SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000350001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
October 31, -19-5
No. 0770/75
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
October 31, 1975
Moscow Pessimistic on Cairo Ties. . . . . . . . 1
Hanoi Gets Aid From Moscow;
Backs Detente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Yugoslavs Believe More Work
Needed on Final Document, for
European Communist Conference . . . . . . . . 4
Romanian Youth: The State of the Union . . . . 6
Soviet Fumigation Policy
May Delay Grain Imports . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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Moscow Pessimistic On Cairo Ties
The Soviet ambassador in Cairo who returned to
his post in mid-October after an extended period of
consultations in Moscow recently said that Soviet-
Egyptian relations had reached the' Inwpqt point
since the 1952 Egyptian revolution.
I lit
seems p ausi e an tnere is o iU eViaencecnat Am-
bassador Polyakov and Fahmi had a heated two-hour
discussion on October 18.
Polyakov said he had returned from Moscow with
instructions to be civil with the Egyptians, but
that his session with Fahrni had convinced him that
Cairo was not interested in improving bilateral re-
lations. Indeed, Polyakov apparently got the im-
pression from Fahmi that the Egyptians might soon
move to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian friendship
treaty.
Moscow has demonstrated continuing nervousness
over the future of the treaty. Pravda, for example,
in its scathing denunciation of Egyptian policies
and Sinai II on the eve of President Sadat's arrival
in the US this week, went to great lengths to point
out that it was Sadat himself who had called for the
1971 accord.
Polyakov indicated that, for the time being at
least, Moscow planned to respond to Sadat's public
expressions of hostility in a low-key manner and play
for time. He said a Soviet reassessment of Middle
Eastern policy--particularly with respect to Egypt--
was currently under way in the Kremlin and that Mos-
cow intended to stall the Egyptians on matters of
economic cooperation and debt rescheduling until the
review was completed.
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By employing these delaying tactics, the Soviet
ambassador said Moscow hoped to convince Cairo that
the USSR is too important to the Egyptian economy to
permit a further deterioration in relations. He pre-
dicted that future Soviet economic policy toward
Egypt would be much tougher, with specific political
concessions demanded in exchange for each increment
of foreign aid.
The ambassador's comments, among other things,
suggest that considerable disillusionment exists in
Moscow over the failure of its substantial investment
in Egypt to pay more dividends.
October 31, 1975
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Hanoi Gets Aid From Moscow; Backs Detente
The communique issued yesterday at the end of
North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan's official visit
to Moscow indicates that Hanoi has received some of
the economic aid it was seeking and that Moscow did
obtain a North Vietnamese endorsement of some of the
USSR's major foreign policy themes.
Le Duan, for example, proved willing to endorse
Soviet detente policies more explicitly than Hanoi
has before. The Soviets find this especially wel-
come in light of Peking's efforts, during Le Duan's
visit to China last month, to persuade him of the
dangers of detente.
Hanoi praised the results of the European se-
curity conference and expressed support for the
Kremlin's line toward the Middle East, Portugal,
and Chile.
In the declaration, Hanoi and Moscow adopted
a relatively non-committal position toward Phnom
Penh, where Chinese influence is predominant. This
stance contrasted sharply with pledges of aid and
support for the pro-Hanoi regime in Laos.
Like the Chinese, the Soviets will provide
credit on easy terms, indicating that the days of
grant aid for Hanoi are over. Moscow went a step
further than Peking, however, by promising to dis-
cuss support for North Vietnam's second five-year
plan.
In another gesture Moscow will find to its
liking, Hanoi agreed to develop economic ties
"within the framework of the multilateral coopera-
tion of socialist countries." Although this may
foreshadow a closer North Vietnamese relationship
with CEMA, the vague formulation employed allows
for considerable flexibility.
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Yugoslavs Believe More Work Needed on Final
Document for European Communist Con erence
In a speech on Thursday, Aleksandr Grlickov,
the top Yugoslav negotiator at the meeting of
delegates from 27 European parties in East Berlin
earlier this month, described the preliminary draft
now under consideration as a "possible and acceptable
basis for further work" that "could evolve" into
an agreed text for a final document. Grlickov
added, however, that almost all participants offered
verbal and written proposals that must be considered
in the next stage of the drafting effort. He hinted
that the revisions differed widely and said that
"new joint efforts by all parties are needed" in
order to produce the final document.
