CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000700330001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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No Foreign Ditsem
Ng
12ffl~T HOUE
Chinese Affairs
Top Secret
April 1975
SC No. 00407/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
S 5B (1), (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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GAMMA ITEM
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
April 14, 1975
Mao Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Peking's Reporting on Indochina Picks Up . . . . 4
Two with Troubles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Peking Comments on Taiwan. . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Criticism of Foreign Trade Policies Continues. . 13
The Course of Sino-US Relations. . . . . . . . . 16
China: Capability to Produce Oscilloscopes . . . 24
New Headaches: The Choygal's Fall. . . ... . . . 26
Political Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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Recent events have done nothing to clarify
Chairman Mao's current political status. He sent
a wreath to, but did not attend, the funeral of his
old comrade Tung Pi-wu, and he failed to meet the
visiting Tunisian prime minister.
Given Tung's role, along with Mao, in founding
the party, the Chairman's failure to attend Tung's
funeral is significant. His absence was somewhat
obscured by the absence of several other Politburo
members, but they were either out of the country
or in the provinces. The only other notable
absentee was Chou En-lai, who met with the Tunisian
prime minister a few days earlier. Chou was prob-
ably healthy enough to attend the funeral, but it
seems likely that he stayed away to make Mao's ab-
sence less conspicuous. Politburo member Wang Tung-
hsing, who used to be Mao's bodyguard, also missed
the funeral, suggesting he may be staying with Mao
in the provinces.
Despite what appeared to be a conscious effort
to soften the impact of Mao's absence, Yeh Chien-ying
in his eulogy to Tung seemed to underscore that ab-
sence in his reference to the joint role of Mao and
'Tung in founding the party. Ironically, Yeh said in
public what Teng Hsiao-ping curiously failed to men-
tion in his private speech to the Central Committee
in January. Teng made no reference to Mao's role in
founding the party in his comments on the Chairman's
early political activities. If this omission was in-
tended to slight Mao--and it appears that it was--
Chinese leaders are obviously being careful to
balance unflattering private statements with lauda-
tory public statements.
April 14, 1975
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a speech by chief
economic planner Yu C iu- i to the National
People's Congress seemed to raise much the same
criticism of Mao that other Chinese officials
have made. Yu complained that political instability
over the last ten years, i.e., since the Cultural
Revolution, has had an adverse effect on economic
development. He raised yet another issue on which
the Chairman is vulnerable--the failure of the
Great Leap Forward--when he commented that the
"three difficult years" (a synonym for the Great
Leap Forward failures) could not be blamed on
others, specifically the Soviets.
Yu's reference to the Soviets, in what could
imply a more flexible attitude toward Moscow,
coincides with comments of other Chinese officials
that appear critical of Mao's policy toward the
Soviet Union. Yu's comment, however, could also
be read as an answer to those--if any--who may be
arguing that an improvement in relations with
Moscow might bring needed economic assistance.
Yu's message was that responsibility for economic
development is in Chinese hands.
Comments by some Chekiang provincial officials
raise still further questions about Mao's status.
They reportedly believe that Mao, at his own
request, is in the "second line" of leadership
and has become the adviser to "first-line" leader
Chou En-lai. This view is the reverse of last
year's anti-Confucius propaganda, which portrayed
historical prime ministers as advisers to their
emperors. Whether Mao is in fact in the second
line and whether he is there of his own volition
remain open to question. Nevertheless, coming on
the heels of comments by officials in Fukien
Province that Mao's influence is on the decline,
April 14, 1975
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the view of Chekiang officials that Mao is
voluntarily in the second line of leadership
suggests that local officials in China are taking
a hard look at Mao's current status. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 14, 1975
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Peking's Reporting on Indochina Picks Up
Peking continues to replay PRG and North Viet-
namese commentary on the situation in South Vietnam,
but has so far refrained from elaborating its own
view of the fighting. Chinese coverage of the Cam-
bodian situation is somewhat more intensive, but
still centers on the inevitability of an insurgent
victory. In both cases, Peking seems to be getting
over its earlier surprise at the rapidity of recent
developments, and its press is now keeping pace with
battlefield developments.
one new element in Chinese press treatment of
the war revolves around the US domestic debate over
US involvement in Indochina. In an April 1 Peking
radio broadcast, the Chinese referred to the divi-
sion among US leaders on this question, pointing out
that some Americans argue that the Indochina effort
has prevented the US from devoting sufficient atten-
tion to Europe, which should be Washington's "primary"
concern.
