NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000400030007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 25, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
25 July 1966
No. 1684/
Copy No.
NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE WAR
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 1684/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 July 1966
North Vietnamese Intentions and Attitudes
Toward the War
Introduction
1. The Communist military drive in South Vietnam
has been stymied and the prospects for victory as viewed
from Hanoi are almost certainly dimmer than at any time
in the past five years. Nevertheless, Hanoi probably
feels that the moment for a basic decision on whether or
not to end the conflict is still well over the horizon.
As the Vietnamese Communists see it, the allied will to
persist in the war has not yet been adequately tested.
Also still to be fully measured, in their view, is the
ability of the US combat force in Vietnam to sustain its
effectiveness, particularly in rolling back the Commu-
nists from the substantial ground position they still
hold or in uprooting their political infrastructure.
2. It is clear that the Vietnamese Communists believe
Washington will soon be forced by the demands of the
conflict to put the US on an extensive wartime footing.
They hope that such measures, combined with the
effect of sustained and increasing US casualties, will
fan additional domestic American opposition to con-
tinuing the war. In their view, these developments
may well inhibit substantially greater US ground escala-
tion of the conflict and may, in the long run, force ma-
jor concessions in Washington's policy which could offer
a realization of some Communist objectives in the South.
Hanoi probably still believes that Washington's determina-
tion to pursue the war will crack before curtailed Commu-
nist capabilities make it necessary for Hanoi to completely
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rethink its strategy. They realize that the domestic
position of the Republic of Vietnam is stronger now than
at any time in the past three years, but they also judge
that Saigon's programs to win the populace over have a
long way to go before they reduce significantly the insur-
gent hold on the South.
3. In sum, the policy makers in Hanoi see lit-
tle choice but to continue to support and prosecute
the war generally along the present lines, at least un-
til their prospects worsen decidedly. It is probable
that they view the coming winter as at least the ear-
liest point at which the long-term outlook for the
conflict may come into sharper focus. In their view,
the Vietnamese Communists have the ability to continue
the fighting through this period, and probably well
beyond. Despite the bombing of the North, sufficient
supplies of men and materiel are still moving south and
the will and ability of the domestic population to support
the war remains adequate. The main force Communist
units in the South still hold a powerful hand, and the
Communist grip on a substantial segment of the populace
in the South is still strong enough to ensure most of the
indigenous logistic backing needed for the war effort.
Determination to Continue the War
4. Recent North Vietnamese actions have left no
doubt that Hanoi plans for the present to continue
supporting and prosecuting the war in South Vietnam
with large commitments of men and materiel. They
have already sent at least 30,000 troops to the South
in 1966. Only 26,000 infiltrators are known to have
come south in all of 1965. In late June an entire
North Vietnamese combat division, the 324th, entered
the South across the DMZ, apparently to shorten the time
required to bolster the southern forces as well as to
strengthen the Communist position in the strategically
important northern section of South Vietnam.
5. On 17 July Hanoi announced that it was calling
up part of its reserve force of officers and enlisted
men. This announcement was probably designed primarily
for its propaganda impact, since our evidence shows
that Hanoi had already stepped up inductions and extended
terms of service to the point where its regular armed
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forces had reached an estimated strength of slightly
over 400,000. The new call-up suggests an intent to
convey to North Vietnamese people and to the world
Hanoi's continuing determination in the war. It also
makes the people of the North aware that greater par-
ticipation by all of them will be necessary in the war
effort.
6. Hanoi is apparently still planning, however,
to enlarge even further its pool of trained manpower
for infiltration and for the defense of North Vietnam.
Our estimates indicate that Hanoi can draw on sufficient
northern manpower to raise its total military force to
well over 500,000 men without unbearable strain on its re-
sources. It can probably dispatch as many as 55,000-
75,000 of these annually for infiltration into the
South.
7. Recent tough talk out of Hanoi also appears to
be aimed at leaving no doubt in anyone's mind that
North Vietnam intends to keep fighting. Ho Chi Minh
himself stated flatly on 17 July that the DRV will
"fight through to victory, despite all the difficulties
we have to overcome." Chinese Foreign Minister Chen
Yi recently sought to reinforce this same notion by
telling the French ambassador to Peking that North Viet-
namese leaders are determined to continue the war. He
implied that the Chinese had recently been in direct
touch with Ho and that Peking and Hanoi were in full
agreement on their hard line.
