EAST ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002200010020-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 13, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

National Secret
e6cPd9 Release 2002/05/07 : Cho BP 00VA002200010020-
Assessment NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
Center ORCON
East Asia
Review
Secret
RP EAR 79-007
13 March 1979
Copy 2
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National Security
Information
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
NOFORN (NF)
NOCONTRACT(NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
REL...
FGI
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Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
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Derivative classification by 035653
Review 30 years from date
Derived from multiple
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EAST ASIA REVIEW (U)
13 March 1979
CONTENTS
Indonesia-Malaysia: An Anxious Eye on the
Muslims (C-) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Events in Iran have aroused concern in the
Governments of Indonesia and Malaysia over
the possibility of agitation from their own
Muslim populations. (U)
25X6
CHRONOLOGY (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
25X1A
Indonesia-Malaysia: An Anxious Eye on the Muslims (C)
Events in Iran have aroused concern in the Govern-
ments of Indonesia and Malaysia over the possibility of
agitation from their own Muslim populations. (U)
The at least nominal adherence to Islam of 90 per-
cent of Indonesia's 140 million people makes it the
world's largest Muslim community. Although President
Suharto and most of his cohorts are Muslim in faith,
Muslim leaders have long complained that only lipservice
is given by the government to Muslim interests. Muslims
have been in the forefront of Indonesians who object to
the country's pro-Western orientation, a stance the gov-
ernment considers imperative if it is to acquire the
foreign funds essential for Indonesia's economic develop-
ment. (U)
Under the military-dominated government, Muslim
political activities have been as circumscribed as those
of any other group, and according to state policy Islam
is given equal recognition with other major religions.
The Muslim profession of most Indonesians does result in
some catering to them. For example, missionary work--
mainly Christian--has been forbidden among people who
already profess a religion, and all foreign assistance
for religious activities must be approved by a govern-
ment committee. (C)
Even before the recent changes in Iran, there had
been a "back to the mosque" movement in Indonesia.
Its more extreme manifestations have been in urban areas
among youths and intellectuals who apparently feel guilt
over their material possessions and secular lifestyles.
The Islamic revival in rural areas has largely been mod-
erate, and its leaders profess to see the benefits of
modernization. (C)
The triumph of the Khomeini forces in Iran has in-
creased sentiment in Indonesia for creation of an Is-
lamic state. The government has been disturbed by the
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appearance of large numbers of portraits of the Iranian
religious leader in West Java. The chairman of the na-
tional council of Muslim leaders has been cheered by
students with cries of "Be our Khomeini." (S NF NC)
Indonesian Muslim leaders have--out of fear of gov-
ernment countermeasures--refrained from public expres-
sions of satisfaction over Khomeini's success. None has
indicated plans to undertake similar agitation in Indo-
nesia, but the government has nevertheless taken measures
to monitor antigovernment sermons by planting agents in
the mosques. (S NF NC)
Muslim leaders are divided over the implications
for Indonesia of the developments in Iran. Some see
parallels with the claimed oppression of Indonesian Mus-
lims. These leaders discount the differences between
Iran's Shiites and Indonesia's Sunnis, saying events in
Iran symbolize a reuniting of Muslims worldwide regard-
less of sectarian allegiance. others, however, see the
basic differences between the Shiites and Sunnis as
militating against any similar upsurge in Indonesia.
(S NF NC)
The Sunnis in Indonesia lack the organizational
structure that produced the leadership in Iran. Their
many divisions seem to be a hedge against coordinated
and concerted antigovernment agitation. The Indonesian
Government is probably correct in assessing that the
number of Muslim extremists is small and that there is
no early prospect of an Indonesian Muslim leader with a
following comparable to that of Khomeini. Even so, most
government officials recognize that it is prudent not to
underestimate the popular appeal of the creation of an
Islamic state. (S NF NC OC)
In Malaysia, there has been no reported adulation
of Khomeini, even though Malaysian Muslims--generally
considered more orthodox in the practice of Islam than
the Indonesians--might be expected to react. (U)
Unlike their Indonesian brethren, Malaysian Muslims
do not feel oppressed. Government programs are focused
on the economic and educational betterment of ethnic
Malays--44 percent of the population and almost all
Muslim--against the economically dominant Chinese, who
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comprise 36 percent,of the population. Also, Islam is
the state religion in Malaysia, not just one among equals
as is the case in Indonesia. (U)
Despite the absence of Iran-inspired agitation, the
government is keeping a watchful eye on the fundamental-
ist dakwah (missionary) movement, active in Malaysia for
several years and apparently growing. The government
looks with favor on the movement's efforts to revitalize
the practice of Islam in Malaysia. A worrisome aspect,
however, is the rejection by some extremist groups of
the Western values and methods that Kuala Lumpur con-
siders essential to the success of its modernization
program. It fears extremists may be encouraged by the
Iranian example. (U)
Also worrisome is the extremists' intolerance of
"infidels," an attitude that disturbs Malaysia's uneasy
racial mix of Malays, Chinese, and Indians. An example
of the type of incidents the government fears could set
off communal strife was the desecration of Hindu temples
last summer by members of an extremist Muslim group. (U)
The government is also disturbed over the involve-
ment of young and educated Malays in the fundamentalist
movement. About 80 percent of Malays in the universities
are believed to be associated with dakwah groups. In em-
bracing a more traditional form of Islam, young people
are shunning Western-style clothes and ideas. This
phenomenon is seen even among students recently returned
from studies in Western countries and appears to be a
delayed rejection of Western permissiveness. The gov-
ernment is concerned that the attraction to more tradi-
tional ways not spill over into a rejection of the study
of modern science and technology that would impede Ma-
laysia's economic development. (C)
The government's plan to double the size of its
military forces over the next three years--although aimed
mainly at containing communist insurgency--is also in-
tended to bolster the government's ability to cope with
Muslim extremism. The government's shelving of plans
to purchase 60 US-produced aircraft now in Israeli hands
is a measure of the degree to which it feels bound to
cater to Muslim sentiment. It concluded that the
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probable revelation of the "taint" of previous Israeli
ownership could cause additional problems with revived
Islamic fundamentalism. (S NF NC OC)
The government of Prime Minister Hussein, dominated
by his United Malays National Organization, must strike
a balance between support for Islam and espousal of a
multiracial society. It wants to hold the allegiance
of Malay voters against the appeal of an opposition
Muslim fundamentalist party without adding to resentment
among the Chinese over preferential treatment for Malays
in business and education. An increase in Muslim ex-
tremism would compound the government's difficulties
in maintaining this balancing act. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
13 March 1979
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25X1A
North Korea: Chronology (U)
19 January At the request of North Korea, the
secretaries of the Military Armistice
Commission hold their 456th meeting.
