EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600190001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
2~1~p X10
E
East Asia
Secret
185
August 25, 1975
No. 0758/75
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No Dissem Abroad
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
456(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Data Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
August 25, 1975
Cleansing the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
VIETNAM
South Vietnam: The First Three Months. . . . 18
ANNEX--The Two Koreas: An Economic Appraisal. . . 26
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Laos; Cleansin the Lao Army
The Lao communists over the past few weeks have
been implementing a careful plan to re-educate Lao
army officers who did not flee the country following
the collapse of the coalition. The officers, par-
ticularly those with past close connections with the
US, have been humiliated, and many have been trans-
ported to communist towns deep in the hinterlands
for indoctrination. There is no evidence that any
have been executed or physically abused, but the
conditions in some of these areas resemble concen-
tration camps.
The First Phase: Re-education Seminars
In late June and early July many Lao army offi-
cers and some civilian officials were required to
attend training seminars at local military facilities
to learn the new "political realities." The ex-
periences of about 250 officers who attended a semi-
nar at Chinaimo Camp near Vientiane seem typical.
The participants spent part of their day digging
ditches, learning how to construct grass huts, and
tending vegetable plots. The remainder of the day
was taken up with lectures by Pathet Lao cadre on the
new Lao political situation.
Soviet and Chinese personnel a so ma a presen?a ions.
the
participants in the Chinaimo seminar were stripped
of all badges of rank and other insignia and each
was given responsibility for a specific garden plot.
All call one another "comrade" and learn to break
into applause on cue from instructors.
described the site as like a concentration camp and
reported that the senior communist political officer
went so far as to ask
for assistance in electrifying barbed wire fences
an installing security lights.
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Movement to the Hinterlands
The communists in late July began moving groups
of officers and others to Sam Neua,,the Plaine des
Jarres, or elsewhere deep within parts of Laos long
under communist domination. Participants were us-
ually given little notice. The participants at the
Chinaimo seminar were hustled out o- Vientiane so
quickly that they were not allowed ::o bid farewell
to their families. As a result of ,:hese swift moves,
many of the officers' wives believe; they will never
see their husbands again. Several !)fficers, who were
warned, managed to slip across the :river.
No officer has yet returned from these seminars
in the hinterlands and we have no information on the
fate of the participants. The sessions are supposed
to last from two to three months. bit most Lao expect
it to be considerably longer.
many wit remain tor more an
a year. most of t nose who fully
grasp and accept t e communist teac;zings will be al-
lowed to return to Vientiane, but same will remain to
work at posts in the hinterlands.
This re-education effort probably serves several
communist purposes. One important goal almost cer-
tainly is to keep a close watch on the officers while
the remainder of the coalition is d=emolished. The
movement of most officers far from.their homes pre-
cludes their flight and ensures that they will not be
in contact with potentially trouble';some elements in
Vientiane or across the Mekong in Thailand.
The communists probably also hope that some of
the officers will demonstrate a willingness to co-
operate in the new order. Technicians and capable
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middle grade officers and civilian personnel are in
short supply in communist ranks. Reformed officers
could be put to good use either in Vientiane or with
communist units in the back country. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
August 25, 1975
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Celebrations have begun in Vietnam commemorat-
ing the 30th anniversary of the August revolution
oaf 1945 which led to the establishment of North
Vietnam on September 2. The communists took over
in South Vietnam on April 30, but this part of the
country has been under virtual martial law for the
past three months with the military exercising
almost exclusive control over the daily tasks of
administration. It is possible that the communists
will use the September 2nd anniversary celebrations
to announce the formation of a civilian government
or the South or provide some indication when that
L:ransition will occur. Beyond this possibility,
aiowever, the communists are not expected to make
ttany additional commitments on the South's future,
:specially regarding reunification.
What the first 100 or so days cf communist
control of Vietnam has most clearly shown is that
the goal of formal reunification will be pursued
gradually and in accordance with no preconceived
timetable. The impatience for some indication of
how soon that will occur seems to be greater out-
aide the country than among the Vietnamese them-
selves. For a people who maintain they have been
fighting for centuries to reunify their country,
a few more months or years is of little consequence.
The first three months have also shown that
the Vietnamese may have underestimated some of the
problems confronting them following the victory.
The rapid collapse of the Saigon government put the
communists in an exposed position administratively.
A recent joint article by Hanoi's defense chief and
his deputy confirms that North Vietnam's objectives
until the latter part of March were considerably
more limited than total victory. The last minute
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decision to go all out--made on March 25--did not
permit Hanoi to do much political homework before
assuming administrative control of the South.
Many of the initial communist actions were
makeshift and had little resemblance to firm policy
decisions or sound administrative judgment. In the
ensuing weeks, the communists have begun to concede
publicly that the business of putting the country
back into working order would likely be a long and
difficult task and that instilling the proper dedi-
cation to the revolutionary cause among the southern
population as a whole might require lengthier and
harsher forms of persuasion than the communists
probably originally anticipated would be necessary.
Reunification
There is little likelihood that the goals of a
socialist and collectivized south reunited with and
dominated by the North, will be moderated. In their
public commentary, both North and South Vietnamese
communist officials have made it clear that de facto
reunification occurred with the surrender of Saigon.
These statements, in addition to other indications,
have also clearly established that the North Vietna-
mese are in control and that Hanoi is calling the
shots. For example, in early May a military manage-
ment committee was established in Saigon headed by
a North Vietnamese general, and during celebrations
on May 19 commemorating Ho Chi Minh's birthday,
the fourth-ranking member of the North Vietnamese
Politburo was publicly identified as the individual
in charge of party and military affairs in the South.
