SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100300002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 14, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
ass
RTI~,-~P HO
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
November 14, X975
No. 0774/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
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ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11552, exemption category:
* 58(1). (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 14, 1975
CPSU Politburo Members at
Foreign Party Congresses. . . . . . . . . . . 1
Yugoslavs to Take More
Active Role in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenov Visit
Improves Tone of Relations. . . . . . . . . . 5
ANNEX: Soviet Relations with Western
Europe, October to mid-November . . . . . . . 7
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CPSU Politburo Members at Foreign Party Congresses
According to an official at the Soviet embassy
in Warsaw, party boss Brezhnev will attend the next
congress of the Polish Communist Party which is
scheduled to begin on December 8. Assuming he goes,
it will be the 13th foreign party congress to his
credit. He heads the list of full members of the
Politburo performing this chore.
Since becoming General Secretary in 1964,
Brezhnev has concentrated on the six East European
members in more or less good standing of the
"socialist commonwealth", leaving "less important"
congresses to other members of the Politburo. He
attended the Romanian Congress in 1965, but in 1974
left the job of representing the CPSU in Bucharest
to Kirilenko. That same year, Kirilenko also at-
tended the Yugoslav Congress, thus ending the long-
standing Soviet practice of boycotting congresses
of the Yugoslav party. Kirilenko and Pelshe each
has six congresses under his belt.
Full members of the Politburo with highly
visible government positions do not attend the
congresses of foreign parties. Andropov, Grechko,
Gromyko, Kosygin, Mazurov, and Podgorny have not
attended a foreign party congress in the last 10
years. (Andropov and Mazurov each attended one
congress during this period, but neither at the
time was a full member of the CPSU Politburo.)
Kulakov and Polyansky have also attended no foreign
party congresses.
A list of Politburo members attending the
congresses of foreign parties since October 1964
follows:
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Andropov--1965-Romania
(became full member Politburo 1973)
Brezhnev--1965--Romania
1966--Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Hungary
1967--East Germany
1968--PD land
1970--Hungary
1971--Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Poland
East Germany
1975--Hungary
Grishin--1968--Poland (with Brezhnev)
1972--Italy
Gromyko--None
Kirilenko--1965--Chile
1970--France
1971--Mongolian People's Republic
1974--Romania
Yugoslavia
1975--Italy
Kosygin--None
Kulakov--None
Kunayev--1971--India
Mazurov--1964--Belgium
(became full member Politburo 1965)
Pelshe--1965--Denmark
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1967--France
1968--India
1969--Finland
1972--Finland
1975--Finland
Podgorny--None
Polyansky--None
Shcherbitsky--1971--Bulgaria
Suslov--1966--Italy (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Yugoslavs to Take More Active
Role in Europe
Belgrade is preparing to take advantage of its
position as host for the follow-up CSCE meeting in
1977 to press its views on post-Helsinki Europe.
to assume a very active role in following
Foreign Minister Minic
at Yugoslavia
25X6
in en s
the implementation of the Helsinki accords. Minic
said Belgrade's preliminary view is that the East
is showing a "restrictive tendency" regarding con-
fidence-building measures, while the West is over-
emphasizing the Basket III agreements. Minic in-
dicated that Yugoslavia sees this as a perpetuation
of the bloc-to-bloc mentality in Europe which is
the greatest danger to the Helsinki agreement.
Belgrade has long envisioned itself as a spokes-
man for the interests of smaller European countries
ainst bloc interests. If, as Minic claims, Yugo-
ag
slavia assumes an activist role in CSCE implementa-
tion, it might cause some waves in Western Europe.
These would be small, however, compared to the
potential Soviet reaction if Yugoslavia pressed its
case for CSCE implementation in Moscow's eastern
buffer area. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenov Visit
Improves Tone of Relations
Sofia and Belgrade have apparently decided to
try to come to grips with the seemingly omnipresent
problems in their bilateral relations. Quick solu-
tions are not likely, but, provided both sides abide
by the new spirit of reasonableness, there could be
a hiatus in the squabbling between the two Balkan
rivals.
The new attitude emerged during Bulgarian For-
eign Minister Petur Mladenov's visit to Belgrade
from November 11 to 13. In talks with his Yugoslav
counterpart Milos Minic, Mladenov apparently ad-
dressed major bilateral issues, including the sen-
sitive Macedonian problem. Press announcements re-
ferred to the discussions as "friendly" and "frank,"
and described the atmosphere as one of "full open-
ness and readiness" to discuss their difficulties.
Minic and Mladenov agreed on an eventual meet-
ing of Presidents Tito and Zhivkov to discuss "ways
I 'wand means" for resolving their disputes. The sum-
mit is, however, clearly dependent on an effort. by
the two sides to limit polemics.
