LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
g~j~p X10
C~
Latin American Trends
Secret
126
March 19, 1974'
No. 0501/75
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No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only
Controlled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. G. 11652, exemption category:
y 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
March 19, 1975
Colombia: Perceiving The
United States . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Argentina: Catholic Church Raps
Lopez Rega . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Argentina: New Movement On The
Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Surinam: Independence Talks . . . . . . . . . 7
Chile: Changes in the Army
Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Trinidad-Tobago: Labor Strike . . . . . . . . 12
Dominica Goes to the Polls . . . . . . . . . . 14
Cuba: Book Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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Colombia: Perceiving The United States
A significant change is occurring in the
Colombian Government's perception of and attitude to-
ward the US. Even more significant is the apparent
readiness of President Lopez to act on that changed
perception. In its half-year tenure, the Lopez admin-
istration has gradually developed strong and stubborn
convictions about the US, and these, while not hostile,
have turned Colombia away from its traditionally close
relationship with this country.
Lopez sees the US as largely indifferent to
Colombia and the rest of Latin America. Moreover, he
sees contradictions in our maintaining supposedly co-
equal relationships with Latin countries while single-
mindedly pursuing our own national interest--particular-
ly when that interest compels us to impose sanctions
on or even,in Colombian eyes, to intervene outright in
the affairs of another country. Furthermore, Lopez sees
the US as an exporter of its domestic problems in the
sense that US internal politics affects US foreign
policy, which in turn affects Colombian development
through assistance programs and other channels of in-
fluence. This view forces the Lopez government into
a mind-set such that the value of bilateral relations
is judged largely in terms of how the US responds to
Colombian problems, interests, and needs.
A thorough investigation of this change in the
Colombian attitude toward the US would involve many
complex, long-range factors. Three more immediate
reasons can be isolated, however. One is the meeting
of the Organization of American States that was held
last November. Lopez believes that the organization
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would have lifted its long--standing economic sanctions
against Cuba if the US delegation had played more than
a neutral role. Another reason is the new Trade Re-
form Act. Although this legislation has no direct
impact on US-Colombian trade, the Lopez administration
interprets the restrictive language of the act as
evidence that the US continues to impose conditions
on the terms of international agreements, including
those broadly affecting US assistance to other coun-
tries.
The third immediate reason for the changed
Colombian perception of the US is a collection of un-
resolved bilateral issues. The most important of these
is US protectionist legislation affecting Colombian
textiles. Another is the apparent lack of US interest
in drawing up a new international coffee agreement.
Yet another is the US delay in ratifying the treaty on
Quita Sueno and two other tiny Caribbean islands, the
disposition of which last year was supposed to end a
minor but long-standing irritation in bilateral re-
lations. Still another is the issue of whether Colombia's
right of free passage through the Panama Canal will be
preserved in the treaty now being negotiated by the US
and Panama.
There is a characteristically Latin thread of
personalism and concern for "dignity" running through
all this--a point easily overlooked from the geographic
and cultural distance of Washington. Colombians are
intensely protective of personal honor, which affects
their country's foreign relations in ways that are often
surprising to North Americans. The defeat of the resolu-
tion to end the Cuba sanctions at the November OAS meet-
ing, for example, was personally embarrassing to the
President and the foreign minister, as they had proposed
and strongly supported the resolution. In this unfamil-
iar--even alien--atmosphere, logical arguments carry
little weight. Colombian resentment of the US is pro-
found and is clearly eroding our countries' tradition
of excellent bilateral relations. (CONFIDENTIAL/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
March 19, 1975
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Argentina: Catholic Church Raps Lopez Rega
As if he did not have enough enemies already,
presidential adviser and confidant Lopez Rega has
now incurred the wrath of the Roman Catholic Church
in Argentina. According to the papal nuncio, the
church hierarchy was highly offended by Lopez Rega's
recent invitation to an off-beat religious sect to
officiate at a mass dedicating the new "Altar of
the Fatherland"--a monument where Juan and Evita
Peron are to be laid to rest.
Lopez Rega, who is believed to be a practicing
spiritualist, arranged the ceremony presided over
by the American Orthodox Apostolic Catholic Church,
a small group founded by defrocked Catholic priests
who purportedly practice a mixture of spiritualism
and voodoo. This bizarre religious order is head-
quartered in Brazil where Lopez Rega frequently
travels--apparently for pseudo-religious purposes.
Lopez Rega's mysticism is a topic of considerable
public speculation and indignation has been expressed
in military, labor, business, and opposition party
circles.
Lopez Rega's troubles with the church have been
compounded by a quarrel between the federal admin-
istrator of Cordoba Province, Raul Lacabanne, and the
Roman Catholic leadership. Lacabanne, who is under
fire for his high-handed actions and abuse of civil
rights in Cordoba, is a political ally of Lopez Rega.