The Chinese seem to be arguing that the US should
not allow itself to be drawn into increasing its in-
volvement in South Vietnam, a step they allege would
seriously weaken the US capability to devote adequate
attention to more important areas where the Soviet
"threat" is greater. Hong Kong's communist Ta Kung
Pao reflected this notion last week, suggesting that
the US should remember the lesson of the 1960s when,
after becoming "bogged down in the quagmire of Indo-
china," the Soviets were able to "sneak into the
Middle East and Europe."
By casting Washington's Indochina "predicament"
in the context of Soviet-US confrontation, Peking
may be attempting to forestall the possibility of
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Indochina creating problems in Sino-US relations.
At the same time, of course, this approach tends
to play down Peking's influence over events in
Vietnam.
Recent reports from several sources quoting
Chinese officials abroad support this line of
reasoning. These sources strongly suggest that
Peking had been surprised and disturbed at the
rapid pace of North Vietnamese battlefield suc-
cesses in South Vietnam. In late March, 25X1C
claimed Peking a
"nothing to do with" the current North Vietnamese
offensive and would not supply additional aid to
u ort the cam aign. In early April, 25X1C
said a Chinese military delegation
that visited Hanoi in March had discussed only rou-
tine military aid with the North Vietnamese and that
the Chinese had not been forewarned of plans for an
offensive. the Chinese had been
led to believe a anol s intention was to press
for implementation of the Paris agreement while it
continued mopping-up operations in "liberated" areas.
said in
early April that Peking had curtailed oviet mili-
tary aid to Hanoi in the past and suggested that the
Chinese were considering similar steps in order to
impede both Soviet and North Vietnamese efforts to
"establish hegemony" in other parts of Indochina. He
also suggested that Peking was taking other measures
to improve its position in both Laos and Cambodia.
Peking is clearly attempting to make the best
of the complicated situation in Indochina, playing
down its own role in Vietnam in order not to jeop-
ardize its more important interests'with the US,
while maintaining efforts to improve its influence
in Cambodia and Laos. Peking will not, of course,
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abandon its equities in Hanoi and presumably will
maintain what it considers to be "proper" levels
of military assistance. The North Vietnamese
have reportedly applied strong pressures on Peking
to provide additional foodstuffs, transportation,
and other aid for recently liberated areas in
South Vietnam. Peking will probably respond rather
generously to these requests. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CON-
TROLLED DISSEM)
April 14, 1975
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The political fortunes of Politburo members
Chiang Ching and Hsu Shih-yu do not appear very
bright at the moment. There were indications dur-
ing the anti-Confucius campaign last year that the
two were linked in some way, and this apparent con-
nection is now being talked about by Chinese offi-
cials. Adding to Madame Mao's woes, in particular,
is the belief now being expressed by Chinese that
Mao himself is unhappy with her political performance.
Chiang Ching's current round of difficulties
appears to date back to early January, when the lead-
ership was working up a slate of new government of-
ficers for ratification at the National Peo le's Con-
gress. Mao did
not want is wi e to o a government post and, ac-
cording to one account, even vetoed her nomination
to the relatively innocuous position as one of sev-
eral vice chairmen of the National People's Congress.
Adding insult to injury, Mao reportedly praised Chou
En-lai's wife and the widow of former vice premier
Li Fu-chun as the two most respected female party
officials.
On one occasion, Mao reportedly became so angry
with Chiang Ching that he wanted her removed from
the Politburo. The incident that allegedly precipi-
tated his anger was his reading of the transcripts of
his wife's interviews in 1972 with American sociol-
ogist Roxanne Witke. Ms. Witke was told at the time
of the interviews that the transcripts would be re-
leased to her after they were read and approved by
the Chinese leadership, but she has never received
them. Chinese rumor has it that Chiang Ching was not
removed from the Politburo over the incident because
Chou dissuaded Mao from doing so.