During toasts at official dinners in Belgrade,
both men recited their differences, but said the
problems should not rule out future close coopera-
tion in all spheres. The communique summarizing
the talks accentuated a mutual desire to improve
relations based on the principles of "equality, in-
dependence, respect for territorial integrity...
and noninterference in internal affairs."
The communique attached "exceptional impor-
tance" to mutual efforts to harness "information
_Y""activities" as a means of building an atmoshpere
of trust. This presumably means that vociferous
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Yugoslav press polemics and the occasional inflam-
matory publications appearing in Bulgaria will be
held in check for a time.
Agreeing to discuss their differences is the
most progress toward improving Yugoslav-Bulgarian
relations in several years. A number of factors
could still undermine these good intentions. The
most immediate threat is the Bulgarian census sched-
uled for December, which will, Belgrade fears, omit
a category for Macedonians. Jointly claimed cul-
tural heroes, the role of the Bulgarian military in
"liberating" Yugoslavia during World War II, and
Belgrade's wariness of Sofia as a stand-in for So-
viet interests all offer hotheads on both sides of
the border opportunities to scotch any progress.
On Balkan cooperation and the proposed Cara-
manlis conference, the two seem to be moving closer
together. Stressing the importance of bilateral
cooperation, Minic and Mladenov supported multilat-
eral efforts "only in those fields that are really
acceptable and of interest to the Balkan countries."
Sofia has declared it is against any multilateral
activity of a political nature, and Belgrade has
emphasized that it is premature even to consider
ambitious inter-Balkan ties. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Soviet Relations with Western Europe
Octo er to mid-Novemer
CSCE/NATO
Controversy over CSCE implementation centered
on the military-related "confidence-building meas-
ures" (CBMs) that NATO and the neutrals had succeeded
in incorporating in the conference final act against
the strenuous effort by the Warsaw Pact to curtail
its application.
The initial reaction of the Soviets and their
allies to CBMs, notably Brezhnev's speech at Helsinki,
was at least superficially positive. In subsequent
weeks, however, the Soviets seemed to be disconcerted
by the scale of both the NATO exercises and the no-
tifications preceding them. The NATO members had
determined to adhere scrupulously to the text of the
Helsinki accord and provided full advance notifica-
tion not only of exercises meeting the numerical
threshold (25,000 troops), but also some smaller
ones.
Meanwhile, the Soviets launched an unusually
voluminous and vehement propaganda attack on NATO's
series of fall exercises, which it claimed were
unprecedented in scope. Soviet media asserted that
these exercises violated the spirit of Helsinki and,
by reviving the specter of a Soviet threat, con-
stituted a lame effort by Western militarists to
neutralize the achievements of the conference. The
NATO exercises may have seemed larger than usual to
the Soviets because a number of exercises were inte-
grated into a single program (Autumn Forge).
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Initially, CBMs were spared from criticism, but
beginning on September 15 several articles charged
that the advance notification of maneuvers was
irrelevent and that notification did not obviate the
deleterious effect of the maneuvers on detente.
Soviet criticism of CBMs tapered off in October
and was not formalized by leadership endorsements.
Nevertheless, the Soviets have not yet officially
acknowledged Western notification of exercises, sent
observers, or provided notification of their ex-
ercises. Using the argument that the presence of
Warsaw Pact observers would undermine the position
that the NATO exercises were inconsistent with
detente, the Soviets reportedly advised their allies
that they, too, should neither acknowledge receipt
of notifications nor send observers to the exercises.
All the Warsaw Pact members, including the Romanians,
took the advice.
The Soviets are obviously uncomfortable with
CBMs and their unresponsiveness to NATO notifica-
tions seems designed to make it easier for the
Warsaw Pact not to invite observers to its exercises.
The Soviets may also hope that their policy will
encourage NATO to see the agreement as less stringent.
There has been no evidence to date to confirm specula-
tion that the Warsaw Pact has either failed to pro-
vide notification of an exercise meeting the param-
eters for notification, or revised its exercise for-
mat to keep from meeting the parameters.
Technically, the Soviets are on solid ground
since, at their insistence, the Helsinki text cover-
ing the CBM's stipulates that they should be under-
taken voluntarily. Still, if the Soviets flagrantly
disregard the CBM provision, they will be held to
account when the day of reckoning comes in Belgrade
two years hence.
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The once-vaunted "special relationship" between
the USSR and France seemed to have lost much of its
remaining luster after Giscard's visit from October
:L4 to 18, his first to the Soviet Union since be-
coming president. In a sense, as some French ob-
servers pointed out, the visit merely helped bring
appearances in line with reality, since Moscow's
improved relations with the US and West Germany had
made detente with France less important and Soviet-
French relations had been cooling even under Pompidou.
