POST-BERLIN THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT SOVIET PSYCHE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000900110027-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 22, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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h'ebruary 22, 1954
NSC REVIEW
POST-BERLIN THOUGHTS ON THE COMPLETED,
CURRENT SOVIET PSYCHE 10/31/04
If Berlin did nothing else, it removed quite a few question marks
with respect to Soviet attitudes and policies toward the West.
We went to Berlin wondering if the so-called "New Look" had any
sincerity behind it or could lead to any :practical negotiated results.
We also wondered if the recent talk about Army ascendancy in the
Kremlin was more than a rumor.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and t_h_=? Chinese Communist
regime was another big question mark.
Another vast "guess" area was how much the internal agricultural
and economic stresses so clearly stated. by Krushchev might affect external
Soviet policy.
We also wondered whether the death . fStali-1 had in any way affected
the traditional Soviet inflexibility in negotiation, and if the passing of this
almost Asian tyrant would permit top Soviet Foreign Office personalities
to be more relaxed among themselves and. in their relations with "foreigners".
To some of these questions some pretty clear answers emerged during
the Berlin Conference. To others,' the answers, although not completely
clear, may be estimated with considerably more accuracy than before
Berlin.
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The Soviet Delegation was unquestionably their first team. In the
front row of the Soviet Delegation were Molotov, Gromyko, Malik, and
Zarubin, with Vinogradov and Semenov being frequently consulted in
the second row, and Sobolev, head of the Foreign Office North American
Desk, always present.
The atmosphere between themselves seemed to be quite relaxed.
The passing of notes and the whispered advice during the conferences
was spontaneous and the advisers volunteered information and advice to
Molotov just as easily as he turned to consult them.
Gromyko, who incidentally looked like death taking a holiday, was
unquestionably the chief consultant-adviser, and frequently showed consider-
ably less deference toward Molotov than, for instance, Frank Roberts
toward Eden, or the top French toward Bidault.
During the social gatherings, whether in the Soviet Embassy or when
we were hosts, the Soviet mood was one: of great personal friendliness,
sometimes verging on an almost pathetic eagerness to be liked personally
even though professionally the gap between us was as great as ever.
Molotov, with Troianovsky at his side, was by far the most enter-
taining member of the Soviet group. Compared to the others, his humor
was sharp, subtle, and fast, and he seemed to derive genuine pleasure
from being able to throw the switch and have verbal fun.
On the other hand, none of the Russians ever really forgot the party
line, and if they found themselves on the edge of any kind of personal
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admission, the party line reappeared very fast -- in Molotov's case with
an occasional twinkle; in the case of the others, with heavy-footed
solemnity.
Anthony Nutting of the British Delegation reported that daring one of
his conversations with the Soviet Chinese expert, he was urging the Soviets
to have the Chinese Communists relax their impossible attitude and regu-
lations against British businessmen in China, who were being held as
virtual prisoners because of the financial demands :made upon them.
Nutting reported that his Soviet vis-a-v:is appeared about to say the equivalent
of "Well, I'll see what I can do about it", when all of a sudden his face
changed, he drew himself up, and said, "If you would accept the Chinese
People's Republic as a member of the Big Five, such matters could be
more easily handled".
This policy of personal friendliness within a framework of unremittingly
tough foreign policy, is about the only visible evidence of the hoped-for,
or at least puzzled-over, "New Look" in Soviet foreign policy. Nowhere
else could any sign of it be found. In fact, the whole Molotov performance
in Berlin was, if anything, almost needlessly tough, and actually hielped
us not only to preserve Western unity, but to further our propaganda out
of the mouthbf Molotov rather than out of our own.
For instance, Molotov came to Berlin with quite a few potential
customers -- to name some of the important ones ... the East Germans,
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the West Germans, the German Socialists, Austria, French fears,
French neutralists, British public opinion.. It would have been a very
difficult job to sell all of these customers, but it would not have been too
difficult to select a few and sacrifice the rest.
Instead, day after day Molotov made absolutely no effort to sell
or even salvage any of these possible customers, and wound up by having
all Germans disappointed, if not enraged, with the German Socialists in
such a quandary that their leaders didn't: know what to do or say, and
frequently contradicting themselves in print, with even "Le Monde"
squirming in public, with the French so scared of losing NATO that they
actually felt better about EDC, with the British by and large behind Eden,
with all but the most doctrinaire neutralists on very rockyground, and
with Austria, the cheapest sale of all, dumbfounded and desperate.
Furthermore, when Molotov's early attempts to split the French and
British away from us on the very touchy Asian and Chinese matter failed,
Western solidarity won a tremendous victory, from which Bidault, Eden,
and Dulles all derived new strength in their determination to stick together.
And toward the end of the Conference, the three Western Ministers hardly
needed any signal practice at all in order to complement each other in
reply to Soviet tactics.
Admittedly, my flat statement regarding Molotov's having lost all
his possible customers is quite an oversimplification. The world press
during the period of the Conference was not 100% for us, nor were all
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Parliamentarians in Paris, London, Washington, and Bonn uniform in
their reactions. There was criticism of what they considered Western
intransigeance and unwillingness to compromise, but on balance, I
believe the oversimplification will stand up. It was interesting to note that
some of Molotov's trial balloons on Asia and on the German referendum
never took real root, and never held the headlines for more than 24 hours.
This ruthless and total disregard of public opinion and propaganda
dividends on Molotov's part could not have been accidental. Soviet expert
Bohlen several. times said that this was a perfect illustration of the Soviet
technique that although the Soviets give more thought to propaganda than
anyone else, nevertheless when propaganda and policy come into conflict,
propaganda is sacrificed without a second thought. The Molotov behaviour
in Berlin certainly confirms the Bohlen thesis.
