THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002400060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 17, 1967
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Intelligence Report
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly)
Secret
143
17 July 1967
No. 0359/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNCItADINO AND
DEC:I.ASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(10 July - 16 July 1967)
Section
Presidential candidates; Thieu-Ky
campaign apparatus; Reaction of
civilian candidates to Thieu-Ky
ticket; Consequences of Thieu-Ky
presidential alliance; Review of
senate slates; Communist call for
election boycott.
National Police; Additional arrests
of members of the Communist infra-
structure in the Saigon area; In-
cidents directed against Revolution-
ary Development cadres; Third country
assistance.
Prices; Currency and gold; GVN's
view of its role in the economy.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices (graph)
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The Provisional National Assembly is
scheduled to take final action on 18 and
19 July on the presidential candidates
whose credentials have been challenged.
Premier Ky was reported to be still uncer-
tain as of 10 July about whether or not
to fully pledge his existing campaign ap-
paratus tothe Thieu-Ky ticket. The lead-
ing civilian candidates are said to be
more sanguine about their chances to win
against Thieu than against the former Ky
slate. Following the military meetings
between 28 and 30 June, the locus of power
in the military establishment has shifted
somewhat to the corps commanders. The
original 64 senate slates are expected to
be pared down, possibly by as much as one
third, by 22 July.
1. On 18 July, the Provisional National Assembly
is scheduled to deliberate on the final status of pres-
idential nominees whose candidacies have been chal-
lenged. The Central Election Council forwarded its
recommendations to the special assembly committee on
elections on 15 July, advising that General Duong Van
("Big") Minh be disqualified because his running mate,
Tran Ngoc Lieng, once held French citizenship. The
presidential election law stipulates that candidates
must have been Vietnamese citizens since birth.
2. In addition, according to a member of the
special assembly committee, the council recommended
that six slates be approved and nine disqualified, in-
cluding that of "peace" candidate Au Truong Thanh and
eight other minor tickets. No recommendation was made
on the slates of three candidates, including Chief of
State Thieu, but the source believes these will be ap-
proved by the special committee when it presents its
own recommendations, in turn, to the full assembly.
Representatives of each slate are to meet separately
with the committee on 16 and 17 July. Final posting
of the approved slates will be on 19 July.
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3. Although committee chairman Nguyen Thanh
Vinh had earlier indicated that the committee would
probably approve Minh's candidacy, the Central Elec-
tion Council's recommendation, while not binding,
may prove decisive. The charge against Lieng is ap-
parently legal and is supported by documentary evi-
dence--a copy of a 24 February 1950 decree signed by
then French premier Georges Bidault granting Lieng
French citizenship. The council's move in making
Lieng, rather than Minh, the victim will allow the
government and the assembly to remove a thorn in
their sides without danger of making a martyr of
Minh personally.
4. If Minh's candidacy is nonetheless approved,
it may be because some members of the Democratic Al-
liance Bloc (DAB) in the assembly, which was decid-
edly pro-Ky until a few weeks ago, are piqued at Ky
and may not echo his sentiments that Minh should be
disqualified. Some of the DAB members reportedly
claim that Ky has reneged on a number of promises to
reciprocate for legislation they enacted at his re-
quest. It was only through DAB efforts, they contend,
that Ky was able to enter the presidential race, since
other assembly deputies had favored a 40-year age
minimum for candidates--which would have eliminated
the 37-year-old Ky. Bloc members were reportedly
angered that Ky did not consult them before agreeing
to become Chief of State Thieu's running mate, and
they feel that Ky does not take them seriously or re-
gard them as equal parts of the "team."
5. If the assembly approves Minh's candidacy,
the election will shape up primarily as a contest
among the four leaders--Thieu, Minh, Tran Van Huong,
and Phan Khac Suu--with Ha Thuc Ky drawing off the
Dai Viet vote in Central Vietnam and the four remain-
ing candidates probably trailing far behind. At this
point, any prediction of how the vote will go is con-
jecture, but some factors likely to influence the
electorate are emerging. One possibility, in the
wake of the Thieu-Ky combination, would be a polariza-
tion of the vote on the basis of the military versus
the civilians,although Minh's candidacy might offset
this to some extent.
