CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A002200010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 3, 1970
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
5 NOVEMBER NSC MEETING
I. Mr. President, Salvador Allende, the Chilean
Marxist, has now taken office as President in
that country with virtually no significant
opposition to hold him in check, and with a
cabinet dominated by the Communists and his
own even more extreme Socialist Party.
II. Allende was a narrow winner in the three-way
presidential elections on September 4, when
his Popular Unity coalition got him 36.6 percent
of the vote.
A. Former President Jorge Alessandri, running
as a "Conservative Independent," was second
with 35.3 percent, losing by less than
40,000 of nearly three million votes cast.
B. Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of retiring
President Eduardo Frei's Christian Democrats,
ran a poor third with 28.1 percent.
C. The orthodox pro-Moscow Communist Party of
Chile put together the Popular Unity coalition,
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chose Allende as the candidate, and provided
the organizational base for his election.
D. Allende himself belongs to the Socialist Party,
which in the Chilean political spectrum is
completely Marxist, and even more nationalistic
and more extreme than the Communists.
1. Ironically, until the Communists provided
the political cohesion and muscle for the
coalition, the Socialists appeared to be
ready to jettison Allende.
2. He has been their perennial candidate, but
many of the leaders mistrust Allende,
particularly for his long and close relations
with the Communists.
III. Chilean election law provides that when no presi-
dential candidate receives a majority, the president
will be chosen in a run-off by both houses of Con-
gress meeting jointly.
A. Theoretically, there were enough votes in the
full Congress to keep the presidency from
Allende, as the pie chart indicates.
1. There was even some speculation that the
Congress might vote on October 24 for
Alessandri, who would then refuse to
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serve. This would have required another
.popular election in which Frei could have
run, because technically he would not be
seeking a second consecutive term.
B. The opposing forces, however, were not only
fragmented, but left leaderless before the run-off.
1. Frei continued the aloofness he had displayed
during the campaign, and Tomic, fulfilling
an earlier deal with Allende, recognized
him as president-elect on election night
on the basis of his plurality.
2. Alessandri, after a brief initial agree-
ment to head a movement to stop Allende,
refused to cooperate in the effort to
turn his strong second-place showing at
the polls into a run-off victory.
3. The effort was probably doomed by the
quick support for Allende from the left wing
of the Christian Democratic Party, but
Alessandri's refusal to make a fight
turned the run-off vote into a foregone
conclusion.
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C. Moderates in the Christian Democratic leader-
ship tried to have a special party congress
condition any support for Allende on a firm
promise that he would abide by the "democratic
guarantees" in the constitution.
1. The party was so divided, however, that
Allende was able to win the support of a
majority of the Christian Democratic
leaders with only a token statement of
his intentions.
IV. The Allende forces, even before the run-off, were
moving quickly and forcefully to ensure his
inauguration and prepare for the take-over.
A. Methods ranging from soothing persuasion to
terrorist threats were used effectively to
make his presidency appear palatable--and
inevitable.
1. His supporters popped up in key positions
of influence in the information media,
either maneuvering their way in, or simply
declaring their authority in the name of
the forthcoming regime.
2. Allende and his close associates contacted
many important Chileans in political,
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economic, and such professional fields as
.education, to reassure them that cooperation
would pay.
3. Grass-roots support for Allende was whipped
up by some 8,000 Popular Unity Committees
in factories and neighborhoods, organized
originally as campaign forces for Allende's
popular election. These groups, largely
controlled by the Communist Party, will
apparently be kept in being to provide
local propaganda, control, and intelligence.
B. On October 24, 195 of the 200 legislators in
the full Congress showed up. (Allende himself
did not vote, and four others were ill.)
1. Allende got 153 votes--75 of them from
the Christian Democrats. Their 20 sena-
tors and 55 national deputies followed
party orders to vote for Allende.
2. Alessandri got 35 votes from the National
Party--conservatives who have announced
that they intend to offer "constructive
opposition" to Allende.