Later reporting tended to discount speculation
that an abrupt change in Giscard's schedule was
meant as a snub by the Soviets or that Brezhnev im-
provised a harsh rebuttal to Giscard's remarks on
"ideological disarmament" during their initial ex-
change of speeches. In the latter part of the visit,
both leaders made studied efforts to convey an at-
mosphere of cordiality and accomplishment. Never-
theless, the visit left an unmistakeable aftertaste
of strain and unfulfillment.
Disagreements over CSCE implementation appeared
to be the main source of discord, at least at the
working level. Giscard was the first leader of a
major Western country to visit Moscow since the
Helsinki conference, and the Soviets may have used
his visit to impress the West in general with their
toughness on CSCE. The Soviets have taken the posi-
tion that the Helsinki agreements on improved human
contacts are not automatically self-implementing,
but must be put into force via bilateral arrange-
ments. The lesson of the Giscard visit is that
even bilateral agreements will not be easy to obtain.
The Soviets made some effort to meet French
concerns on Basket III matter by agreeing to issue
multiple exit/entry visas for journalists. The
Soviets, to the surprise of the French, quickly
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accepted the French proposal, probably because they
had already reached a similar accord with the US.
Moreover, the Helsinki text clearly obligates the
Soviets to grant such visas. In return, the French
said some favorable things about a world disarmament
conference, which they probably regarded as a harm-
less gesture to Soviet interests.
The principal documents signed by Giscard and
Brezhnev were a brief formal communique and a friend-
ship declaration. The declaration speaks of the need
to deepen bilateral consultations, but does not for-
mally change the 1970 protocol on consultations. It
stresses the importance of summit meetings and agrees
to hold them on a "periodic basis," which may be a
step toward formalizing the annual summit conclaves.
While the political atmosphere was clouded,
economic relations progressed smoothly. Bilateral
agreements were signed on cooperation in civil
aviation, tourism, and energy. Most of these had
been negotiated beforehand and were intended mainly
to ensure some tangible results from the talks.
Sizeable trade agreements were also signed, and
Giscard said that the possibility of increasing
French oil imports from the Soviet Union was dis-
cussed, but no agreements were reached. The Soviets
apparently tried to convince the French to purchase
more oil in order to reduce an embarrassing trade
deficit.
West Germany
Helmut Kohl, chairman and chancellor-candidate
of the Christian Democratic Union, was in the USSR
September 22-30. His main purpose was to enhance
his status on the domestic scene by showing that
he could deal with the Soviets. In this he received
an unexpected--and certainly unintended--boost from
his hosts. During the trip Pravda published an
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article severely criticizing Christian Social Union
leader Franz Josef Strauss, who was then in China.
Kohl demonstrated his displeasure over the attack
on his nominal political ally by canceling his ap-
pointments for the following day, but did not scuttle
the trip, all of which earned him a good press back
home.
The Soviets claimed to be nonplussed by Kohl's
reaction, but it is not inconceivable that they
intentionally ran the article to test Kohl's mettle.
They did not hesitate to their antipathy to Strauss'
political views. Indeed, Premier Kosygin told Kohl
that he agreed with the anti-Strauss article 100
percent and would have worded it even more strongly.
Kohl and other CDU members who accompanied him
described his conversation with Kosygin as frank,
open, and constructive. Kohl and Kosygin discussed
Berlin and East-West German relations, CSCE, MBFR,
bilateral trade and economic cooperation, family
reunification, and ethnic German emigration from
the Soviet Union. Kohl had not expected any break-
through and none was achieved. Indeed, the day
after Kohl left, Pravda published an article reit-
erating customary Soviet opposition to West German
ties with West Berlin.
Foreign Ministers Genscher and Gromyko met in
New York during the UNGA to discuss pending bilateral
agreements that have been stymied by the problem
of including West Berlin. Some progress was made,
but problems remain. Discussion of these issues
were also discussed during Genscher's recently
finished visit with President Scheel, to the USSR.
This visit is being billed as primarily a protocol
exercise, but some substantive issues are bound to
come up and both sides would like to have some
tangible progress to show for their efforts. The
early signs are that by at least outward appear-
ances there will be no repetition of the Giscard
contretemps. Genscher told the press that some
progress had been made.
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Portugal
The Soviets continued to monitor events in
Portugal closely, but their media approach was
mainly reportorial and much less shrill than in the
final weeks of the Goncalves regime. Criticism of
Western "meddling" in Portugal continued, but it,
also, was muted. Moscow's commentary focused on
the danger of a rightist resurgence, always a safe
theme.
The Soviet approach to Portuguese events seemed
once again to follow the lead of the Portuguese Com-
munist Party. Both criticized the Portuguese So-
cialists, but with more restraint than had been
shown during the crisis days of August, and both
declared open season on the Popular Democrats, ex-
pelling them from the "progressive" ranks. Both
lauded the concept of leftist unity, but there was
little evidence they were doing much in a concrete
way to foster it.
