MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000900220001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000900220001-9
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0667/75
May 9, 1975
140
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No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Background Use Only/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
>3 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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 Approved For Release 2001/O 1 k DP79T00865A000900220001-9
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
South Yemen: Results of the National
Front Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.1
Nigeria:
The Ibos Since the CivirWar. . . . .
. 3
Kenya:
More Hurdles for Kenyatta. . . . . . . .
5
Bangladesh: First Hundred Days of the
"Second Revolution" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
May 9, 1975
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Results of the National Front Congress
Decisions taken at the sixth congress of the
ruling National Front, held in Aden in late March,
will not lead to dramatic departures in South Yemen's
domestic or foreign policies. Secretary General Abd
al-Fattah Ismail, leader of the extremist wing of
the National Front, and other important party leaders
retained their posts. Differences between Ismail
and his reputedly more flexible rival, President
Salim Rubayi Ali, were papered-over.
In the domestic arena, the congress reaffirmed
the Front's commitment to "scientific socialism" as
the basis for economic development. Prior to the
congress, President Ali had advocated a modification
of socialist measures to give some encouragement to
the country's dwindling entrepreneurial and land-
owning groups. Ali's less doctrinaire position may
have been based, in part, on his belief that it would
generate aid from more conservative Arab governments.
The party's published foreign policy resolutions
were generally restrained. This was in line with
efforts during the past year by President Ali to take
a more flexible approach--perhaps as a result of
Egyptian overtures. South Yemen will continue its
efforts to establish relations with the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar. Aden hopes to secure
additional sources of economic aid, neutralize Arab
support for Omani Sultan Qabus, and diminish Western
and Iranian influence in the Gulf.
Predictably, the National Front. adopted a strong
resolution supporting the Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Oman
The Front
went on record again in support o the peaceful
unification of North and South Yemen.
May 9, 1975
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(Continued)
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The Adenis avoided direct criticism of Saudi
Arabia. In what may have been an opening to the
Saudis, Secretary General Ismail noted that South
Yemen is ready to establish diplomatic ties with
governments having different social systems on the
basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-
intervention. Cairo has been attempting to get Aden
and Riyadh talking, and to reduce the Soviet role in
South Yemen. President Ali has, been the advocate of
this position in the National Front.
Moscow appears to have made at least one move
to buttress the position of Ismail, who is generally
identified as the leader of the pro-Soviet wing of
the Front. A Soviet cruiser docked in Aden on the
eve of the congress and remained--with several other
Soviet ships--for the duration of the session.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
May 9, 1975
SECRET
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Nigeria
The Ibos Since the CiviZ War
Five years after their defeat in the civil
war, Nigeria's Ibo tribesmen have accepted the fact
that "Biafra" is dead and are quietly rebuilding for
their economic and political future. The best
educated and most industrious of Nigeria's tribes,
the Ibos are among the strongest backers of General
Gowon and continued military rule. This attitude
is a direct result of Gowon's policies of reconcil-
iation and reconstruction, which were primarily re-
sponsible for putting the tribe back on its feet
after the war.
Ibo political activity is confined largely
to East Central state, where the bulk of the tribe
lives. Ibos maintain a low political profile and
avoid involvement in controversial national issues,
as they are still viewed with suspicion throughout
much of Nigeria. Despite this consideration, however,
they are seeking to restore links with other tribal
groups, undoubtedly with an eye to building future
political alliances.
The Ibos are particularly eager to reestablish
ties with the Hausa.-Fulani of northern Nigeria. The
Hausa-Fulani dominated Nigerial politics from inde-
pendence until the military took power in 1966. More
than 50,000 Ibos have returned to the north; many more
had fled from the region during the anti-Ibo riots
of 1966. Northerners apparently have been receptive
to their presence.
The Ibos have rejected involvement with the
sizable Yoruba tribe of western Nigeria.. As a result
of the war, Ibo domination of Nigerian commerce and
the civil service passed largely to the Yoruba, whom
the Ibos--and the northerners--now view with intense
distrust.
(Continued)
May 9, 1975
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The Ibos have had little success in reestablishing
their ties with the country's minor tribes. In Rivers
and Southeastern states, small tribes were freed of
Ibo domination by the war and are determined to keep
them from returning. The Ibos have been unable to
regain their considerable valuable property in Port
Harcourt, a predominantly Ibo city before the war.
There are few identifiable Ibo leaders today.
Although several thousand former Biafran enlisted
men and civil servants have been readmitted into
the military and the federal government, fewer than
50 Ibo officers have been taken back into the army.
None have been placed in key commands. The civilian
administrator of East Central state, Ukpabi Asika, is
an Ibo, but has no following among his fellow tribes-
men and owes his position solely to his wartime loyalty
to General Gowan. Colonel Ojukwu, the former secession-
ist leader, remains in exile in the Ivory Coast. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 9, 1975
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Kenya
More Hurdles for Kenyatta
The parliamentary committee investigating the
death of J. M. Kariuki will soon begin a very sensi-
tive phase of its work. Within the next week it will
reexamine three senior police officers whose previous
testimony was evasive. Unless these officials provide
useful testimony--which they probably will not--the
committee may be able to come up with nothing more
damaging to the government than lack of cooperation.
There is no indication that the committee has come up
with any evidence linking any high ranking figures to
the Kariuki murder or to the irregular and inept
handling of the case by the police..
Despite the lack of evidence, much of the public
already suspects President Kenyatta and his top
associates of complicity in Kariuki's murder. Even
a report pointing to the refusal of police officials
to cooperate with the investigation would further
discredit the president.
Kenyatta normally makes a major speech on June 2,
a national holiday. If the committee report has been
published by then, he is likely to encounter an un-
friendly crowd. If the crowd rebuffs the increasingly
irascible Kenyatta, it will only reinforce his present
inclination to take a tough line with his critics.
May 9, 1975
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Bangladesh
First Hundred Days of the
"Second Revolution"
Three months after assuming dictatorial powers
Mujibur Rahman still is not providing the effective
leadership his impoverished nation needs. His much-
publicized "second revolution" has made little
progress toward:
-- Producing an effective civil service;
-- organizing the country's single national
political party;
-- Improving the policymaking process;
-- Improving economic conditions.
Internal security remains fragile, despite the
considerable publicity that has accompanied the
President's use of the army and security forces to
control smuggling and terrorism. The check on
smuggling--although effective--may have been only
temporary.
Disillusionment and discontent remain rife over
economic issues, particularly high prices and shortages
of basic commodities. Most Bengalees realize the
dangers of outright opposition to Mujib, however, and
appear to be reserving judgment for a while longer.
Mujib's approach to leadership inhibits quick
decisions and dynamic policy initiatives. He makes
all final decisions himself, but because he has little
understanding of economic and technical subjects, this
is a very time-consuming process. He still relies
primarily on compromise, promises and manipulation
to attain his goals, but will use intimidation if
necessary. Personal and political relationships
continue to be more important to him than an under-
standing of the issues. Accordingly, key positions
(Continued)
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in government continue to be held by close family
members or political cronies, often in preference to
more capable personnel.
Despite his shortcomings and a continued erosion
of his popular support, Mujib is still widely respected
and remains the only person who has the national
credentials to unify and lead Bangladesh. Presumably,
he recognizes that under the new system of government
he will be held personally responsible for all future
failures and successes.
Mujib apparently has been able to retain the
loyalty of most members of the military and security
forces. Nonetheless, they are impatient for signs
of economic progress and political stability, and
continue to represent the greatest potential threat
to his continued rule. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Secret
Secret
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