3. Seven members of the Congress abstained.
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V. Even before the election, there had been speculation
that as a last resort the Chilean military would not
permit a Marxist government to take office.
A. Many high-ranking officers had expressed
opposition to Allende, and a few had told
United States officials that as a Marxist,
he would not be allowed to become president
if he should win.
1. There was no strong indication at that
time, however, that these officers
seriously envisaged his victory.
2. Not long before the election, one top
military official criticized the Alessandri
campaign as inadequate, and expressed dis-
gust at the assumption of the Alessandri
backers that the military would act if he
lost.
B. When Allende won his plurality, a number of high
officers--including troop commanders and the
head of the Air Force--were casting about for
ways, means, and support to prevent a Marxist
government.
1. According to one report, this group in-
cluded General Vicente Huerta, commandant
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of the carabineros.
2. A number of them still expressed optimism
that Allende would be defeated in the Con-
gressional run-off.
3. Some, like the assassinated Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, General Rene Schneider, said it
was up to the politicians to extricate them-
selves from the dilemma which they had created.
C., To put the whole situation between the popular
vote on September 4 and the inauguration on
November 3 in perspective, there was a substantial
agreement at high levels among both political and
military leaders in Chile that Allende should not
be allowed to bring a Marxist regime to power.
1. There was motivation.
2. There was strong recognition of the inherent
danger to the country.
3. There were the necessary forces, either for
legal action in the run-off, or for extra-
legal action in the form of a military coup.
4. But the spark never came.
D. Essentially, each element--the political and the
military--looked to the other to provide the
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leadership, and no leader with the clout to bring
it off was willing to step forward at the crucial
moments.
E. One major factor appears to have been the
traditional commitment of the Chilean armed
forces to the constitutional process.
1. This has changed significantly in recent
years. Many of the younger officers no
longer have the economically and politi-
cally conservative backgrounds of their
predecessors. Leftist political influence
has been growing among the non-commissioned
officers, and nearly half of the troops
are short-term conscripts.
2. In addition, growing resentment by the military
over the refusal of successive regimes to give
the armed forces the role, the pay, and the,
equipment they expected has come to a head in
the past two years, straining the support the
military might otherwise offer the establish-
ment.
F. The commanders and career officers, nevertheless,
placed major emphasis on the traditionally
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non-political character of the Chilean armed
forces.
1. General Schneider, in particular, insisted
that if Allende reached power constitutionally,
the military must uphold constitutional
processes.
2. Schneider's attitude--whether it stemmed from
conviction or a reported preference for
Allende--influenced General Carlos Prats,
who is the new Commander-in-Chief. Many
officers considered Prats the best potential
leader for action to block Allende.
G. Retired Air Force General Viaux, who had earlier
led an abortive military revolt to improve the
position and perquisites of the military, has
wide support among the older noncommissioned
officers, and appeared to be seeking active
support for a coup attempt.
H. Most of the senior active officers, however,
did not favor Viaux as potential head man for a
coup.
1. They feared the risks involved in the commu-
nication and coordination essential for
choosing a leader and ensuring the necesssary
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support from their fellow officers and troops.
2. As the deadline for action approached, the
cooperation of troop commanders in the Santiago
area--considered a necessity--was not assured.
Divisions among leading officers became more
evident, for example by the calls which several
admirals paid on Allende.
I. Schneider's assassination unified the military,
but it unified them against any likelihood of
a coup to keep Allende from office.
1. The presumption--and the public consensus--
is that it was instigated by the extreme
right wing.
2. Allende's claim that the murder was a threat
to constitutional order is widely accepted
by Chileans.
3. It therefore effectively cancelled the
possibility of a military move against
his inauguration.
VI. Allende announced his cabinet a few days before
his takeover, after considerable behind-the-scenes
strife between the Communists and his Socialists.
A. Communist leaders had been openly concerned
in the period since the popular election that
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the Popular Unity coalition was not proceeding
fast enough with plans to implement the
reforms proposed in the campaign.