What, then, was this overriding policy point which controlled every-
thing ?
It was a military point. And whether the Soviet military dictated
to the Soviet civilians, or whether the Soviet civilians thought that
self-preservation indicated reliance on military considerations is not
really important. Whoever thought of it first, the fact remains that
military considerations controlled.
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This was particularly obvious in the case of the Austrian Peace
Treaty.
What was at stake here? Certainly the loss of 7-million easy-going
Austrians without overwhelmingly important agriculture or industry could
not be considered a major threat to the USSR. Furthermore, although
the letter of Treaties with Hungary and Rumania called for the withdrawal
of Soviet troops from those two countries once peace was concluded
with Austria, a simple invitation from the Hungarian and Rumanian
puppet regimes to have Soviet troops remain would easily have taken
care of that problem.
But Soviet military considerations and the Soviet military equivalent
of "J'y suis; j'y reste" apparently dictated the absurdity of the Soviet
position with respect to the Austrian Peace Treaty. Not a square inch
of occupied or controlled territory was to be given up.
In the case of German unification and German .elections, Molotov
passed up the fairly easy opportunity to say that he could live with
NATO but could not live with EDC. Had he done this, he would un-
doubtedly have scuttled EDC with the French and the Germans. Instead,
he chose the most extreme position that could be taken, namely, that
EDC must be abandoned, NATO must be dismantled, the U. S. must
become nothing more than an observer in European affairs, and all
possible regional defensive alliances must be forbidden.
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Here again was an. :me military reaction without regard for
political or propaganda consequences, inasmuch as by the statement of
that position he got a horse laugh from. the Americans, he really scared
the French and the British, and he convinced German Socialists and
neutralists that compromise on some middle ground was impossible.
Their military men told them that there is no way of appeasing them-
selves out of their problem -- that if they grant the inch of Austria they
will eventually be forced to grant the ell of Eastern Germany and all the
European satellites. The flywheel of history can only turn in one direction
at a time -- therefore, they should hold on to what they have no matter what
the cost in bitterness, seething discontent, and negative world opinion.
As to Soviet relations with Communist China, when we went to Berlin
it was pretty generally agreed that Molotov would have to make a major
pitch fir the elevation of Communist China to the position of a full-fledged
Big Five club member, but some of us felt that he would not carry it beyond
the point at which he could say to the Chinese Communists, "I did every-
thing I could for you. "
Instead, he carried this proposal to the absolute bitter end. With
the single exception of the Austrian Peace Treaty, there was no discussion
of any item during the entire month into which Communist China was not
injected at some time or other. Molotov even nsisted that the Chinese
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Communists should participate in the discussions on the President's
atomic pool for peaceful purposes' proposal, and it was not until
6 PM of the last day of the Conference that Molotov finally accepted our
language for the final clause of the proposal for the Geneva Conference,
which stated that the proposal did not imply recognition of Communist
China.
In other words, Molotov's solicitude for the social standing of
his ally went well beyond the call of either friendship or expediency.
For the first time since the war -- in. fact, since 1918 -- the Russian
Soviets have to look over their shoulders at 400-million Chinese when
they are negotiating with the West, and this may have important implications.
How Peiping will react to Molotov's failure to have them accepted
in the club, how they will react to our underscoring that failure in the
language of the final clause of the proposal for the Geneva Confers; c e,
is not yet known. It is to be doubted, however, that they will be pleased
at the lack of performance on the part of their Russian ally, which always
advertised itself as almost omnipotent.
What, then is the composite Soviet picture emerging from Berlin?
It would appear that on the one hand the Soviet leaders are a groupd
of men slowly relaxing in the absence of the whip of the Stalin tyranny --
anxious to be liked as individuals, and eager to give every personal
evidence of their desire to be accepted as human beings.
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On the other hand, another tyranny is in process of forming, and
that is the tyranny of fear that their expansionist conquests will melt
away unless they are willing to impose almost absurd conditions for what
they call the relaxation of world tensions. Everybody could really relax
if the Soviet world extended from Kamchatka to the English Channel, and
the U. S. promised to remain within its own continental limits.
Furthermore, these Soviet rulers haven't even begun to chew the
China mouthful, let alone swallow it -- but they know they've got something
big and tough in their mouths, something that may prove troublesome and
something that cannot be ignored.
And all of this against the backdrop of a very complicated and
possibly dangerous internal agricultural and economic situation which
has assumed sufficient gravity to force them to reverse the policy of
decades and overnight to attempt to placate the peasant and the consumer.
This adds to their extraordinary fear, and is one more reason for
no external relaxation. They do not feel that they can appease both
inside and outside at the same time.
But here they are in a very real sense prisoners of their own
slogans. If krushchev can say publicly, as he did last fall, that there is
less livestock in the USSR today than there was under the Czars, he can
afford to sgy it because some miraculous Soviet Plan will fix everything
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so that in 1954 there will be more livestock in the USSR than there was
under the Czars. Similarly, a Plan can convert a factory from machine
guns to nylons in a few months.
These things are not going to come about, and 1954 looms as a
very important year in the Soviet scheme of things.
If, during 1954, we have the guts and the skill to maintain constant
pressure at all points of the Soviet orbit, we will get dividends from such
a policy. Furthermore, our pressure can take the form of much bolder
harassment than we have yet felt advisable, the reason being that the
chances of Soviet military aggression, at least during 1954, are probably
lower than they have been for a long time.
At some time or other during 1954, the combination of external
discontent and the fruits of internal unfulfilled appeasement will start
working in our favor in a great big way.
If this is true - - and I believe that it is true -- the Berlin Conference
will have been the most important and most successful encounter
between the East and the West in ten years.
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