April 14, 1975
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which he warned Chiang Ching of
ery and advised her to correct
The letter was first circulated
the campaign to discredit Lin,
again last year in conjunction
Lin
Piao's treach-
her
own mistakes.
in
1972
as part of
and
was
circulated
with
the
anti-Con-
fucius campaign. The same letter reportedly was
disseminated throughout China earlier this year and
is the subject of study sessions. Madame Mao made
her first public appearance since the National
People's Congress at Tung Pi-wu's funeral on April
7. During her absence, International Women's Day,
a time for praising the contributions of female
party members, passed without a single mention of
her.
Canton Military Region commander Hsu Shih-yu
seems to be facing double jeopardy. As a regional
military commander, he automatically falls within
a group viewed with some suspicion by the civilian
leadership in Peking. In addition, Hsu, perhaps more
than any other regional commander, seems in the past
year to have developed ties with the party's left
wing and especially its leader, Chiang Ching.
This connection, alluded to by historical analogy
in the propaganda last year, is now being openly ex-
pressed by Chinese officials. 25X1C
some of t e mi 1 ary and the
e worse o e er durin the anti-Confucius cam-
paign. mentioned 25X1C
several military regions Pre leftist sympathies ran
high, and these included Hsu Shih-yu's former and cur-
rent commands. Chekiang Province officials recently
claimed that Hsu was in line for the job of defense
minister, but lost out because he "supported the left-
ists" during the anti-Confucius campaign.
Whether Hsu was ever seriously in the running
for the defense portfolio, there were several indica-
tions last year that Madame Mao was in correspondence
April 14, 1975
Another ominous sign is a letter from Mao in
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with troops under his command and, perhaps, even
with Hsu personally. According to rumors in Canton,
Chiang Ching even visited Hsu in April of last year.
Like Madame Mao, Hsu dropped out of sight after the
National People's Congress. Unlike her, he did not
appear at Tung Pi-wu's funeral but only sent a
wreath. Possibly as a sign of Peking's suspicions
about Hsu, he is the only regional military commander
with two civilian members of the Politburo as politi-
cal commissars in his region.
Although both Chiang Ching and Hsu Shih-yu ap-
pear to be under a dark cloud, it is not at all cer-
tain that they will suffer any major political ca-
tastrophe in the near future. Given Peking's concern
with promoting unity and stability---and evidently
with setting such an example among the top ranks of
the party--a decision to remove either of the two
from office would probably have to be weighed against
the potentially destabilizing effects of such a move.
As one Chinese has claimed, Chou En-lai had "his own
political reasons" for not wanting Madame Mao to be
completely humiliated. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO
DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
April 14, 1975
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Peking Comments on Taiwan
Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek's death
last week provided Peking with the opportunity to
reiterate a theme to which it has given heavy at-
tention in recent weeks--the hope that Taiwan's
residents would participate in the peaceful reuni-
fication of the island with the mainland.
Commenting last week on Chiang's death,
People's Daily--after characterizing the Generalis-
simo as the "common enemy of all Chinese people"
--asserted that "patriotic" military and govern-
ment personnel on Taiwan could now actively con-
tribute to Taiwan's reunification with the main-
land. The brief article also pointed out that
increasing numbers of people on Taiwan would be
able to see the benefits of solidarity among all
Chinese peoples. No timing for the island's
liberation was mentioned, however, in keeping
with the patience Peking has shown for some time
on this issue.
Peking's renewed enthusiasm for increased
communication and cooperation between Chinese on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait surfaced last
February. On February 27, marking the anniversary
of the 1948 uprising on Taiwan, Liao Cheng-chih
claimed that many former Taiwan residents had
returned to China and said he hoped more "com-
patriots" would come to "tour, see relatives, and
take part in various activities." Liao also ex-
pressed confidence that "patriotic forces" on
Taiwan would grow and contribute there to the
island's reunification with the mainland.
The themes of peaceful reunification and
Peking's desire for more communication with Taiwan
residents were pointed up again in March, when
April 14, 1975
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the Chinese announced the amnesty and release of
nearly 300 Nationalist "war criminals." At that
time, Peking said the released prisoners could
travel to Taiwan, if they wished. Although none
of the prisoners has as yet exercised that option,
Peking's frequent references to it suggest
that some of the prisoners will eventually make
the attempt.
