MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 11, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
~4pf~f~ a04~
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
123
No. 0654/75
April 11, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
No Foreign Diesem/Controlled Disaem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
1158 (1), (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30: CRI64 T00865A000700300002-1
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Algeria: Middle East Role Expanding . . . . . . 1
North Yemen: Conservative Pressure on
Colonel Hamdi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Pakistan: A Fragile Democracy . . . . . . . . . 5
Apr 11, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
SECRET
North Yemen
Conservative Pressure on Colonel Hamdi
The domestic political scene has been marked
during the past several weeks by pressure from
traditional tribal leaders on the middle-of-the-
road forces led by Colonel Ibrahim Hamdi, head
of the ruling military command council. The falling
out between moderates and conservatives has
reportedly encouraged Iraq and its followers in
North Yemen to adopt a rather convoluted strategy
by which the Baathists hope eventually to eliminate
Hamdi from the government.
Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, North Yemen's
most powerful tribal leader, head of the
Consultative Assembly, and client of Saudi Arabia,
has been demanding since mid-March that Hamdi
bring to a close the so-called "transitional
period" of military dominance and return the
government to civilian hands. This would, among
other things, involve new elections for the
Consultative Assembly and restoration of the
Republican Council, a collegial executive
arrangement. Al-Ahmar anticipates that the assembly
would continue to be dominated by tribally-
connected members with strong traditional values.
He also expects that the three- to five-member
Republican Council, from which the head of state
has been chosen in the past, would include
Abdallah al-Hajri, a religious traditionalist
with Saudi ties, and General Hasan al-Amri,
another conservative politician.
Colonel Hamdi has taken the line that he is
completely committed to returning power to civilians,
but that he intends to delay the transfer until
the domestic situation is stabilized. Hamdi took
ower along with military colleagues in June 1974
p
following the collapse of the civilian government
61 that had come under conservative pressure for failing
to be tough enough on Baathist coup plotters.
,3 1 The US embassy in Sana believes that the "transition
(period" will last at least until October 1975.
The delay is partly attributable to the assembly's
failure to complete work on a new election law
and to continuing politicking on the size and
composition of the Republican Council-and the
legislature.
SECRET (Continued) 3
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
SECRET
Hamdi reportedly is particularly interested
in delaying the transfer until he can secure the
total political eclipse of Iraqi-supported
Sheikh Sinan Abu Luhum and the removal of
several Abu Luhum family members from key
military command positions. Ironically, the
arch-conservative al-Ahmar has recently been
giving aid and comfort to the Abu Luhum group
I in order to strengthen anti-Hamdi forces in Sana.
Hamdi and his supporters in the army and
bureaucracy consider al-Ahmar and the other
traditional, locally-oriented sheikhs a drag on
;modernization and reform and would prefer to
=do without them. Hamdi realizes, however, that
;unless the military intends to rule permanently,
an accommodation with the conservative
,leaders will be mandatory.
Baghdad, which sees Hamdi as the primary
obstacle to the expansion of Baathist influence in
North Yemen, reportedly hopes to exploit the
current split between Hamdi and al-Ahmar.
The Iraqi scenario calls for Baghdad and its
leftist allies in Sana to give whatever aid
they can to the conservative al-Ahmar, hoping
that it results in polarization of society
or that a far-right wing government comes
to power. The Baathists apparently believe
they would then have an opportunity to pick up
the pieces, presumably with someone like former
'prime minister Muhsin al-Ayni, a Baathist
symphathizer, coming to power. (SECRET NO
;FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
April 11, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
SECRET
Algeria
Middle East RoZe Expanding
Algeria is getting more involved in the politics
of the eastern Arab world and is actively working to
ensure Palestinian attendance at a reconvened Geneva
conference.
President Boumediene is offering to mediate inter-
Arab disputes, a role he personally enjoys. He has
certain credentials; he is radical enough to have the
ear of militant leaders in Syria and Iraq, yet he is
sufficiently pragmatic to have working relations with
Arab moderates like Egypt's President Sadat.