Hanoi's Evaluation of the Situation in North Vietnam
8. Hanoi appears to believe that its transporta-
tion system will be able to withstand increased air at-
tacks and still maintain an adequate flow of men and sup-
plies to the South. This judgment is probably based in
part on the DRV's proven success in moving more than
enough supplies south during the past dry season to sus-
tain the Communist forces currently in South Vietnam--
at their present rate of action--through the rainy sea-
son despite heavy air strikes against the logistic sys-
tem. Moreover, the North Vietnamese have made enough
improvements in the road network in Laos to provide a
considerably enlarged rainy season capability.
9. The development of this all-weather capability
could enable the Communist forces to use surplus stocks
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brought in during the dry season for a further expansion
of forces to support an increased level of combat
by existing units. Recent strikes against North
Vietnam's POL storage facilities have destroyed over
50 percent of the nation's petroleum storage capac-
ity. However, it is estimated that substantial stocks
still survive and that the DRV can continue to import
sufficient fuel to keep at least essential military and
economic traffic moving.
10. Although the North Vietnamese economy has
been hurt by the cumulative effects of the strikes,
damage has come largely from the disruption of trans-
port and from dislocations caused by diversion of man-
power into war-related projects. This has resulted in
shortages of certain types of food in some localities
and in a rise in the price of some consumer items on
the extensive free market. The North Vietnamese,
nevertheless, appear still to have the essentials nec-
essary to sustain life and continue the war. Their
success in the face of the bombings so far probably has
reinforced Hanoi's confidence somewhat in its ability
to carry on despite the air war.
11. The state of popular morale in North Vietnam
is difficult to assess, but it appears that there is no
significant opposition to the regime. This is not to
say that the cumulative effect of the air strikes
has not had a wearying effect on the citizenry; however,
there is no evidence that morale has yet declined to
the extent that it exerts an inhibiting effect on the
regime's policy options in pursuing the conflict.
Within the party leadership there are no clear signs of
opposition to current policy on the war.
12. One of the key elements in Hanoi's assessment
of its capability to sustain the war effort is the level
of military and political support it believes it can
count on from its allies, particularly Peking and Mos-
cow. Since Hanoi realizes it needs support from both
powers, the North Vietnamese have made every effort
to avoid commiting themselves to the dictates of either
government. Moreover, the North Vietnamese appear to
believe that there are distinct limits on the level of
materiel and political support which can be counted on
from Peking and Moscow and that, in the final analysis,
the outcome of the war will depend essentially on the
will and resources of the Vietnamese themselves. Thus,
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while Soviet and Chinese backing tends to sustain the
Vietnamese will to persist, there appears little likeli-
hood that Hanoi will permit either bloc power to gain
decisive control over its decisions on war policy.
13. In fact, both Soviet and Chinese spokesmen
have voiced recognition of their essential inability
to control Hanoi. Soviet Premier Kosygin recently told
Mrs. Gandhi that the USSR could take no action on end-
ing the war until Hanoi signified its agreement. Chen
Yi put it another way. He told the French ambassador
that all decisions on the conduct of the war lay
"strictly" with the Vietnamese.
The Situation in South Vietnam
14. Hanoi undoubtedly views the situation in the
South with mixed emotions. It was certainly discour-
aged over the blunting of the 1965 Communist offensive
by the rapid introduction of large numbers of US combat
troops. The failure of the Communists to regain the in-
itiative this year also contributed to Hanoi's dis-
comfort. These difficulties are being compounded daily
by the increasingly effective use of US air power against
insurgent base camps and by US "spoiling" operations
which clearly have upset Communist plans for launching
major attacks this summer. The Communists have also
begun to feel the impact of increasing casualties. In
addition, there has also been a drop, although not
a critical one, in Communist morale in South Vietnam.
This is reflected to some extent in the growing number
of Communist soldiers who defect to US or South Viet-
namese units.
15. Hanoi's assessment of the situation in South
Vietnam is, however, not all dark. Communist forces
still hold most of the ground they held last summer.
Communist main force units continue to increase in
number. Hanoi probably feels that, although the Com-
munists have failed to move ahead during the past year,
they have by and large, successfully checkmated the
US by preserving the major portion of their strength.
Furthermore, the Communists have managed to maintain
their political apparatus in South Vietnam basically
intact. They still control at least 20 percent of the
population and are able to operate among a considerably
greater portion of the people.
