LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000270002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 29, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
rL\DE HOUE
Latin American Trends
SOURCED
Secret
October 29, 1975
No. 0533/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL , .. - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Clesslled by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
*58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
October 29, 1975
Mexico: Peasant Killings and a
Governor Ousted . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brazil: Focus on Weapons Production . . . . . 3
Uruguay: Tempests in Teapots . . . . . . . . 4
Guyana: Ties With Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Jamaica: The Loss of a Voice of
Moderation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Venezuela: Oil Price and Nationalization
Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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3
Mexico: Peasant Killings and a Governor Ousted
Land seizures by organized campesinos led to a
bloody clash with police and army troops in southern
Sonora late last week. Seven peasants were killed,
including a well-known campesino leader, and several
were seriously wounded in the gun battle.
The immediate fallout of what is being called
the Chaparral massacre," named after the ranch where
the shootings took place, is the forced resignation
of Sonora's governor, Carlos Armando Biebrich.
Biebrich, 36, became governor two years ago even
though the state constitution had to be changed to
lower the age requirement. His "imposition" at that
time was regarded as an indication of Secretary of
Government Moya's great power and influence with
President Echeverria. Now that the governor has been
forced out, almost certainly at the order of Echever-
ri_a, the implication is that Moya's power has faded to
the point where he is unable to protect his allies.
As for Biebrich, his political career seems to
be ended. When he became governor he was regarded as
a young man who would go far in Mexican politics. His
apparent fault was to become too closely associated
with the big land owners and other economically power-
ful groups. As the PRI enters the presidential cam-
paign period. the last thing it wants is a governor of
an important. state like Sonora being identified with
"reactionary elements" who are not following the "rev-
olutionary path." The peasant deaths provided Echeverria
and the, party leaders the appropriate reason to dump the
young governor.
The governor's removal is not likely to quiet the
peasants. They are impatient with bureaucratic delay
in reviewing their claims to private lands. At week's
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end the situation in southern Sonora was very tense
and authorities were taking precautions to prevent
further violence. Other authorities were critical of
the show of force approach taken to remove the squat-
ters, saying that this was an open invitation to agita-
tors and demagogues to provoke more gunfire and create
martyrs for their cause. (CONFIDENTIAL)
October 29, 1975
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Brazil: Focus on Wea pons Production
The Brazilian government is encouraging multi-
national participation in domestic weapons production
3 with apparent hopes of making its armed forces self-
sufficient and expanding the nation's export market.
Last April President Geisel formally proposed the
creation of the War Materiel Industry as a public
enterprise that could also provide incentives for in-
dustrial growth and advance strategic research and
f`3 development. In justifying the action, Army Minister
Sylvio Frota said that more centralized control was
needed because "private enterprise, developing without
a clear and fixed orientation, had not been enough."
It would appear that government support is already
having major impact. During the past year more than 100
directors of large firms specializing in the production
of military equipment have visited Brazil to explore
investment possibilities. A recent article in the
Jornal Do Brasil expressed special interest in coopera-
ting with the West Germans, stating "We have an ideal
community of interest with Germany ... Brazil will take
advantage of excellent German expertise in the production
of arms, including sophisticated missiles,with a guaran-
teed market assured."
Economic considerations may be as significant as
strategic ones. The government is attempting to bolster
its sagging balance of payments position and an upswing
in weapons exports would provide needed foreign exchange.
Although Brazil will probably still need to import sophis-
ticated weapons for some time, an expansion in exports of
small arms, motor vehicles, and trainer aircraft would
result in valuable feedback from foreign buyers that
might speed the transition to self-sufficiency.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
October 29, 1975
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SECRET
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Uruguay: Tempests in Teapots
A personal squabble between a prominent army
general and the deputy foreign minister has quickly
embroiled other top military and civilian officials
r zf in what appears to be another episode in the ongoing
struggles for power and prestige between individuals
that have replaced conventional politics in Uruguay.
The fracas occurred when General Gregorio Alvarez
sought out Guido Michelin at the Foreign ministry and
struck him with a riding crop for allegedly calling
im a homosexual. Although "affairs of honor" are
1- / I taken seriously in Uruguay and duels are legal, other
generals and some cabinet ministers who oppose Alvarez
on ideological grounds are urging President Bordaberry
to initiate disciplinary action against him. Bordaberry
would prefer to stay on the sidelines and has asked Army
Commander-in-Chief Vadora to handle the matter.
This plan is unlikely to end the affair, however,
since Alvarez is a powerful figure who is widely consider-
ed the leader of populist military sentiment, while Vadora
is lackluster and has virtually no support within the
army. Instead the dispute will probably attain more
serious proportions and could result in the dismissal of
Michelin or Vadora or both.
To foreign observers such disputes may seem no more
than petty scandals, but personalist struggles between
ambitious generals or between military and civilian of-
ficials have become the major political activity in
Uruguay since the army shut down the legislature and
forced traditional parties to disband two years ago.
The frequency of these conflicts--this is the third this
year--and the seriousness with which they are treated
highlight the frustration Uruguay's leaders experience
when they try to define guidelines of authority and re-
solve social problems that have persisted since the
mid-1950s. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Guyana: Ties With Cuba
High-level ministerial travel to Havana marks
another phase in Guyana's growing ties with the Castro
government.
