THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800060002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 8, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY REPORT
OCI No.0649/65
Copy No. 1 1
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
8 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
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OCI No. 0649/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(2 December - 8 December 1965)
CONTENTS
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, facing page
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Directorate continues plans for
eventual restoration of civilian
government (p. 1); Ky and other
ranking generals doubt advisability
of any early moves, however (p. 1);
Buddhist leader Tri Quang drafts ap-
peal for end of war (p. 2); Quang's
statement could well have considerable
impact on Buddhists (p. 2); Buddhist
and Catholic journals reacting to in-
creased US presence (p. 3); Catholics
again express dissatisfaction with
present government (p. 3); Former gen-
eral Tran Van Don currently active in
regionalist circles (p. 3); VC radio
offers Christmas ceasefire (p. 4); Con-
struction materials pace over-all price
increases (p. 4); Rice stocks and deliv-
eries are discussed (p. 5).
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B. MILITARY SITUATION 6
Weekly statistics reflect over-all
decline in activity (p. 6); US First
Division continues probe for VC in
Binh Duong Province (p. 6); Allied
operation protects rice harvest in
Binh Tuy (p. 6); Friendly forces con-
duct 84 large-scale operations (p. 7);
VC continue efforts to disrupt Saigon
maritime traffic (p. 7); Minor Communist
actions in the four corps areas (p. 8);
VC terrorist attack on US quarters in
Saigon (p. 8); Current status of major
transportation routes (p. 9).
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 9
C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION 10
Embassy notes factors having adverse
effect on popular attitudes (p. 10);
II Corps psywar conference ends success-
fully (p. 10); Psyops seminars held in IV
Corps (p. 11); Chieu Hoi ralliers show
decline, especially in military category
(p. 11).
Map, North Vietnam, facing page 12
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 12
DRV economic delegation concludes Peking
visit (p. 12); Chinese switch from grants
to loans may explain cautious announce-
ment of new agreements (p. 12); Chinese
again deny impeding Soviet aid to North
Vietnam (p. 12); Chinese letter appears
as effort to regain lost prestige in Com-
munist circles (p. 13).
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Page
III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 14
Cambodia asks ICC port control to
disprove allegations of VC assistance
(p. 14); Buddhist leader Chau concludes
visit to Korea (p. 14); GVN offers Lon-
don post to former Quat government of-
ficial Tran Van Tuyen (p. 14); GVN moves
to implement observance of Geneva pris-
oner-of-war conventions (p. 15); ICRC
to offer medical teams to DRV, GVN, and
Liberation Front (p. 15); Free world
aid from Japan and Luxembourg (p. 15).
ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Incidents
(Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Weapons
Losses (Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Personnel
Losses (Monthly)
Table 1. General Statistical Data
Table 2. Viet Cong Incidents
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam
is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it
is edited and published by CIA without final coordina-
tion.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Statistics for the week ending 4 December reflect a de-
cline in the intensity of the fighting in South Vietnam. How-
ever, a number of Communist-initiated actions this week,
together with a sharp engagement between US and Commu-
nist troops about 35 miles northwest of Saigon, suggest
little more than a breathing space has occurred in the pace
of combat. The Saigon government is reportedly con-
sidering a cessation of rail traffic between Nha Trang and Da
Nang, a five-province stretch of track that has been repeatedly
sabotaged by the Viet Cong.
On the political scene, as Saigon's military rulers con-
tinue to turn their attention to setting up long-range ma-
chinery for a more popularly based government, they have
again come under low-keyed attack from Catholic elements
expressing dissatisfaction with progress to date. Addition-
ally, Buddhist monk Tri Quang is reportedly preparing a
draft appeal for efforts to end the war to be circulated at a
forthcoming Buddhist internal conference.
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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. South Vietnam's military Directorate evi-
dently continues to plan governmental machinery in
anticipation of an eventual restoration of civilian
supremacy. The subject reportedly was discussed
by the top generals at Directorate meetings on 27
and 28 November, with current plans calling for Di-
rectorate Secretary General Pham Xuan Chieu to super-
vise the development of new government institutions.
