DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000100290002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 14, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Developments in Indochina
Secret
I ,3 P
January 14, 1975
No. 0057/75
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Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt frorn general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division. Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
January 14, 1975
LAOS
Souvanna--A Man Under the Influence? . . . . . 1
NORTH VIETNAM
More Plowshares Than Swords
in 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Anticipated Communist Action
in Saigon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Thieu Looking for Better
Military Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Communist AAA Increasingly
Effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's convalescence
in the royal capital of Luang Prabang seems to be
proceeding satisfactorily. Apparently recognizing
that recovery from the serious heart attack that
felled him last summer depends heavily on the ex-
tent
to
which he is able to limit personal involve-
ment
in
the host of difficult problems confront-
ing
the
coalition government, Souvanna has wisely
kept
his
political workload at a minimum. He meets
only
twice monthly with his cabinet and leaves
routine coalition business to the government's two
deputy prime ministers.
The US embassy is concerned, however, that
Souvanna's seclusion in Luang Prabang has exposed
Souphanouvong (I) and Souvanna Phouma
January 14, 1975
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him to the persistent influence of his half-brother,
Lao Communist leader Souphanouvong, who--as chair-
man of the coalition's Joint National Political
Council--maintains permanent residence in the
royal capital. Senior non-Communist members of
the coalition, most of whom are based in Vientiane,
have only limited access to the Prime Minister. As
a result, much of the information he receives on the
current state of affairs in the kingdom comes from
Pathet Lao sources.
constant
exposure to the Pa e Lao point o view doubtless
colors Souvanna's judgments and exacerbates his
long-standing suspicions of right-wing political
and military leaders and contributes to his incli-
nation to minimize the threat posed by the Pathet
Lao's drive for greater power and authority.
As an illustration of Souvanna's present de-
pendence upon the Pathet Lao, 25X6
the Prime Minister's New Year s a ress to t e
nation was drafted either by Souphanouvong or by Com-
munist deputy prime minister Phoumi Vongvichit. Not
surprisingly, much of the speech has a distinctly
Pathet Lao cast. One passage, for example, singles
out the US as having special responsibility for "heal-
ing the serious wounds of war in Laos"--a propagandistic
formulation long pushed by the Lao Communists.
Souvanna's recent endorsement of Souphanouvong's
18-point national political program, a comprehensive
set of domestic and foreign policy guidelines for the
coalition government, is another case in point. The
program had been pending before the cabinet for more
than six months, but, because of non-Communist objec-
tions to several controversial provisions, no final
action had been taken. The non-Communists have pro-
posed a number of amendments to those provisions they
January 14, 1975
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considered inimical to their own political interests
as well as those of the US. Souvanna, however, ap-
pears to have approved Souphanouvong's original pro-
posal more or less intact--almost certainly in re-
sponse to pressure from the "Red Prince."
There is no reason to believe that because of
these recent actions, Souvanna is in danger of becoming
a pawn of the Pathet Lao. Nor is there any evidence
that he deliberately wishes to complicate US-Lao re-
lations or to seriously undercut the political posi-
tion of the non-Communist side. Rather, the Prime Min-
ister seems to have concluded that, if Laos' third
coalition experiment is to succeed, the non-Communists
must ultimately yield on all but the most important
issues in the face of Pathet Lao intransigence. (SE-
CRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
January 14, 1975
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More Plowshares Than Swords in 1975
Media coverage of the North Vietnamese Army's
30th anniversary celebration in late December rein-
forces the view that Hanoi is not yet ready to commit
itself to an all out offensive in the South, but
rather will concentrate this year on building its
economy and strengthening its armed forces.
During December, major articles by the army's
three senior generals were published commemorating
the anniversary. By far the most significant was
the article by General Van Tien Dung, the army's
chief of staff. He addressed the problem of com-
bining economic development with consolidation of
national defense---the same subject touched on in an
unattributed essay in the August issue of the party's
theoretical journal. Dung clearly states that the
present goal of the army--as well as the rest of the
population--must be to devote "all of its strength to
building and developing the economy while strengthen-
ing national defense." He justifies this course by
saying that the army's primary responsibility of
defending the socialist North can only be accomplished
with a powerful military establishment and that this
in turn depends on a strong economy.
Dung goes out of his way, however, to emphasize
that the regime's present economic priorities may
eventually be superseded by military ones as the
overall situation of the revolution changes. He
repeatedly notes that current efforts must focus
on the economy first and "consolidating national
defense" second, but acknowledges that at a later,
"critical" date, the requirements of the war may
replace those of building up the economy in importance.
January 14, 1975
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Like the August article in Hoc Tap, General Dung's
essay suggests that the leadership's present priorities
may not be fully accepted by elements within the army
and, possibly, the party itself. Dung's repeated ex-
planation of the party's "flexible" lines and his
admonitions to both economic and military cadre to
"firmly grasp the present line" indicate that some
people still disagree with the regime's choice of
priorities.
The recently completed session of North Vietnam's
National Assembly also focused its attention on
promulgating economic targets for 1975. Le Thanh
Nghi, the regime's foremost economic planner, gave
the long--albeit overly optimistic--keynote address.
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in his report
to the assembly also emphasized the importance of
"building socialism" in the North. In ranking
diplomatic priorities for the coming year, Trinh
placed efforts to gain support for "the struggle
for the building of socialism" before the struggle
for implementation of the Paris agreement and the
completion of the national, democratic revolution.
