MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00865A001100330002-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 1, 2001
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 13, 1975
Content Type:
NOTES
File:
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Body:
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01100330002-3
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0691/75
June 13, 1975
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001100330002-3
No Foreign Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
g 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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SECRET
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Kuwait: Succession Problems . . . . . . . . . . 1
Malagasy Republic: Military Tribunal's
Verdict Announced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pakistan: Status of Tarbella Project . . . . . 5
June 13, 1975
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Kuwait
Succession Problems
The poor health of Emir Sabah al-Sabah and the
reported failing health of the Crown Prince raise
questions about the Kuwaiti succession and the ruling
family's prospects for retaining its dominant
position over the long term.
The Emir, who is in his mid-fifties, has been
or health for many years
The US embassy in Kuwait has now receivecL several
reports that the health of Crown Prince and Prime
Minister Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the Emir's nephew,
has deteriorated recently.
Should either the Emir or Crown Prince die or
become incapacitated the al-Sabah family will be
faced with a tough problem in naming a new crown
prince. The Kuwaiti constitution restricts succes-
sion to the descendants of Mubarak al-Sabah, who
ruled at the beginning of this century. Family
practice has been to limit eligibility to the branches
of the family originated by two of Mubarak's sons,
Jabir and Salim. The al-Sabahs have sought to main-
tain intra-family peace by alternating the emirship
between the two branches. It has not always been
able to do so, however; the last two emirs have both
come from the Salim line. The present Crown Prince
is a Jabir.
In the Salim branch of the family, the strongest
candidate to move up the political ladder is the
controversial Jabir al-Ali, the deputy prime minister
and minister of information.
Interior and Defense minister aad Abciallan., wno ma
be in the running, is reportedly both capable and
(Continued)
June 13, 1975
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able to get along with all factions of the family.
He faces a major impediment, however, in the fact
his mother was a black slave--a serious drawback in
a lineage-conscious society. The current ruler's
oldest son, Salim al-Sabah, the minister of social
affairs and labor, is considered not well qualified
and too young to become Crown Prince.
In the event the position of Crown Prince becomes
vacant first, the Jabir branch would be hard put to
come up with a suitable candidate. Foreign Minister
Sabah al-Ahmad is perhaps the best qualified member
Other Jabiris now in government are all too
ounginexperienced, and lack a following.
the combination of
poor health at the top, coup lee with intra-family
squabbling and the lack of truly outstanding candi-
dates in the wings presents a situation of potential
instability. This is particularly true now that the
position of the al-Sabahs is being eroded by internal
political developments. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
June 13, 1975
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Malagasy Republic
Military Tribunal's Verdict Announced
I IV
The verdict of a military tribunal hearing the
case of 33 defendants accused of complicity in the
assassination last February of head of state Richard
Ratsimandrava will probably keep alive the ethnic
tensions that have troubled Madagascar since January.
The tribunal on June 12 found only three of the
defendants guilty and sentenced them to five years
hard labor and heavy fines. Those acquitted include
former president Tsiranana, socialist party leader
Andre Resampa, and Colonel Brechard Rajaonarison,
who led the revolt of a paramilitary police unit in
January. About 200 other defendants were granted
amnesty in May.
Almost all the defendants are members of coastal
tribes, the traditional rivals of the Merina tribe
of central Madagascar. Despite the absence of hard
evidence linking the bulk of the defendants to the
assassination, many Merina are likely to believe that
coastal members of the ruling military directory,
established after Ratsimandrava's assassination, used
behind-the-scenes influence to secure the release
of most of the accused.
The 18-member directory, which includes repre-
sentatives of the main tribal groups and all security.
forces, is expected soon to establish a new government
and name a single head of government. The primary
task of the new government will be to find ways to
dampen the ethnic antagonisms that threaten to create
a serious split between the coastal-dominated gen-
darmerie and the Merina-dominated army. It will also
have to deal with a sluggish economy and food short-
ages that have led to high prices in the capital,
Tananarive, where most Merina live.
(Continued)
June 13, 1975 3
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Commander Didier Ratsiraka, a coastal tribes-
man and the leader of the directory's radical faction,
is the most likely choice to become head of govern-
ment. He has support among both the coastals and
the Merina, although some Merina believe he was
primarily responsible for the tribunal's favorable
treatment of the coastal defendants. Another con-
tender is Major Soja, a gendarmerie officer who is
25X1A more moderate than Ratsiraka. He is currently minister
of rural development. (CONFIDENTIAL)
June 13, 1975
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Pakistan
Status of Tarbella Project
Repair work on Pakistan's massive Tarbella
dam is ahead of schedule, and water may be available
from the dam to irrigate the rice and cotton crops
late this summer and the next winter wheat crop in
the fall.
Tarbella is not likely to bring self-sufficiency
in foodgrain to Pakistan for several years. Farmers
in the Indus Valley will have to develop the skills
for the more intensive cultivation Tarbella waters
will make possible. An increase in the next winter
wheat crop depends on use of high-yield varieties,
which in turn require a controlled water supply and
the careful application of fertilizer and pesticides.
Stocks of high-yield Seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides
are inadequate for the 9-million-ton harvest Islamabad
has targeted.
Squabbling among the provinces has interfered
with planning the use of Tarbella waters. A top-
level committee is working on a plan for allocating
the waters, but we are not certain when, or even if,
a decision will be made. Under these circumstances,
the next winter wheat crop is not likely to be more
than 10 percent greater than the last crop. (CONFIDENTIAL)
June 13, 1975
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Secret
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