In a second display of poor judgment last week,
Lopez Rega opened himself to attack from critics on
yet another front. Accompanied by an entourage of
social welfare ministry minions and the presidential
press secretary, he made a brief trip to Misiones
Province, where he turned over seventeen ambulances
to.a local hospital and gave several hundred thousand
dollars worth of subsidies and equipment to local
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organizations. Provincial elections are scheduled
early next month, and his trip has been widely in-
terpreted as government interference to ensure a
good showing for the Peronists. Lopez Rega's
blatant partisan gesture has already brought
private mutterings of disgust from some Peronist
politicians, and it is sure to elicit condemnation
from all opposition parties.
The social welfare minister's inveterate dab-
bling in spiritualist hokum and his unabashed ef-
forts to ingratiate himself with the voting public
will have a detrimental impact on Mrs. Peron's
political position and further weaken support from
key social and political sectors. In short, he
continues to be a major liability to the President.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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Argentina: New Movement On The Left
The split in Peronist ranks was boldly under-
scored last week when an assemblage of dissident
left-wing Peronists, including some prominent for-
mer government. officials, met in Buenos Aires to
launch the Authentic Peronist Party. To the sur-
prise of almost no one, the government responded
by sending police to disband the meeting, claiming
that its sponsors had not obtained the proper per-
mit and that it violated the state of siege.
Organizational efforts have been under way for
some time now to put together a coalition of leftist
opponents to President Isabel Peron's rightist-
oriented Peronist government. Last week's abortive
rally was timed to coincide with the second anniver-
sary of the victory of Peron's Justicialist Libera-
tion Front (FREJULI) in the elections on March 11,
1973. By holding the affair at the Nino Restaurant,
where Peron conducted negotiations with other politi-
cal parties to form FREJULI, the left-wing organizers
clearly hoped to make the point that they are the
legitimate heirs of Peronist doctrine.
Among the key backers the press cited former
president Hector Campora, who is said to be maintain-
ing permanent contact with the new party's supporters.
Campora has been living in self-imposed exile in
Mexico because of his fear of assassination at the
hands of right-wing death squads. His recently pub-
lished book entitled Peron's Mandate is a clear-cut
bid to establish himself as the true disciple of
:Peron. Actually, Campora was held in contempt by
:Peron and was forced to step down as ambassador to
Mexico while Peron was on his deathbed.
In addition to leftist Peronist luminaries such
as the deposed governors of several provinces, the
Authentic party evidently commands strong allegiance
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from radical Peronist youth and the Montonero guer-
rilla movement. In its declaration of principles,
the party pledged itself to a "revolutionary defini-
tion of Peronism" and denounced the "commitments
contracted with imperialism behind the people's back."
Strong criticism was hurled at Mrs. Peron's admin-
istration for violating Peronist ideals and adopting
the same principles as the military dictatorships
that the Peronists fought to unseat.
The gathering at the Nino Restaurant marks the
first endeavor by the fragmented left to unite
against the ruling orthodox Justicialist Party on
the national level. The left embarked on this path
several months ago in Misiones Province, where it
hopes to run candidates in the first electoral con-
test to be held since the Peronists returned to power.
With the elections less than a month away, the govern-
ment is stalling in granting legal recognition. At
first the left tried to gain entry on the ballot as
the Descamisado Party (named after Peron's "shirtless
ones"), but an electoral court prohibited the party
from using Peronist slogans or labels.
The government is apt to continue using all the
power at its discretion to prevent the inscription
of a rival Peronist party that might challenge it at
the polls. While the military will back the govern-
ment's measures to exclude a leftist political move-
ment from political participation, the potential
threat raised by the left will not be lost on of-
ficers who already believe that Mrs. Peron's constit-
uency has eroded considerably. (SECRET)
March 19, 1975
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Surinam: Independence Talks
This week in The Hague, the Netherlands and its
internally self-governing colony of Surinam open a
new round of negotiations to determine the terms
under which the latter will achieve independence
later this year. The current Realm Conference of
Prime Ministers was preceded by a lower level meet-
ing in Surinam during late January. At this prelim-
inary meeting, the Dutch agreed to sponsor Surinam's
membership in the United Nations and other interna-
tional organizations and to support Surinam's con-
tinued associate membership in the European Community.
The agenda of the Prime Ministers' Conference
includes a number of thorny issues which the earlier
meeting purposely ignored or left unresolved. Wide
differences on the amount and duration of Dutch
monetary assistance after independence precipitated
a brief breakdown in the January talks and could
lead to a similar impasse at the current meeting.