It became evident that for the time being Vietnam
would be one country under the umbrella of the
Communist Party, but with "two governments."
The communists probably will decide on formally
reunifying the country when they are satisfied the
bulk of the problems with security and the economy
in the South are under control. The most likely
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format for achieving formal reunification would be
to hold a plebiscite. Such a forum in itself argues
1for a deliberate pace since the commtLnists must be
certain that the "free" choice of the people will
be properly expressed.
Qualit of Life
The communists have conceded in the public media
that their most serious problem is security. Re-
sistance to the new regime is mostly from former
government soldiers fearing for their lives, reli-
gious groups philosophically opposed to the
communists, ethnic groups which traditionally have
resisted any sort of Vietnamese domination, and
robbers and bandits stealing to survive. None of
this resistance activity appears organized and it
is unlikely to present any long-term threat to com-
munist control. But it is a thorn ir: the side of
the communists and unquestionably is an important
factor compounding the other problems confronting
the new regime.
Second on the list of problems is the economy,
which the communists admit is in sad shape. Actions
taken so far appear to be makeshift--for example,
banks were secretly reopened, but no new money has
been printed. Living conditions in Saigon and
throughout the rest of the country apear to have
deteriorated somewhat, but there are as yet no
indications of mass starvation or widespread epi-
demics. People in the cities are being encouraged
to return to the countryside to resume farming in
the wake of tentative indications that food shortages
may occur later this year. The commL.nists lack the
fertilizers, machinery and spare parts, fuel, and
high yield rice stocks to become self-sufficient in
food and probably will not be able tc. offset these
shortcomings by expanding farm acreage.
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The communists appear to have begun efforts to
mobilize non-communist members of the population
to attack these various economic and social prob-
lems. A recent Saigon municipal congress of the
National Liberation Front was held in July and is
the best sign to date that attempts are being made
to intensify such efforts on a national scale. The
National Liberation Front is the Vietnamese Com-
munist vehicle for mobilizing widespread non-com-
munist popular participation to implement party
policy.
The Foreign Scene
Just as the Vietnamese communists have adopted
a deliberate timetable for internal consolidation in
the South, they appear to be in no great hurry to
expand the new regime's diplomatic points of con-
tact with the outside world. From all appearances
to date, Hanoi is unlikely to sanction full ambas-
sadorial representation in Saigon in the near future.
Most nations probably will be invited to send an
ambassador to Hanoi and that ambassador will also be
accredited to the southern regime. Others, espe-
cially Hanoi's communist allies and western nations
such as France, may be permitted to send a charge
d'affaires to Saigon. This would give the appear-
ance of independent diplomatic status for the southern
regime for the near term, and once formal reunifica-
tion is announced, the accreditation could easily
be converted to consular status.
Several countries, especially the two big com-
munist allies, have complained about not being per-
mitted early official access to Saigon. The French
have also been especially irate, feeling that the
Vietnamese falsely led them to believe they would
be the first western country to have relations with
the new regime. So far, however, the communists
have permitted no foreign missions into the South,
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ITE,
although since assuming power, they have agreed
to exchange ambassadors with over 8C countries.
Hanoi has nonetheless encouraged the southern
regime to expand its diplomatic activity and to be
accepted as a separate member of the world com-
munity. It certainly had to approve Saigon's ap-
plication for separate admission to the UN and
endorse the Saigon request to be admitted to the
nonaligned group of nations. The l&.tter move
unquestionably is tied to Hanoi's attempt to assure
as much third-country support for tp:e recent UN
bids as possible--without relying e:clusively
on its communist backers. The communists have
reacted with predictable harsh rhetoric about the
US Security Council veto of the bid for dual UN
membership. But in fact, the numerous public state-
ments by Vietnamese communist officials to the
effect that a de facto union of the north and south
has already been accomplished did little to
strenghten the case for two truly independent
Vietnamese states. If the process of reunifica-
tion continues to proceed smoothly, the issue of
dual membership for North and South Vietnam could
become a dead issue before long. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Authorities in Rangoon have been engaged in a
new get-tough campaign against lawbreakers in recent
weeks. The effort, which began shortly after the
student and labor disturbances last June, has centered
on political dissidents and economic criminals. Last
month, the crackdown was broadened to include hundreds
of "bad characters"--vagrants, squatters, and petty
thieves.
Penalties are also becoming more severe. Stu-
dents and workers found guilty of participating in
the disturbances are now being given stiffer sentences
than those involved in similar disorders last year.
Some students have received eight-year jail terms,
while workers got up to 16 years. Even petty crimi-
nals are summarily sentenced to terms of up to six
years, and traffic laws are being strictly enforced.
Charges of corruption, neglect, and indiscipline
have been levied on several hundred low level govern-
ment officials. Although the regime normally turns a
blind eye to black market operations, raids have been
made on Rangoon warehouses and nearly 100 small
private industries in the capital have been closed for
reselling raw materials purchased from the government.
Hard-line elements in the army apparently are
behind the tough tactics. The military has admin-
istered Rangoon directly since the riots last Decem-
ber, and soldiers, rather than police, are now making
house to house searches in lower class suburban areas.
Army patrols are again stopping long-haired youths on
the streets and giving them free haircuts, as they
did in December.
The authorities had originally acted with con-
siderable restraint in dealing with the most recent
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SECRET
disturbances in Rangoon. Senior officials met with
student and worker groups to explain the government's
policies. The regime has been. unwilling or unable,
however, to come up with new solutions to alleviate
$urma's underlying economic ills, and authorities