6. In General Thieu's favor would be the fact
that his three major opponents are from the delta,
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25X1X
which would tend to split the southern vote. The
consequences of Minh's candidacy, whether he re-
mains in exile or manages to return to Saigon, are
difficult to gauge, although Thieu, Huong, and Suu
alike have exhibited some fear of what his appeal
would do to their chances of winning. Minh might
coalesce a great deal of the Buddhist vote, but
there is little indication now that the electorate
is divided along strictly religious--Buddhist versus
Catholic--lines. At present, it appears that the
most decisive influence on the voting may be the
methods and thoroughness that the Thieu-Ky forces
finally bring to bear during the month of official
campaigning prior to 3 September.
Thieu-Ky Campaign Apparatus
7. As of 10 July, Ky was still uncertain about
whether to pledge his full campaign apparatus to the
support of the Thieu-Ky ticket, according to an
American observer who talked with him. Ky said that
he would be considering in the next few days whether
to reactivate the organization. Although he probably
wants to resurrect it, he implied that he is waiting
to work out the specifics of sharing future responsi-
bilities with Thieu should the latter be elected
president. In Ky's opinion, the success or failure
of the Thieu-Ky slate in the election rests on his
decision. Ky sent his former campaign manager, Soc_2~1X
Welfare Minister Nguyen Xuan Phong, to Thieu on 7 July
to discuss the campaign organization,
and no campaign manager and would have to rely on Ky's
facilities.
ac that ieu had no un s,no platform, no workers,
P ong reporte
8. Ky's embryonic political "front," however, 25X1X
which was originally conceived as a public vehicle
for his own presidential campaign, has decided to sup-
ort the Thieu-K ticket,
25X1X On 10 July, a 13-man working group
of representatives from factions of the Cao Dai and
Hoa Hao religious sects, a faction of the VNQDD political
party, and an association of young "professionals" laid
the groundwork for a national convention of the "front"
in early August. Ky has already reportedly given two
million piasters to the "front" and has authorized an
addition five million piasters to be allocated through
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Police Director Loan. Although the group claims
it can deliver two million votes to Thieu and Ky,
it is not clear how much support these representa-
tives actually have with their locally based parent
organizations. They probably are overstating the
extent of their influence.
9. In addition, Ky is apparently preparing
to move the police apparatus into operation again.
He told an American observer in Da Lat on 15 July
that he intended to meet on the 16th in the resort
city with approximately 100 provincial police chiefs
and security officials to give them instructions on
how the elections are to be held and what the role
of the police should be. He is downgrading the role
of Police Director Loan, asserting that Loan's state-
ments and actions in connection with political mat-
ters "should not be taken as definitive," and he has
told Loan to "keep his mouth shut" on political sub-
jects.
Reaction of Civilian Candidates to Thieu-Ky Ticket
10. The reaction of the leading civilian presi-
dential candidates to the Thieu-Ky ticket is mixed
but generally optimistic, according to sources close
to them. Tran Van Huong's supporters believe that
his chance of winning has been enhanced because the
opportunity for honest elections will be better and
because voters will view the Thieu-Ky slate as "more
of the same." They also think that Ky's campaign or-
ganization will not function as effectively for Thieu.
Huong's colleagues are reportedly somewhat concerned,
however, that "Big" Minh will draw votes away from
Huong if the Provisional National Assembly allows
Minh to run.
11. In apparent reaction to the Thieu-Ky coali-
tion, attempts have been made by both the Huong and
Phan Khac Suu camps to form an alliance with Ha Thuc
Ky, the Revolutionary Dai Viet candidate who is ex-
pected to control a significant bloc of voters in
northern South Vietnam. One of the Dai Viet party
members has reported that both proposals were re-
jected. At the same time, Huong and Suu have agreed
"in principle" not to criticize each other during
the campaign and to cooperate in establishing the
new government if either wins, according to Vo Long
Trieu, one of Huong's campaign organizers.
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12. At least one significant organization, the
Greater Solidarity Force comprising northern refugee
Catholics, is not now certain which ticket it will
support, having previously voted to back the expected
ticket of Premier Ky and Nguyen Van Loc. In addition,
the central committee of the Hoa Hao religious sect,
which had appeared likely to support Ky's candidacy,
is again engaged in internecine squabbling, although
it is not clear how directly this is related to the
issue of support for Thieu and Ky. In any event, it
is apparent that the major blocs of political and
religious strength are reassessing their allegiances
in the light of the military ticket headed by Thieu as
well as of the meaning of "Big" Minh's re-emergence
on the Saigon political scene.
