EAST ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: September 19, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National Secret
v&d l' Release 2002/05/07: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO0220001444/V-NOCONTRACT
Assessment
Center
East Asia
Review
Secret
RP EAR 78-004
19 September 1978
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
EAST ASIA REVIEW
19 September 1978
CONTENTS
North Korea: Continuity, Not Change . . . . . . . .
There was strikingly little that was
new or innovative in North Korean pro-
nouncements made on the occasion of the
regime's 30th anniversary.
25X6
North Korea Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Note: A Supplement to today's edition of EAST ASIA REVIEW has been
published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.
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North Korea: Continuity, Not Change
There was strikingly little that was new or innova-
tive in the pronouncements from North Korea on the occa-
sion of its 30th anniversary. President Kim Il-song, in
a major address on 9 September, continued to profess
North Korea's readiness to resume a dialogue with South
Korea, but on terms that clearly remain unacceptable to
Seoul. Kim was relatively restrained in his criticism
of US support for Seoul--a pattern that has remained more
or less consistent since the Carter administration an-
nounced its plans to withdraw ground forces from South
Korea last year.
The minimal representation from the Soviet Union for
this important anniversary--contrasted with the presence
of China's Teng Hsiao-ping--provided further confirmation
of North Korea's more pronounced tilt toward Peking. The
regime publicized progress on a number of longstanding
construction projects in industry and transportation,
but its claims of overall economic achievement remained
characteristically vague. In an unusually direct and
positive manner, Kim Il-song endorsed several domestic
campaigns linked to Kim's behind-the-scenes efforts to
promote his son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor.
Policy Toward Talks
Kim Il-song devoted, considerable effort to describ-
ing North Korea's attitude toward talks with the US and
the Pak government in South Korea. The exercise seemed
artfully designed to deflect international attention
from Pyongyang's continued unwillingness to permit the
present South Korean Government a meaningful role in
talks on the future of Korea.
Kim opened his discussion on dialogue with a new
formulation that seemed to endorse tripartite talks on
Korea--a concept that gained currency for a short time
last spring when the Yugoslavs raised the idea. Kim
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said: "We leave the door open for a conversation with
the US and with the South Korean authorities and politi-
cal parties, too." In elaborating on this theme, however,
Kim made clear that he still has in mind a two-track ap-
proach involving separate conversations with the US and
the South Koreans.
With the US, Kim wants to negotiate a withdrawal of
us military forces and a peace agreement. In North Korean
phraseology, these talks are aimed at enabling the Korean
people to regain their national sovereignty. According
to Kim, Pyongyang will negotiate only if the US approaches
the talks with a genuine desire to seek a single, unified
Korea. Implicit is the notion that only one Korean entity
should represent the Korean people at the talks, and that
this entity "naturally" should be the North Korean Govern-
ment.
The purpose of the long-stalled North-South dialogue,
on the other hand, is to achieve national union. The
North is prepared to reopen discussions with the South
if the "South Korean authorities" demonstrate a sincere
desire for reunification. Kim reiterated the longstand-
ing requirements for abolishing the "Yushin" constitution
(which legitimizes Pak's control), ending the emergency
decrees, and legalizing the activities of political move-
ments of all persuasions--preconditions anathema to the
Pak government.
Kim also held out the prospect that the North was
prepared to "promote unity" with political parties in
the South regardless of present institutions and ideolo-
gies, and he invited political representatives from the
South to "come and operate in the northern half of the
republic." This appears to be yet another empty gesture
designed to contrast the North's alleged open political
environment with the "fascist suppression" in the South.
North Korean propaganda called attention to the fact that
a "South Korean People's Delegation" was present at the
ceremonies in Pyongyang.
Moderate Toward the US
In criticizing the US, Kim Il-song called in a gen-
eral way for the US to end its support for the Pak gov-
ernment. The demand for a withdrawal of US troops was
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added almost as an afterthought and given Kim's remark
that the action should occur "as soon as possible," in a
manner not suggesting any great urgency. Kim also did
not question the sincerity of the US withdrawal plan or
charge that the US was increasing tension in South Korea--
two themes that North Korean propaganda has stressed dur-
ing the past summer.
Kim's restraint probably can be explained in part
by the nature of the occasion and the presence of a large
number of delegations from Third World countries that
have little understanding of the military balance in
Korea or the stabilizing role of US forces in that equa-
tion. Even so, Kim's speech will presumably set the
policy lines for at least the next several months. The
continued absence of the customary shrill anti-US rhetoric
indicates that Pyongyang, is prepared to hold its propa-
ganda fire, probably at least until the first US combat
elements formally begin their departure, despite its
serious misgivings about the slow pace and partial nature
of the withdrawal.
