
Jen-min Jih-pao of 30 April 1954 reported that
ducer Cooperatives in suburban Peking had cant
dividends for land shares. 28/ These examples
of judging when a cooperative becomes a collet.
cases, apparently, is included in the total of
cooperatives announced by the Communists.
collectivized. Because
is on returns to land
eedingly difficult to
ized forms. In the
ith over 100 families
al number of families
ther case,the Peking
98 Agricultural Pro-
lled the system of giving
indicate the difficulty
ive; neither of these
200 "fully socialistic"
Another advanced organization is the tate farm, of which there
are two types. One is the mechanized or sem echanized type, and the
other is the lo.2al unmechanized state farm.* By the summer of 1954
there had been Drganized in China 110 mechani ed or semimechanized
state farms and 2,300 local state farms, 29 ompared with 2,219 state
farms at the end of 1952, of which 52 were of the mechanized type. 30
d. Miscellaneous State Organizations.
As of the summer.of 1954 there were i China a total of'8,300
Institutes of Agricultural Research, 89 stoc and livestock farms,
101 Machine Tractor Stations, and a few others miscellaneous organiza-
tions set up to serve specific purposes or t~ meet special needs. 31
3. Agrarian Policy in 1954?
In the falL of 1953 the Chinese Communis s inaugurated a new
social and ecoaomic policy called the "gener 1 line." To the extent
* State farms are owned by the government a d operated with hired
labor. At the present time they are not reg rded as an institutional
form suitable for the mass of peasantry.
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that it affected agriculture, the new policy increased the pressure
on the peasant to join one of the socialized organizations recommended
by the government. This was a policy shift away from the 1953 position
of catering to the individual peasant. Perhaps one reason for this
shift was the fact that the regime could not afford to slacken the
drive toward socialism. To do so for more than a brief time appeared
to run the risk of beginning to slip back toward capitalism; left
alone, the Chinese peasant showed a strong inclination to acquire more
property. It is probable that rural policy was shaped also by the
failure of the 1953 harvest to measure up to expectations. The
authorities may have decided that the soft line of 1953. did not pay
off and that an uninterrupted advance in the organization of the
peasant would have produced a better harvest. Certainly the authori-
ties found it expedient to gain greater control over what was produced,
regardless of whether production was large or small.
The various decrees and announcements made during 1954 shed some
light on the motives of, and the problems confronting, the government
in the socialization program. A few of the principal pronouncements
are analyzed below.
A resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party, published 8 January 1951+, on the establishment of Agricultural
Producer Cooperatives was the first major policy announcement of
1954. L2/ Even before this resolution was published, it was clear
that the movement was going ahead at a good pace. The resolution
touched upon two matters which gave an insight into the difficulties
encountered by the regime at the level of the village and indicated
the pressure which the Party was using to achieve its ends.
The resolution states that "an ever greater contradiction between
the individual economy and Socialist industrialization is making it-
self increasingly felt" and that the peasants, mainly the middle
peasants, have a "two-sided nature" -- as working people and as private
owners. As the spontaneous tendency of the peasants toward capitalism
develops, "there will inevitably grow in rural villages a conflict be-
tween Socialism and Capitalism." The Party now realizes that, in order
to drive the peasants along the right road, it must keep a continuous
pressure of propaganda on the villages.
The other significant aspect of the resolution was the stress
that it placed on the role of the Communist Party. The resolution
states that "the development of mutual-aid and cooperation is the
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center of the Party's rural work in the future." The Party committees
in all strata below the provincial level must "shift the center of
their work to this direction and implement th Party policy of relying
at present on the consolidated alliance of poor peasants and middle
peasants, gradtally developing mutual aid andl cooperation, and re-
stricting exploitation by rich peasants." Patty members and members
of the New Democratic Youth League are to exert leadership in the
Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer Co peratives. There are
now about 6.5 idllion Party members and abou 12 million members of
the Youth League. At least half of these lie in the villages, and
they constitute a tremendous organization which the Party can bring
to bear on the reorganization of the peasant economy.
Probably the strongest statement of the
is the spring cultivation directive issued o
Government Administrative Council. This dir
officials that "agricultural production and
tives are a whole task which is unified and
They are the center of all work in the rural
Chou En-lai's report of 23 September 195
support to this new policy line. It continu
formation of cooperatives and to disregard c
besetting the socialization. program.