In recent months, three cabinet ministers--Hamilton
Green, Cooperatives and National Mobilization, Steve
Naraine, Works and Housing; and Shirley Field-Ridley,
Information and Culture--have made visits to Cuba to
profit from the Cuban experience in their particular
fields. In addition, University of Guyana vice chancel-
lor Dennis Irvine led a seven-man delegation from the
1 ministries of education and national development earlier
this month to investigate the possibility of adapting
Cuban work-study programs to Guyana. The Guyanese dele-
gation was expected to invite Cuban representatives to
come to Guyana to advise the government how such programs
could be instituted.
3
Cuba is already the western hemisphere nation with
which Guyana's top leaders as well as some of its chief
technocrats are most ideologically attuned. In recent
months Burnham and party leaders have singled out Cuba as
one of several socialist models of Guyana. These
incipient links seem likely to strengthen and broaden as
Burnham strives to transform Guyana into a socialist one-
party state.
A spearhead of the new relationship very likely will
be the Cuban embassy now being set up in Georgetown. A
resident Cuban fishing mission has been in Georgetown since
early 1974. The 32-year-old Cuban ambassador, Ivan Cesar
Martinez Montalvo, is expected to present his credentials
later this year. The Guyanese are awaiting his arrival
before establishing an embassy in Havana. Their ambassador
to Cuba will reportedly be Frank Campbell, the 29-year-old
editor of the New Nation, the official organ of the ruling
People's Nationa^L ongress. (CONFIDENTIAL)
October 29, 1975
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Jamaica: The Loss of a Voice of Moderation
The Jamaican government
lost one of its most talent-
ed administrators and Prime
Minister Manley a trusted
adviser and a voice of mod-
eration with the resignation
of minister of National Se-
curity and Justice Eli
Matalon last week for rea-
sons of health.
Matalon is a member of
one of Jamaica's leading fam-
ilies--sometimes referred to
as Jamaica's Rothschilds.
The Matalons have extensive
commercial and industrial in-
terests, but several of the
brothers have also been ac-
tive public servants. Eli,
who formerly was minister of
education, served as a link
between Manley and progres-
sive businessmen in Jamaica.
Within the Peoples National
Party (PNP) he acted as an
effective counterbalance to the young firebrands and
other leftist members.
Matalon is a strong advocate of close relations
with the US and a useful conduit for Manley to US policy
makers. His departure could have a negative impact on
US-Jamaican relations. Matalon's braking influence on
radical initiatives, such as Jamaica's growing ties with
Cuba, will also be missed. During Manley's trip to Cuba
in July, arrangements were reportedly made by a high
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Jamaican police officer for selected officials to re-
ceive intelligence training in Cuba, and discussions
were reportedly held concerning a security liaison
relationship. This security relationship, which pre-
sumably is directed against the US, will undoubtedly
develop more smoothly with Matalon removed from the
scene.
.Former Minister of Agriculture Keble Munn, a mem-
ber of the ]?NP's old guard, has replaced Matalon. He
is a competent professional, but he is not a man of
the stature of Matalon. He will have his hands full
dealing with Jamaica's massive urban crime problem.
The loss of Matalon comes at a decisive moment for
Jamaica. After Manley's trip to Cuba and the resulting
backlash, the prime minister has adopted, temporarily
at least, a low-keyed approach. He gives some indica-
tion of being the pragmatic liberal reformer many thought
he was when he first took office. Manley's drift to the
left has been intermittent, however, and he may be re-
grouping before launching new aspects of his program of
"democratic socialism." In any event, the removal of
Matalon from the cabinet is an important loss for the re-
straining forces. (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)
October 29, 1975
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Venezuela: Oil Price and Nationalization Developments
New oil export prices, announced last week but
effective as of October 1, suggest that Caracas is only
partly implementing the OPEC price hike. Prices for
light and medium crudes will rise by the OPEC-approved
10 percent; smaller increases for heavy crude and prod-
ucts will reduce the overall rise, to perhaps 7 percent.
Caracas is realigning the latter prices in an effort to
boost demand for these products.
According to Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons
Valentin Hernandez, the delay in issuing price revisions
was due to preoccupation with negotiations on national-
ization of the oil companies' properties in Venezuela.
The government has recently made formal compensation of-
fers to the companies totaling about $1 billion. The
offer is substantially below depreciated book value of
company assets. Compensation is only one aspect of the
settlement, however, and probably of less importance to
most companies than the terms of marketing and technical
assistance contracts under which they will operate the
nationalized enterprises.
These marketing and technical assistance contracts
are under negotiation. Caracas has offered to pay at
least some of the companies a basic service fee of up
to 15 cents per barrel on all production and an additional
fee geared to the share of crude they refine in Venezuela.
The companies reportedly are asking twice the basic
amount; some other OPEC governments already consider the
Venezuelan offer alarmingly high. Caracas apparently
recognizes its dependence on the companies, especially
for marketing. Hernandez reportedly stated that he expects
Petroven, the state oil company, to export only about
120,000 barrels per day in 1976, leaving the marketing of
almost 1.9 million barrels per day to the companies.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
October 29, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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