The activities of the released prisoners
have been given extensive coverage in the Chinese
media, with emphasis on their salutary comments
about the changes in China since the communists
came to power in 1949. In Hong Kong, the communist
press has carried a number of articles on the am-
nesty, urging Taiwan residents to work for reuni-
fication. One Hong Kong newspaper has pointed out
that Peking is likely to treat Taiwan residents
fairly after "liberation," because among those
pardoned last month were some of the most notorious
Nationalist "war criminals."
In late March, Peking returned to the notion
of improving communications with residents on Taiwan,
in an open invitation to Taiwan suggesting that a
delegation of athletes be sent to the Third National
Games in Peking next September. The invitation
included a call for "unity of compatriots in Taiwan
and the rest of the entire Chinese people."
The Chinese clearly have several objectives
in mind in their appeals for unity among Chinese on
both sides of the strait. In addition to the obvious
attempt to quiet any fears that Taiwan residents will
be treated harshly after "liberation," Chinese leaders
also hope to create apprehension among Taiwan's
residents about the island's prospects after Chiang.
Peking has argued that Chiang was the major obstacle
to accommodation between the two sides and that his
death will clear the way for better understanding
between them.
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Moreover, by declaring the fundamental unity
of all Chinese, Peking may be taking steps to
make clear its opposition to any options other
than eventual reunification with the mainland.
The Chinese appear to be most concerned about
forestalling any speculation in Taipei about an
independent Taiwan or the development of some sort
of relationship with Moscow. Although there is no
evidence that Taipei is actively considering
either option, Chinese wariness, especially
regarding the Soviet angle, surfaced in two recent
articles in Hong Kong's communist press.
In early March, Hong Kong's PRC-owned Ta
Kung Pao published a front-page article that
warned of Soviet designs on Taiwan and implied that
some officials in Taipei had toyed with the pos-
sibility of "changing allies," a move characterized
as "absurd" by the author. In mid-March, the
same newspaper claimed that the Soviets had made
unspecified moves toward Taipei, but played down
the possibility of any collusion between the
Nationalists and the Soviets. A major factor that
inhibits Soviet designs on the island, according
to the article, is the likelihood that the US would
not permit the Soviets to step in. The article
also dismissed the notion that an independent
Taiwan is a real possibility, declaring that even
after President Chiang's death, it will be impos-
sible to separate Taiwan from the mainland.
Another feature of Peking's recent statements
regarding Taiwan should be noted. In keeping
with Peking's low-key treatment of the US role in
Taiwan, little press attention has been paid to
this potential complication in Peking's efforts to
enhance communications with Taipei. In fact, the
refutation of any possibility that Taipei could
"change allies" reflects Peking's preference that
Taipei retain its links with Washington, at least
for the time being. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 14, 1975
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Criticism of Foreign Trade Policies Continues
China's expansive foreign trade policy has
drawn sharp. criticism in domestic propaganda for
some time. While honest differences undoubtedly
exist smong leaders of various ideological hues
over the role of China's foreign commerce, criti-
cal comments in the media have been highly polem-
ical, mainly reflecting the use of the foreign
trade question for partisan political ends by ele-
ments of the political left. A notable criticism
of over-reliance on foreign resources appeared in
the national media in August 1973, when the anti-
Confucian campaign was just getting under way. More-
over, the linkage between Confucius, Lin Piao, and
those who advocate "the philosophy of servility to
things foreign" has been stressed repeatedly.
As the leader of the broad coalition of mod-
erate forces and the chief architect of external pol-
icy, Premier Chou En-lai has been the apparent target
of many of these propaganda barbs. An article in the
January 6 issue of the Peking Kuangming DaiZy, which
was only recently received in Washington, continues
the attack and leaves little doubt that the objective
is to disparage Chou. The piece assaults Chang Chih-
tung, described as "the bureaucrat handling foreign
affairs at the end of the Ching dynasty who worshipped
things foreign and fawned on foreign powers."
The article charges that 19th century modern-
izers, who favored the melding of Western technology
with traditional Chinese. culture, were in effect col-
luding with reactionary elements at home and abroad.