;overnment's new policy
31 March 19511- by the
ctive informed rural
utual aid and coopera-
annot be separated.
areas." 33
3?- lends further
s to emphasize the
mpletely the problems
In addition to the motives indicated by he resolutions and
directives on rural work, there are undoubtedly other reasons for
the emphasis on agricultural socialization. Increased crop pro-
duction is undoubtedly one of these reasons. The dominating factor,
however, probably is the government's desir to obtain control over
grain and other agricultural products. It s possible in this
fashion to obtain food and fiber requiremen s to support the military,
the administration, and the industrial pop ation. In addition, the
peasant population is probably the most rec lcitrant in a political
sense, and unless the peasants are brought der strict control and
their livelihood made dependent on the mach nery of the state, there
is the possibility of their disaffection to an extent that would pose
a threat to the government.
Another facet of the motivations be:hindjthe government's
socialization. program is suggested in Lord indsay's report pertaining
to his visit to China as a member of A'Uee' party in August of
19511-. 35 Lord Lindsay offered the theory that in the minds of the
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25X1X7
Chinese Communists collective farms are a political good; there is
little reference to, or inquiry about, their ultimate economic effect.
Dogma insists that peasants be organized along socialist :Lines to
prevent capitalism from creeping back into the countryside. Although
it might be more realistic for Peking to push organized farming only
where it would yield obvious technical advantages., for political
reasons the program is being pushed on an over-all basis.
4. Problems.
Some of the effects of the government's agricultural policy have
been revealed in the Chinese Communist press and radio and by the
accounts of refugees and others who have had opportunities to observe
the agricultural situation in Communist China.
25X1X7ed Fo sections of the Chinese peasantry became more dissatisfied
with their lot under the Communist government in 1954. Because
of a gradual depression of rural living standards in many areas and
the multiplicity and severity of the controls imposed by the
Communist authorities, dissatisfaction increased markedly during
the winter and spring of 1954. Official concern at signs of rural
unrest was reflected in the Chinese Communist press, which reported
cases of arson, violent attacks against cadres, serious grain
thefts, discord between members of mutual aid organizations, and
"counterrevolutionary activities"* in many parts of the country.
The press reports admitted that agricultural production had been
adversely affected. One of the reported reasons for this dissatis-
faction was the decision by the government to hasten the c:ollectivizar
tion of agriculture. 37
Possibly more disturbing to many government planning officials was
the realization that Agricultural Producer Cooperatives were not in-
creasing production as had been expected. During the second quarter
of 1954 the controlled press hinted that cooperatives had been
organized too rapidly. On 3 August 1954 the Peking Jen-min Jih-pao
expressed concern that only 30 percent of the Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives were well managed and producing as expected and 50 per-
cent to 70 percent of the cooperatives were reported as not showing
good production records. 38
* In the terminology of the Chinese Communists, this does not
necessarily imply organized resistance. As used here, in fact, the
term implies individual acts against the state.
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The slackening of leadership after the spr.
as the main reason for the uncontrolled develo
cultural Produce:- Cooperatives. Party organs
were criticized :for having helped the few adva
disregarded the others. The tendency of cadre
collection and t:ae antiflood battle overshadow
cooperativizatio2 was strongly criticized. 39
Jih-pa of 10 August 195+ said that in soiree of
of the country a great many members of cocpera
couraged over their hardships and had tended t
to other areas. 40/ In certain areas of B:cpeh
Cooperatives have shown a tendency to disinte
organization by the cadres and a general evasi
In Shantung there are reports that a number of
up in Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. For
more interested in the cultivation of their pr
the cooperative land. 42 In many areas the p
accounting mismanagement has become serious.
solving all of these problems rests with the 1
ship. 43
ng plowing was given
ment of some Agri-
n a number of localities
ced cooperatives and
to let grain and tax
the "critical. work" of
The Peking Jen-min
the badly flooded areas
ives had become dis-
drop out and migrate
Agricultural Producer
ate because of poor
n of responsibility. 41
weaknesses were showing
example, members were
vate plots than in
oblem of financial and
e responsibility for
cal Party lealer-
The Chinese Communists apparently believe that the principal
problems in the development of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives
and increased agricultural production are thos in the realm of in-
ternal organization, management, and education. Apparently the
question of incentives is ignored. The belief is firmly entrenched
in the minds of the authorities that socialization will increase pro-
duction; any result to the contrary is blamed n factors other than
lack of incentive or faulty theory.
The problem of incentives, however, is a t ctor which probably
will determine the success or failure of the socialization program.
The situation as of 1954 ii4di.cates that farm production incentives
have decreased. US observers arriving from various parts of China
believe that there is universal resentment to enforced coopera-
tive farming. 41f In addition, the peasants discovered that, they had
little access to the bank deposits which they had to make when they
sold their grain to the government. 45
A.j
Chinese Comunist planning is predicated on the assumption that
socialistic ins-,itutional forms of agriculture will result in
important increases in farm production ani that these increases will,
in turn, be invested in industrialization. The failure of many
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cooperatives to show any production increase - many actu3,lly showed
decreases in 195+ -- is serious from the point of view of the long-term
economic development of the Chinese Communist economy.