The US Embassy now expects that following consulta-
tions with leading Vietnamese figures, an advisory
council of perhaps 70 members will be appointed and
announced to the public early in 1966. This council
would probably be tasked with the drafting of a new
constitution, which would be submitted to the Direc-
torate for approval, and eventually, perhaps during
1967, to a public referendum,
2. At least some ranking generals have indicated
doubt over the advisability of any early steps to
try to increase civilian participation in the govern-
ment. Premier Ky had previously indicated to Ambas-
sador Lodge that he has reservations concerning any
civilian council or committee having even quasi-
official status or advisory powers; Ky also claimed
that the best estimate by his pacification advisers
is that it will take at least two years, and an in-
tensive program of public education, before conditions
are sufficiently favorable, militarily and politically,
to permit truly free elections among a bare majority
of the population. General Khang, commander of the
Saigon area, is also reportedly skeptical that se-
curity in the provinces will allow any type of pop-
ular election or referendum by 1967, or that the new
constitution will represent anything other than the
"whims" of the Directorate. Evidently to kill any
public speculation surrounding the plans for the
advisory council and draft constitution, Secretary
of Psychological Warfare Dinh Trinh Chinh was quoted
by the official Vietnam press agency on 7 December
as ruling out the establishment of an elected pop-
ular assembly in the near future.
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3. There is a report from a
close to monk Tri Quang that Quang has prepared a
draft statement on the need for peace in Vietnam.
The statement is to be issued in the name of Thich Tinh
Khiet, the aged, highest ranking bonze in South Viet-
nam. The appeal would be issued at the forthcoming
internal conference of the United Buddhist Association
(UBA), which is scheduled to open on 11 December in
Saigon, The statement, according to a draft
25X1C calls on Buddhists to urge all parties
concerned to seek ways to negotiate a peace and to
stop the killing and destruction in Vietnam. It makes
no attempt to distinguish between the justice of the
cause of either side in the war. The statement ex-
presses gratitude for peace movements in the US, Japan,
and elsewhere, and warns that persons seeking to pro-
long the fighting, or to exploit peace slogans merely
to try to conquerone another, will be "judged guilty
by the people and history."
4. Tri Quang was earlier reported "under pres-
sure" from various Buddhist circles to issue a state-
ment in the cause of peace. Although it is known
that many provincial monks and other religious leaders
have been concerned over the expansion of hostilities
and the attendant civilian casualties, this "pressure"
on Quang may merely be his public rationalization
for asserting, under the authority of Khiet, ideas
of his own concerning the course of the war. The
statement could well have considerable impact on
Buddhist faithful, posing new problems for the Saigon
government and the US. Other recently expressed views
of Tri Quang reflected in the appeal's emphasis on
unity within the UBA, and its reference to the "mis-
takes and shortcomings" of officials of the Buddhist
Institute--a slap at Ouang's rival, Buddhist Institute
chairman Thich Tam Chau, Chau, who has just returned
from travel to other Asian Buddhist countries (see
1110 Third Country Developments, B. South Korea) and
has spoken privately of organizing an anti-Communist
international Buddhist organization, reportedly is
now admitting that he desires reelection to his present
post. There are indications that Chau may be trying
to delay the UBA conference in an effort to consolidate
his support.
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5, Certain Buddhist newspapers have been in-
creasingly sensitive to the greater reliance on
"foreigners"--meaning the US--in South Vietnam and
critical of those who "sacrifice their honor to adopt
this new form of slavery." Although Catholic journals
have also expressed considerable concern over the
threat of US impingement on Vietnamese sovereignty,
the issuance of any Buddhist appeal such as that re-
portedly contemplated by Tri Quang will almost cer-
tainly revive and reinforce Catholic suspicions of
neutralist or pro-Communist sentiments on the part
of the Buddhists.
6. Continued Catholic dissatisfaction was again
expressed last week in the form of a second communiqu?
issued by two leading priests from the liaison office
of the Saigon archbishopric The communiqu?ostensibly
a "memorandum of position" pegged to the visit of Sen-
ator Mansfield, cautioned the US that war and peace
were essentially Vietnamese matters and warned the
government in Saigon that it was as yet satisfying
neither the political and religious aspirations of
the people, nor the need for stability. References
in the memorandum to the still-inadequate influence
of South Vietnam's southern "majority" also point
up the continuing alliance of militant refugee Cath-
olics from North Vietnam with southernregionalist
circles.
