ESTIMATED ECONOMIC GAINS TO THE SOVIET BLOC IN NORTH VIETNAM

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• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1954
• Content Type: IM

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US OFFICIALS ONLY
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC GAINS TO THE SOVIET BLOC
IN NORTH VIETNAM
CIA/RR IM-402
25 October 1954
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING TEE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF.THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Si~.nsdl464
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FOREWORD
This memorandum outlines generally the level of economic activity
in the territories of Indochina placed under Viet Minh control by the
Geneva Conference. Estimates are made of the extent of agricultural
self-sufficiency and of the level of activity of industry,, principally
of mining, textiles, cement, and transportation. The trading structure
of the North Vietnam area is outlined as it functioned before and
during the recent hostilities. The probable benefits to the Soviet
Bloc of the inclusion of the Viet Minh area within the Bloc are
discussed. A comparison is drawn between the prospects for develop-
ment of North and South Vietnam into self-sustaining economic entities.
An estimate of probable economic developments through 1957 is made.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Productive Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 7
A. Agricultural Output in 1953 and Trends since 1946
B. Industrial Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Ferrous Metals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
13
a. Iron Ore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
b. Iron and Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
c. Ferroalloys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
(1) Manganese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
(2) Chrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
(3) Tungsten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Nonferrous Minerals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
a. Zinc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
b . Bauxite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Tin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
d. Phosphates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
e. Salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. Electric Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Cement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Consumer Goods and Handicrafts . . . . . . . 26
a. Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
b. Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 26
7. Engineering, Munitions, and Shipbuilding
Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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a. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
b. Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
c. Shipbuilding . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . 29
C. Transportation and Communications . . . . . . . 29
1. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
a. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
b. Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
c. Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 30
d. Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 32
(1) Inland Waterways . . . . . . . . . .. . 32
(2) Maritime Shipping . . . . . . . . . ? . 32
2. Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . 34
III. Human Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 34
IV. Economic 0:?ganization . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 36
V. Economic Relations of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . 38
A. Prewar Foreign Trade 38
B. Trade with Communist China and the Soviet Bloc . . . 39
.
'
1. Exports . 39
2. Im.Dorts . . . . . . . . . . . . f . . . . . . 42
3. Ex;ent of Material and Technical 'Assistance Given
to the Viet Minh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
C. Relations with South Vietnam and Other Asiatic
Count:^ies . . . . . . . 44
D. EffeCt3 oh. World Trade Patterns of the Inclusion
of North Vietnam in the Soviet Bloc . . . . . . . . 45
i
VI. Comparison of the Level of Economic Activities
and Viability of North and South Vietnam . . . . . . . 46
VII. Estimate of Probable Economic Developments
in North Vietnam through 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . 50
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Page
A.
Future Soviet Bloc Aid . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
50
B.
Probable Economic Developments through 1957 . . . .
50
1. Iron and Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
2. Nonferrous Minerals . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
53
3. Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
4. Textiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
5. Cement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
54
6. Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
54
Appendix
Sources
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
55
Tables
1. Estimated Production of Rice, Corn, Sugar, Sweet Potatoes,
and Manioc in North Vietnam, 1937-41 and 1946-53 .
2. Estimated Production of Fuelwood and Industrial Wood
in North Vietnam, 1938, 1940, and 1950-52 . . . . . 10
3. Estimated Production of meat in North Vietnam,
1935-39 and 1949-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Per Capita Production of Principal Items of Food
in North Vietnam, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Production of Iron Ore in Indochina, 1937-45 . . . . . . 13
6. Production of Tungsten Concentrates in Indochina,
1937-42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Production of Zinc in Indochina in Terms of Metal Content
and Smelter Output, 1937-43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Page
8.
Producticn of Bauxite in Indochina, 1936-43 . . . .
18
9.
Production of Tin in Indochina, 1937-43 ? ? ? ? ? ?
18
10.
Production of Phosphate in Indochina, 1937-43 . . .
19
11.
Production and Distribution of Coal inIndochina,
1937-41 and 1946-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
12.
Capacity and Production of Electric Poker in North
Vietnam., 1929, 1935-42, and 1949-53
24
13.
Production and Export of Cement at Hai~hong,
Tonkin, 1929 and 1933-53 . . . . . ..
14.
Production of Textiles in North Vietna ,
1937-41 and 1946-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15.
External Trade of North Vietnam and ofTotal Vietnam;,
1936-38 and 1949-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
16
Prewar Commodity Trade Balance of North Vietnam,
1936-41 and Average . . . . . . . . . . .
41
17,.
Trade of North Vietnam with France,
1936-38 and Average . . . . . . . .
18.
Composition of Trade of North Vietnam,;
1936-38 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
19.
Peak Production and Estimated Production of Selected
Commodities in North Vietnam in 1.957 and Consequent
Percentages of Chinese and Total Soviet Bloc Pro-
duction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
M
Indochina: Natural Resources and Processing Centers
:L954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inside
Back Cover
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(ORR Project 10.567)
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ESTIMATED ECONOMIC GAINS TO THE SOVIET BLOC
IN NORTH VIETNAM*
Summary and Conclusions
The partitioning of Vietnam, decided upon at the Geneva Conference
21 July 1954, has split a natural economic entity into two parts. The
area now to be controlled by the Viet Minh has relatively greater
potentialities for developing a viable partially industrialized econo-
my, because it is richer in coal and mineral resources; already pos-
sesses cement, textile, and food-processing industrial installations;
and, in addition, has fair possibilities of establishing self-suf-
ficiency in food production. South Vietnam, on the other hand, is an
almost exclusively agricultural economy, with an exportable rice surplus
and rubber plantations producing for export, but with very little in
the way of mineral resources and with few industrial facilities of
consequence except rice mills, rubber factories, distilleries, and
shipyards.
Reports of the 1954 "5th month"** rice crop in North Vietnam,
which may have been as low as 50 percent of normal, indicate that
there may be the worst famine in this area since 1945. The conse-
quent reduction of at least 25 percent of the total 2.4 million
tons*** of rice produced from the two annual rice crops in 1953 would
reduce per capita availability from indigenous production to about
97 kilograms.**** Since domestic requirements are estimated at 200
to 250 kilograms per person per year, North Vietnam must either
The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum repre-
sent the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 15 September
1954. This memorandum does not include any estimate of possible gains
to the Viet Minh from their acquisitions from North Vietnam residents
and institutions of holdings of old French-issued Indochinese piaster
currency.
** The 5th month crop, harvested in May, is the first crop of the
year.
Tonnages throughout this report are given in metric tons.
** Crop production figures are in terms of paddy rice,, whereas
consumption is in terms of milled rice (which represents a 75--percent
extraction rate).
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suffer severe restriction of consumption or receive imports up to
500,000 tons of rice from other areas, includ].ng Communist China,
which is not ir, a position to supply such an amount readily. North
Vietnam normally obtains grain from South Vietnam and has only
limited potentialities for increasing indigenous production. and
availability of food through long-term improvements in agriculture
and methods of distribution.
North Vietr.am has the essential resources]for small-scale indus-
trial development and for sizable exports of coal, nonferrcus metals,
and cement. It contains most of the known mineral resources of
Indochina, but except for coal these had not teen developed. to sig-
nificant proportions for purposes of industrialization under the
French.
Generally, the inclusion of the Viet Minh areas into the Soviet
Bloc will not mean the addition of any v-"-tally important natural
resources of w1.ich the Bloc does not already control adequate sup-
plies. Any sut stantial production from North Vietnam',s mineral
resources other than coal can'be made available to the Bloc only
at the cost of considerable investment in trafnsportation, mining,
and processing facilities.
Communist China will receive more benefit from the inclusion of
the area in the Soviet Bloc since important additional supplies of
cement and coal, will become available to it, as well as a convenient
railroad route for facilitating exploitation, of Southwest China's
tin and copper resources and for importing egIuipment for further
development of that area. The two railroad links with South China,
when restored, will assist North Vietnam's development and facilitate
possible future transport of military supplie's from the Bloc.
North Vietnam's proved iron reserves are ;estimated at only 5.7
million tons, End iron mining was developed 'ainly for the purpose
of export of iron ore to Japan. Only small ounts were processed
into iron and .feel products, in local nativE furnaces, the cement
plant, and the Bac Son iron and steel plant.: Unless further geo-
logical surveys prove otherwise, North V:Letnn will not have the
indigenous resources for an adequate iron and steel industry.
1
Production of ferroalloy metals, notably manganese, tungsten,
and chrome, from the important deposits of North Vietnam has
virtually ceased since World War II. Under table conditions it
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is possible that as much as 10,000 tons eacn in metal content of
marketable manganese and chrome and 700 tons of tungsten ore may
be produced per year by 1957 for export to the Soviet Bloc. These
are relatively unimportant, however, in comparison with reserves
and production in the Bloc. Manganese and chrome may be of future
importance to the Bloc for bartering purposes, or when Communist
China's requirements exceed exploitation of its own deposits. Of
the nonferrous minerals, North Vietnam has reserves of zinc,
bauxite, and tin which would be of little significance in the Bloc
supply position but perhaps would be of some use in improving
North Vietnam's trade position. The zinc smelter at Quang Yen,
if restored, would be of possible benefit to Communist China, which
has inadequate facilities for the conversion of zinc ore to metal.
Possibly 8,000 tons of zinc metal and 1,250 tons of tin metal in
concentrates may be produced per year by 1957.
The phosphate industry in North Vietnam will be of great value
to the Viet Minh in its future progtam to increase food production,
particularly in view of the fact that there is a phosphate fer-
tilizer factory in Haiphong. North Vietnam is not self-sufficient
in salt, and, pending expansion of the existing salt field, the
large population probably will require imports.
The estimated reserves of coal in North Vietnam are 20 billion
tons. The local Indochina market has been comparatively limited,
and coal. has been an important export,. especially to Japan. The
accretion of the Indochina coal mines and reserves to the Soviet
Bloc adds to Soviet resources a significant volume of high-grade
anthracite coal (with lesser amounts of bituminous and lignite),
which is particularly well located for transportation by water to
China and other Asiatic countries and well adapted to supplement
and complement the coal presently being mined in China.
The acquisition by the Viet Minh regime (in May 1955) of the
Haiphong Cement Plant, the largest cement producer in Southeast
Asia, with an installed annual capacity of 400,000 tons, will
provide a relatively significant source of supply to Communist
China, whose requirements for cement for immediate construction
purposes are substantial.
The centers of the electric power industry in North Vietnam
are at Hanoi and Haiphong and total 41,000 kilowatts (kw), or
three-fourths of the total North Vietnam capacity of 55,000 kw.
Indications, however, are that the electric power facilities have
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not recently been utilized at nearly their optimum capacity and that a
significant portion of the supply has been for li~hting and electric fans.
Although a considerable hydroelectric potential ecists, a total capacity
of less than 1,000 kw is currently installed at 1, zinc mine and 2 tin
mines. The installation of other than the snallest units in the im-
mediate future is tnlikely, because of the costs band time involved.
Most of the baEic needs of the population of North Vietnam, as re-
gards consumer goods, are met through the efforts; of local artisans, al-
though the two cotton mills of Indochina, produci#g cotton fabrics, yarn,
and cotton blanket?;, are located in North Vietna*. Raw cotton supplies
have been obtained entirely from imports, recentlyy from the US?
North Vietnam contains no industrial iroiuction facilities which
can be considered Important or significant to the machine-building
production of the soviet Bloc as a whole. Although the area is well
endowed with both naterial and human resources fcr greater industrial-
ization, the machine-building industries are still in the planning or
rudimentary stages.
The weapons and ammunition industry of North4Vietnam is very limi-
ted, production te3hniques having been largely improvised. It is evi-
dent that total production has met only a fraction of past Viet Minh
needs.
North Vietnam possesses the base of a well-developed transporta-
tion system involving railroads, highways, End w .ter, which should be
adequate for any immediate exploitation of the resources now under its
control. Rehabilitation of the area's railroad system, particularly to
Communist China and also to the Soviet Bloc, will be expedient both
strategically and economically. The chief requirements for these pur-
poses will be railroad construction equipment and rolling stock, and
the relatively small amounts needed are within tie capability of Com-
munist China and the USSR to supply. By connecting the Chinese rail-
road system to th?t of North Vietnam north of Lang Son, the Bloc will
establish through rail service from the USSR through Communist China
to the Southeast Jsian Communist frontier. The restoration of the
Raiphong-Lao Kay line to Yunnan Province in Southwest China will prob-
ably receive high priority as a means of further developing and ex-
ploiting the tin and copper resources of Yu:anan Province in Communist
China.
Combat destruction and widespread sabotage have accounted for
much of the decline of the rapid communicationsjservices of North
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Vietnam, and intercity wire-line facilities are almost nonexistent
today. In order to restore the existing facilities so that they
can meet the immediate requirements of the Viet Minh regime, the
regime will have to obtain from the Soviet Bloc trained manpower,
communications and electric power equipment, some heavy machinery
items, and raw and finished materials.