The parallel to what is wrong with current imports of
Western technology and equipment is obvious, but the
line of argument seems to have another objective. A
number of harsh articles have been published under
April 14, 1975
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pseudonyms associated with Mao and Chou, branding
feudal princes and other Confucianists as traitors
who colluded with foreign enemies, especially the
Huns--i.e., the USSR. The targets of the criticism
were certain regional military commanders and their
leftist political allies. The line of attack in
the Kuangming Daily article turns the traitor charge
against the original accusers by drawing the com-
parison between those who have shaped foreign trade
policies with historical figures who have sold out
to foreign revisionists.
The Kuangming article does not limit its scope
to foreign trade matters. Chang Chih-tung is also
charged with suppressing the legitimate revolutionary
struggle of the people under the guise of countering
the "non-enforcement of rules and regulations and
the emergence of great disorder in all corners of the
country"--an obvious jab at Chouist efforts to dampen
wall poster and other disruptive mass criticism ac-
tivity.
The real impact of these propaganda blasts is
difficult to assess. China has continued to import
large quantities of foreign technology and equipment,
and a growing number of foreign technicians are now
setting up equipment in China. Premier Chou may have
been criticized as the result of China's large trade
deficit last year--nearly $1 billion--or the Premier
may have perceived the advantage in a pre-emptive
move to protect his flank.
Chou's address on
the work of government to the National People's Con-
gress included critical remarks against workers and
cadre who began "to worship things foreign" and began
to ignore domestically produced equipment and manage-
ment techniques. Chou is said to have concluded that
"we do not oppose foreign assistance," but that the
most important consideration is to carry out the policy
of independence and self-reliance. In any case, the
trade deficit should narrow somewhat this year.
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Most of the articles that attack current for-
eign trade policies include the caveat that China
must never adopt a policy of exclusion or isola-
tion. This suggests that real differences among
leaders or groups on the issue are a matter of de-
gree. Still, so long as foreign trade policy con-
tinues to be used as a political weapon, politically
motivated adjustments in foreign trade remain possi-
ble, particularly during the succession period. (SE-
CRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 14, 1975
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Washington's postponement of the US tour of
a Chinese performing arts troupe has had minimal
impact on Sino-US relations.
Peking's reaction was as mild and low key as
possible. The US decided to shelve the tour on
the grounds that the troupe planned to use a song
calling for Taiwan's liberation. The PRC Liaison
Office, in a statement to the organization spon-
soring the tour, regretted the US decision, de-
fended the inclusion of the objectionable song and
implied that the US was "retreating" from the Shang-
hai communique. The statement included no further
criticism and made no mention of Chinese displeasure
or possible retaliation.
The Chinese waited almost a week before making
an official public announcement about the affair
and then issued a tepid, low level joint statement
under the aegis of a friendship association and the
spokesman of a Foreign ministry department. The
statement used much of the same language employed
earlier by the Liaison Office and also affirmed
China's intention to promote contacts with the US.
In charging that the US action contravened the
spirit of the Shanghai communique, both statements
misrepresented the US position on Taiwan contained
in the communique. While the statements said the US
"agreed" that there is one China and that Taiwan is
part of it, the Shanghai communique said that all
Chinese maintain this position and the-US government
"does not challenge" it. The Chinese obviously are
aware of the language in the communique and probably
do not in fact regard the US action as incompatible
with it.
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Peking seems at pains to make its position
clear in other ways. A few days after the tour was
postponed, NCNA carried a glowing article on the
PRC archaeological exhibit in Washington. The
Chinese further endorsed continued cultural ex-
changes with the US in agreeing to permit this ex-
hibit an additional and unscheduled run in San
Francisco.
The postponement of the Chinese troupe's tour
came up during the visit to Peking of House Speaker
Albert and Congressman Rhodes early this month. Al-
though Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua complained
rather strongly about the US action, he said the
issue was not too important. Teng Hsiao-ping told
the congressmen that such problems probably could
not be avoided at this stage of Sino-US relations.
There is every indication, in fact, that Peking
believes Sino-US relations are on track. Chiao
characterized relations to the congressional delega-
tion as "not bad," and Teng said that Peking has
"nothing to complain about." Teng reportedly added
that the US and PRC should not have unrealistic il-
lusions about what can be accomplished and that re-
lations inevitably would develop in zig zags.
