CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200190002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 24, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
P2)
J/ALE ]@YUE
Chinese Affairs
Secret
1
,.Ij... N,r~
November 24, 1975
SC No. 00545/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11852, exemption category:
458(1), (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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NOCONTRACT/ORCON
CHINESE AFFAIRS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
November 24, 1975
Angola: A Propaganda Windfall . . . . . . . . .
4
Shaking Up Szechwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Bearish on the Fedayeen . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
China's Growing Trade
Deficit with Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Defining "Hegemony" for Japan. . . . . . . . . .
14
Tientsin Is China's
First Containership Port . . . . . . . . . . .
16
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6)
Angola: A Pro a ands -fall
Anti-Soviet vitriol has been a standard feature
of Chinese commentary on the Angolan strife for some
time. The effort to embarrass Moscow for its heavy-
handed involvement with the Popular Movement has,
however, gained momentum since Peking lowered the
visibility of its own involvement by withdrawing
Chinese advisers from Zairian training programs for
the National Front late last month. People's Daily
has carried two commentator articles in recent weeks
lambasting Soviet "interference" in Angola. The tra-
ditional independence day editorial gave heavy play
to this same theme. NCNA has carried several lengthy
reports of its own focusing on the Soviet role in
Angola, and its daily broadcasts have been saturated
with replays of anti-Soviet articles from numerous
African capitals.
At the same time, the Chinese have sought to
contrast Moscow's policy with Peking's "evenhanded"
approach to the Angolan imbroglio. An official
statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on
November 15, for example, gave official endorsement
to the stand taken by the Organization of African
Unity (OAU)--includinq non-recognition of any Angolan
government until "national unity" has been achieved--
while charging the Soviets with efforts to "sow dis-
cord and create disharmony" in Angola. Two days
later the Chinese ambassador in Kampala delivered
an official letter to OAU Chairman Amin--whose recent
frictions with Moscow over the Angolan situation have
been widely reported by the Chinese media--which
praised and supported his mediatory efforts. Uncon-
firmed reports from Kampala indicate that Amin may
also have been invited to visit China in the near
future.
Despite this public posture, the South Africans
reportedly sighted a Chinese vessel transferring cargo
to trawlers off the Angolan coast on November 11--in
November 24, 1975
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an area just off the territory controlled by the Na-
tional Union. The Chinese vessel could have been
making good a long-standing Chinese promise to pro-
vide some arms to Jonas Savimbi's group. An earlier
arms shipment destined for delivery to the Union was
embargoed by Tanzanian President Nyerere.
In light of the embarrassment that public dis-
closure of such direct assistance would cause, future
Chinese assistance will probably be channeled through
~' African intermediaries such as Zaire's Mobutu in order
to leave Peking with a plausible case for denying any
direct role in Angola. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/
ORCON)
November 24, 1975
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Shaking U Szechwan
A number of new provincial party secretaries
have been named in the last few months. Most are
veteran civilians who held similar posts before the
Cultural Revolution and who suffered under the as-
saults of leftist Red Guards. Many of the more re-
cent appointees attended the national Tachai con-
ference, convened in mid-September, and their ap-
pointments seem specifically designed to strengthen
provincial leadership in support of Peking's pri-
ority goal of economic progress and to underscore
the regime's commitment to social and political
stability.
Szechwan provides a good example of the pro-
vincial party shakeup now under way. Although Peking
has riot yet publicly revealed the transfer of former
Kwangtung first secretary Chao Tzu-yang to Szechwan,
the populace has been informed in official party
documents. The delay seems related to changes below
the first secretary level--four new secretaries have
been named in Szechwan recently, three of whom were
secretaries prior to the Cultural Revolution, and
there is an unconfirmed report that the second sec-
retary has been transferred. An unusual number of
Szechwan leaders were in Peking for National Day on
October 1, suggesting that meetings on the new
leadership arrangement were under way. Chao Tzu-yang
may still be involved in meetings at the center be-
cause the lame duck first secretary, Liu Hsing-yuan,
appeared in Szechwan in late October after news of
the rotations was passed down. Liu is variously
reported as slated for the top job in Kwangsi and
as remaining in Szechwan as the Chengtu Military
Region commander.