The leadership in the North has not given any
public signal that it is prepared to abandon the
Paris Accords in favor of a return to all-out warfare.
Propaganda over the last few months has sought to
justify the "correctness" of the party's decision to
sign the 1973 agreements and prove that tangible gains
in the South are being made with the present strategy.
Moreover, Hanoi's coverage of the recent increased
level of fighting has, in general, been muted and has
emphasized that Communist "counter-blows" have been
made in direct response to cease-fire violations by
Saigon's forces.
The current public emphasis on economic matters
does not mean that the North Vietnamese leadership
has given up its goal of conquering the South and
January 14, 1975
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reunifying the country. As in the past, Hanoi's
decisions on the war will be based primarily on
the military opportunities and realities it per-
ceives in the South.. Meanwhile, the task of re-
constructing North Vietnam's economy will not be
an easy one. There are still no clear signs that
the regime has made the hard decisions on the
allocation of resources between sectors that would
normally accompany socialist economic planning.
Development of the agricultural sector will be a
long-run process which will only slowly respond to
the state's policy initiatives. Industrial growth,
in turn, will depend to a large extent on sub-
stantial foreign material and technical assistance.
(SECRET)
January 14, 1975
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Anticipated Communist Action in Saigon
Prime Minister Khiem told his staff late last
week that he was convinced, on the basis of some
reports received during the past several months,
that. the Communists are about to implement a vigor-
ous sabotage and terrorist campaign in and around
Saigon before the Tet holidays in mid-February.
Khiem has ordered security precautions increased
within the Capital Special Zone--the city of Saigon
and surrounding Gia Dinh Province--to lessen the
threat of new attacks. All district chiefs are to or-
ganize more patrols, ambush operations, and reconnais-
sance missions, and are expected to tighten up security
at power and water plants. These measures are patterned
after the ongoing pre-emptive operations of the National
Capital Police Command which has been reinforced with
newly trained cadets and a National Police Field Force
detachment. Since mid-December, the combined police
forces have rolled up large numbers of suspected Com-
munists while conducting massive search operations in
Saigon's 11 precincts and the four districts of Gia
Dinh Province.
While Communist planning called for attacks
against a large number of targets, only two signifi-
cant: incidents have thus far occurred. The first was
the rocketing of a government communications facility
just: outside of Saigon in early January, and the sec-
ond was a sapper attack on the main electrical power
plant which briefly disrupted service to the city. A
number of lesser attacks have been aimed at police
facilities just outside the city limits, but these
have been ineffectual.
Despite increased government countermeasures,
the Communists are likely to continue their sabotage
January 14, 1975
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and terrorist efforts in and around Saigon. In
addition to government offices and facilities,
fuel and ammunition storage areas and the Tan Son
Nhut Mr Base probably remain top Communist priori-
ties for attacks. By conducting such attacks, the
Communists hope to underscore their claims that
the government is unable to provide sufficient se-
curity for the populace, even in the capital city.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
January 14, 1975
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Thieu Lookin for Better Military Leadership
Recent government reverses in Binh Tuy Prov-
ince may be spurring President Thieu to replace
several hi h-level commanders. 25X1C
Prime Minister iem a -
vised Military Region 3 Commander Dong last week
to recommend replacements for the 18th Division
commander and the Binh Tuy province chief.
Although the first phase of the Communist
winter campaign may be over and the threat to the
northern reaches of Binh Tuy diminished, Khiem
was anxious to find a military leader who would
energetically defend government territory rather
than one whose ability was primarily in adminis-
tering villages and hamlets--a characteristic of
the existing province chief. On January 13, the
province chief was replaced by Colonel Tran Ba
Thanh, a former Regimental Commander in the 18th
Division.
The South Vietnamese 18th Division commander
has had a prolonged and serious eye ailment and
plans to come to the US for treatment after the
current fighting dies down. His impediment has
caused him to be absent frequently, however, and
performance of the division has suffered. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
January 14, 1975
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Communist AAA Increasin 1 Effective
Communist antiaircraft fire has been increasingly
effective and has been instrumental in their ability
to make recent offensive gains. It prevented resupply
of the government's beleaguered and isolated positions
at Phuoc Binh and atop Nui Ba Den. This new tactic is
expected to be utilized in future operations against
isolated government targets, such as the Kien Tuong
provincial capital of Moc Hoa near the Cambodian border.
In addition to the normal 12.7-mm. machine guns,
the commander of the South 'Vietnamese 3rd Air Division
claims that 23-mm., 37-mm., and even 57-mm. weapons have
been used by the Communists since their campaign began
in early December. These larger weapons force the South
Vietnamese to bomb from altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000
feet, greatly reducing their effectiveness. Air drop-
ping of supplies from high altitudes to surrounded
troops has also been almost completely ineffective.
The Communists have also been very effective with
their highly mobile heat-seeking, hand-held SA-7 mis-
sile system. During the past 30 days, their kill ratio
has been one aircraft downed for every three missiles
fired (compared to one for five in 1974). Some losses
may be attributed to an increase in the number of lower
altitude government air missions during the recent
fighting. The South Vietnamese, however, can ill af-
ford additional losses of their attack and support air-
craft and probably will continue to restrict sharply
the number of missions flown within the 9,000-foot range
of the SA-7. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
January 14, 1975
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Secret
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