The total population of North Vietnam in 1954 is estimated to
be about 14 million, or about 56 percent of the population of all
Vietnam. Nearly 70 percent of the population reside in the Red
River delta or coastal areas, which make up only about a quarter
of the land area of North Vietnam. About 90 percent of the popula-
tion is dependent on agriculture for a livelihood, but many of those
persons working in the mines or industrial installations are part
of an agricultural population, appearing to work in the plants only
to supplement their agricultural income. Most of the industrial
labor force is semiskilled or unskilled. With only meager facili-
ties for the training of skilled workers, the. withdrawal of French
technicians will create for North Vietnam the problem of a severe
shortage of skilled and managerial personnel.
The economic organization of the Viet Minh regime is typical
of that of a Communist state, and the policy of the regime in
genera]. appears to follow closely the lines of Mao Tse-tung's
procedure in China in applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism
to domestic conditions. North Vietnam may be expected to emulate
Communist China's example of the last several years in the imple-'
mentation of planned economic development on the Soviet model.
Technical assistance from Communist China or other Bloc countries
will be required to accomplish such development.
North Vietnam has been a deficit area in respect to foreign
trade. During the postwar period, 1949 through 1951, North
Vietnam controlled only 6 percent of the exports and 22 percent
of the imports of Indochina as a whole. The pattern of external
trade no doubt will be oriented toward the Soviet Bloc and will
follow the typical one of an underdeveloped area dependent on a
few basic commodities in trade. Grains, coal, and cement accounted
for more than three-fourths of the value of exports from North
Vietnam during 1936 through 1938, while textiles and metal manu-.
factures represented more than three-fifths of all imports. The
Viet Minh has received material aid from Communist China since at
least early 1950, and it has been fairly well established that
Chinese Communist personnel have been operating with the Viet Minh.
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Though the Viet Minh Communist policy is not known, the Communists
may consider this area important enough to encourage some indus
trialization, requiring the importation of capital goods from the
Soviet Bloc and increasing, though not, significantly, the drain
upon Bloc resources.
Of the two areas of Vietnam, North Vietnam possesses by far the
greater potential for a viable industrial economy with its well-
balanced resource base even though it needs technical aid and
investment funds to develop it, and even though the rice deficit
probably will render it dependent upon some grain imports to sup-
port its polulation.
I. Introduction.
The conc.itions for normal production and economic development
have not existed in North Vietnam since prior to 191+1. The
Japanese wartime occupation was followed by Chinese. occupation at
the end of lrorld War II, and from 19)+6 to the time of the French
defeat the Exea was the field of a civil war between the Viet Minh
forces and the French and French-supported Vietnamese government.
Under French rule in Indochina the development of heavy indus-
try was not encouraged, mainly because it would compete with
interests of the homeland. In the northern area industrial activity
was limited to the exploitation of the coal resources and deposits
of some metallic minerals and to the development of agricultural
and mineral processing plants and a few f4ctories producing con-
sumer goods for local use. These f acilites are located primarily
,in the Red River delta area, which the French forces controlled
during the hostilities, and which has always been the major source
of agricultural production in North Vietnam. Since these resources
were denied to the Viet Minh forces, they had to rely upon Com-
munist China and the Soviet Bloc for economic and military support
and on clandestine procurement of grain and medical supplies in
French-cont:olled areas. Now that the Vi4t Minh, as a result of
the Geneva agreements, is about to obtain control of the economic
resources o:' Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel, it is important
to assess tae economic assets of the area' in the new context
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(a) of the association of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
with the Soviet Bloc, and (b) of the prospective exploitation and
development of the resources of North Vietnam under Communist
methods of planning and economic control. It is also of interest
to examine the relative prospects of the DRV and of South Vietnam
in respect to the viability of the two areas as separate entities.
II. Productive Resources.
A. Agricultural Output in 1953 and Trends since 1946.
Agriculture, the mainstay of the Indochinese economy, pro-
vides a livelihood for about 90 percent of the total population of
the country. Rice is the principal crop as well as the main staple
of diet and the chief export. North Vietnam currently does not
produce enough rice to support its estimated population of 14 mil-
lion, while the southern part of Vietnam produces a surplus for
export. Historically the North has always depended upon the South
to make up its deficit, particularly in times of drought. In 3-953
the estimated per capita production of milled rice in North Vietnam
was 126.2 kilograms (kg)* while on the basis of the 1953-54 esti-
mated crop, the per capita production for South Vietnam alone was
approximately 255.3 kg- !/** The yearly rice requirements have
been estimated to be between 200 and 250 kg per capita. D' Because
rice production in the North is not sufficient to support the esti-
mated population of 14 million, a poor harvest -- such as not in-
frequently occurs in the Red River delta -- would further aggravate
the situation and would necessitate the importation of even greater
quantities of rice. This rice could be made available in the course
of normal trade with South Vietnam or otherwise from Communist China
at the expense of the latter's own consumption. As a matter of fact,
the entire area of North Vietnam underwent a dry winter in 1953-54,
and the majority of the spring crops appear to have been severely
damaged. J There are prospects that the "5th month" crop of rice
may be as low as 50 percent of normal, which would mean the worst
crop since the famine year of.1945. !/ According to information
currently available this would mean a reduction of at least 25 per-
cent of the total normal crop (there are two rice crops) or an
approximate estimated production of 1,810,000 tons of rice for :L954,
or a per capita production of approximately 97 kg.
* See Table , p. 12, below.
** Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
the Appendix.
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The observed eating habits of the northern Vietnamese cast
considerable light on their varying standards of living from season
to season and :,tear to year. Prior to the man harvests, when the
rice supply from the previous crop is exhausted and the new harvest
has not yet come in, there appears to be recurring death and famine.
In general, the Tonkin peasant eats only 2 meals per day, and only
in times when the workload is heavy does he at 3 substantial meals 'Uiy
a c . When food runs short and little work has to be performed,
he attempts to adapt himself by eating curly once a day, sleeping
long hours, and reducing as much as possiblelhis expenditure of
energy. He eats, if not to satisfaction, atjleast enough to keep
fit when work requires during certain times of the year. When
there is scarcity, he consumes anything he can find which is edible,
which besides normal kinds of food includes %rorms, water insects,
locusts, flies, ant eggs, snails, herbs, and other forest products.
Undernourishment is common in the area, and localized famines occur
frequently.
Thus the average food supply position of North Vietnam is
relatively di,.-,advantageous compared vita that of South Vietnam.
It is believed, however, that rice production may be increased
somewhat in North Vietnam within a year or.1wo, if peace is main-
tained and if intensive irrigation, other agricultural improve-
ment programs, and conversion of other lands to rice are under-
taken by the 'Tiet Minh regime. Increased production and con-
trolled distrLbution of chemical fertilizers (utilizing phosphate
from the mines near Lang Son and Lao Kay) would, for example, help
to boost production. North Vietnam, however, has a lower potential
for increased rice production than South Vietnam.
Other major food crops produced. in North Vietnam Include
corn, sugar, sweet potatoes, and manioc:. Table 1* shows 'the pro-
duction of the principal agricultural c:ommod.ities for the years
19:37-41 and 19+6-53. It will be noted that:, rice and sugar pro-
duction have increased slightly over the years, while corn pro-64 000
duction has decreased drastically from 225 ,00 tons in 1937
tons in 1953. The cultivation of corn was romoted by the French
to satisfy fodder requirements of metropolitan France, and over
80 percent of' the total Indochina prewar crop was exported. J
It may well die that the acreage devoted to the production of this
* Table 1 follows on p. 9
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Table 1
Estimated Production of Rice, Corn, Sugar, Sweet Potatoes, and Manioc
in North Vietnam
1937-41 and 1946-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Rice Y
Sugar L
Year
Paddy
Corn
Raw
Potatoes
Manioc J
1937
2,240
225
22.4
N.A.
N.A.
1938
2,240
225
22.4
N.A.
N.A.
1939
2,176
225
22.4
131
45
1940
2,208
117
23.4
N.A.
N.A.
1941
2,176
117
.23.4
N.A.
N.A.
1946
1,834
102
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1947
2,279
59
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1948
2,240
59
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1949
2,122
59
28.0
150
45
1950
2,238
59
27.7
150
45
1951
2,412
64
27.3
150
45
1952
2,412
64
27.3
150
45
1953
2,356
64,
27.3
150
45
commodity may be converted to some other food crop which would be
more acceptable to the indigenous population and would supplement
the main diet of rice. Kidney beans and soybeans, as possible
alternative crops, are reported to be even now the most important
'source of protein in the Indochinese diet after rice and fish. 10
In any case, it is evident that the low average food balance of
North Vietnam based on indigenous production need not be regarded
as an irremediable condition.
Other agricultural commodities produced in North Vietnam
include peanuts and peanut oil, sesame seed and oil, soybeans,
tea, cottonseed oil, castor beans and oil, tobacco, and raw
cotton. Peanut production, which reached an estimated peak of
9,696 tons 11 in 1940, dropped to 4,927 tons 12 in 1953. Tobacco
production dropped from an estimated 4,162 tons in 1939 to
1,805 tons in 1953. Tea production dropped from an estimated
prewar average of 7,120 tons 13 to an estimated production of
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5,340 tons 14 in 1953. Table 2 indicates thsyt fuelwood production
in North Vietnam is now approximately one?-thirld of what it was in
1938, while industrial wood production is now one-fourth of what it
was then.
Estimated Production of Fuelwood and
in North Vietnam
1938, 1940, and 1950-52
Thousand Cubic Meters
Year
Fuelwood _a15
Industrial Wood J 1 : J
1938
614
385
1940
614
385
1950
327
78
1951
277
88
1952
233
98
a. The geographical. breakdown for fuelwood was cal
culatec~_ from a total. fuelwood production for Vietnam
which was broken down for the area alcove and below
the 17th Parallel on the basis of preiwar and postwar
population estimates for these areas.;
b. The geographical. breakdown for industrial wood is
based on a total industrial wood production for Viet-
nam wh:_ch was broken down for the area above and below
the 17th Parallel on the basis of they total controlled
forest acreage in Vietnam during the prewar period..
It was estimated that about 40 perce t of the total
industrial wood produced in Annam wa produced north
of the 17th Parallel, based on n merous vegetation
and forestry maps.
Livestock raising has been a minor fa tor in Indochinese agri-
culture, and meat is relatively unimportant i the diet. J In the
past, fish has supplied the bulk of animal pr tein. Table 3* indicates
* Table 3 follows on p. 11.
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that total estimated production of meat in North Vietnam in 1951
was one-fifth of 1935-39 average production. Footnote a of Table 3
also shows the considerable drop in the fish catch. Unless
general fishing conditions have changed radically, the reported
60,000-ton salt water fish catch for 1930 in the Gulf of Tonkin and
Northern Annam, together with the potential for increased raising
of fresh water fish in ponds, may serve as sofne indication of the
program which may be resorted to by the Viet Minh regime to increase
this important source of food for the Indochinese diet.
Table 3
Estimated Production of Meat
in North Vietnam a/ l8
1935-39 and 19+9-51
Thousand Metric Tons
Item
1935-39 Average
1949
1950
195_
Beef
11
2
2
2
Carabao.
11
1
1
1
Pork
100
13
22
22
a. The data on fish catch in Indochina and
North Vietnam are extremely sparse. It has
been reported that 60,000 tons of salt water
fish was the catch for the Gulf of Tonkin and
Northern Annam and it was estimated that the
salt and fresh water catch for Vietnam in 19)+0
was 180,000 tons. L 9J 1953 the Embassy
estimated that this catch had been reduced to
30,000 tons.
Table 4* shows the principal items in the estimated production
of food per capita in North Vietnam in 1953. It will be observed that
these figures are based on production only and do not allow for ex-
ports, imports, stocks, and nonfood uses. As a partial picture of
food resources per capita in North Vietnam, Table )+ suggests that on
the whole the average availability of food per capita will. hot be suf-
ficient to support the population at its previously accustomed level
Tab1 )4 follows on p. 12.
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of sustenance. This problem, however, could be overcome with improved
methods of distribution, increased food production, and grain imports.
Table 4
Per Capita Production of Principal Items
in North Vietnam a
1953
Item Kilograms per Capita
Rice (Milled) 126.2
4
6
C
orr
.
Sugar (Raw)
2.0
Sweet Potatoes
10.7
Manioc
3.E
Peanuts
(Shelled)
.24
Sesame
.08
Soybeans
.16
Meat
1.6
Fish
2.1
a. Does not include wheat flours, pulses, white
potatoes, fats and oils, vegetable's, fruits,
poultry, eggs, and milk which in 151-52 in Indo-
china as a whole were estimated to!be about 170
kilograms per capita. 20 They above data are
based solely on production and. do not include
estimates of stocks, trade, or nonfood uses.
Only processed fish are included; unprocessed,
fresh water fish are not included.
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B. Industrial Output.*
1. Ferrous Metals.
a. Iron Ore.