Numerous reports agree that Chao Tzu-yang was
sent to Szechwan to improve lagging agricultural
production. To achieve this goal, Chao will have
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to overcome persistent and deep rooted factionalism
that has been only slightly less pronounced than in
Chekiang. The central authorities brought troops in
to restore order in that province and have now turned
their attention to Szechwan, and the difficult process
of restoring order and production there seems to be
under way.
Although the situation in Szechwan was not quite
as bad as in Chekiang, the solution will probably be
more difficult. Szechwan is China's most populous
province and has many more industrial facilities
than Chekiang. On the other hand, the growing au-
thority of the no-nonsense Vice Premier '.Deng Hsiao-
ping, a new sense of unity at the center, the heavy
and continuing propaganda barrage against bourgeois
factionalism, and Peking's demonstrated willingness
to take the measures necessary to restore order--
including the use of troops--may make the contending
forces in Szechwan and other troubled provinces more
amenable to compromise. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)
November 24, 1975
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Bearish on the Fedaveen
After some fairly open wooing of fedayeen groups
this summer, the Chinese are again turning cool toward
the Palestinians. Fedayeen delegations that were
greeted with considerable ceremony when they visited
China during the summer, for example, are now being
received in a more low key manner, and there have been
signs of friction during discussions between the visi-
tors and Chinese officials. Differing views over the
Soviet role in the Middle East have undoubtedly been
a major bone of contention.
The Chinese viewed the Sinai II agreement as a
major setback for the Soviets but have voiced appre-
hension that Moscow is capitalizing on militant Arab
backlash to the agreement. In recent months, pub-
lic and private Chinese commentary on the Middle East
has focused almost exclusively on warnings of "de-
structive" Soviet tactics in the region and on the
need for the Arabs to submerge their differences and
maintain unity (see Chinese Affairs, September 29,
1975). Such Chinese advice may go down with less
militant Arabs, particularly the Egyptians, but
clearly does not appeal to the Palestinians, who be-
lieve that their cause was ignored in the Sinai II
negotiations and that a Soviet role in any future ne-
gotiations is in their best interest.
Peking's strong opposition to any such Soviet
role was reflected in the decision not to participate
in the recent voting on the UN resolution calling for
Palestinian participation in any UN-sponsored Middle
East conference. The Chinese have traditionally voted
with the Arabs on Palestinian related issues at the
UN. In this case, however, they believed that the
resolution would provide further impetus for a re-
convening of the Geneva Conference and bring Moscow
back onto center stage in the Middle East. In ex-
plaining his country's stand on the issue, the Chi-
nese representative stated that China firmly opposed
any "expanded superpower role" in the region.
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Suspicion of fedayeen ties with the Soviets also
appears to be coloring Peking's outlook on Pales-
tinian involvement in the Lebanese strife. Last
summer when the Chinese were trying to exploit strains
between Mosocw and the PLO, Peking had high praise
for fedayeen attempts to limit the fighting in Beirut.
With Soviet-Palestinian relations again on the up-
swing, the Chinese now appear convinced that a major
Palestinian role in working out a compromise between
the Lebanese groups will only result in increased
Soviet influence in Beirut. Chinese officials are
privately opposing any "external" involvement what-
soever in Lebanon.
All this, however, does not point toward a com-
plete freeze in Peking's relations with the Pales-
tinians. The Chinese are well aware of fedayeen
potential for upsetting the delicate balance in the
Middle East and will want to maintain contacts if
for no other reason than to monitor Palestinian ac-
tivities and attitudes. The Palestinian cause will
also remain too important in China's efforts at
Third World leadership for Peking to risk major fric-
tion or strains. The fedayeen, for their part, rec-
ognize that the leverage their ties with Peking give
them with the Soviets is reason enough to keep the
relationship correct if not cordial. (SECRET NOFORN)
November 24, 1975
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China's Growing Trade Deficit with Japan
China's trade with Japan, its largest trading
partner, will show a record deficit of over $1
billion this year, despite Peking's efforts to
reduce its trade deficits with non-Communist
countries.
