MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 21, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
State Department review completed
Secret
ll0
No. 0845/75
August 21, 1975
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Lebanon: A New Army Program . . . . . . . . . . 1
Jordan-Syria: Some Jordanians Nervous
About Rapprochement with Syria . . . . . . . . 3
Iran: A Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR-Angola: The Popular Movement's
Sugar Daddy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
East Africa: Restructuring of Regional
Community Likely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Aug 21, 1975
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Lebanon
A New Army Program
Prime Minister Rashid Karami has advanced
proposals.that would double the size of Lebanon's
17,000-man army, increase Muslim representation
in the officer corps, limit Christian domination
of defense policy, and reduce the strength of the
country's several private militias.
These proposals will meet stiff opposition from
some Christian groups in parliament, but if im-
plemented would reduce the continuing religious
and political tension among Lebanese. This, in
turn, would reduce the likelihood that Lebanese
Muslims would join with the Palestinian
fedayeen in any future clash between the commandos
and the Lebanese army.
The government, for domestic political gain,
would cite these changes as evidence that it was
taking steps to protect Lebanese territory against
Israeli incursions. In fact, they would not
strengthen the army to the point that it would be
any more eager to stand up to either the Israelis
or the Syrians.
Karami's program provides for compulsory
military service for all males at age 18. In
addition to bolstering the understrength army,
this would restore religious balance at the
lowest ranks--where Muslim volunteers now outnumber
Christians--and pull manpower away from the
private militias.
Interior Minister Shamun, the most powerful
Christian in the government, has gone further
than Karami and proposed that private militia
training camps be shut down. He reportedly has
already closed one belonging to his own National
Liberal Party. Many other important political
leaders--Christian, Muslim and Druze--have less of
an independent power base than Shamun, and are
therefore not likely to follow his lead or to
provide more than rhetorical support for his
proposal.
(Continued)
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The provision of Karami's program most likely
to be implemented would involve reduction of the
authority of the powerful army commander, who by
custom is always a Maronite Christian. Some of
the commander's prerogatives would be assumed by
a 7-man command council made up of representatives
oz the country's major religious groups.
President Franjiyah, a conservative Christian,
met with top commanders last week tc discuss such
a reorganization. This suqgests that Lebanon's
Christian leaders may be moving toward recognition
that they must sometime give.-up a portion of their
power if they are to strengthen the army and check
the general diminution of government authority.
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Jordan-Syria
Some Jordanians Nervous About
Rapprochement with Syria
The growing improvement in Jordanian-Syrian
relations has been favorably received by most
Jordanians. Both East Jordanians and Palestinians
alike reportedly see many benefits accruing from the
relaxation of travel and trade restrictions and the
opening of new commercial markets.
Some elements of Jordanian society, however,
especially the army, have exhibited varying degrees of
caution and skepticism over the new relationship
with Jordan's northern neighbor. The army is
reportedly fearful that one consequence of the
rapprochement will be the return to Jordan of the
fedayeen in some form. Almost without exception,
the military is opposed to any fedayeen presence, no
matter how controlled that presence might be.
A large number of Jordanians, especially
the East Bankers, are said to fear that in any close
relationship with Syria, Jordan will be dominated by
her larger, more powerful partner. Some civilians
reportedly do not understand how an economic, industrial,
and commercial union can exist between a basically
socialist republic and an essentially capitialist
monarchy.
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(Continued)
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Iran
The US embassy's economic and financial officer
in Tehran, has provided a comprehensive end-of-tour
assessment. His economic prognosis for Iran, is
cautiously optimistic especially when set next to the
gloomy prospects for most of the developing countries.
He is less sanguine about political developments. He
believes the Shah's refusal to liberalize the authori-
tarian political system during a time of rapid econom-
ic modernization increases the prospect that political
change, when it comes, will be revolutionary rather
than evolutionary.
The Positive Side
According to the diplomat's assessment, Iran's
economic and political policies during the past two
years have been almost without exception successful.
Iran is firmly committed to a mixed economy, has a
rational development plan, and has few ideological
hangups.
The economy is booming. A per capita gross
national product of nearly $1,800 has thrust Iran
into the ranks of the richest developing countries.