7. Also reported to be currently active among
southern regionalist circles is a retired former
general from the Minh junta, Tran Van Don. Don, who
has often boasted in the past two years of his con-
tinued contacts with various coup plotters, is alleged
to have claimed recently that he possessed sufficient
strength to mount a coup. Don reportedly stated
that any coup mave at this time would be potentially
disastrous for the stability of the armed forces4?
but he implied that he would not hesitate to exploit
for his own ends a coup attempt by any faction? He
also commented that he anticipated a prominent role
for himself under General Thieu should Premier Ky
be removed from office. Don is said to have been
drumming up funds to try to finance the return to
South Vietnam of former junta chairman General "Big"
Minh, now exiled in Bangkok. Minh's latest request
to return to Saigon, however, has been denied by the
Directorate.
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8. The Viet Cong clandestine radio on 7 December
broadcasta Liberation Front offer of a 12-hour cease-
fire from Christmas eve until early on Christmas morn-
ing to permit Catholics in the South Vietnamese army
and in US and allied forces to attend church services.
The ceasefire offer, however, is contingent on these
troops circulating without arms during the ceasefire,
and on the absence of aggressive military actions by
government and allied forces. A similar Viet Cong
Christmas standdown has been offered on at least one
occasion in the past, evidently as a propaganda ges-
ture toward Catholic elements. As in the past its
implementation is likely to be reflected in a decline
in overall Viet Cong activity during the period set,
provided there is at least some tacit reciprocation
by the government. Meanwhile, the Front has also
urged South Vietnam to mark the fifth anniversary of
the Front's establishment on 20 December in a "dig-
nified" fashion. The significance of this exhortation
is not yet clear, but it may reflect some sensitivity
to the Front's public image.
Economic Situation
9. A capable key official in the Ministry of
National Economy, Assistant Minister Ngyuen Hoang
Cuong, has submitted his resignation. This action
stems from blame heaped on the ministry for the cur-
rent inflation, as well as from criticism directed
at Cuong's personal life. The US Embassy in Saigon
comments that if his resignation is accepted, it
may indicate that disintegration of the GVN's "Eco-
nomic Group" has begun.
10. Retail food prices rose only slightly last
week, but construction materials (cement, iron, and
steel) continued to experience sharp price increases
due to unsatisfied demand and to speculation. Prices
of most imported commodities rose moderately, apparently
in anticipation of the increase in freight surcharges
requested by steamship interests serving Vietnam.
11. Rice stocks in Saigon totalled about 30,000
metric tons (MT) at the end of November, down 10,000
mt from the middle of the month. Known stocks in the
Mekong delta and central Vietnam remained steady,
but average daily delta rice deliveries'to Saigon dUr-
ing the month were at the year's low of 842 mt, contrasting
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sharply with the daily average delivery of 1,243 mt
for the first half of the month. Provincial economic
officials have predicted that 1966 deliveries to
Saigon will total a 420,000 mt equivalent of milled
rice, only marginally above the 1965 estimated total
of 412,000. Only three delta provinces report poor
crops, but domestic supply is still inadequate to
meet demand. The scheduled import of 175,000 mt of
rice will still be necessary in order to fulfill
demand at reasonable prices.
12. Coastal shipping rates have dropped by 85 per-
cent since USOM started contracting in August and Sep-
tember for coastal vessels to supplement GVN capabilities.
USOM has taken steps to extend the contract of the eight
coasters originally employed and will add two more for
extended periods.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. Communist activity for the week ending 4 Decem-
ber declined from the previous week when the 1,038 Viet
Cong - initiated incidents reached the highest of the
war. However, the total of 757 incidents reported this
week is consistent with the weekly average maintained
during the months of October and November. The intensity
of the war also decreased, with the most significant
ground activity occurring near the Michelin rubber planta-
tion in Binh Duong Province of III Corps where US and
Vietnamese forces conducted a search-and-destroy opera-
tion against Communist elements that had mauled the 7th
Regiment (GVN) on 27 November.