Senior Chinese officials with knowledge of the
state of play between Washington and Peking have
consistently indicated since the first of this year
that China remains patient and recognizes that dis-
engagement from Taiwan poses difficulties for the
US. One went so far as to indicate that China would
welcome President Ford whether he came empty-handed
or brought "gifts."
Along these lines, a PRC-owned newspaper in
Hong Kong carried a front pa e article warnin of
Soviet designs on Taiwan.
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earlier had indicated the pace of
US withdrawal from Taiwan was due, in part, to
concern in Washington that the Soviets might fill
the resulting vacuum. This may be an argument
used in Peking with those Chinese who might ques-
tion the pace of US withdrawal from Taiwan, and
its appearance in the Communist press in Hong Kong
is another sign of Chinese patience regarding Taiwan.
Peking also used the Hong Kong Communist press
recently to signal that it has taken note of US
plans to withdraw fighter aircraft and airmen from
Taiwan this spring. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO
DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DIS$EM)
April 14, 1975
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Capability To Produce Oscilloscopes
China's advance into modern electronics
technology--large-scale integrated circuits, high-
speed computers, lasers, and the like--depends in
large measure on the availability and sophisti-
cation of its testing devices. The oscilloscope
is one of the most important and versatile units of
test equipment for electronic research, development,
and production. It is used to provide a visual
presentation of the characteristics of various types
of electronic pulses.
China produces roughly 20,000 to 25,000 oscil-
loscopes a year, most of which are used domestically
in industry, research laboratories, and in military
field applications. The technical level of these
instruments is considerably lower than that of the
US--judging from the characteristics of the 50 or
so types of oscilloscopes produced in China, most
of these appear to be copies of Soviet prototypes.
China produces both general-purpose and
sampling oscilloscopes. A general-purpose oscil-
loscope presents a real-time display of electronic
signals across the viewing screen. Oscilloscopes
of this type produced in the US have bandwidth
frequencies up to 600 megahertz (MHZ), while the
majority of Chinese general-purpose instruments
operate at less than 60 MHZ. Sampling oscillo-
scopes, with their extremely wide bandwidths and
fast operating speeds, have wide application in
testing band-limited components, sub-assemblies of
radio frequency transmission systems, and high-
speed switching circuitry of computers. While US
manufacturers produce a variety of sampling
oscilloscopes with bandwidths up to 18 gigahertz
(GHZ), Chinese production in this area is still
at the prototype stage.
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At least 12 electronic plants throughout the
country manufacture oscilloscopes. Shanghai Radio
Plant No. 21, which began producing oscilloscopes
in 1958, is the largest, followed by Tientsin
Electronic Instrument Plant No. 2. In 1966, both
of these plants started producing transistorized
scopes in addition to the earlier the tube-type
models.
A number of new oscilloscope manufacturing
plants have come into existence since the end of
the Cultural Revolution in 1969. A small number
of oscilloscopes are being manufactured at Peking
University, presumably for in-house use. Recent
reports indicate that these are similar to 1962-
vintage US instruments, although university officials
claim that modern electronic components such as
gallium-arsenide, light-emitting diodes are made at the
university for use in oscilloscopes.
China relies heavily on Western suppliers to
meet its demand for advanced oscilloscopes. Approxi-
mately 200 to 300 oscilloscopes have been imported
annually from the West since the mid-1960s. Because
Coordinating Committee (COCOM) regulations have set
technical constraints on the types of oscilloscopes
that can be exported, some of China's requirements
for advanced oscilloscopes remain unfulfilled, par-
ticularly for use in the research laboratories.
('CONFIDENTIAL NO FOPEIGN DISSEM)
April 14, 1975
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Indian acquiescence, if not connivance, in
the abolition of the Sikkimese monarchy makes
chances of Sino-Indian rapprochement in the near
term even more remote. While Chinese criticism
of what Peking regards as a blatant Indian attempt
to consolidate power in Sikkim is to be expected,
Peking's initial reaction has been relatively sharp.
On April 13, a People's Daily Commentator article
"strongly" denounced the "ugly features of Indian
expansionism." Furthermore, it named Mrs. Gandhi
as being largely responsible for the "annexation,"
and went on at some length about what it alleged
was Moscow's backstage role.
This language is a few notches stronger than
Commentator's treatment in March of the new political
arrangement that New Delhi engineered in Kashmir.