Although there is still a serious income distribu-
tion imbalance--one fifth of the population receives
50-60 percent of total income--the US official be-
lieves that both the urban and rural poor perceive
their lot as improving. Plans to reform the corporate
and income tax system and to broaden worker ownership
of industry are aimed at reducing the income gap,
although the government's ability to implement the
programs is questioned.
The reporting office projects an eventual middle
power status for Iran. It should catch up to southern
Europe in living standards by the end of the century,
and could surpass all but the wealthiest European
countries in GNP.
(Continued)
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In addition to being hampered by inflation,
a severe shortaqe of skilled manpower, and in-
adequate infrastructure, Iran's development program
-- running well behind schedule in the crucial
areas of steel, petrochemicals, and agiriculture.
Perhaps the greatest failure has-been in agri-
culture. Production barely keeps pace with popu-
lation growth and falls well behind demand. Demand
is estimated to increase by 8-10 percent annually,
but production cannot be expanded rapt_dly and is
expected to increase by only about 4 percent. The
food import bill has been driven up t4 a worrisome
1;=vel.
Iran's economic outlook appears Brighter to
the US official than does its political future.
The basic problem he sees is that the; leadership
is sponsoring modernization in almost; every social
and economic area, while maintaining in autocratic
p=-)litical system. It is unrealistic,; in his view,
to expect that Iran can be changed in; only a few
decades from a poor peasant society if1to an af-
fluent, modern nation without undergoing political
u-,)heaval.
The Shah is gambling that continued improvement
i.-i living conditions will take the stp-aam out of
demands for political liberalization.' At the same
time, he has pointedly, and narrowly, drawn the
boundaries of acceptable political activity through
his cre decree, of a single ;political
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USSR-Angola
The Popular Movement's Sugar Daddy
Moscow is pursuing a policy of uncompromising
support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola. It is not only training Popular
Movement troops, but more important, is delivering
military equipment. These deliveries do not cost
the Soviets mucn, but they have considerable
impact on troubled Angola. Moscow has sharply
increased shipments during the past year, almost
certainly because it calculated that the revolution
in Portugal would foster a change in the status
quo in Angola, which the Soviets wanted to be
in a position to axploit.
Even before the increased shipments began,
the Popular Movement had amassed an impressive
array of Soviet equipment. The Movement's arsenal
was well stocked with a variety of small arms,
including machine guns and grenade launchers, and
some heavier items, such as 82-mm. mortars, B-10
82-mm. recoilless rifles, and 122-mm. rockets.
The new deliveries have continued the flow of
some of this equipment and have added several
other types of materiel, including armored cars,
trucks, tracked armored anti-aircraft vehicles,
armored personnel carriers, RPG-7 anti-tank
launchers, anti-tank wire-guided missiles, and
rocket launchers. With the receipt of this
materiel, the Popular Movement is far and away
the best equipped of the contending groups in
Angola.
The Soviets have used various routes for
getting supplies to the Popular Movement. During
the insurgency against the Portuguese, Soviet equip-
ment was unloaded at the Tanzanian port of Dar
es Salaam, and from there it was transported
overland through Zambia. The Soviets are still
making some use of Dar es Salaam, but equipment
is now moved into Angola via aircraft and third
country vessels, as well as overland transport.
(Continued)
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The primary route over the past yeai, however, has
been via Congo. Equipment unloaded; at Pointe
Noire is flown from Brazzaville intvv Angola, or
shipped down the coast in two converted landing
craft used by the Popular Movement.: These landing
craft do not need a deep-water port.? and are thus
able to deliver cargo to prearranged secluded
rendezvous points along the Angola roast. On
occasion, arms-bearing ships have unloaded into the
Landing craft or fishing boats while: at sea. An
East German ship and a Yugoslav ship have each
unloaded military equipment in Luanda harbor
:itself.
Moscow conducts training programs for the
Popular Movement both within the USt;R and in Congo.
Thousands of Popular Movement troopt have received
:raining in the USSR since the earlt7 1960s; hundreds
of trainees are now in the Soviet Utiion. A few
members of the Movement have been sent to East
Germany to be trained in intelligent:e and security
subjects. It is no-surprise that.Pt>pular
Movement troops are better organizer and better
Led than those of its major rival, t:he National
Front.