2. Statistically, Viet Cong activity in all
categories decreased. There were 14 attacks this week
compared to 20 last week. None of the attacks recorded
were larger than company size, although delayed reports
indicate a battalion-size attack on 4 December against
a hamlet in Phu Yen Province. Terrorism decreased from
679 to 508 incidents; acts of sabotage declined from 147
to 77; propaganda incidents were down from 65 to 57; and
antiaircraft fire dropped from 127 incidents to 101. Viet
Cong casualty losses also dropped from 1,609 last week
(1,539 killed, 70 captured) to 698 this week (640 killed,
58 captured). South Vietnamese casualties increased, how-
ever, largely as a result of the losses sustained by the
7th Regiment. A total of 1,286 casualties were suffered;
345 killed, 574 wounded, and 367 missing. This compares
to last week's casualties of 240 killed, 470 wounded, and
135 missing. There were 35 US combat deaths this week
compared to 39 last week. Also, one New Zealander and
two Republic of Korea soldiers were killed, whereas none
were lost last week. The Viet Cong lost 203 weapons this
week compared to South Vietnamese weapons losses of 366.
GVN/Allied Operations
3. The US and Vietnamese operation in Binh Duong
Province failed to make contact with the Communists
until 5 December, when a battalion of the US 1st Infan-
try Division engaged an estimated 1,000 Viet Cong rein-
forced with mortars, machined guns, and recoilless
rifles. Casualties to date are 39 US killed and 109
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wounded. Viet Cong losses are 236 killed. The operation
continues and with present information indicating that
the Viet Cong are remaining in the area, renewed activity
can be expected.
4. A combined allied operation to protect the
rice harvest continues in Binh Tuy Province but the Viet
Cong avoided contact with this US, Australian, and Viet-
namese force during the past week. Results of the opera-
tion thus far are 18 Viet Cong killed and 158 captured,
with 90 tons of rice, some medical supplies, and seven
tons of cement also taken, Friendly losses are two US
killed and 33 wounded (1 US),
5. An amphibious operation was conducted by the
US Marine Corps (USMC) along the coast in Binh Tuy Prov-
ince from 30 November to 2 December with minor results;
however, similar operations are planned for the future.
6. A total of 84 battalion-size or larger opera-
tions were conducted by friendly forces this week. Of
these, three were combined operations and six were US
operations. These operations made 37 contacts with the
Communists, two of which occurred during combined opera-
tions and three during US operations. A total of 22,235
small-unit actions were conducted, with contact being
made 131 times during daylight hours and 86 times during
the hours of darkness.
7. B-52 Stratofortress strikes were made against
Communists targets in Pleiku, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong
provinces. Thirteen missions consisting of 81 sorties
were flown during the week,
8. US and Vietnamese navy surveillance activities
resulted in the search of 12,410 persons and 3,200 junks.
Twelve junks and 23 persons were detained, but no con-
firmed Viet Cong were captured. Three naval incidents
occurred about 20 kilometers south and southeast of
Saigon. On 1 December, a Viet Cong mine was detonated
by a Vietnamese Navy patrol craft, resulting in four
wounded and damage to the boat. On 2 December, an
unsuccessful attempt was made to mine a Danish merchant
ship in the channel south of Saigon. On the same day,
the Viet Cong fired at a cargo LST but no damage re-
sulted. The attempt to mine the Danish vessel is
another example of the Viet Cong efforts to disrupt
logistical support destined for the port of Saigon,
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Communist Activities
9. In 1 Corps, the Communists reversed the trend
of recent weeks by not attacking although a group of
three hamlets in Quang Ngai Province were heavily
harassed. Harassing fire directed against USMC bases
probably was designed to keep US forces from making in-
cursions into areas of Viet Cong control. In the II
Corps zone, the Viet Cong concentrated their activities
in the coastal areas. This was probably to take advan-
tage of the relatively poor flying weather in the area
and to divert attention from the central highlands where
infiltration is believed to be continuing. Inactivity
of other enemy forces in the highlands area is probably
caused by the need to regroup and recover from recent
losses, and to plan and rehearse their next offensive.