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Hanoi's Estimate of US Military Intentions
16. North Vietnamese spokesmen have frequently ex-
pressed the belief that the US build up in South Vietnam
may surpass 400,000 men by the end of this year. They
appear, however, to believe that the US will continue
to employ these forces along basically the same lines
as at present. The Americans, in Hanoi's view, will
be aiming to keep Communist forces off balance by dis-
rupting and destroying their bases and by attempting to
trap and destroy their main force units. It would ap-
pear, however, that they are not, as yet, convinced
that the allies will have enough combat forces in South
Vietnam by the end of 1966 to inflict a decisive defeat
on the Communists.
17. The Vietnamese Communists probably estimate
that they will still hold a powerful hand in South
Vietnam if they can maintain the bulk of the regular
units intact in the face of the anticipated level of
allied build up. They would, in such a case, still
retain the option of protracting the war. This has long
been their main strategy, one which they eventually hope
will wear out the allied will to fight. The North Viet-
namese probably also believe that the US will be ex-
tremely reluctant to expand the ground war by invading
North Vietnam. Frequent public statements by US offi-
cials that the US does not desire the destruction of
the North Vietnamese regime may also encourage Hanoi
in this belief.
18. In the North Vietnamese view, Washington
probably would be forced to make a basic re-examina-
tion of its policy if the allies, with an American
ground force of around 400,000 failed to force a de-
cisive outcome of the war. Hanoi may hope that, at
this point, the US would be willing to make some sig-
nificant concessions on the war which would offer a
realization of at least some Communist objectives in
South Vietnam. War mobilization and economic measures
required of the American people might, in Hanoi's
view, contribute to substantial domestic opposition
to another large-scale escalation of the ground fight-
ing. According to this thesis, the opposition in the
US would be heightened by the continuation of American
combat losses in Vietnam.
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19. To this end, Hanoi will probably continue to
be basically cautious in its treatment of US pilots cap-
tured in the DRV, lest it provoke an adverse reaction
from the American people. Thus far, Hanoi officials
have gone no further than assertions that the airmen
are "criminals" subject to trial in the DRV. No North
Vietnamese official has raised the threat to execute
them. Harsh treatment of the pilots might tend to
undercut, in their view, existing Free World pressures
on the US to end the bombing. Hanoi may, however,
stage trials in which "confessions" of war crimes by
the prisoners would be presented. Long prison sentences
could then be meted out, but it is doubtful that death
penalties would be carried out even if they were handed
down. It is likely that the North Vietnamese will at-
tempt to keep the pilot issue as much in the forefront
of their propaganda as possible, since they see it as
a means of focusing continued Free World attention on
the bombing of North Vietnam.
Future Prospects
20. If the Communists can gain a sustained stale-
mate in the South in which substantial pressures are
working on Washington to modify US policy on Vietnam,
Hanoi may finally prove interested in negotiations on
the war on the basis of joint concessions. Such a situa-
tion would be roughly similar to that which existed
in 1954 when the North Vietnamese were negotiating
from a position of strength with the French while,
at the same time, they had gone about as far as they
could go in the military sphere without a long breath-
ing spell. If Hanoi opted for a negotiated settlement
at this point, it would be seeking at the minimum to
gain a guaranteed territorial foothold for the Commu-
nists in South Vietnam, along with the participation
of the Viet Cong in a coalition government.
21. Such a settlement would permit the Communists
to build up their strength for a new effort in the
future to complete a takeover in the South. Hanoi
would almost certainly insist on a total suspension of
the bombing of North Vietnam and on an unpoliced
ceasefire throughout the South during any talks. The
advantage of theespite
maximum
Communists would take
to prepare themselves
military and political areas.
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22. If, however, the US build up in the South during
the rest of 1966 is successful in turning the course
of the fighting decisively against the Communists, the
chances appear better than even that they will opt for
retrenchment rather than for escalation. Retrenchment
would be more likely to take the form of a de facto
termination of the fighting than of a negotiated set-
tlement. The DRV would probably estimate that a with-
drawal of the bulk of Communist forces from the South,
even if conducted clandestinely, would result in a
cessation of US military pressure on North Vietnam.
The Communists would, of course, attempt to maintain an
underground apparatus in the South in the hope that the
insurgency could be started anew after a period of re-
building and reorganization.
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