As of 1951, the total well-established iron ore reserves
in Indochina are estimated to be only 5.7 million tons. 21/ The few
deposits which have been economically significant in the past are
all located north of the 17th Parallel, primarily in the Thai Nguyen
area (210351 N - 105057' E). The ores of this deposit are of high
grade, containing from 55 to 66 percent iron, but are rather limited
in quantity. Iron mining in Indochina after 1936 was developed
largely for the export of iron ore to Japan. In fact, aside from
small quantities consumed by local cement plants, native furnaces,
and the Bac Son iron and steel plant, Japan has been the chief his-
torical consumer. Table 5 illustrates the relatively small produc-
tion of iron ore in Indochina. 22
Production of Iron Ore in Indochina a/
1937-45
Metric Tons
Year
Amount
Year
Amount
1937
33,000
1942
63,000
1938
130,000
1943
8o,6oo
1939
134,700
1944
22,000
1940
32,400
1945
7,900
1941
52,400
a. Iron content, 50 to 70 percent.
Postwar iron ore production has been of very minor sig-
nificance. Although the French had ambitious plans for expanding
iron mining, the continuation of hostilities in the area of the iron
ore deposits prevented the execution of these plans. The value of
* See the map, Indochina: Natural Resources and Processing Centers,
1954, inside back cover.
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Indochina's iron ore resources to Communist China and/or to the Soviet
Bloc is questionable.* Unless further geological surveys prove other-
wise, North Vietnam cannot be regarded as a !significant source of
iron ore for itself or for any of the Bloc countries.
b, Iron and Steel.
Indochina's very small :Lron and steel industry, as
well as the bEsic raw materials for it, lies' north of the 17th
Parallel. Other than negligible native iron furnaces, the only
known production of pig iron and steel was from a plant at Bac Son
(21053' N - 106021' E), which was operated in 1942, 1943, and
1944 by the French Tonkin Coal Mining Company. Production, at
this plant varied from 1,100 tons of pig iron in 1942 to a ,high
of 2,900 tons of pig iron and 600 tons of st a eel in 1943.
A 1948 survey made by a French commission for the
modernization of Indochina indicated the exiptence of a raw material
base, with the exception of coking coal, sufficient to support an
iron and steel industry capable of producing 100,000 tons of pig
iron and 60,000 tons of steel per year. 23 The development of
minting and transportation facilities would bp necessary, 24 and
unless the prcblem of using anthracite coal .nstead of coke in the
blast furnaces is solved, any future steel i dustry of Communist-
held Indochina would have to import 125,000 to 400,000 tons of
coke annually. The future development of a steel industry of any
size by the Communists would require coreside'able investment and
provision of equipment by the USSR and its Satellites.
c. Ferroalloys.
AMong its mineral resources, lndochina possesses
several ferroalloy metals, notably manganese, tungsten, and chrome,
the important deposits of which are all locoed north of the 17th
Parallel. Production of all these minerals as virtually ceased
since World War II. Until such time as a steel industry is de-
veloped in North Vietnam the importance of these metals will be
limited to expert purposes.
See also VII, below.
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(1) Manganese.
Reserves of manganese ore in Indochina, have been
estimated at 25,000 tons, but exploitation would require extensive
field investigation to prove the deposits for further development. 25
The most important occurrences of the deposits are to be found in
Vinh (Nghe An)-Ha Tinh (18?40' N - lob?oo' E. Production. of man-
ganese began in 1935 and reached its peak in 194+4 when 7,700 tons
were produced. 26 Under stable conditions at least 10,000 tons of
marketable ore could probably be extracted. Inclusion of Indo-
chinese manganese reserves into the Bloc total is relatively un-
important because of the large reserves already controlled by the
Bloc.*
(2) Chrome.
Measured and inferred chromite reserves of the
Co Dinh deposit near the village of Nong Cong (20000' N - 105?30' E),
in Thanh Hoa Province, are estimated at 1.7 million to 2 million
tons.of?recoverable metal. 27 In 1939, this mine produced 2,000
tons. During the Japanese occupation, production rose to 12,400 tons
of 45-percent concentrates for 1943-44+ inclusive. 28 In general,
North Vietnam may have the potential to produce 5.0,000 tons of
chromite concentration annually. 29 Chromium ore reserves may be
of future importance to Communist China when its requirements exceed
exploitation of its own minor deposits.* 30
(3) Tungsten.
Known tungsten ore reserves in Indochina are
quite small, the only deposits of commercial quality being located
in the immediate area surrounding Tinh Tuc (22039' N - 105?51' E).
Production of tungsten concentrates is shown in-Table 6.**
There are several reports indicating that the
Viet Minh with Chinese Communist aid have been operating these
mines. 31 In view of Communist China's large reserves of tungsten,
inclusion of the limited Indochinese tungsten reserves within the
Soviet Bloc appears to be of negligible significance to Communist
China or the Bloc.*
See also VII, below.
Table 6 follows on p..16.
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Table 6
Production of Tungsten Concentrates
in Indochina a/ 32
1937-42
Metric Tons
Year Amount
1937 580
1938 553
1939 486
Year Amount
194d 361
1941 310
194 200
a. 66-percent tungsten]
2. Nonferrous Minerals.
The greatest period of production for nonferrous metals
in Indochina occurred just before and during the period of Japanese
occupation. Most of the deposits of these metals are located in or
near Viet M_nh-controlled territory, and consequently there has
been no known production since 1946.
Zinc, the deposits of which are located in North
Vietnam, is the only major nonferrous metal produced in Indochina
which has occupied a position of importance in the economy of the
country. A smelter built; in Quang Yen near Haiphong, in 1924)
with a capacity of 6,000 metric tons of metallic zinc, was reported
to have been destroyed or severely danage4 by bombing in 1943. 33
Table 7* gi-ires the production of zinc in ndochina in terms of
metal content and smelter output.
The acquisition of Indochijna's zinc industry by the
Viet Minh would be of possible benefit to Communist China, particu-
larly if the smelter at Quang Yen were restored. Because facilities
in China are inadequate for the conversion of zinc ore to metal,
China imports zinc metal from Poland. Asi de from this, the
* Table 7 :'ollows on P. 17.
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rehabilitation of the Indochina zinc industry would have little sig-
nificance in respect to the Soviet Bloc zinc supply position.*
Table 7
Production of Zinc in Indochina
in Terms of Metal Content a/ 34 and Smelter Output 3/
1937-43
Year Metal Content Smelter Output
1937 5,000 4,200
1938 5,100 4,5:00
1939 6,978 5,750
1940 6,753 6,090
1941 7,343 6,240
1942 6,119 5,270
1943 4,625 4,1.40
a. 100-percent zinc metal.
b. Bauxite. 361
Indochina's reserves of bauxite are estimated at
about 300,000 tons; 200,000 tons are located near Dong Dang
(21057' N - 106?42' E) and 100,000 tons near Hai Duong
(20056' N - l06?19' E). Production has been irregular, as shown
in Table 8.**
Indochina has long produced small quantities of tin
(see Table 9**). The producing centers are Tinh Tuc, in North Vietnam,
and Nam Pathene, in Laos. 37
See also VII, below.
Tables 8 and 9 follow on p. 18.
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Table 8
Production of Bauxite in Indochina
1936-43
Metri
c Tons
Year Amount Year
Amount
1936 30 1940
118
1937 7,000 1941
10,200
1938 16o 1942
12,800
1939 330 1943
360
a. 50- to 60-percent alumi a,
2- to 14-percent silica, and{up to
26-percent iron oxide.
Table 9
Production of Tin in Indochina a/ 38
1937-43
Metric Tons
Year
Amount
1937
1,602
1940
1,495
1938
1,625
1,41
1,316
1939
1,490
1942
1,045
1943
663
a. Tin concentrates (tin content).
For the period from 1933 to 1940, the average annual
output of tin was 1,384 tons. Based upon scattered reports of in
dividual mines, it is estimated that 40 to 59 percent of the total
production was achieved in North Vietnam and 50 to 60 percent in
Laos. Using 45 percent as an average figure!, the output of Tonkin
for the 1933-40 period would be 620 tons of contained tin per year.
On the basis cf limited reserves and past production records, a
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maximum output of 1,000 to 1,500 tons of contained tin in concen-
trates is anticipated for North Vietnam. In view of the large
Chinese tin reserves and rapidly growing Chinese output, together
with the expected reconstruction Of the railroad from Haiphong to
Kunming, the significance of the Vietnam tin potential is compara-
tively unimportant.*
d. Phosphates.
Most of Indochina's major phosphate deposits are
located above the 17th Parallel. The most important of these is
at Lao Kay, near the Chinese border. Estimates of reserves range
from 10 million tons of 40-percent phosphate and 40 million tons
of varying grades to.100 to 200 million tons of all grades. The
Japanese raised production at Lao Kay to 120,000 tons in 1942.
Other less important deposits are found in Lang Son and Thanh Hoa
Provinces. 39 Table 10 gives the production of phosphate in
Indochina.
Production of Phosphate in Indochina 40
1937-43
Year
Amount
1937
20,252
1941
100,000
1938
37,341
1942
150,000
1939
35,694
1943
4o,ooo
1940
22,266
Phosphates represent an important source of fertilizer,
which will be of considerable use to the Viet Minh in increasing food
production. As early as May 1952 the Chinese Communists reportedly
had 10,000 miners extracting the phosphate ores at the Cam Duong mine
near Lao Kay. 41 The expected reconstruction of the railroad. from
Haiphong to Lao Kay will greatly stimulate production, particularly
in view, of the fact that there is a phosphate fertilizer factory in
Haiphong.*
See also VII, below.
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Large and small salt works are sattered all along the
Indochina coast, but North Vietnam in the past h.s produced on the
average only an estimated one-third of the total salt production of
Indochina. For exaunple, of 193,600 tons 42 of Galt produced in 1937
in the whole of Indochina an estimated 661, 000 tors were produced in
what is now North Vietnam. In 1941, because of increased Japanese
requirements for salt, production rose to 260,000 tons. This serves
to illustrate to some degree the existing potential for increased sea
salt.* The large :)opulation of North Vietnam wi.l probably require
imports of salt, pending expansion of the existing salt fields.
3. Coal.
All tha developed coal mines of Indochina are located
north of the 17th ?arallel, in the vicinity of t e coastal areas of
Haiphong, Hon Gay, and Cam Pha. The bulk of production has been
anthracite coal, most of which is of supericr quality. The prin-
cipal area of production has been the Quang Yen lasin (21007' N -
107027' E), in which the above-named coastal ports are located.
Before World War II, 44 mines were producing coal in this basin.
At present, 1 large French company, La Societe FTancaise des C;aarbonnages
de Tonkin, and 4 o:r 5 smaller companies of diveroified ownership are
the only active operators. The major portion of production is from
open-cut mines of the French company. Plans had recently been developed
for an extensive renovation of this company's pr6perties over a 5-year
period, involving substantial investment and. the introduction of
modern mining methods and up-to-date mechanized equipment whereby the
use of manpower and the cost of production c:ould1 be reduced. About
US $1.7 million worth of coal mining equipment s been delivered to
the Charbonnages du Tonkin-company by the UPI under MSA and FOA
auspices. 43 It was planned to restore production to approximately
1 million tons annually,4 depending upon the .evelopment of mar-
kets for the increased production. The local InPchinese market for
coal has been comparatively limited, and coal has been an important
export, especially to Japan. 45
Coal. reserves in Indochina, mostly located in North Vietnam,
are estimated at 20 billion tons, about equal. in', volume to the estimated
original reserves of anthracite coal in Pennsylvania. Approximately
* See also VII, below.
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12 billion tons of these reserves are believed to exist in the Quang
Yen Basin, of which 390 million tons are in the currently most pro-
ductive fields within` the basin. Based on an estimated recovery of
65 percent, coal from this mine alone would last 200 years at the
1952 rate of production. L6
The accretion of the Indochinese coal mines and reserves
.to the Soviet Bloc adds to its resources a significant volume of
high-grade anthracite coal (with lesser amounts of bituminous and
lignite), which is particularly well located for transportation. by
water to China and other Asiatic countries and well adapted to sup-
plement and complement the coals presently being mined in China.
The possibilities of wider trade, both intra-Bloc and with non-
Bloc countries, are materially enhanced by the Bloc's acquisition
of these mines and deposits.*
Table ll** gives the production, imports, exports, and
consumption of coal (anthracite, bituminous, and lignite combined)
in Indochina, 1937-41 and 19)+6-53
4. Electric Power.'
Hanoi and Haiphong are the centers of the electric power
industry in North Vietnam. Three coal-fired steam plants -- a
22,500-kilowatt (kw) plant in Hanoi, a 6,300-kw plant in Haiphong,
and a 12,200-kw plant in the Haiphong Cement Works -- total
41,000 kw, or three-fourths of the total area capacity of 55,000 kw.
