MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00865A002200020002-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 22, 2001
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 17, 1975
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00865A002200020002-5.pdf214.43 KB
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 Sec t NO MORN TLLEY L1ED E Middle East Africa South Asia Secret No 0881/75 November 17, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 ~^ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 NOFORN/ORCON Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL) NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL... - This Information has been Authorized for Release to ... Classified by 010725 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: 058(1), (2), and (3) Automatically declassified on. Data Impossible to Determine Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/ E+ QRIW79T00865A002200020002-5 This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com- munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. Iran: EC Officials Optimistic on Trade Pact . . .l Nigeria: Armed Forces Purge Launched. . . . . . . 2 Afghanistan-Pakistan: Afghan Posture on Banning of Pakistani Political Party . . . . . . 3 Nov 17, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/OP ~l 9T00865A002200020002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 1kpr79T00865AO02200020002-5 Iran EC Officials Optimistic on Trade Pact EC Commission officials profess to be optimistic that some kind of trade agreement with Iran will eventually be concluded. The parties will probably meet in December. e Iranians are no longer asking for a preferential pact, recognizing that the US strongly opposes such an agreement. Tehran has nevertheless made clear that it wants the same pre- ferential access granted Mediterranean countries for several non-agricultural products. These presumably include older Iranian exports like rugs and newer exports like oil products, petrochemicals, and metals. The EC is trying for a compromise. It probably will try, within the context of a non-preferential pact, to meet Iran's economic interests as well as the Shah's desire for added prestige. An economic and technical cooperation arrangement probably also will be included. (CONFI:DENTIAL NOFORN) Nov 17, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/0 ED1A RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 Approved For Releas 2QQ%0FJj : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200020002-5 Nigeria Armed Forces Purge Launched Nigeria's new military regime has quietly begun a housecleaning of the armed forces similar to its earlier purge of the country's public service. the military housecleaning pro- ably will not result in a significant reduction in the size of Nigeria's 250,000-man army, the largest standing force in black Africa. Starting with the officers corps, discharges will be made on grounds of incompetence, old age, ill health, and corruption. Those discharged for bad conduct will be ineligible for retirement benefits or rehabilitation training for civilian jobs. The decision to extend the purge to the armed forces appears to have been taken collectively by the ruling 22-man Supreme Military Council and is not a vendetta being pushed by a particular group of senior officers for reasons of their own. So far, 20 naval officers have been dismissed with an undetermined number of army and air force officers to follow. Housecleaning in the enlisted ranks will include the demobilization of all former servicemen recalled to duty during the recent civil war. there is a good deal of discontent among those o icers slated for retire- ment or who fear their turn is next. those discharge wi n pro- est too loudly tor tear of losing what benefits they will get or being punished severely. it is unclear at this stage whether the ouse- eaning will create a large number of disgruntled ex- ervicemen who could become a source of unrest. So far, the regime has met with surprisingly little oppo- h s ra ho and o i o - it e. e. e. v e l f. u0 c s ex v se1 va111i7. who have been dismissed. (SECRET NOFORN) Nov 17, 1975 2 020002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 SECRET Afghanistan-Pakistan Afghan Posture on Banning of Pakistani Political Party Afghanistan has reacted with relative moderation so far to a Pakistani Supreme Court decision last month that upheld the Bhutto government's banning earlier this year of an Afghan-supported political party. Afghan President Daoud, however, may still be weighing how to deal with this issue, and he could decide in favor of a more militant policy. ~_- r L~13 0, affirmed Islamabad's decree of last February labelling the National Awami Party as subversive and r)loutlawing it. The verdict. was quickly followed by wo blasts of critical commentary on Afghanistan's L\ Jovernment-controlled radio. Since then- gnan posture nas been surprisingly restraine iven the Daoud regime's long-standing critical stance toward Prime Minister Bhutto's policy of sup- pressing the National Awami Party and spurning its emand for greater autonomy for the two Pakistani provinces bordering on Afghanistan. The people of these provinces--Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier--are ethnically closer to the Afghans than to most other Pakistanis. Almost all of the Awami party's domestic support is concentrated in the two provinces. (government may still be pondering =to respond to the Pakistani Supreme Court's action. Daoud's decision may be affected by whether Bhutto makes further legal or other moves soon against already- imprisoned National Awami Party leaders, especially party chief Wali Khan. Daoud might decide to launch a new round of vituperative anti-Pakistani propaganda, and he could also step up his government's material assistance to anti-Islamabad elements in the two border provinces. (Continued) Nov 17, 1975 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200020002-5 SECRET Daoud will probably try to keep Pakistani-Afghan frictions from getting out of control, however. He knows that Pakistan is militarily much stronger than Afghanistan and also that Islamabad might strike back by instigating dissidence within his country. Daoud is aware, moreover, that most of Kabul's foreign economic benefactors, particularly neighboring Iran, would look askance at Afghan moves that threatened to disrupt the region's delicate stability. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/ ORLON) Nov 17, 1975 Approved For Release M/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200020002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200020002-5