Civil rights guarantees for Surinam's minority groups
and questions of emigration, repatriation and nation-
ality also will be difficult to resolve. Future
civil aviation relations and border questions with
French Guiana also are on the agenda.
The Surinamese delegation under the direction
of Minister President Henck Arron can be expected to
indulge in some theatrics, primarily for its do-
mestic audience, but it will also engage in some
very skilled, hard bargaining. Those issues that
elude settlement will form the agenda for an "odds
and ends" meeting with the Dutch scheduled for May
in Surinam. (CONFIDENTIAL)
March 19, 1975
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Chile: Changes in the Army Hierarchy
The death of General Oscar Bonilla, Minister
of Defense and Chile's second-ranking army general
after President Pinoch.et, in a helicopter crash on
March 3 has resulted in a key retirement and some
shuffling of jobs among the army's top generals.
The old and new seniority line-ups are compared in
the accompanying chart.
The third-ranking general, Hector Bravo, was
retired from active service. He probably will ac-
cept appointment as ambassador to Thailand and South
Vietnam. Bravo was senior to the new minister of
defense, Herman Brady, by one day, but reportedly
was considered incapable of handling that job. He
was not particularly popular in the army and was
not highly regarded by Pinochet. In contrast,
Brady's abilities apparently have enabled him to
dispel doubts about his commitment to the military
government lingering from former president Allende's
push of his promotion to general and his reluctance
to help plot Allende's downfall. With Bonilla and
Bravo gone, Brady moves from fourth- to second-
ranking general.
The next six ranking generals also have moved
up, and generals Carrasco and Toro have made the
top ten. The "comer" on the list clearly is General
Sergio Arellano, who received a promotion to Major
General along with his new post. Arellano is cap-
able, respected by his fellow officers, and close
to Pinochet.
The manner in which the changes necessitated by
Bonilla's death were handled indicates that senior-
ity, while an important factor, will not be the sole
determinant of future changes in the army hierarchy.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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THE CHILEAN ARMY'S TOP TEN
BEFORE AND AFTER BONILLA'S DEATH
1.
Pinochet - President
Army CINC
Pinochet
- President
Army CINC
2.
Bonilla - Minister of
Defense
Brady
- Minister of
Defense
3.
Bravo - Army Chief
of Staff
Benavides - Minister of
Interior
4.
Brady - Chief of the
National
Defense Staff
Alvarez
- Army Chief of
Staff
5.
Benavides - Minister of
Forestier - Army Inspector
Interior
General, Deputy
Army Chief of
Staff
6.
Alvarez - Deputy Army
Chief of
Staff
- Chief of the Na-
tional Defense
Staff
7.
Forestier - Army Inspector
- CO, V Army Divi-
General
sion, Punta
Arenas
8.
Arellano
- CO, Santiago
Army Garrison*
Palacios
- Vice President,
CORFO
9.
Lutz
- CO, V Army
Division,
Punta Arenas
Carrasco
- Director of Army
Logistics
10.
Palacios
- Vice President
CORFO
*Brig. General Rolando Garay, now number 12 in the hierarchy,
replaces Arellano in this key command.
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Trinidad-Tobago: Labor Strike
A contract dispute between the oilworkers union
and Texaco has grown into a confrontation between
three militant labor groups and the administration
of Prime Minister Eric Williams. The outcome could
have long-range economic and political consequences.
Even before the contract between the Oilfield
Workers Trade Union and Texaco expired in February,
union leader George Weekes made it clear that he
would hold out for a major increase in the next
three-year pact. He claimed that the workers de-
served a bigger share of the income from the booming
industry, and that wage increases were also needed
to cover the erosion from the workers' income caused
by the 20-percent. annual inflation. To make this
point, he ordered. a slowdown that has effectively
paralyzed the industry.
Weekes has also convinced two key unions to
make common cause with him. Both unions were in-
volved in contract negotiations with the government-
controlled sugar companies, and felt they could gain
an advantage by linking their efforts with the oil-
workers'. They have now brought the sugar industry
to a standstill.
In addition to costing the country several mil-
lion dollars in lost revenue from sugar and oil ex-
ports, the united front could also eventually repre-
sent an important political challenge to Williams.
The front at least temporarily represents an unprece-
dented alliance between black industrial workers and
East Indian agricultural workers.
On March 18, the three unions tried to carry out
a protest march to gain publicity for their cause.
Police used tear gas to break it up, arrested Weekes,
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and are trying to apprehend the leaders of the two
other unions involved.
Williams still is faced with a knotty problem.
