TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY OF STATE FROM GENEVA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000900120047-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: April 30, 1954
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

I NCOMING" TELEG M' For
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FROM: Geneva
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TOP SECRET
Controls 13121
poor d: April 30, 1954
1:41 p.m
Docement No,
TO: Secretary of State Review of this document by CIA has
NO: DULTE 30 April 30 5 P.m. aria has no objection to declass
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SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 30, REPEATED INFORMATP91K 91pXiewe
NIACT 4a}waritys HR 70.2
EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY
LONDON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR
I had a very frank talk with Eden today, in the course of which
he handed me the following memorandum:
"South-East Asian defence.
"l. Communism in Asia cannot (repeat not) be checked by mili-
tary means alone. The problem is as much political as military;
if any military combination is to be effective, it must enjoy
the widest possible measure of Asian support.
"2. We should aim to get the support of Burma as well as Siam
as the immediate neighbours of Indo-China. But Burma will not
(repeat not) come in unless the project commands some sympathy
from other Asian countries, particularly the Asian members.of
the Commonwealth.
"3. If we cannot (repeat not) win the active support of all
the Asian countries of the area, it is important that we should,
at the very least, secure their benevolent neutrality.
"4. To secure this widely based Asian support, we must prepare
.the ground carefully for what is, in any case, intended to be a
lasting defensive organization, not (repeat not) a hastily con-
trived expedient to meet the present crisis.
"5. This does not (repeat not) mean that we desire to delay,,.
On the contrary, we have already been actively using our influ-
ence, particularly with the Asian members of the Commonwealth,
with encouraging results. Pakistan and Ceylon have already
promised not (repeat not) to oppose a South-East Asian collective
defence on the lines we envisage, and. we have succeeded in
diverting Mr. Nehru from his original intention of condemning
it root and branch. We have thus averted the danger that the
State De artment revs ~~f Asian DUCTIOII FROM THIS
p lSt$VSPRelease 2003/10/07: CIA-RDP80ROl 731 8000900120047
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PROHIBITED
 Approved For Release 20961p/ I DP80R01731 8000900120047-3
2- DULTE 30, April 30, 5 p.m., from Geneva
Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo would unite in condemning
our. project, and have grounds for hoping for the actual
support of some of them.
"6. Mr. Nehru's latest statement shows that his ideas have
moved closer to our own. With persistence, we may even secure
his endorsement of the kind,., of negotiated settlement in Indo-
China that would be acceptable to us.
"7. While we do not (repeat not) believe that a French col-
lapse in Indo-China could come about as rapidly or as completely
as the Americans appear to envisage, this danger reinforces
the need to lay the foundations of a wider and viable defence
organization for South-East Asia.
"8. We propose therefore that the United States and the United
Kingdom should begin an immediate and secret joint examination
of the political and military problems involved in creating a
collective defence for South-East Asia, namely: (A) nature and
purpose; (B) membership; (C) commitments.
This examination should also cover immediate aid measures to
stiffen Siam."
Report of my conversation follows by separate cable.
DULLES
ROW/l
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Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900120047-3