Consequences of Thieu-Ky Presidential Alliance
ere is no agreement, written or ora
25X1X
on tne e ineation of power between Thieu and K as
president and vice president.
Thieu would not have agreed to sue an Arran .men
without the approval of the Directorate, suggesting
that the key military members are not aware of any
such deal. Ky is nonetheless beginning to think about
his own cabinet preferences, should the Thieu-Ky ticket
win. During his weekend stay in Da Lat, he told an
American observer, he planned to discuss with several
of his political advisers the composition of the future
cabinet, concentrating particularly on such importan~5X1X
positions as defense, foreign affairs, information,
economy and finance, and revolutionary development.
14.
the locus of power in the wake of the 28-30 June mili-
tary meetings is defense chief Cao Van Vien and the
four corps commanders along with Ky and Thieu. These
men now constitute the decision-making group within
25X1X
the Directorate as well as within the larger group of
influential generals which includes Information Min-
ister Tri, Revolutionary Development Minister Thang,
Security Minister Vien, Planning and Development Min-
ister Quana, and Directorate Secretary General Chieu.
if Thieu and Ky are elected, Cao
an Vien will probably be named defense minister, Gen-
eral Khang will probably be requested to take Vien's
job as chairman of the Joint General Staff, and General
1-5
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Thang will probably be offered a command position,
leaving his pacification job. General Tri will
probably lose his information portfolio and, beyond
that, his future is "dark," in the source's opinion.
has not se e on a Future prime minister, but that
the consensus is for a southern civilian. Ky pre-
viously stated that he will name the prime minister
and announce the choice before the election.
15. the Directorate
Review of Senate Slates
16. Nine of the original 64 senate slates filed
with the Provisional National Assembly on 30 June have
been withdrawn or disqualified by the Central Election
Council. Complaints had been filed against 19 slates
and these are now being reviewed by the council, with
a final decision on the eligibility of all slates to
be made by 22 July. Elimination of five of the nine
already disqualified was based on evidence of Commu-
nist connections with some of the candidates, while the
remaining four slates either filed late or had incom-
plete dossiers.
17. Among the more important complaints under
review are those against Le Phuoc Sang and Le Quang
Liem, both prominent Provisional National Assembly
deputies running on a slate headed by cabinet minis-
ter La Thanh Nghe. Sang, head of the Democratic Al-
liance Bloc, is charged with having been an army de-
serter, and Liem has been accused of corrupt practices
during his term as Khanh Hoa Province chief. Other
complaints include those against retired Generals
Tran Van Don and Ton That Dinh for alleged pro-French
neutralist and pro-Communist activities; against three
candidates, running on two different slates, for Com-
munist connections; and against five civilian Direc-
torate members, running on five different tickets, for
not having taken a leave of absence from the Director-
ate before filing. Included among these Directorate
members is Foreign Minister Tran Van Do.
18. The disqualification of any one candidate
for pro-Communist activities results in the elimina-
tion of the entire 10-man slate, but disqualification
for reasons other than pro-Communism does not neces-
sarily affect the rest of the slate.
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Communist Call for Election Boycott
19. The Viet Cong broadcast on 2 July an appeal
to residents of the Saigon-Cholon area to boycott the
3 September presidential and senate elections. A
similar appeal was broadcast to the region east of
Saigon on 10 July. These appeals have been accompanied
by a number of Liberation Radio and Radio Hanoi broad-
casts terming the election a farce and accusing Thieu
and Ky of acting only at the behest of the US.
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Several changes have been made at
the Saigon headquarters level of the Na-
tional Police, National Police Director
Loan, having been divested of his posi-
tion as chief of the Military Security
Service, may attempt to tighten up-con-
trol of the police organization. As the
result of the exploitation of four mem-
bers of the Communists' Region 4 Intel-
lectuals' Proselyting Section (IPS), 32
additional individuals associated with
the IPS have been neutralized. In the
first six months of 1967 the Communists
initiated 521 incidents against the Rev-
olutionary Development Cadres. In the
fall of 1967, Australia will reportedly
augment its military forces in South
Vietnam with a 45-man helicopter detach-
ment. As of 30 June, 18,145 persons had
rallied to the government in 1967 under
the Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program.