5- Plans.
a. Agricultural Producer Cooperatives.
The rapid rate at which Agricultural Producer Cooperatives
were established in 195+ led to revision of the planned numbers of
cooperatives. In-a July 195+ speech, Teng Tse-hui, Chairman of the
Rural Work of the Communist Party Central Committee, said that the
original plan of 500,000 Agricultural Producer Cooperatives for the
spring of 1955 should be revised to 600,000. "At this rate," said
Teng, "there will be 1.5 million Agricultural Producer Cooperatives
in 1956 and 3 million in 1957 with an average of 20 families per
cooperative." / If such an increase were to be realized, the
number of peasant households organized in Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives would increase to 12 million in 1955, 30 million in
1956, and approximately 60 million in 1957 -- compared with the
1.7 million peasant households reported in the spring of 195+. In
this event, by 1957 the Chinese Communists will have organized in
agricultural cooperatives 50 percent of the total peasant house
holds in the country. This is in line with the statement made by
Chou En-alai on 23 September 1954 in which he stated that "by 1957,
the last year of the First Five Year Plan, more than half of
China's peasants are expected to be in Agricultural Producer
Cooperatives." L7/
Considering the numbers of households included in other
socialized forms of agriculture and assuming the rate of growth in-
dicated by Chou, the Chinese Communists are well on their way to their
goal of complete control over the rural economy. It is on the basis of
the number of households organized that the extent of their program can
best be gaged.
b. Mutual Aid Teams.
There have been no announcements by the Chinese Communists
about future plans for the establishment of Mutual Aid Teams. It is
most likely that in view of the revised plans for the establishment
of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives, Mutual Aid Teams will decrease
as the transition to cooperatives is effected and will diminish
in importance as their role in the socialization process is completed.
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c. Advanced Socialized Organizations.
In view of the Chinese Communists'
pertaining to collective farms, it is not s-
tional plans have not been forthcoming. Al
about state farms and other miscellaneous a
is available, there is virtually no inf orma
plans.
6. Conclusions.
eluctance to publish data
rprising that organiza-
hough current information
xicultural organizations
ion on organization
On the basis of the 1954 situation, it is difficult to draw any
definite conc:Lusions regarding the specific effects of socialization
upon agricultural production.* There were riany indications that in-
creased production claimed for the relatively few Agricultural Pro-
ducer Cooperatives established before the 1 ?54 organization efforts
had been the result of discriminatory treatment in the form of
government-allocated supplies of credit., fe tilizer, and other pro-
duction inputs. Although the number of households organized in
cooperatives still accounts for only a small portion of the total
agricultural households (about 4 percent), there is the increasingly
awkward problem of how to concentrate as lim.ted supply of production
materials into a growing number of cooperatives and thus establish
them as examles to the peasantry. With th growth of the coopera-
tive movement, moreover, an active depressive influence makes itself
manifest. T1..e attempt to enforce close sup rvision and control has
been passively resisted by some of the peas ntry, particularly in
South China. I
If the Chinese Communists continue to push their cooperativiza-
tion program at the present rate of growth, the organizational plans
for 1955 through 1957 no doubt will be realized. The uninterrupted
organization of cooperatives throughout the various planting and
harvesting seasons, however, probably will have a disruptive effect
on. agricultural production. It is appaa,ren that the government
The analysis of the impact of instituti nal changes on the social
fabric of a nation is essentially a long-range task, except in certain
cases. Thus, in speaking about the impact on production of changes in
the institutional aspects of Chinese agricti6lture, it must be recognized
that in any 3iven year agricultural produc ion fluctuates with varia-
tions in weather. In 195+ the fluctuation was downward, primarily
because of extensive flooding. That facto is taken into considera-
tion in the evaluation of the effects of socialization.
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has considered this probability and is willing to accept the con-
sequences in return for greater control over agricultural output. The
collection of grain and other crops by the state will thus be facili-
tated, regardless of whether production increases are realized?
Little more than a start, however, will have been made with the
long-term problem of adapting a traditionally peasant agriculture
to the requirements of a socialized economy based on heavy industry.
This probably is the most difficult long-range problem confronting the
government of Communist China.
Apparently the authorities are still making every effort to avoid
provoking active resistance. There is continued emphasis on the
principle of voluntary participation and the need for the cadres to
win the peasants over. Nevertheless, the problem of general peasant
resistance will probably increase as the Chinese Communist collectiviza-
tion program develops. It is not only the rich but also the poor
peasant who favors the private ownership of land. Regardless of propa-
ganda in favor of cooperatives, the Chinese peasant is likely to re-
tain his deep-rooted desire to own his own land, and it is difficult
to believe that collectivization can be achieved in Communist China
except by strongly coercive measures.