The Hon Gay Coal Mine Plant with a 4,000-kw installed capacity and
the Ben Thuy wood products plant with a 3,)+50-kw installed capacity
are the other two significant plants. 47 These 5 plants thus account
for nearly 90 percent of the total, with the remainder divided among
13 diesel, gasoline, and hydro plants. As a matter of comparison,
It is interesting to note that the total capacity of all these plants
is only about two-thirds that of the single smallest unit installed
in the Potomac Electric Power Company's new Alexandria Station. In
the past the Hanoi-Haiphong area was served by over 700 kilometers of
30-kilovolt transmission lines. 48 Unsettled conditions over the
past. several years, however, resulted in.destruction of a major
portion of the system and the installation of small gas and diesel
generators to serve the many small centers. 49
See also VII, below.
** Table 11 follows on p. 22.
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Indications are that the electric power facilities have
not recently been utilized at nearly their optimum capacity and. that
a significant portion of the supply has been for lighting and electric
fans. Although some rather elaborate plans for the development of
the hydroelectric potential of the area have been advanced., a total
capacity of less than 1,000 kw is currently installed at 1 zinc and
2 tin mines.
It may be presumed that the Viet Minh will assign some
priority to the restoration of the transmission system so that a
maximum portion of the demand may be met from coal-fired plants,
rather than from diesel-driven plants which require imported fuel.
Such restoration will require the importing of equipment and prob-
ably will also require some technical assistance from the Soviet
Bloc. The supply of power to local industry may be considerably
increased by scheduling techniques and by limitation of domestic
use. Any expansion of electric facilities would be a reflection of
major expansion of industries. Although a considerable hydroelec-
tric potential exists, the installation of other than the smallest
units in the immediate future is unlikely because of the costs and
time involved. Table 12* shows capacity and output of electric
power in North Vietnam.
The partition of Indochina has placed the only cement
plant in the area in the control of the Viet Minh. The output of
this plant, located at Haiphong (20052' N - 106041' E), constitutes
the largest volume of production of any single industry other than
coal mining in Indochina. 60 The Haiphong plant is the largest
cement producer in Southeast Asia, with an installed annual capac-
ity of 400,000 tons. Allowing for unavoidable plant maintenance,
an effective annual production of about 300,000 tons could be
realized. 61 As shown in Table 13,** there has been a marked
difference between actual production and theoretical installed
capacity, the best production having been achieved during the
period 1937-41. The relatively high output of these years was
brought about by modernization of the plant and a resultant improve-
ment in quality which opened more foreign markets. The location of
the plant on a waterfront serving deep-draft vessels makes its
Table 12 follows on p. 24.
Table 13 follows on p. 25.
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Capacity End Production of Electric Power in North Vietnam L2/
1929, 1935-42, and 190-53
Capacity Production
Year (Thousand Kilowatts) 4i11~ ion Kilowatt-Hours)
1929
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
48.4
49.4
55.0
17.5
18.3
20.4
21.6
24.2
29.9
33.8
36.3
35.3
58.3
73.6
100.0 aJ
120.0 EJ
140.0 EJ
a. Estimate, including allowance for unreported plants.
I
product easilr available for inexpensive tra'nsportatLon. Cement ex-
ports reached a peak of 159,000 tons in 1930.
Some difficulties may be encountered by the Communists
in their operation of the Haiphong Cement Plant. The gypsum required
for production has heretofore been imported from Europe and the San
Marcos Island,, off the California coast and hereafter will probably
have to be ob-.ained from the Chinese mainland. The plant is vul-
nerable to breakdowns if intensively operat'd, and its maintenance
and repair could become a critical problem 4ince much of the equip-
ment was installed in the period 1928-.33 an was manufactured in
Western Europ,:, the US, and Japan. If the lant is required to main-
tain high production, however, makeshift re;airs and substitution of
spare parts from the Bloc could prevent any major drop in output.
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Table 13
Production and Export of Cement at Haiphong, Tonkin
1929 and 1933-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Year Production Export
1929 183 63 40.3 64
1933 133
1934 115
1935 107 7/
1936 149
1937 235 124.6 70
1938 266 71
1939 3122/ 159.0 73
1940 282
1941 263 75
1942 177
1943 149 77
Year Production Export_
1
145 944 09~
1946 ~6 Sa/
1947 43
1948 98
1949 154 63 38.'7 84
1950 143 5 17.6
1951 213,x// 12.3
1952 235 / 8.9
1953 291 91
. Half year only.
The acquisition of this cement plant by the V:Let Minh regime
will be relatively significant as a source of supply to Communist
China, whose requirements for cement are substantial for immediate
construction purposes. Thus, Communist China may become the principal
external consumer of the plant's output, possibly leading to maximum
exploitation of the plant's capability.* The 1953 output of the
plant approximated 10 percent of estimated total Chinese Communist
cement production of that year. The expected reconstruction of the
Haiphong-Kunming Railroad will make cement conveniently available
to the heretofore relatively isolated region of Southwest China.
South Vietnam, which in the past used a large portion of the annual
cement production of Haiphong, may for the time being be forced to
seek its requirements elsewhere.
* See also VII, below.
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6. Consumer Goods and Handicrafts.
a. Textiles.
Two cotton mills, both of whit are located in North
Vietnam, account for the major portion of production of machine-made
cotton textiles in Indochina. The Societe Cotnniere du Tonkin, at
Nam Dinh, the scle industrial producer of cotton fabrics in Indo-
china, also produces yaxn and cotton blankets. 92 The Societe des
Filte:ries de 1'Indochine, at Haiphong, engages only in the spinning
of cotton yarn End thread. 93 Industrial pro uction of cotton
fabrics has in the past amounted to 35 to 40 rcent of the total
output. 94+ The remainder may be attributed t artisan weavers,
approximately 6C percent of whom are located i North Vietnam. Z5./
It should be noted that the textile industry iI completely de-
pendent upon imported raw cotton. During the i past several years
the US has supplied this demand. Altogether, bout 75 percent of
the cotton fabric production facilities and al of the yarn pro-
duction capacity are north of the demarcation line. Table 1)+*
gives textile production in North Vietnam,
b. Miscellaneous.
Almost the entire Indochinese production of matches
and glassware i:, carried out in North Vietnam. One of the match en-
terprises has fe.ctories at Ben Thuy and at Hanoi, and the other
operates a factory at Thanh Hoa. These companies are said to have
employed a total. of 60,000 workers. 96/ Maximum production of
matches was achieved in 19+1 when 352 mil:Lion~boxes of matches were
manufactured. 9;f Maximum postwar output reached 45.7 million boxes
in 1953. 98/
Glassware is produced by he
E
d'Extreme Orient in Haiphong which is equipped
glass, bottles, and drinking glasses. 99 ThE
glass was suspended by the company in 1939 in
production of bottles, for which there is a le
Postwar production of glassware reached a rec
6,768 tons. 1001
ociete des Vereries
to produce window
production of window
order to expand the
rge local demand.
rd peak in 1953 with
Indochina's present sole industrial producer of leather
goods is located in North Vietnam.
* Table 14 fol:_ows on p. 27.
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,ost of the basic needs of the population of North
Vietnam, as regards consumer goods, are met through the efforts of
local artisans. In most instances, the peasants supplement their
income from agrit3ultural endeavors by artisan activity such as basket
weaving, grass rope making, and pottery making; There are, however,
some villages in which the whole population contributes to the
fabrication of o:ae type of item, such as baskets or mats. 13;/ Examples
of small consume:- goods enterprises located in'North Vietnam are a
candle making plant at Haiphong, 136 porcelain factories at Hanoi
and W)n Cay,13 soap factories at Hanoi and H iphong, 138 button
factories at Hanoi and Haiphong, L32/ and bicycle parts shops at
Hanoi and Haiphong. 1]+0
7. Engineering, Munitions, and Shipbuilding Industries.
a. General.
North Vietnam contains no industrial production facili-
ties which can be considered important or significant to the machine-
building industr;r of the Soviet Bloc as a whole. Although the area
is well endowed 'rith both material and human resources for greater
industrialization, the machine-building in1ustr'ies are still in plan-
ning or rudimentary stages. Colonial policies!in the past have
generally retarded the development of autonomous industrial facili-
ties, and the facilities which do exist are primarily repair and
service shops se-; up by machine-importing companies for the benefit
of their local c:_ients. It is estimated that the benefit to the Bloc
resulting from acquisition of these facilities will be negligible.
b. Munitions.
]?roduction of weapons and ammunition in North Vietnam
is very limited, and without foreign imports in the form of semi-
finished militar;r end items and raw materials,'Viet Minh production
of weapons and ammunition has been carried on in a number of small
plants employing usually no more than 50 to 100 workers each. Such
plants have been established in out-of-the-way '',forested and mountainous
areas, have been operated mostly at night, and frequently have been
moved to avoid bombing. 141Production techniques have been largely
improvised, and :_t is believed that total production has met only a
fraction of past Viet Minh needs. With increa ed supplies of higher
quality Chinese weapons, many such plants in Viet Minh have concen-
trated. on repair work and the production of ammunition.
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c. Shipbuilding.
North Vietnam has a very limited capability for ship
construction and repair. Construction would probably be limited to
small wooden fishing and river vessels without power propulsion.
Haiphong is the only point within the area which reportedly possesses
any kind of facilities. These yards in the past have built large
numbers of wooden vessels and have done repair of small ocean and
coastal vessels. 142
C. Transportation and Communications.
1. Transportation.
a. General.
The DRV, with the areas gained in the truce agree-
ment, possesses the base of a well-developed transportation system
involving railroads, highways, and water* which should be adequate
for any immediate exploitation of the resources now under its con-
trol. The transport network as developed by the French made avail-
able several transport media parallel to each other. The focal
point of all transport is the Hanoi-Haiphong road, rail, and water
route axis. Transport, however, from the Tonkin Delta area south
to the truce demarcation line is not well developed.
The transport system can be made to serve the needs
of the area and to develop relations with Communist China and the
USSR. The chief requirements for these purposes will be railroad
construction equipment and rolling stock, and the relatively small
amounts needed are within the capability of Communist China and
the USSR to supply.
b. Highways.
The highway complex of North Vietnam focuses on the
two major cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Originally the road system
was established to satisfy military needs and to extend French
influence inland from the mouth of the Red River toward China. Hence,
from a very dense highway network within the delta region, high--
ways have been constructed toward the northern limits of the country,
* In addition, the Viet Minh now control several airfields to which
civil air transport could be established.
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linking the delta with the Chinese border at, Ban Leng, Lao Kay,
Thanh Thuy, Tliuy Cao, Nam Quan, and Mon Cay In the past these roads,
because of their military and political use,.' never received the ex-
tensive improvements which could only have een justified in terms of
more intensive economic development. Since 1950 the Viet Minh and
the French have placed a major emphasis on improving tactical com-
munications by reconstructing existing roads and trails, and by
constructing new roads in order to bypass vtlnerable road stretches
subject to interdiction. Conspicuous among these is the road
built by the Viet Minh connecting Dong Dang,11 on the Chinese border
opposite P'in?;-hsiang, the Chinese railhead? to Thai Nguyen, where
the improvements have permitted two-way truck traffic.
Under peacetime conditions, and with the reconstruc-
tion of bridges, it is probable that each ofithe roads leading into
North Vietnam from China will soon have a capacity of 600 to 1,000
tons each way per day (EWPD). With the return to peacetime con-
ditions and the probable reconstruction of railroad facilities,
however, the greater part of the China-Tonkii traffic will move
via railroad cr water as was the case prior Ito the outbreak of
hostilities. Thus, because of the short; supply of gasoline and the
heavy consumption thereof on the long-haul supply route from China,
the truck park built up by tactical expediency will probably be
used more for ancillary or feeder purposes w4ien through railroad
service is restored.
I
The French originally constr4.cted a simple but ade-
quate meter-ga3e railroad system in North Vi+tnam consisting of two
lines crossing at right angles at Hanoi. Thg line running north-
south was built within the concept of a trans-Indochinese :^ailroad
uniting the no:^thein and southern parts of the country. The line
running generaLly .east-west, extending up th? Red River valley from
Haiphong to La) Kay and then Into China to K nming, was built to
enhance French influence in Southwest China 4nd to exploit the mineral
resources of Yunnan.
Just prior to the truce agre4ment, only a few
sepaxate sectors of this railroad system wer in operation --
the vital Hano:_-Haiphong line under French control 143 and some
segments of the system within the Viet Minh areas. 144/ .Although
the rails have been removed from all nonoperating sectors of the
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railroad net, the roadbed remains. In order to facilitate economic
development and to serve military purposes, it is considered probable
that the reconstruction of the lines connecting with the Chinese rail
systems in Kwangsi and Yunnan Provinces will receive the highest
priority in the allocation of labor and materials on the part of both
the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh. It is estimated that these
connecting lines could be returned to operating condition within
the 300 days allowed the French for withdrawal from the delta.