National Police
1. On 27 June Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc
Loan was divested of his position as chief of the
Military Security Service (MSS). Loan, however,
is remaining as the director general of National
Police (DGNP). Lieutenant Colonel Tran Van Thang,
who has been Loan's deputy both for the MSS and for
the National Police, has been named acting chief of
the MSS. Bui Van Nhu, formerly a Police Special
Branch (PSB) officer, has been appointed as the dep-
uty DGNPO
2. Another high-level police change took place
recently when Major Nguyen Thien was appointed the
chief of the Police Special Branch at the Na-
tional Police Headquarters level. According to re-
ports, Thien plans to tighten PSB control over pro-
vincial and district branches by establishing a clear
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chain of command from Saigon through the regions and
provinces to the districts. At present, a PSB chain
of command is almost nonexistent and the Saigon head-
quarters exercises little or no effective control
over province and district PSB personnel and opera-
tions. PSB personnel reportedly are assigned to
each government district and to all Saigon precincts,
but their numbers--as well as their employment--de-
pend on the provincial police chief and, to an even
greater extent, on the provincial chief.
3. Some Vietnamese security officials are re-
ported to feel that a number of province chiefs
who have recently been assigned to their jobs di-
rectly from the army either lack understanding of
PSB activities or are generally hostile to the police.
It is not yet known what factors Thien may be able
to bring to bear to ensure headquarter's control of
provincial PSB personnel and their operations, but
if Thien.is sincere in his desire to make some im-
provements, he faces a tough, uphill fight in any
effort to loosen or restrict the province chiefs'
control of police assets in the provinces.
4. The removal of General Loan as chief of the
MSS is partially attributed to pressures applied to
Ky by his colleagues to-reduce the power and authority
of Loan, particularily as Loan's use of the police
and MSS organizations to further Ky's political am-
bitions has become generally known. Loan indicated
as much in a conversation with the CORDS Public
Safety advisor on 4 July, and said that he had chosen
to remain head of the National Police (NP) rather
than the MSS. He insisted that in the future he
would operate only as a civilian police official and
that his job would have "nothing to do with politics."
He further stated that he had even submitted his res-
ignation from the air force, but he--did not know
whether it would be accepted. Perhaps in an effort
to ward off criticism that the influx of military
officers--in particular MSS officers--into the Na-
tional Police is having a deleterious effect on
police morale and efficiency, Loan reportedly plans
to order all military officers assigned to the police
to resign their commissions for the duration of
their police service.
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5. Although Loan, presumablyron.Premier Ky's
order, has reportedly instructed provincial police
chiefs temporarily to disengage themselves from po-
lice activities, there are indications that Loan may
continue to be the primary person through whom Ky
channels funds to his political organizations and
supporters. In addition, although no longer the
titular head of the MSS, Loan stated in a recent
conversation with a US military officer that MSS
acting chief Thang--whom Loan described as a good
man but a person who has difficulty in making hard
decisions--would still be receiving "advice" from
Loan from time to time.
6. -General Loan has intimated on several oc-
casions,that he believes-that some US officials
apparently do not like him and may be partly re-
sponsible for the events which forced him to re-
linquish one of his security commands. Early this
year, Loan apparently terminated several joint op-
erations-.between MSS and MACV, and, should he become
convinced that Americans are behind the recent
curbs on his authority, he may also become less co-
operative with the US in National Police operations.
Additional Arrests of Members of the Communist In-
frastructure in the Saigon Area
7. Government exploitation of four members of
the Communists' Region 4 Intellectual's Proselyting
Section (IPS) who were apprehended between January
and May 1967 has almost certainly weakened the
enemy's operational assets in the Saigon area, par-
ticularly in the civilian sector. As the result
of information derived from one of the four, who
is alleged to be the deputy chief of the IPS, 32
addtional individuals associated with the IPS have
been identified and neutralized and at least five
have been arrested.
8. The alleged deputy chief of the IPS, Le
Ngoc Lan, has stated that the IPS was established
in mid-1966, although Le Thi Rieng--a Region 4= com-
mittee member who was concurrently chief of the
Women's Proselyting Section and a member of the
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"National Liberation Front" central committee--has
stated that the IPS was in existence at least as
early as 1965. Lan testified that the purpose of
the IPS was to win over influential political and
religious personalities in the Saigon area, in an-
ticipation of a future political situation in which
a cease-fire and negotiations would take place and
a coalition government would be established. He
suggested no time frame for such developments, how-
ever,
9. At the time of Lan's arrest in May 1967, 11
agents and 21 sympathizers were working for or as-
sociated with the IPS, according to Lan; at least
five of these individuals have since been apprehended.
