MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000280002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 29, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
gulf~f~ X10
r
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0875/75
October 29, 1975
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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
058(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
French Territory of Afars and Issas: Moving
Toward Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Angola: An Overview of Chinese Policy and
Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Oct 29, 1975
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French Territory of Afars and Issas
Moving Toward Independence
Ali Aref Bourhan, the president of the local
government in the French Territory of Afars and Issas,
told representatives of the Organization of African
Unity in Addis Ababa last week that he will propose
a referendum on independence to the territorial
assembly in mid-November. The proposal will also
have to be ratified by the French parliament.
Ali Aref's statement indicates that Paris has
decided to grant independence to the territory. A
time table has yet to be worked out, and the French
face serious problems in arranging an orderly transfer
of power and in preventing the territory from becoming
a source of contention between Ethiopia and Somalia.
In addition, objections from the French defense
ministry which still considers the base at Djibouti
strategically important, and from important conservatives
in parliament must be overcome before the government
can formally announced its intentions.
Both Ethiopia and Somalia have claims to the
territory, based on the affinity between Ethiopian
Afars and Somali Issas and their kindred tribes in
the territory. Ethiopia's military government,
however, has declared its support for independence.
Ali Aref, an Afar, received a reaffirmation of this
support during apparently cordial talks in Addis
Ababa last week.
Somalia also gives lip service to independence,
but views it as a prelude to the incorporation of
the territory into Somalia. Ali Aref's recent visit
to Addis Ababa has increased Mogadiscio's distrust
of him and lessened the chances that Somalia will
accept the territorial integrity of an independent
government led by Ali Aref.
Oct 29, 1975
(Continued)
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3 The French government is considering arrangements
or providing international guarantees for,an indep-
endent state. The French are leaning toward seeking
such guarantees from the Red Sea countries--Saudi
\ Arabia, the two Yemens, and perhaps Egypt. If this
fails, France will turn to the OAU, the Arab league,
jor the UN.
The absence of a recognized national leader of
a strong nation political force increased the chances
of instability in the territory as independence
approaches. Neither Ali Aref nor his opponents
lines.
Most Afars and Issas view politics as a struggle
to ensure the dominance of their respective tribes.
This hostility is likely to increase now that the
stakes involve control of an independent government.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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Angola
An Overview of Chinese Policy and Activities
Peking's adoption in the early 1970s of a
flexible, pragmatic foreign policy emphasizing
good state-to-state relations brought to a virtual
halt. Chinese support for subversive activities
against incumbent black African governments--an
activity that was in general decline in any
case. Peking, however, was able to retain a rev-
olutionary aura for its African policy by continuing
to support black nationalist efforts to depose white
minority governments in southern Africa. The Chinese
were also seeking to expand their African contacts
with an eye to limiting Soviet influence throughout:
the region and saw their involvement with the
liberation movements as a means of gaining stock
with black African leaders--who were and still are
united in their opposition to white rule in the
south.
Of the three most important areas of confrontation
in :1970--Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia--a settlement
has been achieved only in Mozambique. In Rhodesia the
basic white-black conflict remains unchanged, but
major differences have emerged among interested black
governments and the liberation leaders themselves
over the best tactics for ending white rule in
Salisbury? In Angola the contrast between the start
of the decade and the present is even more dramatic:.
the movement to replace Portuguese colonialism has
evolved into a civil war among black Angolans.
Early Misgivings in Angola
Although its involvement with the Angolan lib-
eration movements goes back to the early 1960s, Peking
probably long had misgivings about its role. In
varying degrees, all the liberation movements in
southern Africa were rent by internal rivalries that
(Continued)
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undermined the effort to overthrow white or colonial
rule. These problems, however, were particularly acute
in Angola, where even in the mid-60s the three major
liberation groups spent as much of their energies
skirmishing with each other as they did fighting the
Portuguese. In these circumstances, Peking avoided
continuing obligations to any of the three, shifting
its support to first one and then the other group,
sometimes aiding all three simultaneously, and
reviewing the results of each individual infusion
on the political and military activities of the
recipient. Although by the early 1970s Agostinho
Neto's Popular Movement (MPLA) had emerged as the
most effective and widely recognized organization,
Peking grew increasingly disenchanged with the MPLA's
close ties with Moscow and in 1973 cut off its contacts.
Holden Roberto's National Front (FNLA) began receiving
the bulk of Chinese assistance while Jonas Savimbi's
National Union (UNITA) continued to receive occasional
financial support from Peking. This policy also
related well to Chinese efforts to curry favor with
Zaire's Mobutu and Zambia's Kaunda--backers of FNLA
and UNITA respectively.
The Chinese reacted cautiously to the Alvor
agreement of Janaury 1975, whereby the three contending
Angolan groups agreed to participate in a transitional
government and Lisbon set November 11 as the date
for Angolan independence. Publicly, Peking lauded
the agreement--Chou En-lai even sent his personal
congratulations to the three leaders--and the Chinese
no doubt hoped the truce would stick, since it enjoyed
a measure of influence with two of the three groups
which theoretically at least stood an equal chance of
solidifying their position in an elected post-
liberation government. Moreover, with Lisbon's
unilateral decision to decolonize, Peking's."revo-
lutionary" approach to the Angolan situation ceased to
have much relevance. A peaceful transition to inde-
pendence would allow Peking to ease out of its special
relationship with UNITA and particularly with FNLA
and develop a new Angolan policy more in line with
the realities of the situation.