10, In III Corps, the intensity of Viet Cong -
initiated actions decreased. Viet Cong emphasis was on
acts of terror with only one small-scale attack reported
in addition to the major engagement with the US Fi.:i7st
Division on 5 December, In IV Corps, the Viet Cong
initiated five attacks. Four of the attacks were against
isolated, lightly defended regional and popular forces
posts and watchtowers. The fifth attack--against a CIDG
camp--was the first Viet Cong attack on CIDG forces in
the IV Corps area since June 1965,
11. Communist-initiated incidents increased in the
Capital Military Region where on 29 November the Viet
Cong simultaneously mined four bridges and attacked a
watchtower ten kilometers east of Saigon. Terrorist
acts in Saigon rose sharply, highlighted by the highest
casualty producing terrorist incident of the war in which
a panel truck loaded with TNT exploded outside the
Metropole BEQ, One American and one New Zealander were
killed and 72 US and three New Zealand personnel were
wounded; South Vietnamese losses were six killed and 64
wounded, This latest incident may indicate that the
Viet Cong will redirect their terrorist activities
against US installations; in recent months their activity
has been directed mainly against national police facili-
ties.
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
Sections of operable railroad
Sections of inoperable road
Note: Routes are inoperable pnmarily
because of Viet Cong sabotage
interdiction effo,ts
IN
GIJANG
Rt. 14
Pleiku Town
Rt. 19
Rt. 14(
EN
Da Lat..
Ninh Hoe
Nha Trang
Provincial
Rt 10
taraoN
ong La Song
CE Rt. 1
SECRET
Rt. 15
Inte'rprovincial
Rt. 2
information as of 8 December
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12. National Route 1 is closed in Quang Tin,
Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, and Binh Tuy
provinces. Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang
Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. In Binh
Duong and Phuoc Long provinces, Interprovincial Route 1
is closed. Route 19 is closed west of Pleiku city, and
Route 7 is closed east of Cheo Reo, Phu Bon Province.
In Hau Nghia Province, Provincial Route 10 is closed.
13. The national railroad is closed between Xuan
Loc in Long Khanh Province and Song Long Song in Binh
Thuan Province, and between Ninh Hoa in Khanh Hoa Prov-
ince and Hue in Thua Thien Province, On 25 November,
the Republic of Vietnam railway system stopped all
repair activity and reduced general operations in the
area between Da Nang and Nha Trang, This is in antici-
pation of a possible closedown of rail operations in this
region by the GVN as an economy measure.
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C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION
1. A recent US Embassy assessment cites the
following factors as continuing to affect adversely the
attitudes of the people in government-controlled areas
rise in the cost of living, inflation, shortages of basic
materials, and security. While increased Viet Cong har-
assment and intimidation has cost the Communists some
degree of popular support in the countryside, enemy
activity generally has contributed more importantly to a
feeling of uncertainty. For example, in the IV Corps,
Route 4--the main road from the delta to Saigon--is
considered less secure today than at the height of the
Viet Cong summer monsoon campaign. Daylight roadblocks
have appeared recently for the first time in many weeks.
Throughout the Vietnamese countryside, the expectation of
better security resulting from the expanded US military
presence has not materialized, the Viet Cong having con-
tinued to demonstrate their power in spite of the in-
creased American commitment.
2. From 11 to 13 November, a II Corps - wide
psywar conference was held at Dalat, bringing together
for the first time a large number of Vietnamese and
American civilian and military personnel including the
II Corps Vietnamese military commander, General Vinh Loc,
as well as top officials of the Ministry of Psywar, all
senior US military advisors, and the JUSPAO director.
The conference recommended the formation of a II Corps
psyops committee, as well as the revitalizing of the
provincial psyops committee. General Loc ordered that
this be done. The conference also established priority
themes for psychological warfare objectives in support
of national goals, Overall, the conference provided a
much-needed opportunity for greater coordination and for
discussion leading to better utilization of available
resources,
3. The conference was considered a success by all
involved. It served to quicken the enthusiasm of General
Loc, who in the past has been lukewarm toward psyops.
General Loc called for quarterly corps-wide psyops meet-
ings and suggested that the site be rotated, with the
next meeting to be held in Pleiku.
-10-
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4. Less ambitious but nonetheless important
psyops seminars were also held during November in IV
Corps at the initiative of the GVN 9th Division com-
mander and the JUSPAO representative stationed at My Tho.
