SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100050002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 4, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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1NOO }FORN
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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Handle via COMINT Channels
Top Secret
November 4, 1075
SC No. 0053 7/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consu Itants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11552, exemption category:
458(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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Domestic Situation in Poland
the Gierek
regime has taken a ective steps to reduce both pub-
lic tensions and short-term economic strains. Never-
theless, public anxiety over food shortages, pro-
spective price rises, and possible belt-tightening
measures persists.
The wave of arson rumors apparently peaked about
mid-October, but others continue to crop up. There
are, for example, unconfirmed reports of bomb hoaxes
in public buildings in Warsaw, including the dis-
covery of explosive devices at the site of one of
the suspicious fires in early October. Responsible
Polish officials have described stories of a self-
immolation and of kidnapings by "Arabs" or "Germans"
as "sheer idiocy." Another wild rumor says that a
student took a potshot at Gierek somewhere in Warsaw
in mid-October.
Reports of worker dissatisfaction in the Warsaw
area and on the Baltic coast have also circulated,
' but the situation generally appears calm. West Euro-
pean and US officials have noted no unusual military
activity in those areas.
The approach of the party congress in December
has sparked reports of efforts to unseat Gierek_
an unspeciriea group within the top leadership
a vocates a policy adjustment to slow the pace of
economic development. Gierek, however, appears
firmly in control and in recent weeks has projected
a renewed sense of direction and self-confidence.
Meanwhile, the Gierek team has moved to in-
crease market supplies to meet expanded consumer
November 4, 1975
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demand during the coming holiday period. The re-
gime is trying to shift some of the blame for short-
ages to inefficient economic enterprises. Neverthe-
less, the leadership does not seem to have decided
how and when to reveal to the public its answer to
the fundamental question underlying much public con-
cern--the future wage-price structure. Until it
does, public uneasiness will continue. (CONFIDENTIAL
NOFORN/ORCON)
November 4, 1975
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Poles Reassure Moscow on Western Ties
Soviet concern over Poland's expanding economic
ties with the West has evidently led Warsaw to give
1 ~ :Lncreasing publicity to its commercial links with
the bloc.
Party leader Gierek and Prime Minister Jarosze-
wicz have recently lavished attention on Poland's
trade relations with the Soviet Union and other CEMA
members. In some cases, they have even dropped their
standard references to detente as the green light
> _for closer economic ties with Western countries.
Warsaw has also given wide coverage in Polish news
media. to a session of the Main Board of the Polish-
Soviet Friendship Society and to the recent visit of
Soviet Deputy Premier Ivan. Arkhipov.
The current Polish rhetoric is almost certainly
aimed at calming Moscow's apprehension. A knowledge-
able Polish journalist recently told a US diplomat
that the Soviets are unhappy with Poland's success in
'pursuing a "neo-Romanian" course in economic policy,
and Soviet Premier Kosygin reportedly criticized Po-
land's "overly Western" economic policies during his
August visit.
There are no indications, however, that Poland
intends to abandon the difficult task of seeking an
acceptable balance between greater economic integra-
tion with CEMA and expanded economic ties with the
West. A Polish journalist recently said that the
link with CENA provides stability while the one with
the West offers progress. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 4, 1975
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Yugoslavs Press Independent Party
Views on European Communist Conference
Belgrade is again strongly emphasizing the unity
of views among the independent European Communist
parties who most actively oppose Soviet pretensions
to a leadership role in the communist movement (Staff
Notes, October 31, 1975).
Belgrade Tanjug on Tuesday broadcast a long re-
view of a recent plenum of the Italian party Central
Committee that had approved a report by the leader-
ship on preparations for the European Communist Party
Conference. According to Tanjug, Giancarlo Pajetta,
secretary for interparty relations, presented condi-
tions for Italian attendance that dovetail with the
Yugoslav stand. Pajetta's view is that the confer-
ence "could be held" late this year or early next,
but that many problems remain unsolved.
The Italians insisted that "it is necessary ex-
plicitly to confirm that a single center or a lead-
ing party cannot exist" and to reject "the importa-
tion of a foreign model of socialism." Moreover,
Pajetta asserted that "all forms of organizational
ties" with overtones of obligations must be rejected.
Tanjug said the report stressed that the final con-
ference document must be acceptable in toto to all
parties, but quoted Pajetta as warning that it should
not attempt to gloss over irreconcilable differences
and thereby lead to ideological confusion. Belgrade's
leading spokesman on inter-party matters last week
repeated almost all of the Italian demands.
The Italian party has also introduced a new is-
sue that the Soviets and their loyalist supporters
will hotly contest. It wants any statement on Euro-
pean economic trends to stress that Eastern and West-
ern economies are troubled by the same problems.
This position clashes with Soviet propaganda that
November 4, 1975
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asserts the CEMA countries, thanks to their superior
systems and beneficial economic links with Moscow,
are better able than the West to resist economic
shocks. Such a frank discussion of Eastern problems
at a relatively open Communist forum would be politi-
cal dynamite for many East European regimes, not
to mention the Kremlin, and there is virtually no
chance that Moscow will accede to this demand.
In addition to publicizing the Italian party's
stand, the Belgrade party weekly Kommunist this week
carried a long interview with Santiago Carrillo, the
~-' secretary general of the independent Spanish party.
Carrillo stressed his party's admiration of Yugo-
slavia's successful break with Moscow in 1948 and
stressed his party's independence from any foreign
pressures. Carrillo, fresh from talks with Romania's
Ceausescu, also restated his intention to pursue a
role for his Communist party in a multi-party system
in the post-Franco era. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 4, 1975
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USSR: Kama Truck Plant
The USSR's Kama Truck Plant will not operate
at full capacity before 1980, according to a recent
statement by a high Kama official. At capacity the
plant will build 150,000 heavy trucks and 250,000
diesel engines a year. This latest Soviet estimate
was given to two US embassy officials who spent
three days touring the plant in October.
The visitors also learned that the engine
plant, the most nearly complete of the five un-
finished production units, will turn out some en-
gines by the opening of the 25th Party Congress in
February. Three other units--forging, pressing,
and assembly--will probably be ready for operation
by mid-1976.
The foundry, troubled from the start, continues
to be the major bottleneck. Foundry equipment, man-
ufactured mainly in the US, is ready for installa-
tion, but Soviet engineers still are working to re-
pair foundations of the large iron foundry that sank
after building construction was finished last year.
Kama officials expect to have the foundry operating
in about 12 months, in time to meet the current goal
of token production of trucks by the end of 1976.
Construction at Kama is running two years be-
hind the original plan, which called for the plant
to start building trucks in late 1974. (CONFIDEN-
TIAL)
November 4, 1975
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