B. Allende himself, however, appears to be intent
on the kind of a low posture--for the time
being at least--that will project a non-radical
if not moderate image. Interestingly enough,
his friends in Cuba and in the Communist coun-
tries have kept their statements and actions
by and large in a low key that will help him
put this across.
C. The cabinet accordingly reflects a number of
compromises between the Communists and the
Socialists, includes a few nonenities, and
by and large suggests that Allende intends to
move cautiously and gradually at the start of
his administration.
1. He is experienced in dealing with the
rivalry between the two parties, and may
try to use it to maintain a free hand for
himself.
D. The Socialists have four cabinet posts, including
the key Interior and Foreign Ministries.
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1. Jose Toha, a Socialist very close to
.Allende, will be Minister of Interior, and
first in line of succession to the presi-
dency inasmuch as Chile has no vicepresident.
2. Toha will control all police and investi-
gative forces, as well as the chief execu-
tives of the 25 provinces.
3. Allende is reported particularly concerned
over assuring control of the well-armed
national police, the carabineros, a disci-
plined paramilitary force of 25,000 volun-
teers which is better trained and slightly
larger than. the Army.
4. The Foreign Ministry goes to Clodomiro
Almeyda, a leader of the more radical wing
of the Socialists. A dedicated Marxist
theoretician, Almeyda has close relations
with both Havana and Peking.
5. Other Socialists in the cabinet are the
Minister of Housing and the Secretary-General
of the Government.
E. The Communists got the ministries of finance,
public works, and labor, and in addition they
control the important Ministry of Economy and
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Development, which will probably be the focal
point for Allende's first major reform moves.
1. The new minister, Pedro Vuskovic, is iden-
tified as a "leftist independent," but
he has
the full confidence of the Communist leader-
ship, and may well be a secret member of the
party.
2. Vuskovic, formerly an economist on the United
Nations staff, has been the chief economic
adviser in three of Allende's four presiden-
tial campaigns.
3. Communist control of the Labor Ministry may
create substantial friction. In addition
to Christian Democratic efforts to keep
control of some labor and peasant organizations,
many Allende supporters have been proposing
during the campaign that enterprises to be
expropriated by the government should be
taken over by workers' councils. This the
Communists, with a penchant for central control,
oppose. Control of the only effective labor
organization is at present split between the
Communists and Socialists. The major unions
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are concerned that their powerful strike
.weapon will be blunted when industries are
government-controlled.
F. The seven remaining cabinet posts were divided
among the other four parties making up the
Popular Unity coalition.
1. The Radicals, once a major Chilean party,
have been disintegrating. The leadership
has taken a sharp turn to the left, but
the party still affords non-Marxist
window-dressing for the cabinet.
2. This is true, at least, of the nonenities
named as Ministers of Defense and Education.
3. The new Minister of Mines, however, is a
leftist member, Orlando Cantaurias, who is
close to Allende and will have a key role
in the promised take-over of the copper
industry.
4. The new Minister of Agriculture, Jaques
Chonchol, represents the Unified Popular
Action Movement, a small group of dissident
leftwing Christian Democrats. Chonchol
earlier served as a United Nations agri-
cultural adviser to Fidel Castro, and broke
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with the Christian Democrats last year after
playing a major role in Frei's controversial
agrarian reform program.
5. Three lesser cabinet posts went to two minor
opportunistic groups--leftist but non-Marxist--
the Social Democrats and the Independent
Popular Action.
G. It is to be expected that in most of the secondary
cabinet posts, the ostensible ministers will be
bypassed and real power will be in the hands of
second-rank officials. The reporting from Santiago
indicates that these positions are dominated by
the Communists and Socialists.
VII. As for the potential opposition, the Christian
Democrats remain the largest single party.
A. The leadership at present, however, is dominated
by Tomic and other left-wingers.
1. Former President Frei is going to have to
carry out his promise to resume activity
within the party if there is going to be
any effort to oppose the growing Marxist
assertion of control over all aspects of
political and economic life.
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2. The forces led by Tomic--including some
important anti-Marxist leaders--claim that
pragmatic reasons made it desirable for the
Christian Democrats to reach an accommodation
with Allende and support him in the run-off.