That article refrained from mentioning Moscow or
the Prime Minister. Moreover, the speed with which
Peking issued the authoritative comment on Sikkim--
only three days after the event--suggests considerable
dismay. In the case of Kashmir, nine days passed
before Commentator responded.
In terms of short-run prospects for Sino-Indian
rapprochement, New Delhi's move in Sikkim does not
bode well. The Chinese have long expressed their
support for the choygal; and last November, NCNA
aired its apprehension that New Delhi was planning
to abolish the monarchy. In the context of such
warnings and of India's failure to reciprocate China's
recent signals for better relations, Peking will un-
doubtedly read New Delhi's latest actions in Sikkim
as a further sign of disinterest in rapprochement.
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For the next couple of months, at least, China
will probably suspend efforts to improve relations
and will grow more vocal with its public, if not
its private, anti-Indian themes. In doing so, Peking
would seek to tell the Indians not to mistake ges-
tures of friendship for lack of resolve to maintain
the status quo in South Asia, and at the same time
reassure Pakistan and the other Himalayan buffer states
of its support.
On a more fundamental level, India's failure to
respond to recent Chinese initiatives, the abolition
of the Sikkimese monarchy, and the visit to New Delhi
of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko in February will
almost certainly raise new doubts in Peking about
Indian intentions on the subcontinent. Indeed, the
inclusion in the April 13 Commentator article of an
entire paragraph on the Soviet Union seems clearly
related to China's concern over the results of Grechko's
visit.
There are some signs, however, that the Chinese
still hold out hope for Sino-Indian rapprochement.
The April 13 Commentator article, for example, did
not return to the harsh language used when New Delhi
changed the status of Sikkim to an "associate state"
last September. At that time, Peking mentioned India's
new-found nuclear muscle and dwelled on its expansion-
ist ambitions in South Asia. This time, such talk was
absent, although these thoughts are clearly on the
minds of Chinese policy-makers. (SECRET)
April 14, 1975
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The prestige of the People's Liberation Army,
which reached its zenith during the Lin Piao era,
was severely tarnished by his disgraceful fall.
Nevertheless, the armed forces remained an important
avenue to party membership, a good civilian job and,
for many demobilized soldiers, an urban rather than
a rural habitat. Now, however, there is a campaign
in progress to send ex-soldiers to the countryside.
Articles have appeared in domestic propaganda
in recent weeks lauding demobilized soldiers who
have advanced the socialist cause by electing to
take jobs in rural areas. The broadcasts stress
that the arrangements are permanent, and the message
is obviously intended to influence the mass of
recently demobilized soldiers to make a similar
choice.
According to recent reports, the government
has decided to pare a million men from the armed
forces. Such a move could further reduce the
political power of regional military men and would
certainly cut military expenditures. The reports
cannot be confirmed, but the current propaganda
concerning demobilized soldiers is consistent with
such a plan. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Peking's preoccupation with promoting a militarily
strong and united Western Europe as an anti-Soviet
bulwark has resulted in unusual public Chinese crit-
icism of the British government and its ruling Labor
Party.
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An NCNA article late last month criticized a
UK "white paper" on defense policy which called
for cuts in London's defense budget. NCNA ques-
tioned the policy in light of the expansion of So-
viet military strength, and the Chinese account
claimed that the cuts have caused serious concern
among the UK's NATO Allies.
At the same time NCNA carried an article crit-
ical of the Labor Party's stand on continued member-
ship in the Common Market comparing this position
unfavorably to the Conservative Party's more positive
policy. In its account of Parliament's vote last
week for continued membership, NCNA mentioned that a
number of Labor Party members favored British with-
drawal.
In contrast, the Chinese press recently has
carried several favorable accounts of plans in the
US, West Germany, and Austria to increase defense
spending--which NCNA attributes in large part to the
Soviet threat--and an article on French President
Giscard's recent public call for increased European
solidarity.
Peking has tilted somewhat toward some of
Europe's more conservative political parties in the
past but rarely has leveled such criticism at the
policies of a Western government with which the Chi-
nese have enjoyed good relations. China's displeas-
ure with these British policies has not, however,
been reflected in other areas of the UK-PRC relation-
ship. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 14, 1975
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