Last December, Boumediene volunteered to mediate
the Iraqi-Iranian border dispute. Combined with a
parallel Egyptian effort, his work culminated in a
reconciliation agreement between the Shah and Iraqi
strongman Saddam Husayn in early March at the summit
in Algiers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries.
Bolstered by this success, Boumediene is planning
Co move on to inter-Arab disputes. He is scheduled to
visit a number of states soon--Kuwait, Syria,. and
Saudi Arabia--where he will try to narrow the differences
these countries have with Baghdad. Saddam Husayn apparent-
j ly agreed to this effort when he was in Algiers for the
I , OPEC meeting.
Algeria may also be trying to ease strained re-
lations between Egypt and Syria and between Egypt and
the Palestinians. Boumediene met with Presidents Sadat
and Asad at King Faysal's funeral, when the two presi-
dents snubbed one another. Boumediene stopped off in.
Cairo on his way home for further talks with Sadat.
Press accounts suggest they talked about how to achieve
solidarity among Egypt, Syria,. and the Palestinians.
(Continued)
Apr 11, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
SECRET
The Algerian leader has long been a firm
supporter of the Palestinians, and he believes
they must be included in Middle East peace
negotiations. He recognizes that Arab bicker-
ing could leave the Palestinians fending for
themselves. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 11, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA S-RD
E P79f 00865A000700300002-1
25X6
Pakistan
A Fragile Democracy
The Bhutto regime's readiness to employ
undemocratic, even illegal, methods against its
opponents, particularly in the politically sen-
sitive western frontier provinces, was reflected
the a arent use of large-scale fraud by gov-
I scribed
m
landowner and former legislator an ip o a ,_
Bhutto's hand-picked choice to succeed Sherpao as
his chief political lieutenant in the province.
Two of Khattak's leading supporters have de=
in pp
ernment supporters to ensure a victory in a recent
by-election.
Nasrullah Khattak, the nominee of Prime Mini-
ster Bhutto's party and an allied party, won a
lopsided victory on April 6 in a by-election for
a seat in the legislature of the North-West Frontier
Province. The seat had become vacant two. months
ago when Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, then the provincial
home minister, was assassinated. Khattak, a local
t is
d d' 1
ow bogus ballots and voters trom outside
toral district were used to ensure.Khattak's
election. there has been
at. least one o'___er occasion __ the pro-Bhutto
forces in the province made very little effort to
conceal fraudulent techniques they had used in win-
ning a by-election.
Bhut.to's party, the strongest political force
in the populous Punjab and Sind provinces, lacks
grass-roots organization and popularity in both
the western frontier provinces, Baluchistan and
the North-West Frontier. In the two western pro-
vinces, Bhutto has depended on coalitions with
(Continued)
Apr 11, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
SECRET
other parties to maintain majority support in
the provincial assemblies. He has also used
financial blandishments and intimidation to
bring politicians into his party and has some-
times allied himself with local political figures
known for their corruption and ineptness.
In addition, Bhutto has taken various steps
to restrict opposition activity. He has period-
ically circumscribed the civil rights of opposition
groups and in Baluchistan has used the army to
suppress dissident tribesmen. Last February, fol-
lowing the Sherpao killing, he outlawed the opposi-
tion National Awami Party, the largest political
group in the westernfrontier provinces, and arrested
several hundred of its leaders and adherents. He
also suspended the provincial legislature and cabinet
in the North-West Frontier, placing the province
under direct central government control for a 90-day
period.
During his three years in office Bhutto has
exhibited an accurate sense of how far he can go
in using repressive techniques without stimulating
unmanageable unrest or major threats to his authority.
Bhutto seems likely to remain pre-eminent for at least
the next couple of years, despite such problems as
regional dissidence and public restiveness over economic
problems. Over the longer run, however, the US embassy
in Islamabad believes Bhutto's tendency toward "con-
frontation politics" could eventually lead to a re-
surgence of Pakistan's historic political instability.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 11, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000700300002-1