3. There are grass-roots elements--peasant, labor,
and women's organizations--in the Christian
Democratic party that fought for the
insistence on an Allende guarantee of
democratic government. These elements
look to Frei for leadership, and they
are hesitant to weaken the party by
leaving it,'but without his active role
they are too weak to bring about stiffer
opposition to the new government.
B. Conservative forces at present are discredited
by the presumable implication of extremists
of the right in the assassination of General
Schneider.
1. The National Party, as I said, has
announced its intention to form an active
opposition, but many of its influential
members have left the party or-'fled the
country; there is continuing conflict with
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the Christian Democrats; and the economic
.pressures Allende will certainly bring to
bear on the elements the National Party
represents is likely to drive the party
to the wall.
C. Chileans generally do not attach great
weight to the Congress and the political
parties, and will hardly look to them to
protect their interests.
1. Many who could transfer holdings abroad
or count on foreign employment have left
the country.
2. Businessmen'who cannot leave are likely
at the outset to accept the vague assurances
Allende has given privately and in public,
and accommodate as best they can.
3. A substantial number of Chileans who oppose
Allende continue to believe that they will
have an opportunity to vote for an alterna-
tive in a new presidential election in 1976.
4. Party affiliation is not a strong factor
among Chilean voters, and the progressively
leftward trend of their preferences was a
major factor in Allende's victory this year.
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D. As for opposition by the information media,
anti-Marxist publications and broadcast stations
are rapidly losing either their independence,
or their influence.
VIII. Allende's attainment of the presidency with only
about one third of the country's vote climaxes
a highly successful political career of nearly
35 years.
A.' The man knows how to achieve his ends. He
knows the political forces of the country
inside and out. He has a thorough familiarity
with the governmental and economic structures
he plans to revolutionize in the course of
building the socialism he claims will solve
Chile's many serious problems.
1. He is tenacious and singleminded, but
he knows how to dissemble his determi-
nation with a flair for maneuvering,
a quick wit, and an instinct for when
to reassure and when to challenge.
2. This facility for changing his position
according to need can postpone the for-
mation of a concerted opposition, and
it will be an important element in
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maintaining control over the internal
.contradictions within his regime.
3. His maneuverings between the Socialist
and Communist positions will not go
unchallenged, but he has demonstrated
in the past that he can maintain a
balance that keeps him in command.
B. The immediate outlook, accordingly, is not
so much for a dramatic "Hundred Days" in
which he will seek to remake the country,
as for a gradual but persistent probing
toward his goals.
C. Many of the initial measures to consolidate
his political and economic control will not
appear exceptional. He has ample time--the
next congressional elections are set for 1973.
1. The Socialists are anxious to assert
influence and control in obvious sectors
of government policy; the Communists are
most interested in expanding their organi-
zational strength while restraining the
Socialists from triggering opposition or
outmaneuvering them.
2. This will allow Allende to set his own
pace on major changes.
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D. We expect that his first economic moves will
be.aimed at control of the major mining, indus-
trial and financial enterprises that he con-
siders essential to his plans.
1. These assets, combined with the substantial
foreign exchange reserves he inherits
from the outgoing government, will
put his regime in good financial shape
at the outset.
2. Recent high copper prices and extensive
recent U.S. investment in expanded copper
production in Chile are additional bonuses
for the new regime, although world copper
prices have been dropping, and there are
indications that supply is approaching
demand.
3. He and his main economic advisers are
concerned, however, about the deterioration
of the internal economy since his election.
4. He will accordingly continue the efforts
begun even before his inauguration to
create such confidence as he can among
businessmen and others such as food pro-
ducers, whose cooperation he needs at least
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for the short run.
He has described inflation as
problem of the moment, and he
economic steps helpful to the
unemployed as rapidly as
1. Although many of his
inflationary if they
the most urgent
intends to take
poor and the
possible.
programs would be
were implemented in
a free enterprise economy, he can be ex-
pected to take measures to suppress or
mask these effects.
