REPORTED PRESENCE OF US PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE HANOI POWER PLANT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002400190001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved FoMIease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T0082M02400190001-9
SECRET
21 July 1967
Reported Presence of US Prisoners of War
In the Hanoi Power Plant
1. A CIA memorandum prepared on 5 July for Mr.
Walt Rostow on the subject of POWs in Hanoi is at-
tached. In essence, it states that it is unlikely
the North Vietnamese would put US prisoners in a
bombing target area. The memo also states that if
the initial report were intended as a signal to the
US, it would shortly be followed by other signals.
2. The absence of any further "signals" in
the more than two weeks since the initial very weak
"signal" raises further doubt that the original re-
port was officially inspired. Communist propaganda
in reaction to official US concern voiced over the
status of Gustav Hertz and all US prisoners in the
hands of the Vietnamese Communists has been seeking
to allay suspicions that the prisoners are in danger
and has, instead, stressed the "humane" treatment
being given such prisoners. Three US prisoners being
held in North Vietnam were shown on Polish TV on
17 July, apparently to demonstrate how well they are
being treated. The Bulgarian news agency on 18 July
stated that the DRV Government has given proof of
"the good treatment" being given captured pilots.
3. A close examination of aerial photography'
of the Hanoi power plant fails to disclose any indi-
cation that US POWs are being held there. it is im-
probable that any substantial number of POWs are
being housed in the main buildings of the power plant.
The transformer house, boiler house, and generator
hall of a power plant are typically crowded with equip-
ment and the presence of more than a few POWs would in-
terfere with normal operations. At the Hanoi power
plant, they would also interfere with some repair ac-
tivities that are still under way.
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4. Aerial photography shows that 300 to 600
feet west of the main buildings of the power plant
there are some one-story sheds that probably are
used for light repair activities and storage.
These buildings could be used to house substantial
numbers of POWs. In addition, there are a number,
of other buildings (function unknown) in the im-'
mediate neighborhood of the plant that are large
enough to hold substantial numbers of POWs. Aerial
photography (and available ground reporting) fails
to reveal, however, any watch towers, major cleared
areas, or fences that would be expected to be found
near POW compounds.
S. The possibility that small numbers of POWs
are being held in or near the power plant cannot be
ruled out. If the North Vietnamese desired to deter
additional air attacks against the Hanoi power plant
by housing POWs in or. near this installation, how-
ever, it is probable that they would recognize that
the hostage value and credibility of their tactic
would be greatly increased by erecting a few fences
or watch towers clearly visible in aerial photography.
Attachments a
-Copy of memorandum dated $ July 1967
-Photo of Hanoi Power Plant
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5 July 1967
SUBJECT: Reported Presence of US POWs in Hanoi
Power Plant
1. This report could be a calculated effort
on the part of the North Vietnamese to get the US
to cease its air strikes on the IIanoi power plant.
If it is an officially inspired story, we would ex-
pect to hear it again shortly. It should be noted,
however, that this kind of rumor was floating around
Hanoi in late 1966 but was never followed up by the
regime. There need not be any truth to the state-
ment that
US prisoners are housed in the power p ant. Hanoi
may believe that the report itself will suffice to
result in at least a temporary halt to the attacks
on the power plant. If this ploy works, Hanoi may
be encouraged to try floating similar rumors in re-
gard to other key installations.
2. Coming through this unofficial channel,
Hanoi can always deny the validity of the report.
This is important to the North Vietnamese, who
learned the hard way about world and particularly
US. public reaction to threats against US prisoners.
The public outcry against Hanoi's threat to try
US prisoners as war criminals in July 1966 was a
major factor in North Vietnam's backing down quickly
and affirming publicly that its policy was to treat
US prisoners "humanely."
3. On balance, it is unlikely that Hanoi has,
as yet, actually placed US prisoners in a target that
is being bombed. They have never resorted to this
tactic in the past, despite the fact that any number
of key installations have been struck. Moreover, the
Hanoi power plant is not significantly more important
to the North Vietnamese than other targets that have
been hit. Thus, there would appear to be no particu-
lar reason for the North Vietnamese to run the risk of
provoking a wave of adverse publicity in order to pro-
tect the already heavily damaged plant.
CONFIDENTIAL
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