In routine fashion, North Korea charges
the UN Command with numerous minor vio-
lations of the armistice agreement.
The 455th meeting of the MAC secre-
taries was held in September 1978,
also at the request of North Korea.
21 January Kim Il-song, for the second time in
eight months, inspects progress in the
development of the west coast port of
Nampo.
23 January North Korea, ostensibly responding to
South Korean President Pak's appeal on
19 January for a resumption of North-
South talks, puts forward a four-point
proposal calling for the convening in
September of a "pan-national congress"
composed of representatives of all
political parties and social groups.
The proposal, made by the Democratic
Front for the Reunification of the
Fatherland (DFRF), calls for a pre-
liminary meeting in Pyongyang in June
to plan the congress.
27 January The DFRF, responding to South Korea's
proposal to begin talks before June,
proposes that working-level represen-
tatives meet in early April.
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31 January North Korea, in a statement by its
official news'agency, KCNA, announces
its intent to implement unilaterally
the first two steps of the four-point
proposal of 23 January. Pyongyang re-
affirms its adherence to the princi-
ples of the 4 July 1972 joint state-
ment and asserts that it will stop
all polemics against South Korea on
1 February.
2 February North Korean media refer for the
first time to the First and Third
Machine Building Industry Ministries.
5 February The DFRF calls for the formation of a
"Preparatory Committee of National
Unification" to replace the North-
South Coordination Committee (NSCC),
which Pyongyang argues is no longer
a suitable mechanism for reunification
talks. Pyongyang proposes a meeting
of "liaison representatives" of the
North and South in Panmunjom on 20
February to set up the preparatory
committee.
13 February The DFRF, responding to Seoul's offer
to have contacts by NSCC representa-
tives in Panmunjom on 17 February,
says it will send "liaison representa-
tives" to the meeting. On 12 February,
Pyongyang had released the names of
four liaison representatives, headed
by Kwon Min-chun, the former chief
North Korean observer at the UN.
17 February Representatives from the North and
South meet for 80 minutes at Panmunjom
amid heavy media coverage by both
sides. Seoul seeks a reactivation of
the NSCC machinery; Pyongyang pushes
for its broader based preparatory
committee. The two sides agree to
have a second "contact" on 7 March.
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18 February The press in Cairo reports that Egypt
has sent North Korea a "protest memo-
randum" concerning the presence of
North Korean pilots in Libya.
20 February Kim Il-song, in his first publicly
reported activity since 22 January,
visits a petrochemical complex under
construction near Anju and convenes
a conference of chemical industry
specialists.
North Korea proposes that the North
and South form a "unified team" for
the 35th world ping-pong championships
scheduled to be held in Pyongyang in
late April. To this end, Pyongyang
calls for a meeting of sports offi-
cials from the two sides at Panmunjom
on 27 February.
Chinese Ambassador Liu Zhixian (Liu
Chih-hsien) returns to Pyongyang after
an absence of almost three months.
23 February Korea, in an authoritative "commenta-
tor's article" in the party daily,
protests the joint US - South Korean
military exercise "Team Spirit-79"
scheduled for 1-17 March. It says
the exercise casts a "dark cloud"
over the recently resumed North-South
political contacts.
27 February Representatives of the ping-pong as-
sociations of the North and South
meet at Panmunjom to discuss the for-
mation of a joint team for the world
tournament in April. The North pro-
poses that the team participate under
the official title "Koryo." The two
sides agree to continue discussions
at Panmunjom on 5 March.
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28 February In a Defense Ministry spokesman's
state the Team Spirit-79 military
exercise it is compelled to "hold in
abeyance" measures to implement the
third step of its four-point proposal
of 23 January. That step called for
both sides to stop all threatening
military activities effective 1 March.
2 March In a statement by the DFRF, North
Korea criticizes South Korea's failure
to halt its polemics and stop threaten-
ing military activities.
4 March A South Korean Army private assigned
to the 7th Division defects to North
Korea by crossing the Demilitarized
Zone during the early morning hours.
It is the first South Korean military
defection since an Army major crossed
the DMZ in June 1978.
Sports officials from the North and
South continue discussions in Panmunjom
on the formation of a single ping-gong
team. Seoul seeks a guarantee that
the South's team will be permitted to
participate in the world championship
matches in Pyongyang if efforts to
form a combined team fail. The two
sides agree to meet again on 9 March.
North and South political representa-
tives meet for a second "contact" at
Panmunjom. The North defends its
position on the need to set up a new
organization to prepare for full-
fledged talks; the South continues
to question the authority of the
DFRF. Both sides agree to have
another "contact" on 14 March.
The information in this article is unclassified.
3 March 1979
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Secret
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