INTELLIGENCE REPORT PREPARED WEEKLY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 24, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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24 October 1966
No. 1873/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Prepared Weekly
for the
SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL :GROUP
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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GROUP f
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This document contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
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Page
1. 1
2. Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Panama. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Gibraltar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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2. CONGO
President Mobutu's sensitivity to any reflections
on his ability to control the Congo or to anything
that appears to call into question his own independ-
ence from foreign influence is likely periodically to
produce tense moments in his relations with the US.
Mobutu and his associates have been telling US
officials that the Congo Government must acquire a
more "nationalistic" image in order to blunt attacks
from radicals at home and elsewhere in Africa. Mobutu
has almost certainly taken to heart the advice Tan-
zania's Julius Nyerere gave him in June to deal more
aggressively with the West, and he says he hopes by
such nationalistic tactics to unite the Congo behind
him and turn it into a major African power. He al-
most certainly feels a need for the maneuvering room
he would obtain from broadened contacts with radical
African and Communist countries, and he asserts such
contacts can be closely controlled.
Complicating and to some extent vitiating this
attempt at Realpolitik, however, are the weaknesses
for which Mobutu has long been known. He is naive
and impetuous, he has an exaggerated concept of the
degree to which he has solved the Congo's problems,
and he is inordinately sensitive to any sign that
his control may not be as complete as he thinks it
is. When something does go wrong--as it often does
in the Congo--and when Mobutu cannot ignore it, he
frequently seems more interested in finding an ex-
ternal scapegoat than in getting to the root of the
difficulty.
In these circumstances outside powers, including
the US, are likely to find themselves accused of
various sins of omission or commission, whatever
they do. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY)
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NIGERIA
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3. NIGERIA
In the continuing absence of effective action
by Lt. Col. Gowon's federal government to hold the
country together, the Eastern Region seems likely
to formalize its existing near-independence before
long (see map). A further fragmentation of the coun-
try would probably ensue,
Anger and bitterness have swelled at all levels.
of society in the predominantly Ibo East as over
300,000 refugees, many maimed, have returned follow-
ing the recent large-scale attacks on Ibos in the
Northern Region. This has given strong new impetus
to secessionist pressures generated last July when
Northern military elements destroyed the former.Ibo-
led national regime and purged Ibo personnel from
most army units.
Eastern military governor Ojukwu, who has gone
his own way in many respects since July, still pro-
fesses interest in a loose confederation. However,
he has indicated the East will not participate fur-
ther in interregional constitutional talks unless
Gowon meets impossible preconditions. The talks
resumed ?today without the East, following a three-
week recess.
Last week Ojukwu seemed to regard Eastern seces-
sion as inevitable and said the next "three to six
weeks" would be decisive. His chief concern at
present probably centers on remedying the weapons
deficiency of the army elements in the East--now
composed entirely of Easterners, Eastern agents ap-
pear to have made firm arrangements with at least
one European arms dealer for clandestine deliveries.
Gowon's weak government seems incapable of meet-
ing, or even appreciating the essential needs, prac-
tical and psychological, of the aggrieved East,
Moreover, the breakdown of discipline in the more
numerous army forces at Lagos' disposal is so seri-
ous that they would probably be unable to suppress an
early secessionist move by the East, although an at-
tempt to do so cannot be ruled out.
Any such resort to force would only further em-
bitter the parties and add to the difficulties fac-
ing the US which, in any event, will be importuned
by both sides. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND
USE ONLY)
24 October 1966
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4. PANAMA
Former president Arnulfo Arias is continuing
his efforts to touch off antigovernment action,
but he appears willing to wait for the outcome of
canal treaty negotiations before attempting a full-
scale confrontation with the Robles regime.
Arias and his top aides are reported to be en-
couraging agitation among the country's most vola-
tile and disaffected elements--students and urban
slum dwellers. In exchange for a student commit-
ment to agitate against the canal negotiations and
alleged government repressive measures, Arias and
National Assembly deputies of his Panamenista Party
(PP) reportedly plan to push a political amnesty
bill for imprisoned Communists. Arias followers also
have been stirring up residents of tenement districts
in. Panama City. One usually reliable source reports
that the PP is covertly collaborating with the Com-
munists in this endeavor.
Since the assembly convened on 1 October, PP and
other opposition deputies have introduced a flood of
bills which have popular appeal but which the govern-
ment will be forced to oppose because of their pro-
hibitive cost.
Arias still maintains that he wants to avoid
bloodshed, but it is clear that he has altered his
policy of watchful waiting to one of cautious encour-
agement of antiregime activity. This tactic appears
designed to erode public support for the Panamanian
President. In. all probability, Arias does not be-
lieve he yet. has a clear-cut issue which would, ensure
popular backing for a decisive move. He is hoping
such an issue will be provided later by dissatisfac-
tion with a canal settlement. Arias wants to be the
president who negotiates a treaty and warns he will
oppose any canal compact achieved by Robles.
The next likely dates for trouble are 3-5 Novem-
ber and 28 November when the country celebrates na-
tional holidays and extremist-led students tradition-
ally stage antigovernment and anti-US demonstrations.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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President Castello Branco's decision to force
Congress into recess until 22 November has added
to the uncertainty surrounding the 15 November con-
gressional elections.
The President acted after Chamber of Deputies
president Cardoso and some opposition party members
defied presidential orders unseating six congress-
men and revoking their political rights for ten
years. Cardoso refused to recognize Castello
Branco's authority--derived from the 1964 revolu-
tion--to cancel congressional mandates without
ratification by the Congress itself. He permitted
those ousted to remain and several made strong
antigovernment speeches.
The President reportedly is considering revok-
ing the political rights of as many as 500 more op-
position party members, including some congress-
men. Most will probably be accused of corruption
or of conspiring with exiled political opposition
figures such as former presidents Goulart and
Kubitschek.
Although the moves will neutralize and cow
much of the opposition, they may backfire on pro-
government congressional candidates. A confidant
of Castello Branco maintains that his actions are
not motivated by fear of losing the elections.
Rather, he claims, they are a "house-cleaning"
measure which the President believes necessary
to provide a stable political base for president-
elect Arthur da Costa e Silva, who assumes of-
fice on 15 March 1967.
The government's actions are sure to lend sub-
stance to widespread criticism of the regime as a
military dictatorship. The President's actions
are supported by Costa e Silva and by most of the
Brazilian military and security forces. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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6. GIBRALTAR
London expects Spain to reject its proposal to
submit the Gibraltar dispute to the International
Court of Justice and to intensify pressure on the
colony. Madrid has formally requested London to
stop using the airfield in the neutral zone for
military craft, and London now looks for a series
of moves aimed at physically impeding or denying
it use of the field. Spain could also increase re-
strictions on traffic to Gibraltar and impose a
variety of other harassing actions. Madrid con-
tinues to seek US support in the dispute. It has
warned of repercussions for US defense interests,
such as nuclear overflights and the US-Spanish
defense agreement which will be up for renewal
in 1968, if Spain is rebuffed, (SECRET NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM)
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