F. His program for socialism will be facilitated
by the already preponderant role of the Chilean
government in nearly every field of economic
activity. The private enterprise system has
already been distorted by 30 years of rapid
inflation and government intervention.
IX. In the international economic field, we expect that
Allende, at the start at least, will move with
caution and with considerable regard for the
realities. He has asserted his interest in foreign
capital and technology as long as "the benefits
are mutual."
A. Understandably, foreign investors will be wary
of a professedly Marxist regime, and new foreign
credits will be harder to come by.
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25X1 C
B. Allende and his representatives have reiterated
in.public and in private their hopes of retaining
Chile's traditional hard currency markets in
Western Europe, Japan, and elsewhere for their
copper, iron, and other exports, as well as
plans for expanding into Communist markets.
C. This desire to maintain Western markets is
the reason for his decision to postpone
diplomatic recognition of Peking, East Germany,
and other Communist governments until the
possible economic repercussions are clear.
1. Chile already has economic relations with
Cuba, and Havana may be the first capital
to be given new diplomatic recognition.
D. reporting on the economic
plans drafted by the Popular Unity coalition
shows Allende's desire to give an appearance
of flexibility in economic matters.
1. Examples are his encouraging gestures to
foreign investors in the United States and
in Western Europe, and his reiterated in-
tention to cooperate with the Andean Group
and to retain some private and mixed enter-
prises in Chile.
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2. These measures, of course, would last only
as long as they appeared useful and benefi-
cial to the new regime. The Communists
have magnanimously recommended to Allende
that the government should not expropriate
any enterprises that are losing money.
E. U.S. private assets in Chile total about one
and a half billion dollars, of which slightly
less than half consists of Chilean government
notes issued for nationalization, holdings of
public bonds, and long- and short-term loans.
1. We estimate the book value of direct U.S.
investment a't $800 million, although re-
placement would be considerably higher.
More than half--$480 million--is in mining
and smelting.
2. As of September 10, U.S. investors had
current investment insurance against ex-
propriation amounting to $293 million,
and standby coverage for another $355
million.
X. As for foreign relations, many governments are
skeptical of Allende's aims, but anxious to avoid
an appearance of prejudging him.
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A. Mexico, Colombia, and some of Chile's influ-
ential Latin American neighbors would like
to agree with the hopes of some Western Euro-
pean governments that the maintenance of
normal relations will help Allende to "resist
radicalization."
B. The pleas he has made so far for international
understanding, however, would appear to be
contradicted by the appointment of the
radical Clodomiro Almeyda as Foreign
Minister.
1. Almeyda is so far to the left that
his admiration for the Chinese Commu-
nists and the Cubans in the past has
placed him in opposition to Moscow.
C. Several Latin American governments, in-
cluding in particular Argentina, are
deeply concerned over the possible effect
of the Allende government on political
stability inside their own countries.
-in late October Allende promised
representatives of revolutionary guer-
rilla groups in Latin America that
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Chile would become a center of support
for them as soon as he is firmly in
control.
2. According to this report, Allende said
that this support would have to be
managed covertly by his Socialist Party,
because the Chilean Communist Party sub-
scribes to Moscow's preference for legal
and parliamentary means of coming to power.
D. There is every indication and every reason to
expect that--whatever Allende may say or in-
tend--the forces around him will use every
opportunity to exacerbate relations with the
United States.
1. The personal emissary Allende sent to
our Embassy in Santiago said there was
little the new president could do to
curb the constant attacks on the United
States in the Chilean press.
E. As for the Soviet Union, Moscow is showing
caution in dealing with the new government.
In turn, the Chilean Socialists will want
to avoid excessive dependence on Moscow, and
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the Chilean Communists --for the sake of their
domestic appeal--will exercise restraint in
promoting closer ties with Russia.
1. The USSR extended a credit of $57 million
to Chile in 1967, none of which has been
used. Chilean economic problems, however,
will inevitably create the opportunity for
Moscow to use this for leverage with the
new Marxist government.
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