Foreign Guests
By Pyongyang's count, there were 109 foreign delega-
tions present for the national day. North Korea's will-
ingness to provide air service was an important factor
in encouraging a large turnout. The guest list was headed
by two chiefs of state--President Rahman of Bangladesh
and President Ratsiraka of Madagascar. Many of the so-
called "delegations" were in fact headed by ambassadors
resident in Peking who attended the ceremonies in Pyong-
yang as "special envoys" of their home governments.
Kim Il-song took advantage of the situation to ex-
pand on the now familiar North Korean theme that the
Third World should form a united front to oppose the
machinations of the imperialists and "dominationists."
The Chinese have endorsed North Korea's attacks on the
so-called "forces of domination" and have used the term
in the context of criticizing Soviet "hegemonistic" am-
bitions. In his speech, however, Kim I1-song seemed to
go out of his way to point out that small as well as large
countries can act as forces of domination. This may be
an attempt by Kim to soften the anti-Soviet overtones of
the expression.
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Chinese Tilt Evident
Since the visit by Chinese party leader Hua Kuo-feng
in May, North Korea has moved closer to the Chinese posi-
tion on a range of international issues. The relative
ranking of the Chinese and Soviet delegations at North
Korea's national day ceremonies accurately reflected the
current inclination toward Peking. Politburo member and
senior vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping was ranked third
among the visitors; the Soviet representative, Vice Pres-
ident Matchanov, was listed among the last of the dele-
gations.
Teng Hsiao-ping's group met separately with Kim
twice during the visit. Kim did not meet separately with
the Soviet delegation--an omission that is even more
glaring in view of the fact that Kim did extend this
courtesy to some 20 other visiting delegations. The low
rank of the Soviet delegation--Matchanov holds a largely
ceremonial government post--undoubtedly was intended by
Moscow to signal its displeasure with North Korea's drift
toward Peking.
There were some slight hints of discord, however,
in North Korea's treatment of their Chinese guests.
Pyongyang consistently gave favored protocol treatment
to the visiting heads of state from Bangladesh and
Madagascar, while Peking portrayed Teng as the honored
guest. Pyongyang's official news service also failed to
carry the occasional anti-Soviet remarks made by the
Chinese.
Economic Development
The major portion of Kim's speech was devoted to
describing North Korea's efforts to develop its domestic
political and economic base. Even so, Kim was unusually
reticent on specific economic goals and achievements.
Kim made no reference, for example, to the ambitious
"110 prospective goals" that are the major targets of
North Korea's current seven-year economic development
plan (1978-84).
In the weeks preceding national day, however, the
North Korean press carried nearly daily accounts of the
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completion of a number of longstanding capital construc-
tion projects that should figure prominently in the
seven-year plan. These include the claimed opening of
a major crosscountry expressway between Pyongyang and
Wonsan and the commissioning of the first stage of the
Chinese-supplied oil refinery, the Ponghwa chemical plant.
Kim Il-song sent a message thanking the Chinese techni-
cians who assisted in the construction of the oil refin-
ery, but by holding the commissioning ceremony on 7 Sep-
tember, one day before the arrival of Teng Hsiao-ping,
North Korea seemed to have denied Teng an opportunity
for a public relations windfall.
A Boost for the Son's Succession
Many among the foreign guests present probably were
aware of Kim 11-song's behind-the-scenes campaign to
groom his elder son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor. But
few present probably noted that in his major address, the
elder Kim provided an unusually strong endorsement for
several domestic political campaigns and slogans closely
associated with his son.
Specifically, Kim said that North Korea should con-
tinue to develop the "three-revolution Team Movement"
whose "advantages and vitality have been confirmed in
practice." These teams, made up of party functionaries,
technicians, and students, have been dispatched since
1973 to various work sites to spur production and improve
the performance of local cadre. The South Korean press
has jocularly characterized these teams as Kim Chong-ills
"shock troops"--an appellation that comes close to de-
scribing their mission.
Kim also called for a mass production emulation
campaign, known as the "Movement to Capture the Red Flag
of the Three Revolutions," to be "unfolded briskly."
This exhortation contrasts markedly with the relatively
modest endorsement that Kim gave the movement when it
was first revealed in late 1975. North Korean newspapers
have made clear that the Red Flag movement was organized
by the "party center"--a codeword used to describe the
activities of Kim Chong-il.