The probability of strong peasant resistance, even if police-state
methods confine it to passive resistance, is one of the factors which
makes questionable the belief that socialization processes will lead
to increased agricultural production. Despite certain technical ad-
vantages which, in theory, cooperative farming can bring -?- consoli-
dated land use and the rapid introduction of technological improvements
on traditional methods -- the productivity of land cannot be divorced
from incentives and from the attitudes of those cultivating the land.
This fact has been illustrated in the USSR by the wide discrepancy
between the output of collective farm land and that of the private
garden plots of the collective farmers. The phenomenon may be more
common in China, where traditional farming has been intensive and
yields per hectare have been high.
So far, the socialization of agriculture in Communist China has
ignored the factor of incentives, and without incentives, continued
pressure upon the peasant very probably will result in a depressive
effect upon agricultural production. In addition to the problem of
incentives, there is the questionable applicability of large-scale
collectivization to the type of farming practiced in much of
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Communist China. Mechanization of paddy farming is certainly very
difficult, and the prospect of Communist China's producing enough fazm
machinery to mechanize dry-farming areas is emote. According to
Teng Tse-hui, Chairman of Rural Work of the ommunist Party Central
Committee, "collective farms using mechanize equipment is a long way
off, at least until the third Five Year Plan~111 49 It is also
difficult to foresee such rapid industrialization in China as would
be necessary to absorb agricultural labor di placed by mechanization,
particularly in view of the widespread and c onic underemployment
which now exists in Communist China.
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TABULAR SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER COOPERATIVES
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Agricultural Producer Cooperatives in Communist China
by Administrative Region
1951-54
Region
1951 5O/ 1952 5?-/ 1953 52
Spring 1954
-Fall 1954
Northeast
0
1,200
4,872
17,067
53.
60,000 54
North
70
1,700
6,186
43,000
55
103,357 J
East
0
367
3,300
26,000
/
6o,668 J
South-Central
0
152
527
10,000
;57
21,355
Northwest
0
130
300
1,361
/
3,206 J
Southwest
0
40
59
1,538
59
13,237 aJ
Inner Mongolia
0
0
176
N.A.
1,300
Total
70
3,589
15,420
98,966
263,123
a. Computed on the basis of reported provincial totals in Table moI,
below.
Table 4
Agricultural Producer Cooperatives in Communist China
by Administrative and Provincial Region
1954 Plan, 1954, and 1955 Plan
Region and Province
1954 Plan 61
1954
1955 Plan
Northeast
12,500
60,000
62 N.A.
North
12,400
103,357
J 132,837 63
Shansi
16,283
64 32,837 65/
Hopeh
87,074
100,000
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Table 4
Agricultural Producer Cooperativ s in Conmiunist China
by Administrative and Proincial Region
1954 Plan, 1954,; ands 1955 Plan
(Continued)
Region and Province 1954 Plan
1954
1955 Plan
.
8,300
60,668
J*
N.A.
Shantung
24,812
68
:100,000
Kiangsu
17,000
47,000
7
Anhwei
7,594
37,594
Chekiang
9,300
/
N.A.
Fukien
1,962
75
11,451
76
3,6oo
21,355
J
N.A.
Honan
10,700
/
50,000
78/
Hupe h
5,041
79/
19,041
0W
Hunnan
714
15,714
$172
Kiangsi
556
3/
N.A.
Kwangtung
1,003
10,000
85/
Kiangsi
3,341
/
28,000
FZ/
1,000
3,206
J
N.A.
Tsinghai
40
88
N.A.
Kansa
30
UQ-
300
90/
Shen3i
2,997 1
N.A.
Sinkiang
139 2
689 93
600
13,237 J
N.A.
Szec:zwan
7,600 4
19,600 /
Yunn 3,n
4,931
9,931
Kwei,how
706
N.A.
Sikaag
N.A.
100 92/
Inner Aongolia
1,300 100
6,000 lol
Total China 38,400
63,123
488,257 Y
* Footnotes for Table 4 follow on p. 19~
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Table it.
Agricultural Producer Cooperatives in Communist China
by Administrative and Provincial Region
195- Plan, 1954, and 1955 Plan
(Continued)
a. Only regional plan figures are given.
b. Computed on the basis of reported provincial totals for each
region.
c. Total of reported figures. The Chinese Communists have referred
to 500,000 and 600,000 agricultural producer cooperatives by the
spring of 1955-
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APPENDIX B
SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B - Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this re-
port. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluations on the cited document.
25X9A1
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