MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000700130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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onfidential
No Foreign Dnsem
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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Confidential
No. 0650/75
April 4, 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Israel: Rabin Interested in New Talks with
Egyptians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Angola: Effects of Recent Violence. . . . . . 3
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Rabin Interested in New Talks with Egyptians
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on Wednesday
expressed strong interest in bilateral discussions
with Egypt before resumption of the Geneva confer-
ence, but he gave little indication that Tel Aviv
is prepared to take the initiative or to be very
flexible.
Rabin told interviewers there is little chance
that discussions at Geneva can be successful-unless
the preparations are "sufficient." Egypt, he thought,
was keeping all its options open, including the
possibility of bilateral talks with Israel.. Accord-
ing to Rabin, the recent indirect negotiations,
through Secretary Kissinger, also clearly demonstrated
that direct Egyptian-Israeli contacts would be better
because they reduce the chances of "misunderstandings."
The Prime Minister said that Israel would be
willing to proceed on the basis of the three options
Tel Aviv offered at the talks last month:
--A separate Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty
based on an Israeli withdrawal from most of
the Sinai.
--A broad interim arrangement based on an Israeli
withdrawal east of the Gidi and Mitla passes and
the Sinai oilfields in return for the termination
of the state of war.
--A limited arrangement based on withdrawal from
the oilfields and only the western end of the
passes in return for an Egyptian-undertaking not
to use force to solve its conflict with Israel.
Rabin did hint at some flexibility when he re-
marked that these options contained a wide range of
(Continued)
Apr 4, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDE?TIAL
"nuances." He said a detailed discussion of these
measures could lead to progress toward peace.
Reflecting an attitude that has long colored
Israel's approach, Rabin declared that Israel could
negotiate only from a position of strength. He
argued that Israel must proceed slowly at present
because a willingness to negotiate in the wake of
Egypt's recent rejection of its proposals could be
interpreted by the Arabs as a sign of weakness.
Rabin expressed confidence that US disappoint-
ment with the lack of results in the talks last
month would not adversely affect US-Israeli relations
over the long term. He conceded, however, that Tel
Aviv would have to "struggle very hard to achieve
our ends" to obtain the large amount of US economic
and military assistance Israel will need in the years
ahead.
Rabin's remarks, as well as numerous press
articles highlighting Israel's desire for pre-Geneva
talks, have already drawn fire from Israeli con-
servatives, who detect therein a possible softening
of the Israeli negotiating position worked out by
the cabinet last month. On April 3, one commentator
who has good contacts with senior conservatives in
Rabin's Labor Party sharply attacked the Prime Mini-
ster. His article ended with the pointed assertion
that Rabin was speaking for himself inasmuch as the
cabinet had not approved any changes. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 4, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
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Angola
Effects of Recent Violence
The recent fighting in Luanda between the two
principal Angolan nationalist organizations has
undermined whatever degree of cooperation may have
existed among the four groups represented--in Angola's
transitional government. Longstanding hostility
between the two warring organizations has been rein-
forced and new areas of potential conflict have been
opened up.
Now that the fighting has subsided,-the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola are
hauling out their public relations machinery,
defending their respective actions,-and accusing
each other of atrocities-, which were indeed com-
mitted by both sides.
The Popular Movement apparen-.y is making the
better public relations showing. It has produced
witnesses and conducted tours for reporters to back
up its claim that the National Front acted indis-
criminately against innocent civilians.- In con-
trast, spokesmen for the National Front are vague
and evasive. They argue that-the-National Front
will not tolerate "lies" and has the "force" to
squelch them.
If either side can be said to have gained
anything from the violence, the-Popui-ar Movement
probably came out ahead. Support for the Popular
Movement, already-strong-in the African sections of
the city where most of the clashes- occurred, has
certainly been reinforced. Moreover., the renewed
recognition of the threat posed by the National
Front is likely to prompt the Popular Movement's
often-contentious leadership to close ranks. Until
now, the Popular Movement has had difficulty gain-
ing significant political momentum in Angola largely
because of its disorganized leadership.
(Continued)
Apr 4, 1975 3
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The National Front has lost a good deal of the
law-and-order, populist image it had earlier taken
pains to establish. It showed itself bent on
killing as many Popular Movement members and sym-
pathizers as possible. This action has reminded
many Luandans of the massacres, widely attributed
to the National Front, that took place in northern
Angola in 1961 when the insurgency against the
Portuguese first broke out. The bullying and
defensive tone adopted by the Front's spokesmen
will serve as an additional reminder.
So far, no progress has been made toward
honoring the provisions of the cease-fire agreement
signed on March 28 that call for a release of
prisoners, the disarming of civilians, and the
withdrawal by each liberation group of all but 500
of its troops from the capital. The National
Front, which has the largest contingent of troops,
has demanded that all civilians be disarmed before
it cuts back its forces. Such a disarming would be
a virtual impossibility to bring about now that all
-sides will want to be prepared for further violence.
The Portuguese and the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola, the other partici-
pants in the transitional government, remained
neutral during the violence and have maintained a
low profile since. The Popular Movement issued a
communique on April 2 condemning the Portuguese for
not taking a stronger hand in ending the fighting.
The communique also called for a summit meet-
ing of the leaders of the three liberation groups.
Leaders of the Popular Movement who believe that
the military government in Lisbon favors their
position, probably would like the Portuguese high
commissioner in Angola replaced by someone who
might be more partial to their cause. They also
would like the scheduled elections for a constituent
assembly deferred at least until after independence
in November. The other parties to the transitional
=government are anxious to hold the elections as
soon as possible and, in any event, before independence.
(Continued)
Apr 4, 1975 4
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Luanda's whites, estimated to be about a third
of its population of about 600,000, were not involved
in the fighting, although they were surely unsettled
by it. A new wave of fighting between the libera-
tion groups probably would engulf them as well; the
inclusion of racial violence would, of course,
protract and complicate the situation. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 4, 1975 5
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Confidential
Confidential
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