DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00865A000100290001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 1, 2001
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 14, 1975
Content Type: 
NOTES
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00865A000100290001-0.pdf559.4 KB
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Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : ? l i,JT00865A000100290001-0 Thieu Looking for Better Military Leadership Recent government reverses in Binh Tuy Prov- ince may be spurring President Thieu to replace several high-level commanders. claims that Prime Minister Khiem ad- vised Military Region 3 Commander Dong last week to recommend replacements for the 18th Division commander and the Binh Tuy province chief. Although the first phase of the Communist winter campaign may be over and the threat to the northern reaches of Binh Tuy diminished, Khiem was anxious to find a military leader who would energetically defend government territory rather than one whose ability was primarily in adminis- tering villages and hamlets--a characteristic of the existing province chief. On January 13, the province chief was replaced by Colonel Tran Ba Thanh, a former Regimental Commander in the 18th Division. The South Vietnamese 18th Division commander has had a prolonged and serious eye ailment and plans to come to the US for treatment after the current fighting dies down. His impediment has caused him to be absent frequently, however, and performance of the division has suffered. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) January 14, 1975 -9- SECRET Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100290001-0 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CitfPP Q 865A000100290001-0 Communist AAA Increasingly Effective Communist antiaircraft fire has been increasingly effective and has been instrumental in their ability to make recent offensive gains. It prevented resupply of the government's beleaguered and isolated positions at Phuoc Binh and atop Nui Ba Den.. This new tactic is expected to be utilized in :Future operations against isolated government targets, such as the Kien Tuong provincial capital of Moc Hoa near the Cambodian border. In addition to the normal 12.7-mm. machine guns, the commander of the South Vietnamese 3rd Air Division claims that 23-mm., 37-mm., and even 57-mm. weapons have been used by the Communists since their campaign began in early December. These larger weapons force the South Vietnamese to bomb from altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 feet, greatly reducing their effectiveness. Air drop- ping of supplies from high altitudes to surrounded troops has also been almost completely ineffective. The Communists have also been very effective with their highly mobile heat-seeking, hand-held SA-7 mis- sile system. During the past 30 days, their kill ratio has been one aircraft downed for every three missiles fired (compared to one for five in 1974). Some losses may be attributed to an increase in the number of lower altitude government air missions during the recent fighting. The South Vietnamese, however, can ill af- ford additional losses of their attack and support air- craft and probably will continue to restrict sharply the number of missions flown within the 9,000-foot range of the SA-7. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM) January 14, 1975 -1100-- Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA l DP79T00865A000100290001-0 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100290001-0 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100290001-0