MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000280001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
~~~-
G`~ ~104f~
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0875/75
October 29, ].97J
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NOFORN/NOCONTRAC`?'/ORCON
Warning Notice
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~WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
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Dete Imposslbla to Detsrmins
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 SECRET ~ -
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East -Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. (:omments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors oi~ the individual articles.
French Territory of Afars and Issas: Moving
Toward Independence 1
Angola: .An Overview of Chinese Policy and
Activities 3
Oct: 29, 1975
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French Territory of Afars and Issas
Moving Tozaard Independence
Ali Aref Bourhan, the president of the local
government in the French Territory of Afars and Issas,
told representatives of the Organization of African
Unity in .Addis Ababa last week that he will propose
a referendum on independence to the territorial
assembly in mid-November. The proposal will also
have to be ratified by the French parliament.
Ali Aref's statement indicates that Paris has
decided to grant independence to the territory. A
time table has yet to be worked out, and the French
face serious problems in arranging an orderly transfer
of power and in preventing the territory from becoming
a source of contention between Ethiopia and Somalia.
In addition, objections from the French defense
ministry which still considers the base at Djibouti
strategically important, and from important conservatives
in parliament must be overcome before the government
can formally announced its intentions.
Both Ethiopia and Somalia have claims to the
territory, based on the affinity between Ethiopian
Afars and Somali Issas and their kindred tribes in
the territory. Ethiopia's military government,
however, Yias declared its support for independence.
Ali Aref, an Afar, received a reaffirmation of this
support during apparently cordial talks in Addis
Ababa last: week.
Somalia also gives lip service to independence,
but views i-c as a prelude to the incorporation of
the territory into Somalia. Ali Aref's recent visit
to Addis Ababa has increased Mogadiscio's distrust
of Yiim and lessened the chances that Somalia will
accept the territorial integrity of an independent
government. led by Ali Aref.
(Continued)
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The French government is considering arrangements
for providing international guarantees .for an indep-
endent state. The French are leaning toward seeking
such guarantees from the Red Sea countries--Saudi
Arabia, the two Yemens, and perhaps Egypt. If this
fails, France will turn to the OAU, the Arab league,
or the UN.
The absence of a recognized national leader of
a strong nation political force increased the chances
of instability in the territory as independence
approaches. Neither Ali Aref nor his opponents
have accruired a political base that transcends tribal
lines.
Most Afars and Issas view politics as a struggle
to ensure the dominance of their respective tribes.
This hostility is likely to increase now that the
stakes involve control of an independent government.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Oct 29, 1975
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SECRET
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A_ ngola
An Overview of Chinese PoZic~ and Activities
Peking's adoption in the early 1970s of a
flexible, pragmatic foreign policy emphasizing
goad state-to-state relations brought to a virtual
halt Chinese support for subversive activities
against incumbent black African governments--an
activity that was in general decline in any
case. Perking, however, was able to retain a rev-
olutionary aura for its African policy by continuing
to support black nationa]_ist efforts to depose white
minority ly e~~ceeded Peking's darkest fears. When
it became obvious early in the summer that increased
Soviet arm:; deliveries nad tipped the military
balance in favor of MPLA, Peking apparently tried to
forestall a total collapse in Luanda by inviting an
MPLA delegation to Peking and offering to "reassess"
Chinese support for all three groups if the tripartite
status quo were maintained. When this effort failed
and MPLA unleashed its freshly equipped units against
,both FNLA and UNITA, Peking responded by stepping up
its :>hipmen,ts to FNLA via Zaire and by attempting to
work through Zambia and Tanzania to provide increased
support to UNITA.
While renewed arms deliveries and direct Zairian
involvement have averted a total military victory
for MPLA, Peking's clients are still in precarious
positions. Despite its recent battlefield successes,
for example, FNLA has little prospect of regaining all
the military and political ground it has lost since
mid-year. :Even if it does, the rivalry between the
two major groups has grown so unyielding that a new
rapprochement appears virtually unattainable. UNITA
Yias always been a relatively impotent military force,
(Continued)
Oct 29, 1975 5
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staying in the game by virtue of the tribal support
it receives in the area it controls. UNITA,'s pros-
pects appear linked to Savimbi's willingness to
formally ally himself with either of the other two
groups--a move that could still be decisive--but so
far he appears determined to maintain his independence.
Under these circumstances, MPLA will almost certainly
continue to hold all the advantages when the Portuguese
pull out next month, and Peking's chances for future
influence in Angola will remain shaky.
On the regional level, moreover, Peking's
Angolan connections have shown signs of becoming
significant irritants in state-to-state relations.
Tanzanian President Nyerere, for example, has embargoed
a recent shipment of Chinese arms to UNITA and has
privately blasted Peking for letting the Sino-Soviet
rivalry in Angola take precedence over the interests
of the Angolan people. Nyerere is a long-time supporter
of MPLA but., if recent African speeches at the UN are
any indication, even those African leaders who are
not closely connected with any of the contending
Angolan groups are taking a similarly dim view of
external invovement of any sort in Angola. Support
for FNLA and UNITA still gains Peking points with
Zaire and Zambia to be sure, but such returns would
be largely vitiated if a wider African backlash
develops. Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in his own
UN speech last month appeared to reflect concern for
the potential damage to Peking's image when he blamed
the Soviets and the US for using Angola as an ideo-
logical battlefield and tried somewhat lamely to
portray China's treatment of the Angolans as "even-
handed."
Running Out of Options
As things now stand there appears to be little
the Chinese can do to shore up their position in
Angola. Peking could, of course, cut its losses
by ending its involvement altogether or by switching
its support to MPLA in hopes of eventually weaning
(Continued)
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it away from Moscow. From its talks with the MPLA
delegation. in Peking this summer, however, the~Cannese
know that the latter would be a poor gamble.
doning FNLA and UNITA would cede dominant influence
in Angola to Moscow, and such a Chinese default in
the S:ino-soviet rivalry while there still exists a
chance of retrieving the situation is clearly unthink-
ab1E, in Peking. The Chinese have also apparently
discarded the option of stepping up their military
assiistancE:, probably recognizing that, as other outside
powers have begun to provide military assistance, the
military shortcomings of FNLA and UNITA are now more
the result of training anal severe logistic problems
than arms shortages per se.
For 'the short term at least, Peking thus
appears to have little choice but to play out its
string in Angola. The Chinese can be expected to
continue 'to help keep FNLA and UNITA afloat and to
lend their support to efforts at political compromise.
Peking will probably use its leverage with regional
governments and with its Angolan clients to promote
African reconciliation attempts such as the current
undertaking by the Organization of African Unity.
Although they have almost no leverage in Lisbon,
the Chinese may also take what steps they can to
encourage. the Portuguese not to leave the MPLA in
de facto control of Angola on November 11. Peking
might even see some merit in a Portuguese move to
involve t:he UN in a peace-keeping role, although it
would almost certainly not take the lead in seeking
such international intervention.
NevE:rtheless, Peking by now probably reckons
that: the chances are dim for anything but continued
figYiting in the post-liberation period and that China
will be facing hard decisions regarding Angola in the
near future. Indeed, the possibility that FNLA
and UNITA may establish a rival regime or regimes and
that Peking might be drawn into a prolonged insurgency
in Angola may already be creating heartburn in Peking.
(Continued)
Oct 29, 1975
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For the moment, however, the Chinese appear to be
hoping that some eleventh-hour solution will present
itself and that they will be able to salvage something
from a situation that has gone sour on all fronts.
(SECRET IJOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
Oct 29, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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