The exact status of Kim Chong.-il is difficult to
ascertain because the younger Kim does not make public
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appearances, and the regime does not mention him by name.
Through an elaborate use of honorific expressions in the
media, the regime nevertheless keeps the North Korean
populace--and knowledgeable foreign audiences--aware of
the son's activities. These endorsements by Kim in a
major anniversary address indicate that his son is grad-
ually consolidating his position and that the campaign
to groom him as successor may be entering a new and more
intensive phase. (CONFIDENTIAL)
19 September 1978
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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North Korea Chronology
(CONFIDENTIAL)
2 August
Kim Il-song presides over a joint
party-government meeting to assess
the results of the meeting of non-
aligned foreign ministers in Belgrade
in late July. The report praises the
"concerted action" the Asian states
took in supporting a pro-Pyongyang
resolution on Korean reunification,
but it acknowledges that the discus-
sion of the agenda items produced
"some controversy."
12-30 August A Chinese party delegation makes a
friendship visit to North Korea.
The delegation meets Kim Il-song on
28 August.
18 August - A Chinese military delegation led by
1 September Deputy Defense Minister Su Yu makes a
friendship visit to North Korea. Kim
Il-song receives the delegation on
30 August.
21 August Visiting Chinese military official
Yang Te-chih pledges that Chinese
armed forces will come to North
Korea's assistance "if Kim Il-song
and Hua Kuo-feng issue the order, in
case of necessity." In a statement
broadcast on 30 August, Yang ampli-
fies on the conditional pledge, say-
ing that the Chinese will intervene
if South Korea and the US "dare to
invade" North Korea.
23 August
A 20,000-ton cargo ship, the
Yonpungho, is launched at the west
coast port of Nampo.
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26 August The North Korean leadership attends
the opening of a six-story exhibit
hall in Pyongyang built to display
foreign gifts given to Kim Il-song.
28 August At a reception for the visiting Chi-
nese party delegation party secre-
tary Kim Yong-nam, who is responsi-
ble for Pyongyang's relations with
foreign communist parties, is iden-
tified for the first time as a full
member of the elite Political Com-
mittee of the Korean Workers Party.
2 September Kim Il-song attends the opening of an
east-west expressway between Pyong-
yang and Wonsan. The Army's 1"1550th
Engineer Unit" is given credit for
building the highway.
3 September Kim Il-song attends a ribbon-cutting
ceremony for the opening of the
"third stage" of the Pyongyang sub-
way. He also tours a new apartment
district in Pyongyang.
5 September Foreign visitors begin arriving for
the North Korean national day. Ac-
cording to Pyongyang, a total of 109
foreign delegations attend.
6 September. North Korea announces that, in con-
sideration of "good neighborly rela-
tions," it is releasing a Japanese
fishing boat that "intruded deep
into western coastal waters" on 4
September.
7 September The first stage of a Chinese-supplied
oil refinery (the "Ponghwa chemical
plant") near Sinuiju in northwest
North Korea is put into commission.
Kim Il-song sends a message of thanks
to Chinese technicians for their help.
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7-14 September
8 September
A delegation from the USSR led by
Vice President Matchanov attends na-
tional day ceremonies. The Soviet
group is placed near the bottom of
the long list of visiting delega-
tions. Kim Il-song does not meet
separately with it.
Kim Man-kun, recently named chairman
of the Pyongyang municipal people's
committee, is identified for the first
time as a member of the Political
Committee of the Korean Workers Party.
Kim, a veteran cadre, was at one time
a leading agricultural specialist.
8-13 September Chinese Politburo member and senior
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping heads
the Chinese delegation attending
national day ceremonies. Teng meets
twice with Kim Il-song (8 and 12 Sep-
tember) and makes a side trip to
Hamhung (11 September).
9 September Kim Il-song makes an 80-minute "his-
toric report" at the main ceremony
marking North Korea's 30th anniversary.
11 September Kang Hui-won, a relative of Kim I1-
song and long-time administrative
chief of Pyongyang city, is identi-
fied for the first time as a vice
premier.
12 September The Vietnamese news agency reports an
alleged admission by the North Korean
Ambassador in Hanoi that North Korean
newspapers went against party policy
when they reprinted excerpts in early
August from an article by the Chinese
Defense Minister criticizing Hanoi's
treatment of ethnic Chinese (the Hoa
people) in Vietnam.
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