The Lao Kay-Haiphong line will probably be re-
established to its prewar condition to facilitate the exploitation
of the Chinese K'ochiu tin mines and the copper resources in southern
Yunnan as well as to hasten the development of the mineral resources
of North Vietnam. Construction on this line has already been reported
begun. This route will probably continue to represent the most ex-
peditious transport link between Yunnan and the industrial areas of
China until Kunming is joined by rail to Chungking and the Yangtze
River. In 1940 the Haiphong-Yunnan line had a maximum daily capac-
ity of 3 trains EWPD, with train capacity computed at 250 tons. 145
If the Haiphong-Lao Kay line is reconstructed over
its entire length with 30-kilogram-per-meter (kg/m) rail (the weight
used on. the Chinese` section of the line), it will require about
34,000 tons of rails. In addition, use of this line into China will
require the further construction of about 80 kilometers of rail from
the Chinese border to the present railhead at Pi-tze-chai and
strengthening of the Lao Kay - Ho-K'ou bridge at the Chinese border
and other bridges.
Moreover, the Hanoi-Lang Son-Nam Quan line will prob-
ably be rebuilt as soon as possible. This line is not only economically
but also strategically important, in that a short rail connection
across the Chinese border would connect the Viet Minh railroad system
with those of China and the USSR. In 1940 this line had a maximum
daily operating capacity of 3 trains EWPD, with train capacity com-
puted at 140 tons. 146 It is probable that the gage of this rail-
road will be widened to permit use of standard-gage equipment from
China. Such a program may delay full utilization of the line, but, in
view of the advantage of through transit without transloading and of
the relatively low capacity of meter gage lines, it is doubtful if
the Chinese would have doubled the capacity of the Nanning?-
P'ing -hsiang line 147 without anticipating the need for a like in-
crease in the capacity of the Viet Minh line.
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If the Hanoi-Nam Quan line is rebuilt at standard gage
it will require about 15,000 tons of 42-kg/ii rails and a considerable
amount of bridging equipment. Constructionicould proceed into North
Vietnam from the railhead in China.
Reconstruction of railroads
Communist or Soviet aid in the form of roll
bridging equipment, which are all available
quantities. Chinese rail production, estim
to 170,000 tots annually, could supply Viet
economic deve.Lopment of Southwest China (inc
will require Chinese
ng stock, rails, and
in China but in limited
ted to be about 150,000
Minh requirements, and the
luding eastward and north-
ward railroad construction from Yunnan) would be expedited by the
convenient transportation link between Southwest China and coastal
transport ove:^ the Haiphong-Lao Kay line. Communist China can also
alleviate the shortage of railroad repair facilities in North
Vietnam through the accessibility of the repair shops at Hengyang
and Ch'uchang (Kukong).
d. Water.
(1) Inland Waterways.
The inland waterways sy tem in'North Vietnam was
organized by the French to develop the movement of traffic between
the, larger cities and at the same time to e tend the irrigation of
cultivable land. Over 700 kilometers of waterways are open to
navigation, iI / although some of this -,otajj may be presently of
limited use due to silting of channels. The main waterway system
is that of the Red River and its basin In the Tonkin delta.
Normally these waterways are heavily trafficked by sampans and junks,
and. screw and paddle wheel launches regularly serve Hanoi, Haiphong,
Nam. Dinh, and the chief provincial towns. Because of the vast amount
of small junk traffic on the inland waterwa s, no accurate estimate
.of activity c?n be made. There has been, however, no shortage of
available bottoms to handle local cargo requirements.
(2) Maritime Shipping.
The expansion of maritimm traffic and port
facilities in North Vietnam received considerable stimulation from
the French, but during the recent hostilitieb much structural main-
tenance was allowed to lapse with the resultjthat many of the facili-
ties have beer.. impaired. Nevertheless, the basic factors contributing
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to the continuing movement of ocean-going traffic were preserved as
necessary parts of the logistical supply program of the French forces
in the area.
The principal port of North Vietnam, Haiphong, is
supplemented by secondary ports of either specialized or regional
character, such as Cam Pha Port, Hon Gay, Port Wallut, Quang Yen,
Dong Hai, and Ben Thuy. Although other minor ports are susceptible
to expansion, the rehabilitation and exploitation of the above-named
ports should satisfy the major economic needs of the Viet Minh during
the next 2 years (barring any unexpected military events)? Except
for small junks the Viet Minh have no coastal fleet, and probably
will be dependent on Communist China for coastal shipping bottoms.
Haiphong, as the major deep-water port; of North
Vietnam, serves as the gateway for Tonkin. Because of the agreement
to allow the French 300 days (that is, until mid-May 1955) to evacuate
the port, development by the Viet Minh of the Haiphong industrial
complex and port will necessarily be delayed. Although the port has
been allowed to silt up during the past 10 years, the existing port
facilities would permit a substantial increase in the tonnage now
handled. In 1952 the port handled slightly over 1 million metric
tons of cargo, and it has been estimated that it could handle ap-
proximately 8,000 tons per 20-hour working day, or about 2.8 mil-
lion tons per year. 14 The port can berth vessels up to 7,700-
ton Liberty-type vessels, but has limited repair facilities. With
Haiphong opened for trade of the Viet Minh, commerce will probably
be directed chiefly toward Communist China. Since the route between
Haiphong and Canton is less than 1,200 kilometers and for the most
part sheltered, Chinese Communist coastal-type vessels will be capable
of handling a considerable traffic flow between the two areas. Soviet
Bloc and chartered vessels will be able to serve the European-Viet
Minh trade to Haiphong as it develops.
lion Gay was developed solely to export coal from
nearby mines. Over 2 million tons of coal were exported annually
from this port before World War II, 150 and the port has been in
continuous operation. Although most of the vessels calling at Hon
Gay port are of the 4,000- to 5,000-ton variety, it is possible to
bring in Liberty-type vessels, contingent on high tide and calm
waters. 151 Facilities at the port permit turn-around of 5,000-ton
colliers in 24 hours. Cargo other than coal is handled with con-
siderable difficulty.
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Cam Pha Port operates in conjjunction with Hon Gay
in the export of coal, but it has been relatively inactive in recent
years. Maximum leading capacity for coal is estated at 1,000 tons
per day. ,
2. Communications.
{
The rapid communications services of Noith Vietnam have
deteriorated.marke:dly since the period befo:^e World Wax II. At that
time, depending a:most exclusively on foreign equipment and technical
knowledge, they probably adequately met the needs of the country.
Combat destruction and widespread sabotage have accounted for much
of the decline. .:n consequence, intercity 'wire-1line facilities are
almost nonexistent; today, with only an esti:Hated. 129 kilometers of
wire lines and po,;sibly 7 telephone exchanges in operation. As a
result, radio com(Lunication is being utilized a4 a minimal alter-
native. 152 At .)resent there are 20 to 24 radio stations in the
area, concentrated primarily at Hanoi and Haiphong. So depleted are
the permanent civ:Ll communications resources th4.t the contending
military forces r,.portedly meet their own needs for rapid communica-
tions without any dependence on civil facilitie$. It seems likely
that this situati)n will persist for some time.
In communications resources, Ncrth Vietnam is a liability
to the Soviet Bloc. In order to restore the ex.sting facilities to a
condition to meet adequately the immediate requirements of the Viet
Minh regime, the regime will have to obtain. fro i. the Bloc trained
manpower, communications and electric power equipment, some heavy
machinery items, and raw and finished materials,. Expansion of the
:radio broadcasting base as a chief medium of maps communication for
control and indoctrination of the "Viet Minhese1' and the propagandiza-
tion of the peoples of the other Indochina stays and perhaps Thailand
will be included as one of the first orders ofusiness.
III. Human Resources.
In. 1954 the total population of Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel
line is estimated to be about 14 million. 153+ ** This is about
71
2~ million) and 46 percent
56 percent of they population of all Vietnam
* All sources on population state that the e~timates are subject to
** 0f' this tota:L, approximately 7,000 persons are European, primarily
French; 100,000 are Chinese; and a negligible Iumber are other Asiatics.
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of all Indochina (30.5 million). The 195+ population represents an
increase within the Viet Minh area since 19+3 of about 8 percent,
compared with an 11-percent increase within all Vietnam, and a,
14-percent increase within all Indochina.
Nearly 70 percent of the population of North Vietnam reside in
the Red River delta or coastal areas. These areas, however, make
up only about a quarter of the land area of North Vietnam. This
results in many sections within the area having population densities
of over 1,700 persons per square mile, or as high as any nonurban area
in the world, as well as having underemployment of the populace.
An estimate of the total labor force available within the country
is difficult to calculate. In the rural population, however, every-
one works from early youth to old age, and this generalization
applies only to a slightly lesser extent to the urban population as
well. Probably about 8 million persons fall in the 15 to 59 year
age group, of which over 3.5 million would be males. 15~+ About
90 percent of the population is dependent on agriculture for a
livelihood, and probably no more than 1 percent of the total have
no direct connection with agriculture. 155 Many of those persons
working in the mines or industrial installations are also a part of
the agricultural population, as they appear to work in the plants
only to supplement their agricultural income.
Skilled labor represents only a small fraction of the labor
force, and the greater part of the skilled labor force is employed
in the production of local specialty items such as food products,
textiles, baskets, or other handicraft products. 156
Of the modern industrial installationd in North Vietnam, coal and
other mines, textile plants, and the cement plant employ the greatest
amount of labor. Except in the textile industry, most of this labor
is unskilled or semiskilled.
There are only meager facilities for the training of skilled
workers in North Vietnam, and, if French technicians and admini-
strators withdraw, the factories of North Vietnam will be faced
with a severe shortage of skilled and managerial personnel.
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IV. Economic Organization.
The economic organization of the Viet Minh regime is typical of
that of a Communist state. The party directorate is the seat of
power, and Party members hold the principal ministries and direct
the mass organizations which propagandize and implement decisions
of the central boaly. Some ardent nationalists ve been utilized
by the Party in ministerial positions but only n close association
with Party member3 as deputy ministers. Six mi istries, all of
whose ministers or deputy ministers are Party, m mbers, deal par-
ticularly with matters of economic policy and c ntrol: the Ministries
of Finance, Commerce and Industry, Agriculture, Labor, Public Works,
and Information. In general, the policy of thelregime appears to
follow closely th= lines of Mao Tse-tung's proc duce in China in
applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. to conditions in Vietnam.
The Land Reform Law, which was promulgated by the National
Assembly of the DRV on 4 December 1953, has bee heavily propagandized
in order to gain popular support. It provides enerally for confisca-
tion and expropriation of the lands of large 1 downers, absentee land-
:Lords, and members of the opposition ("reaction ies"), and for re-
distribution of the land to landless peasants o small landholders. 157
The law is similar in many respects to the law opted by the Chinese
Communists in June 1950, and, as in Communist China, it appears to have
the twofold immediate purpose of popularizing the regime on a broad
base and of eliminating the opposition of the g ntry as an effective
force.
During the last 3 years, the influence of C
advisors has been pronounced in the inauguratio
currency reforms. In early 1951 a small bond i
than planned) was floated with value, in terms
for 5 years. In 1951 the budget was formulated
paddy, and contracts by the government for serv
inese Communist
of fiscal, tax, and
sue (in fact, smaller
f. rice paddy, guaranteed
in terms of rice
ces were to be paid
in Ho Chi Minh piasters at the market price of paddy on the day of
payment. In 1952, collection of taxes and cont of of expenditures
were centralized in the hands of the Ho Chi Mina government. No
local government expenditures were allowed unless previously autho-
rized by the central government. Local taxes re abolished, and
the people were Eo informed by widespread prop anda. A National
Granary Service, supervised by officials appointed by the central
government, assumed control of the paddy suppli s collected through
taxation, thus removing this function from local authority. In 1952
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a Viet Minh state bank was established with a monopoly on currency
issue, which had previously been partly in the hands of semi-
independent regional administrations. In 1952, five principal forms
of taxation were instituted to replace the previously irregular
taxes-in-kind, real estate and business taxes, agricultural tax,
taxes on industry and commerce, commodity taxes, export-import duties,
and slaughterhouse taxes. The new agricultural tax was based on
production instead of on land area, and the yield estimate for -tax
purposes was said to be stabilized. Exemptions were allowed for
family units instead of individual farmers, but the harvest tax was
to be collected on a graduated scale based on size of land hold-
ings. 158
Taxes on industry and commerce under the reform are of three
types: turnover taxes, taxes on gross profits, and taxes on partic-
ular transactions in the case of petty merchants. Taxes on opium
and salt amount to one-third of production. Tea, sugar, tobacco,
and cigarettes are similarly taxed, but at lower rates. Slaughter-
house taxes amount to 10 percent of the value of the processed meat.
The implementation of the land reform law and of the tax col-
lection system appears to have been erratic, varying, with the degree
of control, from mere propaganda to severe enforcement. The central-
ization of administration, however, has generally been as absolute
as the condition of available communications would appear to allow.