If he gives in to labor's demands in this case, it
will convince the unions that the government can be
made to back down. If he stands firm, two key sectors
of the economy may remain paralyzed, and he may have
to use additional force to get the workers to return
to their jobs. This action would stimulate labor op-
position against the government. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
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Dominica Goes to the Polls
Voters in Dominica, a British dependency in the
Lesser Antilles between Martinique and Guadeloupe,
go to the polls on March 24 in their first general
parliamentary election since October 1970. There is
little ideological difference between the major polit-
ical parties--they are all mildly socialistic, model-
ed after the British Labor Party. The United Kingdom
still controls Dominica's defense and foreign affairs,
but there is little pressure for speeding up progress
toward independence.
The Dominica Labor Party has been in power for
13 years and is often faulted for its handling of
economic and internal security affairs, as well as a
tendency toward authoritarianism. Since assuming the
office of Premier and the leadership of the party last
summer, Patrick John has launched some economic initia-
tives, but unemployment still hovers at an estimated
50 percent. John's government has had more success in
suppressing a cult called "The Dreads," which has been
blamed for a variety of criminal offenses ranging from
murder to burglary.
The Dominica Freedom Party, the major opposition
in the 1970 general election, has entered candidates
in only 15 of the 2.1 constituencies but has ties to
independents in the six other races. It promises a
new economic development program and a number of new
or expanded social welfare programs.
The Progressive Labor Party, a dissident offshoot
of the ruling party, has candidates in 8 constituencies
and will probably drain votes from its parent organiza-
tion. The newly formed Caribbean Federal Party claims
support from all political shades but is not expected
to make much of a showing.
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Late last year Premier John's party was a strong
favorite to capture a majority in the new parliament.
Now, with the proliferation of independent candidates
--some with strong labor union backing--and with the
two small parties competing, the outcome is far less
certain. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Cuba: Book Review
Unfortunately, David Caute's CUBA, YES? is a
sample of the type of literature that will probably
be appearing more frequently as Cuban tourism in-
creases. It could best: be described as a pseudo-
intellectual's snobbish account of a brief sojourn
in Cuba. The reader hoping for a relatively un-
biased view of the island by a European author
(Caute is British) will be disappointed. Studded
with considerable misinformation, the book is a
sorry addition to a body of literature sorely in
need of contributions from authors free of the sub-
jectivity frequently found in the works of Cuban
(either pro- or anti-Castro) and US writers.
Except for a few minor sidelights (Caute's
Cuban tour guide warned the men in the group not
to wear shorts or sandals if they didn't want to be
taken for homosexuals), he does little to relay to
the reader what he learned of the Cuban revolution-
ary experience as a result of the trip. Much of
his information clearly comes from a newspaper
morgue, rather than from personal experience, and
suggests that the author has only a thin surface
knowledge of the Cuban Revolution. He claims, for
example, that "a partial economic blockade (of Cuba)
is still enforced by the US Navy" (confusing the
naval quarantine during the 1962 missile crisis with
the economic denial program); that "the credentials
of the young volunteers of the American Venceremos
Brigade" are considered by the Cubans to be "impec-
cable" (the Cubans are well aware that, despite
careful recruitment, brigade units frequently con-
tain a high percentage of homosexuals, pot smokers,
and other "undesireables" and every effort is made
to isolate the brigade from the Cuban population
for fear of contamination); that political prisoners
are consigned to the Isle of Pines (the infamous
Modelo Prison there was converted into a museum/school
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dormitory in the mid-1960s); and that the city of
Cienfuegos was named after one of Fidel's guerrilla
chieftains, "Camillo" (sic) Cienfuegos (the city
bore the name long before Camilo--not Camillo--was
a twinkle in someone's eye).
Caute's antipathy toward the US sometimes
borders on the childish. "Hatred and hysteria siz-
zled off the burning sidewalk" is the way he de-
scribes "the virulence, the emotional intensity, of
American anti-Communism" at the time of Castro's UN
visit in September 1960. He portrays Americans as
an "affluent people who eat oranges and bananas
without a second thought" of the injustices that may
be involved in producing these products. On flying
to Havana from Gander, "our Czech pilot maintains
a respectful distance from Uncle Sam's fiercely
patrolled shore."
Even ignoring Caute's anti-US bias, he could at
least have gotten Fidel's birthdate correct (1926
instead of 1927); the Bay of Pigs invasion date right
(April 17, not April 15); Abel Santamaria's name
spelled properly (not Santa Maria), and the member-
ship of the Political Bureau right (eight members,
not eleven). He seems more interested in relating
how, after ten days, his wife got a fellow tourist
to change his odoriferous shirt, than in explaining
in depth the attitudes and opinions of the people
he met. He has written eleven other books and
traveled extensively in the USSR and should there-
fore be in a position to make some valuable com-
parisons in an eloquent fashion. This book, how-
ever, falls far short of the mark. (UNCLASSIFIED)
March 19, 1975
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secret
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