Grlickov then listed demands that presumably
represent Belgrade's own position on the existing
draft. He said the conference document must create
the broadest possible opportunities for Communists
to cooperate with the other democratic and progressive
movements in Europe. It should cover only what the
Communist and workers parties have in common, and
not artifically strive to reconcile differences.
Grlickov added--in an apparent reference to the
Soviets' pretensions to leadership in the move-
ment--that the conference offers Communist and
workers parties the opportunity "to rid themselves
of the past with regard to their mutual relations."
He also said that each party must be free to draw
its own conclusions from the variety of opinions
the European party leaders will offer in their
speeches. Grlickov stressed that the leaders of each
party must approve the draft of the final document
before the conference is held and that alterations
must not be made at the conference itself.
The Yugoslavs have avoided taking the lead in
countering Eastern propaganda praising the progress
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achieved at. the last drafting session. This is
Belgrade's first official commentary on the pre-
paratory meeting, which adjourned on October 10. It
closely parallels a recent press statement from the
independent Italian Communists. The day before
Grlickov's revelations, Tanjug broadcast the news
that the British Communist Party had also issued
similar conditions for the European Communist
Conference.
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Romanian Youth: The State of the Union
Ceausescu's opening speech to the congress of
the Union of Communist Youth next Monday will almost
certainly reaffirm his unswerving commitment to in-
ternal orthodoxy and to a strongly national Communist
path in foreign affairs.
This is the first youth congress since Ceau-
sescu's scathing criticism of the youth organization
for its "intellectualism," "bureaucratism," and
"neglect of working youth" in July 1971. At that
time, Ceausescu stressed a campaign calling for ideo-
logical orthodoxy in an effort to reassure Moscow of
Bucharest's loyalty. His visit to Peking had led
the Soviets and their loyalist allies to charge that
an anti-Soviet, pro-Peking axis existed in the Balkans.
Ion Stefanescu, who became first secretary of
the youth organization in 1972, responded to Ceau-
sescu's 1971 criticism by emphasizing the increased
emphasis the organization was placing on ideology
and party policy. Members of the union now partici-
pate in regular annual "study courses" and have been
pressed into service to combat the spread of "mysticism"
(religion). Stefanescu has also championed Ceau-
sescu's hard-driving economic development program by
organizing "volunteer" patriotic work programs in
agriculture and construction, to which students say
they have contributed almost one million work-days
since 1972. Despite Stefanescu's efforts, the leader-
ship is apparently still dissatisfied with the extent
of political mobilization, and Stefanescu has re-
cently called for "radical improvement."
On balance, the regime has little reason to con-
sider youth a threat to Romania's internal stability
and seems satisfied with Stefanescu's stewardship.
His ambitious program has, however, sparked rumblings
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of dissatisfaction from within the organization.
Last year, university students reportedly circulated
a petition calling for less "centralism" and more
"democracy" in the group's activities.
Ceausescu will nevertheless probably call for
increased discipline and commitment, thus using the
occasion to demonstrate once again to Moscow his
commitment to a rigid internal orthodoxy. No major
personnel shifts are expected, but it is rumored
that Ceausescu's son, Nicu, may be shifted to the
youth group's Secretariat to replace Vasile Nicolciou,
who has handled international relations for some 10
years.
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Soviet Fumigation Policy
May Delay Grain Imports
Soviet refusal to accept US fumigation practices
at US ports may cause serious delays in the delivery
of US grain to Soviet consumers. The Soviets have
refused to allow the US to apply one of the two chem-
icals it uses to fumigate grain, and, as a result,
serious weevil infestation is likely to occur dur-
ing shipment.
During the 1972-73 grain lift, weevil infesta-
tion was an important factor in delays at Soviet
ports, prolonging ship turnaround time by as much
as 30 days. At the height of the deliveries in the
summer of 1973, almost every vessel arriving in port
had some weevil infestation, and the Soviets were
forced to undertake expensive and time-consuming
fumigation.
When fumigated at a Soviet port, a vessel is
removed from its berth, isolated in the harbor, and
the crew is removed. All costs, including crew
quartering and demurrage, are absorbed by the Soviets.
Cargo certification may not be given for at least
7 days; more frequently it requires 30 days.
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