(Continued)
Oct 29, 1975
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3,
Ten years of dealings with the mutually antag-
onist Angolan groups, however, undoubtedly suggested
to Peking that the odds favored its early collapse.
AS a result, Peking felt compelled to continue to
provide training and equipment for FNLA units so as
.to assure their military capabilities should full-
scale hostilities begin with MPLA. Reports of FNLA
dissatisfaction with the level of assistance and of
Chinese reluctance to provide more support suggest
that Peking was trying not to increase FNLA capa-
bilities to the point where Holden Roberto of his
own accord would be tempted to opt for a military
solution to his feud with MPLA.
;Sliding Downhill
Developments in Angola since mid-year have
probably exceeded Peking's darkest fears. When
it became obvious early in the summer that increased
Soviet arms deliveries had tipped the military
balance in favor of MPLA, Peking apparently tried to
forestall a total collapse in Luanda by inviting an
MPLA delegation to Peking and offering to "reassess"
Chinese support for all three groups if the tripartite
,status quo were maintained. When this effort failed
and MPLA unleashed its freshly equipped units against
both FNLA and UNITA, Peking responded by stepping up
its shipments to FNLA via Zaire and by attempting to
work through Zambia and Tanzania to provide increased
support to UNITA.
While renewed arms deliveries and direct Zairian
involvement have averted a total military victory
for MPLA, Peking's clients are still in precarious
positions. Despite its recent battlefield successes,
for example, FNLA has little prospect of regaining all
the military and political ground it has lost since
mid-year. Even if it does, the rivalry between the
two major groups has grown so unyielding that a new
rapprochement appears virtually unattainable. UNITA
has always been a relatively impotent military force,
(Continued)
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staying in the game by virtue of the tribal support
it receives in the area it controls. UNITA's pros-
pects appear linked to Savimbi's willingness to
formally ally himself with either of the other two
groups--a move that could still be decisive--but so
far he appears determined to maintain his independence.
Under these circumstances, MPLA will almost certainly
continue to hold all the advantages when the Portuguese
pull out next month, and Peking's chances for future
influence in Angola will remain shaky.
On the regional level, moreover, Peking's
Angolan connections have shown signs of becoming
significant irritants in state-to-state relations.
Tanzanian President Nyerere, for example, has embargoed
a recent shipment of Chinese arms to UNITA and has
privately blasted Peking for letting the Sino-Soviet
rivalry in Angola take precedence over the interests
of the Angolan people. Nyerere is a long-time supporter
of MPLA but, if recent African speeches at the UN are
any indication, even those African leaders who are
not closely connected with any of the contending
Angolan groups are taking a similarly dim view of
external invovement of any sort in Angola. Support
for FNLA and UNITA still gains Peking points with
Zaire and Zambia to be sure, but such returns would
be largely vitiated if a wider African backlash
develops. Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in his own
UN speech last month appeared to reflect concern for
the potential damage to Peking's image when he blamed
the Soviets and the US for using Angola as an ideo-
logical battlefield and tried somewhat lamely to
portray China's treatment of the Angolans as "even-
handed."
Running Out of Options
As things now stand there appears to be little
the Chinese can do to shore up their position in
Angola. Peking could, of course, cut its losses
by ending its involvement altogether or by switching
itssupport to MPLA in hopes of eventually weaning
(Continued)
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10
it away from Moscow. From its talks with the MPLA
delegation in Peking this summer, however, the Chinese
know that the latter would be a poor gamble. Aban-
doning FNLA and UNITA would cede dominant influence
in Angola to Moscow, and such a Chinese default in
the Sino-Soviet rivalry while there still exists a
chance of retrieving the situation is clearly unthink-
able in Peking. The Chinese have also apparently
discarded the option of stepping up their military
assistance, probably recognizing that, as other outside
powers have begun to provide military assistance, the
military shortcomings of FNLA and UNITA are now more
the result of training and severe logistic problems
than arms shortages per se.
For the short term at least, Peking thus
appears to have little choice but to play out its
string in Angola. The Chinese can be expected to
continue to help keep FNLA and UNITA afloat and to
lend their support to efforts at political compromise.
Peking will probably use its leverage with regional
governments and with its Angolan clients to promote
African reconciliation attempts such as the current
undertaking by the organization of African Unity.
Although they have almost no leverage in Lisbon,
the Chinese may also take what steps they can to
encourage the Portuguese not to leave the MPLA in
de facto control of Angola on November 11. Peking
might even see some merit in a Portuguese move to
involve the UN in a peace-keeping role, although it
would almost certAinly not take the lead in seeking
such international intervention.
Nevertheless, Peking by now probably reckons
that the chances are dim for anything but continued
fighting in the post-liberation period and that China
will be facing hard decisions regarding Angola in the
near future. Indeed, the possibility that FNLA
and UNITA may establish a rival regime or regimes and
that Peking might be drawn into a prolonged insurgency
in Angola may already be creating heartburn in Peking.
(Continued)
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For the moment, however, the Chinese appear to be
hoping that some eleventh-hour solution will present
itself and that they will be able to salvage something
from a situation that has gone sour on all fronts.
(SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
Oct 29, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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