Of the 11 agents, who Lan claimed performed regularly
assigned missions, seven were regarded by the Commu-
nists as possible candidates for future cabinet posi-
tions. Lan described these persons as essentially
bourgeois, anti-Communist intellectuals who were
susceptible to Communist appeals because of their
intense nationalism and their opposition to "for-
eign intervention," In approaching potential sym-
pathizers, the IPS member or agent concentrated on
persuasive techniques and propaganda and, in many
instances, carried out a prolonged development period
to avoid any alienation and to ensure future political
usefulness of the potential asset.
10. A number of the people alleged by Lan to
be involved in IPS activities are judges, lawyers,
former teachers, and engineers, some of whom are
influential, respected members of the Saigon com-
munity. The South Vietnamese Government has thus
far been especially careful in handling prominent
individuals being questioned on the basis of the in-
formation provided by Lan. Police officials now ex-
pect the number of persons apprehended on the basis
of Lan's testimony to reach approximately 40. They
claim that they will proceed carefully with such ar-
rests and will hold only those individuals who prove
to be card-carrying Communist Party members, prob-
ably no more than ten individuals. These party mem-
bers, if detained after a review of the evidence by
the'National Security Council, will be held for no
more than three years in a re-education camp. Non-
party members arrested will be held, according to the
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police, only long enough to give statements on
their association with Le Ngoc Lan and will then
be released if they promise to sever their con-
nections with the Communists and to report any sub-
sequent approaches by them.
Incidents Directed Against Revolutionary Develop-
ment Cadres
11. The following is a breakdown of Communist-
initiated incidents directed against Revolutionary
Development (RD) cadres for the first six months of
1967:
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
Totals
January
22
12
6
5
45
February
8
14
13
13
48
March
62
17
17
30
126
April
56
23
16
15
110
May
33
16
16
18
83
June
38
33
11
27
109
25X6
12. During the first half of the year the Rd
cadres suffered combat losses of 333 killed and 573
wounded. The field strength of the RD cadres on
1 June--Vietnamese and Trong San RD and Static Cen-
sus Grievance--stood at 34,026 with an additional
5,217 persons in training at the Vung Tau and Pleiku
training centers.
25X6
Third Country Assistance
e Australian uov-
ernment has approved .sen ing in the fall of 1967 a
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) helicopter detachment to
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augment allied forces in the Republic of Vietnam.
The 45-man RAN detachment will include pilots and
maintenance personnel and will probably be inte-
grated into the US Army's 135th Aviation Company
which is to be established in the vicinity of the
Dat Mountain--the base camp headquarters of the
Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy Province--in October
1967.
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Retail prices in Saigon jumped five
percent during the week ending 3 July after
declining steadily during most of June.
Free market currency and gold prices de-
clined on 3 July. US officials feel that
the viewpoint of the current top GVN eco-
nomic officials presents an opportunity
to start moving away from government eco-
nomic controls and ownership toward in-
creased use of private enterprise for the
economic development of Vietnam.
Prices
1. Retail prices in Saigon jumped five percent
during the week ending 3 June after declining
steadily during most of June. The USAID weekly in-
dex reached a level 27 percent higher than at the
beginning of the year, the highest level since the
rice crisis in March. Prices of most foods, includ-
ing rice, rose, but particularly large increases
were registered for protein foods, especially pork
and shrimp. According to the embassy, the wholesale
price of hogs at the Saigon slaughterhouse rose
steadily during the week, probably because of in-
creased shipments to the provinces north of Saigon
where pork prices are higher. Officials noted that
the increase in Saigon prices was not, as in the
past, brought on by low deliveries from the delta; ar-
rivals have continued to be ample. The increase in
shrimp and fish prices may in part have resulted from
shortages caused by the mining of Route 14 from Vung
Tau on 3 July. Nonfood prices rose slightly as a
sharp rise in bus fares more than offset declines in
the prices of charcoal and firewood. (A table of
weekly retail prices in Saigon is included in the
Annex.)
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2. The wholesale price index for US-financed im-
ported commodities fell sharply on 5 July for the sec-
ond consecutive week. The prices of galvanized iron
sheets continued to decline in response to the release
of new imports on 27 June. The price of cement de-
clined for the third week in succession, falling be-
low the official price on 5 July. Supplies of cement
reportedly are ample and consumption is down because
of the rainy season.