No new information appeared this month about
overt or covert Soviet intervention in Portugal.
Seeking the positive, Soviet commentary empha-
sized the underlying social changes, such as land
redistribution, that have taken place--what Moscow
has long described as the "unfinished business" of
the revolution. By implication, these changes are
irreversible, and so create a lasting potential for
further leftward shifts, regardless of the day-to-
day political balance in Lisbon.
Most of the Soviets are probably not altogether
displeased about the present equilibrium in Portugal
but it is entirely possible that the subject re-
mains controversial and that an active minority
may be unreconciled. The Portuguese Communist Party
has received a setback, but is still influential
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out of proportion to its numbers, seemingly too
well entrenched to be completely suppressed. Even
after a partial retraction, the present Portu-
guese government is far to the left of Caetano, more
open to the Soviets, and more of a problem to NATO.
The Portuguese revolution has given the Soviets an
opportunity to meddle in vast areas of Africa that
are far more important economically than European
Portugal.
Most important of all, as the situation has
stabilized, Portugal has become less contentious
in Soviet relations with the major Western powers.
The Soviets have always placed maintenance of these
relations ahead of gains in Portugal--although of
course not rejecting such gains if they were "free-
bies."
?pain
It takes little imagination to perceive the
potential the Soviets see for gains in Spain, but
Soviet media conveyed only a suggestion of the im-
portance with which they view the country. Develop-
ments in Spain were reported regularly, but the
Soviets held their cards close to the vest, making
no commitments and revealing little of their own
attitude. Much of the Soviet commentary took the
easy way out, condemning the execution of the Basque
terrorists with fervent rhetoric. The only real
judgment made was that "Francoism" was finished,
but the Soviets left it unclear whether Franco's
successor was also being written off. Similarly,
the real Soviet attitude toward the independent-
minded Spanish CP remained largely a mystery, al-
though Moscow has said some relatively positive
things about the PCE's leadership of the Domocratic
Junta and dutifully reports PCE statements, etc.
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Norway
The Soviets accepted a Norwegian proposal to
resume talks on delimiting their continental shelf
boundary in the Barents Sea on November 24. The
first round ended inconclusively late last year,
and it is unlikely that much progress will be made
at the forthcoming session.
This is the area into which the Soviets fired
several SS-7 intercontinental ballistic missiles in
the period beginning September 16. The flexing of
missiles was probably intended to notify Norway,
and possibly other interested parties, that the
Soviets are concerned about protecting what they
regard as special interests in the far northern
waters and to disabuse the Norwegians of any idea
that the forthcoming negotiations will be easy.
The impact area is now claimed by both sides
as part of their continental shelf. It is within
the "sector line" extending from a point on the
extreme west of the USSR's Arctic coast to the North
Pole which the Soviets claim as their boundary. It
is, however, well west of the "median line,"
equidistant between neighboring land masses, which
the Norwegians claim. The Norwegian concept is
generally recognized in international law.
The Norwegians were given advance notification
of the missile firings. They admit that the impact
area is in international waters, but expressed con-
cern to the Soviets because the firings endangered
Norwegian navigation and fishing and because the
area was the subject of negotiations.
The impact area is also extremely close to the
sea boundary of Svalbard, and the missile firings
may have been intended in part to indicate Soviet
concern over developments in this area. Under the
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1920 Spitzbergen (Svalbard) treaty, the Norwegians
have sovereignty over all the land areas within
specified coordinates. The Soviets do not dispute
this point, but contend that they have the right to
exploit the continental shelf within the treaty
limits, a claim the Norwegians do not accept.
While the Soviets wish to protect their own
rights on the Svalbard shelf, which is thought to
be rich in oil, they appear, conversely, to be
worried that other foreign countries may do the
same. The Soviets have expressed concern that oil-
drilling rigs in the North Sea could be used for
espionage purposes by NATO, or give NATO a pretext
for extending its naval operations into new areas.
They may entertain similar fears with respect to
the Barents Sea.
Canada
A visit by Foreign Minister Gromyko on Sep-
tember 25-26 resulted in solution of the two coun-
tries' fishing dispute. Canada's Atlantic ports,
which had been closed to the Soviet fishing fleet
on July 23, were reopened effective September 29.
Gromyko's visit and the ensuing agreement were ap-
parently instigated by Prime Minister Trudeau's
expression of concern to Brezhnev at the European
security conference.
Finland
Soviet Chief of the General Staff Kulikov led
a military delegation to Finland from October 13-18.
He toured military facilities and observed Finnish
military exercises, but the purpose of the visit
was primarily political. Three more Finnish moose
became casualties of Soviet-Finnish detente. (SECRET
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