The results are reported to have been generally in the direction of
a reduced rate of currency and price inflation in the Viet :Minh areas
and strengthening of control of resources in the hands of the
regime. 159
At the DRV government conference held in Tuyen Quang in July 1953,
Vice President Pham Van Dong of the DRV summarized the policies of
his government as follows: (1) more thorough and equitable tax col-
lections under the centralized tax collection system; (2) the increase
of trade with other countries as well as with "enemy-controlled areas";
and (3) the improvement of land and water transportation systems to
facilitate trade. He stated that the fact that prices had become
more stable would aid in the development of economic production and
that the implementation of the land reform program would increase
agricultural production. Since agriculture is the basic element of
the Vietnamese economy, he said that the working slogan would again
be: "Increase agriculture production first, then encourage the
development of family handicrafts." Finally he stated that "production
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and economy are the most important objectives
party and the entire population." 2,60
of the government, the
No economic programs, or even production oals of the DRV, have
been announced since the conclusion of t,, Ge eva agreements. The
policies of the regime, however, as so far ex ressed, are clearly
reminiscent of those which have been so ruthl ssly applied in
Communist Chine,over the last 4 years. In vi w of the close similarity
of fiscal and tax reforms to those in Conmtunipt China and the con-
tinual presence of Chinese Communist advisors in North Vietnam, the
pattern of centralization of authority and co trolled economic develop-
ment may be expected to follow that of the Peiping government, with
but slight modifications to fit local conditions and resources.
V. Economic Relations of North Vietnam.
A. Prewar Foreign Trade.
The va: Lue of the external trade of T
1930's lagged 2onsiderably behind the trade
ing about half its foreign trade with France
area (North Vietnam)** ran a consistent comm
the pre-World War II period, and depended on
support a wider range of imports. North Vie
nkin and Annam in the late
f Cochinchina. Conduct-
* the present Viet Minh
dity trade deficit in
a few basic exports to
nam did not constitute
a significant source of supply for France an the Western world, and
all of its coixmodity exports to the West. can be replaced from other
areas.
Indochinese foreign trade has been weighted more heavily in
favor of the Eouthern area than of the north
period, 1936 through 1938, the present Viet
about 20 percent of the exports and 40 perce
three Vietnamese provinces of Tonkin, Mnam,
relationships change only slightly when the
compared with the whole of Indochina. For t.
through 1951, the declining importance of N
by its control of only 6 percent of exports
France infludes French Union countries.
The area acquired by the Viet Minh unde
agreement constitutes 95 percent of the val
Tonkin and Annam. Trade magnitudes attribu
in this section are those of Tonkin and. Ann'
roughly 5 percent.
tot~r~n. For the prewar
kinh area controlled. only
nt of the imports of the
and Cochinchina. These
present North Vietnam is
he postwar period, 1949
rth Vietnam is indicated
and 22 percent of imports.
terms of the cease-fire
e of external trade of
ed to North Vietnam
m and are overstated by
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French trade with North Vietnam, protected by preferential
customs, was relatively greater than was that area's trade with the
rest of the world. Tonkinese and Annamese exports to France, con-
fined mostly to corn, coal, and metals, represented 52 percent of
all exports from those provinces during the late 1930's. Imports
from France, concentrated in textiles, metal and miscellaneous
manufactures, and paper products and chemicals, amounted to 53 per-
cent of total imports in the same period.
An annual commodity trade deficit marked the prewar period
of North Vietnam, averaging about US $4 million from 1936 through
1941. Cochinchina had an inverse experience during this time,
with the magnitude of its trade surplus dependent on the quantity
and price relationships of grains and rubber.
The pattern of external trade of Tonkin and Annam before
World War II was typical of an underdeveloped area dependent on a
few basic commodities. Grains, coal, and cement accounted for
more than three-fourths of the value of exports from North Vietnam
during 1936 through 1938, while textiles and metal manufactures
represented more than three-fifths of all imports. Grain, repre-
senting 47 percent of exports, consisted primarily of corn exports
(to France), with rice exports (to China) averaging about a third
of the value of corn exports. Fuel and cement accounted for 32
percent of exports. Coal from mines near Hon Gay produced the
major fuel export (to Japan, China, and France), while the cement
plant at Haiphong exported half its production to neighboring
Asian nations. More than two-fifths of the value of imports
arrived as metal and metal manufactures, while textiles accounted
for one-fifth of imports.
Tables 15-18* illustrate the trade relations of North
Vietnam during the immediate prewar period and in 1949-51.
B. Trade with Communist China and the Soviet Bloc.
1. Exports.
It is unlikely that the Chinese Communists have, given
aid to the Viet Minh without demanding some return. We know that**
Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18 follow on 40.? 41, and 42,
respectively.
** Continued on p. 42.
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External Trade of North Vietnam and of Total Vietnam
1936-38 and 191+9-511
Prewar Average
1936-38
Exports
North Vietnam.
(Thousand 1JS
18,615
88,670
20.99
61 Postwar Average 162
1949-51
5,200
87,512
5.91+
(Thousand US
North Vietnam as Percent
of Vietnam
Imports
North Vietnam
(Thousand 'JS $ ) 20,803
53,655
Total Vietnam
(Thousand 'JS $) 52,851+
242, 1528
North Vietnam as Percent
of Vietnam 39.36
22.12
a. Tonkin and Annam.
b. Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina.
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Table 16
Prewar Commodity Trade Balance of North Vietnam 163
1936-41 and Average
Year
Exports
Imports
Balance
1936
22,424
23,035
-611
1937
17,475
19,274
-1,799
1938
16,127
20,100
-3,973
1939
15,130
22,939
-7,809
1940
16' .652
19,818
-3,166
1941
11,595
19,226
-7,631
Average
16,567
20,732
-4,165
Table 17
Trade of North Vietnam with France.. 164
1936-38 and Average
1936 1937 1938 Average
Exports to France (Thousand US $) 12,690 9,749 7,566 10,002
Percent of Total of North Vietnam
Exports 56.6 55.8 47.0 5.3.1
Imports from France
(Thousand US $) 12,293 10,577 10,468 11,113
Percent of Total of North Vietnam
Imports 53.4 54.9 52.1 53.4
Balance with France
(Thousand US $) +397 -828 -2,902 -1,111
a. France includes French Union countries.
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Table 18
Composition of Trade of Northietnam 165
1936-38 Average
Tota:, a
With France b
Tm
Exports
Imports
Export s_
Food Grains
2.7
. 3
68 `8 c/
12.8
Fuel and Aggregates
Metals and Me-gal Manufactures
41.6
i .1
37.6
8
11.0
Textiles
21.0
30.
Paper Product-
6.3
8.8
micals
Ch
5.7
5.2
4
e
Animal Products
2.6
4.3
2.1
3.
4
0
Miscellaneous Manufactures
10.5
3.0
15.5
.
2.0
?7
other
100.0
106.0
100.0
100.0
percent Cf value of total imports Ea exports.
b. Percent cf value of imports and exports; with France.
c. Primarily corn.
. Primarily coal.
from the beginning of 1951 they have exacted 250,000 railroad ties
for the construction of the Nanning-P':ing Usiang railroad. In ad-
dition, the lTiet Minh have been required tc supply such products as
vegetable oi:_s, tea, wood, and minerals.
2. :cmports. {
3eports from a variety of unev luated sources indicate
unist China has sent the followin supplies to the Viet Minh:
that Comm a
Arms and ammunition: moun~ain guns, antiaircraft
guns, machine guns, field guns, howitzers, mortars,
rifles, rocket launchers,lammunition, explosives,
grenades and grenade throrers, and land mines.
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Food: rice, maize, dried sweet potatoes, cereals,
soybeans, and flour.
Clothing.
Transportation and communications equipment: trucks,
tires, spare parts, gasoline, oil, kerosene, radio
sets, and field transmitters.
Other: medical and clinical supplies, X-ray metal-
testing equipment, balances, electric meters,
electric drills, files, abrasives, saw blades,
iron and steel for making cables, electrical
distributing machinery, agricultural machinery,
oxygen. containers, oxygen-generating machines,
gas masks, binoculars, and industrial machinery.
Little information is available concerning direct trade
between North Vietnam and the USSR or other Soviet Bloc countries.
Many of the above items imported from Communist China are of Soviet
or Soviet Bloc manufacture. A Viet Minh trade mission has been re-
ported in Europe in the first quarter of 1954 placing large orders
for military equipment, vehicles (jeeps, trucks, and buses) pharma-
ceuticals, and hospital equipment in East Germany, Poland,, and
Czechoslovakia. 166
3. Extent of Material and Technical Assistance Given
to the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh have received material aid from Communist
China since at least December 1949 and perhaps since 1948,, Until
early 1951 only essential supplies of arms and rice had been sent
to the Viet Minh, but by summer Communist China began supplying
material designed to develop the Viet Minh's internal systems of
supply. Military equipment and supplies, however, apparently con-
tinued to be the Bloc's main contribution to the Viet Minh.
The seale of supply is difficult to estimate. In
June 1951, Communist China and the USSR were each said to have
promised 1,000 tons a month (totaling 2,000 tons per month). The
plans for later in the year indicated aid on a lower level of
possibly 1,300 tons a month, although implementation of the plan
revealed movements of only 500 to 600 tons a month.
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By =nid-1953, Soviet Bloc aid may have totaled as much as
2,000 tons a month, according to French sourc.s. By 195+ there were
indications of increased military aid, possib'y as much as 3,000 to
4,000 tons a month. 167 With the end of the war in sight, however,
the :195' trade agreement called for the excha4ge of industrial goods.
It has been fairly well establish6d that Chinese Com-
munist personnel -- instructors, technicians,' political and military
advisors, and perhaps transport labor along m ,jor supply routes --
have been operating with the Viet Minh. Esti tes on the extent of
this personnel assistance, however, have varild widely. While the
average of the several estimates in the past has been in the neighbor-
hood of 10,000 to 15,000, there was a gradual] decrease during 1952
to roughly 5,000. This decrease was apparent.y attributable to the
progress made by the Viet Minh in their organization, to the develop-
ment of training camps in South China, and to; the difficultids en-
countered by the presence of Chinese in VietLinh zones. With
respect to this latter point, it is felt that the Viet Minh, while
not denying the necessity of Chinese Commmnist assistance, have
been attempting to reduce the numbers of advisors and technicians
in Viet Minh zones because of the possibility of a resurgence of
traditional antipathy among the Indochinese fpr the Chinese.
The Viet Minh may, in fact, ;purs4e a deliberate. policy
of restricting contacts between Chinese personnel and the Viet-
namese populat:_on in order to avoid arousing historic animosities
held by most V:Letnamese toward the Chinese. There are no confirmed
reports of Chiaese combat casualties, except for minor operations
along the nort'.iern border. It appears, therefore, that Ch:Lnese
Communist personnel operate primarily in conjunction with central
administrative units and at higher command 1 vels, and such a policy
would definitely limit the capacity of the Viet Minh organization to
absorb foreign specialists and advisors.
C. Relaticris with South Vietnam and. 0th r Asiatic Countries.
There is probably a limited amount of trade between the Viet
Minh and the French-held areas in Vietnam despite government efforts
to maintain a land and sea blockade. Individuals who have fled from
Viet Minh territory have stated, without confirmation, that trusted
Workers' (Communist) Party members are designated in each sector to
conduct trade with non-Communist regions.
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Although the total volume of such trade is relatively small,
it has been of considerable importance to the Viet Minh because of
specific shortages. Special efforts have been made to secure medical
supplies, fuel, and transportation equipment and parts, and the Viet
Minh have admittedly been dependent upon food supplies seized from
French-controlled areas.
There have been reports of arms smuggling between Thailand
and Viet Minh areas, carried on by coastwise shipping to Communist-
held areas in Cochinchina and overland through Cambodia. No esti-
mates of the volume of this traffic can be made from available
information. .
D. Effects on World Trade Patterns of the Inclusion
of North Vietnam in the Soviet Bloc.
The Viet Minh certainly will attempt to eliminate the area's
trade deficit by pushing exports. It is interesting, however, to note
that in 1952, coal exports -- one of Tonkin's major foreign exchange
earners -- would have paid for only 25,000 tons of rice, about 5 per-
cent of'the possible rice deficit the Viet Minh may face, at least in
the short run. The Soviet Bloc is not in a favorable position to give
aid, although this deficit is relatively small.
Although the Viet Minh Communist policy is not known, the
Communists may consider this area important enough to encourage some
industrialization. Industrialization, in requiring the importation
of capital goods from the Soviet Bloc, would increase, although not
significantly, the stresses and strains already existing within the
Soviet Bloc. As the Viet Minh area is already a deficit area, in-
dustrialization would add to the drain upon Bloc resources.*
The reopening of the old trade routes from South China through
Indochina would facilitate the exploitation of South China's minerals
and the general. development of this area. In 1937, transit trade from
Yunnan through Tonkin to China and Hong Kong totaled more than
50,000 tons valued at US $13.6 million, almost the value of Tonkin's
exports.
The primary commodities entering foreign trade from North
Vietnam before the war are generally supplementary to the Chinese
* See also VII, below.
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economy. Japan, the largest buyer of Tonkinese coal in the 1930's,
may be interested in renewing this source of'supply in exchange for
Japanese textiles and manufactured goods,. Should a trade relation-
ship develop between Japan and North Vietnam, China may have an
opportunity to use Japanese trading desires as a lever to obtain
trading concessions for herself. In the absence of Japanese trade
with North Vietnam, it is probable that the USSR and China can
furnish North Vietnam with the relatively smll amounts of textiles
and manufactured goods required.