Currency and Gold
3. Free market currency and gold prices declined
on 3 July compared with the previous week. The price
of dollars fell four piasters to 154 piasters per dol-
lar. The price of gold declined three piasters to
192 piasters per dollar, the lowest price since the
fall of 1965. The rate for MPC (scrip) fell to 111
piasters per dollar, two piasters below the level of
the previous week and seven piasters below the offi-
cial rate. (A graph on monthly and weekly currency
and gold rates is included in the Annex.)
GVN's View of Its Role in the Economy
4. US officials in Washington and Saigon feel
that the viewpoint of current top GVN economic offi-
cials presents an opportunity to start moving away
from government economic controls and ownership to-
ward increased use of private enterprise for the eco-
nomic development of Vietnam, According to an em-
bassy study, the second most serious factor, after
the war itself, blocking Vietnam's progress is a
legacy of outmoded and misguided public philosophy to-
ward business and the economic system in general.
The traditional Vietnamese philosophy of government
is that "the government knows best" and that a country
is best run from the center by an educated elite, an
elite never defined to include businessmen. Most
high Vietnamese officials view their role as "running
things."--seeing that rules and orders are promulgated
to direct and control, fairly minutely, all activities
of the economy, whether they be movements of goods,
entry into business, prices, or ordering a new piece
of machinery. They feel that businessmen and business
in general cannot be trusted and see their responsi-
bility as one of controlling these elements for the
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public good. The trend has continued toward in-
creased government interference in the economy, and
the US, under the pressures of war and expediency,
has unwittingly furthered this trend by adopting
policies that involve the government more deeply in
the operation ofathe economy. According to the em-
bassy, the cliches that government direction and
ownership lead to favoritism, lassitude, and inef-
ficiency apply with a vengeance in Vietnam.
5. American officials believe that the future
economic development of Vietnam depends heavily on a
new public philosophy which will give significant
scope to the private sector. They hope this can be
accomplished through the introduction of US-trained
officials, the institution of training in modern
business management, and US support for private in-
vestments and institutions. Finally, they believe
that a new attitude will prevail if individuals who
espouse it are successful and survive in public life
in Vietnam. According to the embassy, the two top
economic officials, National Bank Governor Hanh and
his deputy Pham Kim Ngoc, both believe in using and
developing the private sector and are the first
such officials since independence who have had these
views. Ngoc particularly insists on involving busi-
nessmen in government decisions and he apparently is
determined to break down restrictive government reg-
ulations so that goods can move freely, investments
can be made without lengthy red tape, and people can
enter business freely. As reported earlier, he has
already proposed eliminating restrictions on the
movement of hogs from the provinces to Saigon.
6. USAID has drawn up a preliminary outline of
actions it hopes will foster the development of pri-
vate enterprise in Vietnam. These include such
things as production targets for agriculture through-
out the country, negotiation of a contract with an
American university to expand university training
in business administration, and feasibility studies
for major projects and industry areas and for the
establishment of a stock exchange. USAID also will
cooperate with Governor Hanh in trying to sell many
of the 49 public and semipublic corporations with
which the GVN is involved to private persons. These
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and other ideas which USAID hopes to put into effect
will depend greatly on the composition of the new
government to be elected this fall, but the Americans
in Saigon believe that now is the time to begin.
No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only
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 Approved For, Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00240006,A001 d3
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon
13 June 3 Jan. 12 June 19 June 26 June 3 July
1966 b/ 1967 1967 1967 1967 1967
Index for All Items
173
225
269
267
267
280
Index for Food Items
190
242
295
293
293
314
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.)
1,250
1,700
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,500
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)
90
130
160
170
150
180
Fish-Ca Tre (I kg.)
130
150
160
160
180
200
Nuoc Mam (jar) _
70
90
150
150
150
150
Index for Nonfood Items
140
195
221
219
217
218
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Firewood (cu. meter)
360
560
600
550
540
520
Cigarettes (pack) _
10
14
14
14
14
14
White Calico (meter)
27
33
32
34
33
33
Kerosene (liter)
7.8
10.5
10
10
10
10
a. Data are from USAID sources. For all indexes 1 January 1965 = 100-
b. Price level just prior to the 18 June devaluation.
?
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 Approved For Rel*e 2001/03/22: CIA-RDP79T00VA002400060001-3
500
400
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
PIASTERS PER
US DOLLAR
3 J
31 MAY
198
/
'158
:192
154
111
GOLD: Basis gold leaf worth $35 per troy ounce
US $10 GREEN
US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip).
MAY JUN JUL
1967
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