For the first nine months of 1975 China reg-
istered an $880 million deficit in trade with Japan
compared with $845 million for all of 1974. In-
creased purchases of Japanese steel, machinery
and equipment, and fertilizer pushed imports up 40
percent over the same period in 1974. Chinese
exports rose only 18 percent for the first three
quarters to $1.02 billion. Crude oil deliveries
accounted for all of the increase.
Recession continues to hold down Japanese
demand for other Chinese goods, with Tokyo's
embargo on raw silk imports being a major factor in
the decline. Textiles are a major Chinese export,
and Japanese government efforts to protect domestic
industries has caused problems. The Chinese, trying
to boost other exports to Japan, have sent seven
Chinese trade missions to Japan so far this year
seeking increased sales.
Japanese trade makes up about one fourth of
China's total trade.--in addition to being the major
supplier of industrial goods, Japan last year
supplanted Hong Kong as China's largest export
market. Oil has become the dominant item, account-
ing for almost one half the total this year.
Negotiations on a long term agreement for oil are
currently bogged down, and one probably will not be
signed until next year because of Japanese re-
luctance to accept the large increases the Chinese
are trying to sell. Price is also a problem. Peking
recently raised the price of oil to Japan for the
last quarter by 20 cents to $12.30 per barrel, a
move that would increase Chinese earnings by $3 to
$4 million.
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The trade deficit with Japan will not improve
much next year. Peking has been able to obtain
lower prices for Japanese steel and fertilizer for
delivery into 1976 which will hold down import costs,
but major improvement in exports to Japan will depend
on Peking's ability to boost oil sales and some re-
covery of the Japanese economy, which would increase
the demand for Chinese goods. (UNCLASSIFIED)
November 24, 1975
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SECRET SPOKE
Definin "He emon " for
Japan
for Japan
The Chinese are using the "anti-hegemony" issue
in the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty as a peg
for sharp propaganda attacks on Soviet "expansionism"
in Asia.
In recent months, the Chinese have maintained
a steady flow of comment on what they characterize
as wide popular support in Japan for early agreement
on the peace treaty--and for a strong statement in
the treaty opposing attempts by any country to estab-
lish hegemony in Asia. Although the Chinese are not
specifically naming the Soviet Union as the target
of this campaign, there is no doubt that it is aimed
at Moscow.
In their Japanese campaign, the Chinese are
focusing on the northern territories issue as an
example of Moscow's "hegemonistic" designs in Asia.
Peking is even more adamant than Tokyo in contend-
ing that the northern territories, a group of islands
north of Hokkaido that have been occupied by the
Soviet Union since the end of World War II, should
be returned to Japan. The Chinese argue that the
Soviet objection to the anti-hegemony clause in the
Sino-Japanese peace treaty is based on Moscow's fear
of losing these islands. Last week, Chinese media
reported that Japan-China Friendship Association
leader Hisao Kuroda, while in Peking on a visit, had
specifically made this link between Soviet opposition
to the hegemony statement and Moscow's desire "to
perpetuate its illegal occupation" of the islands.
The Chinese hope to use the link with the sen-
sitive northern territories issue to make it diffi-
cult for Tokyo to water down any subsequent "defini-
tion" of hegemony after the treaty has been signed.
Japanese Prime Minister Miki and Foreign Minister
Miyazawa have implied that they could agree to in-
cluding anti-hegemony language in the Sino-Japanese
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treaty, but would insist on "defining" hegemonism as
a "universal peace principle" not directed at any
specific country.
While the Chinese will continue their firm op-
position to any Japanese move that would in any way
imply that the Soviets were not the main target of
the anti-hegemony clause, they have already indicated
they would not object to a Japanese explanation that
the clause does not imply a commitment to joint ac-
tion against another country. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)
November 24, 1975
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Tientsin Is China's First Containership Port
Chinese reports indicate that new construction
has made Tientsin, the port for Peking, the first
port in China capable of accommodating container-
ships. Tientsin now has berths for 10 ships over
10,000 tons, and the new container docks together
with new railways and warehouses have reportedly
doubled the cargo-handling capacity of the port.
China is also building container facilities at
Shanghai and at Canton's port, Huang-pu. In ad-
dition to reducing port congestion because of faster
loading and unloading, containerships with their
greater speeds and cargo volumes are much more eco-
nomical to operate than ordinary freighters.
(UNCLASSIFIED)
November 24, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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