'here have been reports of Soviet military
advisers and Congolese troops in Angola assisting
the Popular Movement, but these rept'rts are sketchy
and unconfirmed. What seems more 1!Lkely is that the
Soviets have asked Cuba to help out; with advisers
and technicians. Indeed, eight Cubtmns arrived
in Luanda on August 3. Officials oi_ the Ministry
of Information, which is controlled; by the Popular
Movement, have tried to pass them of as tourists.
The Soviets are probably using the Portuguese
Communists as the channel for getting political
advice and guidance to the Popular movement. As
Ear as we know, there are no Soviet; officials
in Luanda or Angola. Moreover, the; ties between
the Popular Movement and the Portugtiese Communists
are close. The Popular Movement wa;3 originally an
offshoot of the Portuguese Communist Party.
(Continued)
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Agostinho Neto, the Popular Movement's leader,
is an old acquaintance of Cunhal and seems to
share his outlook on Marxism and Moscow.
The Soviets probably see Neto as the kind of
liberation movement leader they prefer to work
with. Their relative generosity to the Popular
Movement may be intended to exemplify the rewards
which await those who associate themselves with
Moscow. -Over the longer term, the Soviets may hope
that with an amenable government in Luanda, they
will be able to exert a major influence on events
in southern Africa and to limit Chinese advances
in the region.
The Soviets presumably have not lost sight of
the strategic or economic opportunities that might
flow from an Angola under the control of Neto's
Popular Movement. But it is hard to see how
much, if anything, Moscow would actually gain from
bases in Angola. With the opening of the Suez
Canal the south Atlantic seafaring lanes are even
less important to the Soviet navy than they have
been. Bases in Angola could not add significantly
to any current Soviet military activity, and Angola
would be strategically important to Moscow only
if the Soviets contemplated a major new increase
of their activities in the south Atlantic. This
seems highly unlikely.
The Soviets themselves have no need for
Angolan or Cabindan resources, but they might want
to use Cabindan oil to supply some of their East
European clients. The Soviets may also want to
hinder Western access to the minerals in the area.
The Soviets probably do not expect any
immediate return on their investment. While their
arms and equipment have helped the Popular Movement
to assert control over Luanda, Cabinda, and some
other areas, they have not--and probably cannot--
overcome the Popular Movement's inherent weaknesses.
The Popular Movement's essentially urban character,
its relatively limited personnel resources, and
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1Teto's doctrinaire and unappealing t>ersonality
make significant inroads into the countryside
strongholds of the National Front of National
Union unlikely, no matter how much equipment
the Soviets send.
On the other hand, neither of the other two
groups (or both in concert for that matter)
appears able to defeat the Popular Movement
decisively on its territory. Since'::there is no
support whatsoever for a partition agreement,
a protracted war of attrition seems in the offing,
and Moscow wants to make sure the Ptrnular Movement
is well provisioned for the ordeal.11
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Restructuring of Regional Community Likely
Cabinet delegations from Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania--the members of the East African Com-
munity (EAC)--began meeting in Nairobi on August
20. The ministers expect to set up a commission
to review the Treaty for East African Cooperation
of 1967. Although presidents Kenyatta, Nyerere,
and Amin are often at loggerheads, the tripartite
community seems likely to survive the treaty re-
view process--but with the scope of joint econom-
ic functions substantially reduced.
Earlier this month, a high ranking Kenyan
official openly predicted that the community's
railways, harbors, and post-telecommunications
corporations would be eliminated as a result of
the review. Agreement on how the three corpora-
tions are to be split into national organizations
will not come easily, however; each has a large
debt to foreign lenders.
Differences among the three countries on how
the corporations--especially the one administering
railways--were to function have been a continual
source of friction and have frequently resulted
in interruption of services. By reducing the
occasion for such squabbles, the breakup of the
corporations may actually improve prospects for
cooperation among the three East African countries.
There is a good chance that the corporation
that runs the East African Airways will survive a
revision of the community trea-cy, and that the
present customs union also will be retained. The
less controversial jointly funded statistical and
scientific services are also likely to survive.
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