Frencb imports from North Vietnam before World War II
consisted more than 65 percent of corn and of about 10 percent
each of metals and coal. French exports to North Vietnam were
concentrated in metal manufactures (38 percent), textiles (31 per-
cent), and miscellaneous manufactures (15 percent). Should all
trade with North Vietnam be cut off in the future, France should
have little difficulty obtaining these imports elsewhere in the
Free World. Some adjustments may be necessaay in the transition
of ;French trade to other areas, due to the preferential position
France enjoyed from Indochinese customs arrangements.
Of greater immediate significance toi, France than the loss of
this trading area is the possibility_thtat USlwar aid for Indochina
may be diverted to other uses. During the calendar year 1954,
US $785 million were to be funneled through ;France for the war effort
in Indochina, thus greatly relieving-the French gold and dollar
shortage. At the time of the cease-fire, only US $100 million of this
amount had been received by France and US $l100 million additional was
in the pipelir.e. If the US should decide that all or part of the
remaining US $,585 million and the US $800 million now scheduled for
calendar year 1955 should be diverted to Southeast Asian cr other
defense, these funds would not flow through France and would make it
increasingly difficult for the French to maintain a foreign currency
balance.
VI. Comparison of the Level of Economic Activities and Viability
of North and South Vietnam.
The truce demarcation line divides Vietnam into two areas which
under normal conditions would form comp:Lementary parts of a national
economic entity. Of these, the area now under Viet Minh control
possesses by far the greater long-term .Dotertial for a viable indus-
trial economy. However, this area does not ;produce enough rice to
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support its population of 14 million and will probably be dependent
upon some grain imports to make up its general food production
deficit. North Vietnam contains the only major coal deposits of
Vietnam, and practically all of the known metallic mineral resources,
including zinc, tin; iron, tungsten, manganese,. chrome, lead, and
gold. In addition, the only cement plant in the country the
largest in Southeast Asia -- is located at,Haiphong. The country's
two major textile plants are also located in the Viet Minh area,
,although these depend upon imports of raw cotton and do not produce
enough textiles for North Vietnamese requirements.
It is believed that these resources should enable the Viet Minh
in time to procure in foreign trade the manufactures which are
needed for a modest industrial development. However, the apparent
unwillingness of the Viet Minh to offer sufficiently attraftive terms
to the French administrators and managers to continue operating the
coal mines and industrial installations and to carry on interregional
and foreign trade poses an immediate problem for the Viet Minh if they
are to realize any benefit from these economic activities, pending
the time when Communist technicians and advisors become available.
Moreover, the extensive capital construction necessary to rebuild
transport and communications facilities linking North Vietnam to
the Soviet Bloc, and the improvement of mining and industrial
facilities -- even to the levels that had been planned in US Foreign
Operations Administration programs -- is believed to be beyond the
capabilities of the Viet Minh and.will probably require technical
assistance from the Bloc in planning, supervision, and additional
equipment. The immediate needs for imported food supplies, raw
cotton, gypsum, and technical equipment will require aid from the
Bloc if the past level of economic activity in the area is to be
restored soon.
For the long term, North Vietnam, as discussed in Section II
above, possesses a well-balanced resource base for a self-sustaining
industrial economy but needs technical aid and investment funds to
develop it. The USSR has provided substantial technical assistance
to Communist China in its economic development during the past 5 years.
It still remains to be determined whether the USSR or Communist China
is in a position to pass on the lessons which have been learned in
the initial stages of development of the Chinese economy to another
Asian country with an even less developed resource base. North
Vietnam, however, already seems to be benefiting from the experiences
of Communist China, as can be observed in the measures for taxation,
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land reform, and centralized control which hav; been promulgated in
Viet Minh areas Ln the past 3 years. The expected reconstruction
of the two railroads linking North Vietnam to China will stimulate
economic exchanges between the two countries. China is apparently
in a position to benefit more at first from the Haiphong-Yunnan rail-
road connection. It would provide the means of easy export of
minerals from Southwest China and of hastening'ithe construction and
indus-trializaticn programs in that region, whi.e North Vietnam would
benefit incident ally from the restoration of the railroad line
through its are?, of prospective resource development. Thus, in view
of the early evidences of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh, it
is believed that necessary technical aid will be forthcoming, at least
to the extent that is considered mutually beneficial.
South Vietnam, on the other hand, has practically no resources
available other than agriculture and will be hard pressed to create
a self-sustaining economy, even in the long rein. The area does
possess an agrioultural base for rice production sufficient to sus-
tain its populaAon and permit exports, which prior to World Wax II
amounted to over 50 percent of all exports from Indochina. Although
in the past China has been the principal purchaser of Indochinese
rice, there has been no trade between South Vietnam and China in the
last several years. India and other Pacific countries have purchased
rice from the Cochinchina area, but rice production and consumption
are quite elastic in these regions and the market quite variable.
Since rice fron the Cochinchina area is inferior to that of the, other
two main sources, Thailand and Burma, the demand for Indochinese rice
is always dependent upon the amount available in those countries.
Whether rice trading with the Viet Minh areas will be effected is not
yet clear.
In addition to rice production, the only other major resource
available to South Vietnam for foreign trade is natural rubber, pro-
duction of which. amounted to about 73,00-0 toils in 1953, or about
5 percent of the world output. France has been the main market.
Depending on markets (and on allocation of t1e foreign exchange proceeds
of exports), t:iese two resources could provide investment funds for a
modest development of consumer goods industries which would improve
the self-suffi2iency of the area.
A major problem immediately facing the South Vietnam government is
the relocation of an indeterminate number of;ersons refugeeing fromn
the northern area. Traditionally unwilling to leave their homes
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to take up free land in the upland regions, the northern Vietnamese
who accept resettlement in the South will probably be limited for the
most part to the families of military and functionary personnel de-
pendent on the government for support. These number as many as
330,000 to 350,000 people. Temporary provisions for their accommoda-
tion are currently being made. There are several sparsely populated
inland plateau areas where these people could be settled, where they
could grow such crops as maize, potatoes, beans, manioc, and taro,
or where they could develop plantation-type crops such as rubber,
coffee, tea, pepper, or fruits. However, even at best, these pur-
suits would be long-term in their effect and no prospect is in
sight to provide the means of livelihood even for the present
numbers of civilian personnel seeking resettlement in the South.
There seems slight chance that -- in the absence of a vigorous and
efficient organization of migration, agricultural, public works and
handicraft projects, to utilize the emigrants -- the need for self-
supporting economic activity for these people can be fulfilled.
Even with some American aid, the capabilities of the South Vietnamese
government are being taxed to provide for their welfare.
On the other hand, a large number of stay-behind cadres and
guerrilla forces of the Viet Minh can be expected to remain in the
South to carry on the Viet Minh regime's program of political
subversion and disruption of economic activity. In these circum-
stances, the institutional structure of the South Vietnam economy
as an agricultural colonial appendage of metropolitan France will be
subjected to further severe strains. The continued maintenance and
protection of French colonial interests in agricultural production
and trade are at the same time both necessary for the support of the
present level of economic activity in the area and paralyzing in their
effect upon native aspirations to develop a viable national economy.
The long-enforced dependence of Indochina on the metropolitan country
for manufactured goods has discouraged the development of indigenous
industry. At a time when increased economic opportunities are needed
to support the population and to replace employment in occupations
connected with interregional and colonial trade, normal private
sources of investment are lacking to provide the needed maintenance
and expansion of the small industrial and trade sectors. In the face
of the expected further disruption by Communist forces in the area,
additional foreign economic aid to South Vietnam appears to be more
than ever required to maintain and develop the economy and. to provide
stimulation, guidance,and support for projects in public works, agri-
culture, consumer goods and agricultural tools industries, and
handicrafts. 168
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VII. Estimate of Probable Economic Develo !nts ' n North Vietnam
through l95 f'
A. Future ure Soviet Bloc Aid. Up until the time of the cease-fire, t le bulk of aid given
to the Viet Minh by the Soviet Bloc was of a military nature and
consisted mostly of military equipment and rations, as well as
material to develop the Viet Minh's Internal lines of supply.
Mid-1954 protocols for the exchange of goods between the DRV and
Communist China `.ndicate that North Vietnam wa scheduled to
receive very little in the way of capital good for improving indus-
trial production from Communist China. Fu:rthe ore, there is no
known grant of a_.d to the Viet Minh such as th grant extended to
North Korea by the USSR, Communist China, and the European Satel-
lites, which will reportedly amount to US $300 i4illion and restore
the 1946-50 leve:_ of economic activity. On th other hand, because
of the lack of any information on the Viet Mi regime's plans for
economic developzent or on future Soviet Bloc id to North Vietnam,
future production can only be estimated there, predicated upon
North Vietnam's known resources and facilities the immediate needs
of Communist China and the USSR, and the desir of the Peiping
regime to make &i impressive showing in Indoch na for the benefit
of the other Southeast Asian countries.
Under these conditions, it is assumed
Vietnam will rec,~ive technical and material ai
particularly from Communist China because the
gain both economically and politically from th
Vietnam into the Asian Communist Bloc; and. (2)
important enough in itself, will be limited by
1) that North
from the Soviet Bloc,
atter has the most to
integration of North
that such aid, although
considerations of
economic worth and will not be extended tc North Vietnam projects at
an unrealistic cost.
B. Probable Economic Developments through 1 57.
It is believed that the bulk of Sciviet Bloc aid will be granted
to (1) connect North Vietnam with Communist Ch na by rail, and to
improve other transport facilities; (2) exploit the area's coal, tin,
zinc, chrome,and phosphate resources; (3) provide the cotton textile
industry with raw cotton; (4) increase cement roduction; and (5) pro-
vide food supplies to overcome present shortages.
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Rehabilitation of the area's railroad system will be expedient
both strategically and economically to Communist China particularly
and also to the Soviet Bloc. By connecting the Chinese Communist
railroad system to that of North Vietnam north of Lang Son, the Bloc
will accomplish through railroad service from the USSR through
Communist China to the Southeast Asian Communist frontier. Recon-
struction of the Lao Kay-Haiphong line, on which construction re-
portedly has already begun, will again allow Communist China use of
the most expeditious route in exploitation of its Ko-chiu tin and
other mineral resources found in the Southwest as well as aid Com-
munist China's construction program for that region. Reconstruction
of rail facilities will be accomplished almost entirely with Chinese
Communist or Bloc materials and technical personnel, and strategically
will actually benefit the Chinese Communists more than it will the
Viet Minh.
In addition to reconstruction of rail facilities, the Soviet
Bloc will probably aid the Viet Minh in rehabilitating Haiphong harbor.
Dredging equipment and reconstruction of some wharf and repair facili-
ties will be required, and the equipment and technical assistance for
this will also have to come from Communist China and/or the Bloc.
Emphasis on the area's resources will probably proceed as
follows (see Table 19*):
1. Iron and Steel.
Although it is estimated that no iron and steel industry
of any significance will be established by 1957, the export of iron
ore will undoubtedly be resumed after the restoration of necessary trans-
portation and mining facilities and will probably equal or surpass the
prewar production peak of 135,000 tons. Ferroalloy ore production
consequently will also be limited to export demands, and probably
will also surpass past peak production. Chromite production may
receive the greatest attention since Communist China has only very
minor chrome ore deposits of its own, and although present requirements
are meager they will undoubtedly increase.
* Table 19 follows on p. 52.
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2. Nonferrous Minerals.
Zinc production will be of importance to Communist China,
particularly when and if the zinc smelter at Quang Yen is retorted.
It is assumed that the Chinese Communists will probably give this
project high priority inasmuch as their own zinc smelting facilities
are inadequate, and China is importing zinc metal from Poland. It
is therefore believed that zinc production will reach at least
8,000 tons per year.
Tin production, the only significant addition to the
Soviet Bloc as a whole, could possibly reach 1,500 tons by 1957 and
would be very considerably increased, probably doubled, with the
acquisition and operation of the Nam Pathene mines in Laos.
Production of phosphates which reportedly has already
begun under the Chinese Communists in Lao Kay will continue and
become more important with the acquisition of the Haiphong phos-.
phate fertilizer factory. It is estimated that production of
phosphates will attain at least.160,000 tons by 1957?
Although coal production in North Vietnam reached an
historical peak of 2.6 million tons in 1939, it does not appear
likely that this figure will be approached by 1957. The poten-
tiality for a production greater than the estimated 1957 production
figure of 1.0 million tons probably exists, but because most pro-
duction is dependent upon export demands and because present con.-
ditions do not portend as favorable a coal export situation as
existed in the late 1930's, it does not seem likely that the coal-
producing potential in North Vietnam will be fully utilized. New
trade agreements made by the Viet Minh regime, however, could
significantly change the situation within a short time period.
For example, the resumption of coal exports to Japan alone on the
1939 level would mean an increased production of about 350,000 tons
per year.
4? Textiles.
Prior to the partitioning of Vietnam, the cotton textile
industry, especially the plant at Nam Dinh, was almost entirely de-
pendent upon the US for its supply of short staple cotton. Some
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imports of Ind:_an and Egyptian cotton supplezdented the US supply but
were not suitable for most of the production. In 1953 the US, through
the Foreign Operations Administration,supplid about 8,000 metric tons
of raw cotton, and prior to the hostilities the cotton textile indus-
try annually u;3ed 12,000 to 14,000 tons of r w cotton. Practically
all cloth and ;Tarn produced by the industry is consumed domestically
but still does not meet local demand. The Bloc will be required to
supply the industry with raw cotton, as well as finished c=loth and
yarn. This import requirement should not greatly tax the Bloc. The
Nam Dinh mill aas been idle since French withdrawal, but reportedly
is in excellent condition. '169/.
5. Cement.
The only other industry of North Vietnam to which the
Bloc probably will grant considerable aid is the Haiphong Cement
Plant, North Vietnam's most important manufacturing industry. It
is estimated that because of its importance s a new source of
supply to the Chinese Communists the latter pill exert every effort
to raise the slant production to 300,000 ton per year and probably
will achieve this well before 1957.
6. Food.
For the present, considerab:Le Bloc aid will be required
to meet the daily living requirements of 14 million Northern Viet-
namese. Since the area will be a showcase for the rest of South-
east Asia to view Communist "progress," it is believed that the
Bloc will exert considerable efforts to raise the living standard.
The estimated per capita production of rice .(milled) of 1"C16.2 kilo-
grams is cons:_derably below the yearly :rice !requirements of an
Annamite which are estimated to be between 000 and 250 kilograms.
It is anticipated that rice; production may lie increased somewhat
in North Vietnam within the next two years.; General food production
probably will also be increased over the sane time period with
programs for ;;rowing other food crops and i4creasing fish catch
production. The immediate acute needs of North Vietnam for food
because of a coor crop year will necessitat , however, comparatively
high imports Df foodstuffs. These will hav to come either from
Communist Chiaa, which is experiencing a bai crop year in 1954
because of the present floods, from South Vietnam, or from other
Southeast Asian. rice producers. In add.itio ., the area will still
require importation of many daily necessities such as footwear and
clothing, which in the past have been supplied by France.
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APPENDIX
SOURCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other source
A
- Completely reliable
2
s
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E
F
- Not reliable
- Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this re-
port. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluation on the cited document.
1. State, OIR, Selected Background Data, Indochina, 1 Apr 1954. .S.
2. J. Gauthier, L'Indochine en Travail, Paris, 1949. U.
3. State, Hanoi Despatch No. 77, 1 Apr 1954. S. Eval. RR 2.
4. State, Saigon Despatch No. 2701, 9 Jun 1954. C. Eval. RR 2.
25X1 X7 5.
6. CIA NIS 3, draft on agriculture. C.
JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C.
Agriculture, Food Balances, for Burma, Thailand, Indochina,
Philippines and Taiwan, 1952. C.
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State, OIR, Selected Background Data, Indochina, op. Cit.
FOA, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1952. U.
ci3..
7. Agriculture, Food Balances, op.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid .
10. JANIB 70, Chap. I, Oct 1945. U-
11. State, Saigon Despatch No. 28, 13 ar 1947. U.
Inte:'national Yearbook of Agricult ral Statistics,
FOA, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, op. Cit.
12. Ibid.
13. Inte:'national Tea Committee, Bulle in of Statistics,
Jun 1952 and Supplement, Dec 1951 U.
14. Ibid.
1
1
15. Annuaaire des Etats Associe's, 1953, Paris, 1953. U.
16. Ibid.
17. JAN13 70, Chap. I, Oct 1945- C-
18. Agriculture, Food Balances, op. ci
19. JANI3 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C.
State, Saigon Despatch No. 306, 25 Jan 1954. C.
20. Estimate by US Department of Agric lture.
21. Interior, US Bureau of Mines, Mine al Trade Notes,
May 1952. U. Eval. RR 2.
22. CIA VIS 43, Section 63, Oct 1953. C. Eval. RR 2.
23. "Prenier Report de la Sous-Coiimiss on de Modernisation
de itIndo-Chine," 1948. U. Eval RR 3.
UN Economic and Social Council, E/?N 1l/I 8 S/19,, Annex B,
Dec 1950. U. Eval. RR 2.
on
. ................
...
yy
yyyyyyyy
UN, The Manufacture of Iron and St el in Indo-China,
Third Session, Lahore, Pakistan, Feb 1953. 1J.
CIA NIS 43, Section 63, Oct 1953. C. Eval. RR 2.
CIA NIS 39, Section 63, Dec 1952. C.
CIA NIS 43, Section 63, Oct 1953. C. Eval. RR 2.
The Metal Bulletin No. 2539, 3 Nov 1950. U. Eval. RR 3.
Min rats et Metaux-Societe Anon e Statisti ue, Paris, 1946.
U. Eval. Doc.
Ibic.., Paris, 1948. U. Eval, Doc
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25X1A2g
FOIAb3c
36. Minerals Survey-Bauxite, USBM for NSRB, Aug 1953, Section III,
37.
38.
39.
4o.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
p. 1, Section IV, Table 1, pp. 12, 14, 16. U. Eval. RR 3.
Sources of Bauxite in Asia, MTM, USBM, Special Supplement
No. 27, to Vol. 2 , No. 6, Jun 1948, p. 14. U. Eval. RR 2.
JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C. Eval. RR 2.
Army, Strategic Intelligence Digest, "French Indochina,"
1 Oct 19 . C. Eval. RR 2.
JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid.
JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C. Eval. RR 2.
FOA, Indo-China, 9.95-FR-631, 20 Apr 1953. U.
CIA NIS 43, Section 62-B, Jul 1953. C, US OFFICIALS ONLY,.
State, Saigon Despatch No. 353, 2 Mar 1953? C.
CIA NIS 43, Section 62-B, Jul 1953. C, US OFFICIALS ONLY.-
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Board of Economic Warfare, No. 4979, 22 May 1948. C.
Ibid.
CIA NIS 43, Section 62-B, Jul 1953. C, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57.
58. Annuaire des Etats ssocies, Cam o ge, Laos, Vietnam,
Paris, 1953. U.
59. Ibid.
60. J. Gauthier, L`Indochine en Travail, Paris, 1949. U.
Navy, c-31820, Area Study 12-53. S.
61. Navy, NA, Saigon Report No. 234-52, 12 Dec 1952. U. Eval. A-2.
62. Annuaire Statistique du Vietnam, 1949-50, Saigon, 1951. U.
Statistiques conomiques et Financieres, No. 20, Feb 1954,
Saigon. U.
63. C. Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indochina,
Oxford, 1944. U.
64. Ibid.
65. UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1952. U.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
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68.
69.
70.
71.
7?.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77?
78.
79?
8o.
81.
82.
25X1 A20~
85.
25X1A2g 86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91- ?
91 .
93-
94.
95.
96.
97.
8
99.
100.
101.
102.
P79T00935A000300090001-2
Ibid.
Ibid.
Robequair, 2. cit.
UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1952. U.
Ibid.
Navy, Saigon Report No. 234-52, 12 Dec 11952. Eval. A-2.
UN, Stat:.stical Yearbook, 1952. U.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Navy, Saigon Report No. 234+-52, 12 Dec 1952. U. Eva]... A-2.
UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1952. U.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1952.
UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1952. U. I
Navy, NA, Saigon Report No. 234-52, 1? Dec 1952. U. Eval. A-2.
Bulletin Economi ue Hebdomadaire de 1 Chambre de Commerce,
Saigon, 23 Jan 1954. U.
Navy, NA, Saigon Report No. 234-52, 1 Dec 1952. U. Eval. A-2.
Bulleti::.. Economique Hebdomadaire de 1 Chambre de Commerce,
- cit.
Annuaira des Etats Associe's, Paris, 153. U.
CIA NIS 43, Section 64, Mar 1953. S.
JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C.
Ibid.
Premier Report de la Sous-Commission le Modernisation
de 117:ndochine, Commission de Modernisation des Territoires
d'Outre Mer, Nov 1948. U.
Annuaire des Etats Associes, off. cit.l
Statis;iques conomiques et FinancT es1No. 8, Feb 1953,
Saigon. U.
Bulletin Hebdomadaire de la Chambre d.e Commerce
de Haiphong, Haiphong, 26 Sep 1953.1 U.
Statistiques Economigues et Financie~es,No. 8, Feb 1953,
Saigon. U.
Premier Report de la Sous-Commission de Modernisation
de 1'Indochine, OP. cit.
JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C.
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105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Annuaire Statistique du Vietnam, op. cit.
107. Annuaire des Etats Associes, op. cit.
108. Statistiques Economiques et Financieres, No. 20, Feb 1954,
Saigon. U.
109. JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945. C-
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Premier Report de la Sous-Commission de Modernisation
de l'Indochine, op. cit.
25X1 A2g0093?01-2ANIS 70, Chap. IX, 2p. cit.
119.
25X1A2g 120. Annuaire des Etats Associes op. cit.
121.
122. Annuaire Statistique du Vietnam, op. cit.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Annuaire des Etats Associe.s, op. cit.
126. Statistiques conomiques et Financieres, No. 20, Feb 19511,
Saigon. U.
127. Robequain, op. cit.
128. JANIS 70, Chap. IX, Oct 1945- C.
129. Ibid.
130. State, Saigon Despatch No. 237, 6 Oct 1950. U.
131. Annuaire Statistique du Vietnam, op. cit.
132. Ibid.
25X1A2g
133. Annuaire des Etats Associes, op. cit.
134. Statistiques conomiques et Finan is eres, No. 20, Feb 1954,
Saigon. U.
135. Robequain, op. cit.
136. Ibid.
137. Annuaire des Etats Associes, op. cit.
138. CIA NIS 3, Section 64, Mar 1953. S.
139. Robequain, op. cit.
140. CIA NIS 43. Section 64, Mar 1951. S.
141.
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25X1X7^
25X1A2gD
001-2
147. Air, FEAF, Intelligence Roundup, Nc . 151, Jun 1954. S.
VoL 3 . I and II, 3-944. C.
146. Ibid,
145- CIA 1 ?DD No. 15868T, Military Too 221-
Z_of Northern
French Indo-China Southern Army Headquarters,
143.
144.
150.
Navy,,
NA,
Saigon Report No.
61-52,
16 Apr 1952.
151.
Navy,,
NA,
Saigon Report No.
51-52,
7 Apr 1952.
C.
C.
25X1 A2g152.
153. CIATtR IM-389, PPo .2ulation and Manpower in Indochina,
I SFm 1QS11_ S.
T'
ebA1 A1g 154+
155.
156. State, Saigon Despatch No. 3991, 1 Mar 1954. S.
Robequain, op. Li-t-
157.- State,. Saigon Despatch No. 302, 9 Feb 1954. C.
158. StatE', Hanoi Despatch No. 206, 1 Juln 1953. C.
'ia,
25X1 A2gDP7~g$Q0
161. Indochina, Commerce Exterieure, 1936, , 1937, 1938. U.
162. Annus,ire Statistique du Vietnaxa, 19151, 1952, Saigon. U.
163. Indochina, Commerce Exterieure., op. 1 cit.
164. Ibid.
165 . Ibid.
166.
FOIAb3bl
CIA FDD, Selected Briefs from the I ternational press,
No. 12, 13 Aug 1954. C.
167? FOIAb3b1
State, Hong Kong, Review of the HonD, Kong Chinese Press,
Nos. 52, 53, 54, 19 Nov 1953. U.
168. State, OIR Report No. 6701, 4 Oct 1)54. S. Eval. RR 2.
169. State, Saigon Despatch No. 892, 4 S p 1954.
(For official use only.)
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 Approved W(56ftpM 1954
1 )
. Sse mao
MengC H I,, N
Wen-she,, I..
Yen
Kong lung ~?~ ( +.~. ... ,... 0SOh5La I
i Z I ;I,~naeo~
~'? /- oi'hone
INDOCHINA
NATURAL RESOURCES
Circled symbols represent mines
Al Bauxite Pb Lead
Au Gold Sb Antimony
l}fteradit 1,/
i J Nan {\--
Muango
Lampeng --~Muang Ph"ae }
F, or
Chlengmel ^' 1 V ,,9 Vlenu
Muango(%
~sTHAI!LND'I
V Petroleum field-unexploitel
is Rice
R Rubber
Sn Tin
W Tungsten
Fe Iron Zn Zinc
P Phosphate
Anthracite coal-exploited
q Bituminous coal-exploited
C Lignite - exploited
PROCESSING CENTERS
A Rice milling Textile
^ Sugar milling Glass
? Fish processing (bottle)
Iron processing Coke
Zn
Zinc foundary monv-
~??- International boundary
National Capital
Scale 1:7,500,000
0 20 40 80 120 Miles
20 40 8
0 20 40 80 120 Kilometers
ILES DE
[? POULO CONDORS
Appro ~, 59 9 O01 -2
SECRET
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
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