Among the principal items stressed in these seminars was
the need for psyops committees, continuous training in
field techniques, expansion of Chieu Hoi propaganda,
exploitation of ranking defectors, increased use ol
loudspeakers, and heavy emphasis on the theme of the
inevitability of government victory,
5. Official GVN statistics show that 429 Chieu
Hoi ralliers returned to government control during the
past week, as compared to the previous week's total of
556. The sharpest decline was reflected in the number
of military returnees--311 for the current reporting
period against 407 last week. Communist political cadre
ralliers dropped from 114 last week to 78 this week, The
only category reflecting a net gain was that of civil
refugees, 38, an increase of nine over the previous week.
The number of draft/dodger deserter returnees continued
at a low level, three this week following last week's
total of seven,
6. In the 1 December issue of The Situation in
South Vietnam, C. Rural Construction, the figure appear-
ing as the total under the 3 October column of the chart
in paragraph 3 should read 680,000 instead of 670,000.
In addition, under the Net Change column, 57,901 should
read 47,901,
-11-
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Approved For Release 2001/4911tEly9T00472A001800060002-5
0rd (A
041ok
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.
\
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Hai ?Haiiihong,
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VIETNAM
N'.
/
.7', Kleters
lom
e
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Approved Feg?Release 2001/8E GR-EPT0044.2A001800060002-5
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
1. The North Vietnamese economic delegation
headed by politburo member Le Thanh Nghi--which
arrived in Peking on 29 November on the first stage
of a trip to China, the USSR, and North Korea--signed
an agreement on loans and a protocol on mutual trade
and payments for 1966 with the Chinese on 5 December.
No further details were disclosed. During Nghi's
trip to China last summer, however, the North Viet-
namese secured assistance from the Chinese in the
form of grants.
2. The fact that the Chinese would change the
nature of their aid--from grants to loans--at a time
when the North Vietnamese need for asistance is in-
creasing hardly supports Peking's protestations of
all-out support for North Vietnam. This may partially
explain why both Hanoi and Peking have thus far treated
the new agreements cautiously and have avoided the
normal expressions of close support and friendship
that usually accompany such pacts. It is also pos-
sible that the Chinese are avoiding any comment on
the agreement pending the return of the DRV delega-
tion from the Soviet Union. It was only after Nghi's
delegation had concluded talks in Moscow last summer
and was passing through Peking on the way home that
the Chinese made any comment on their agreements with
the North Vietnamese. The delegation left for Moscow
on 6 December, but no details of its meeting in the
Soviet capital are as yet available.
3. In a letter of 5 November to the Soviet Union,
which was apparently also circulated widely to other
Communist parties, the Chinese once again attempted
to refute Moscow's charges that they were impeding
Soviet efforts to aid Vietnam. This attempt at justi-
fication is perhaps the best indication to date that
Chinese restrictions have hampered Soviet military
aid to North Vietnam. To date, more than 50 SAM sites
have been detected in North Vietnam but only 12 to 15
of these are believed to be equipped with missiles.
Moreover; it is probable that the general delay in
installing a more effective air defense capability is
due in some measure to Chinese interference. in view
of Peking's interference last spring and of increasing
Sino-Soviet tensions over recent months, it seems un-
likely that disputes ovcm deliveries can easily be
resolved.
-12-
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60002-5
4. The letter also appeared as an effort by
Peking to regain the prestige it had lost among
Communist circles because of Soviet charges of
Chinese obstructionism. In the letter, the Chinese
taunted the Soviets by suggesting that Moscow over-
come its fears of US seapower and send its aid direct-
ly to Haiphong by ship. Replying to Soviet allegations
said to have been made in a letter of 21 October, the
Chinese admitted that late last summer they held up
certain Soviet materiel, but Peking claimed this
was due solely to technical and bureaucratic problems.
-1.3-
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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. CAMBODIA
Cambodia has repeatedly denied recent charges that
the Viet Cong are utilizing CambOdian territory in the
conduct of the war in South Vietnam. On 8 December, the
Cambodian prime minister formally asked the ICC to con-
sider establishing strict ICC control over the port of
Sihanoukville to disprove the allegations that it was
being used as an entrepot for supplies to the Viet Cong.
Similarly, in a follow-up to Sihanouk's earlier deploring
of rice smuggling into South Vietnam, the RKG and the
FARK are reportedly organizing efforts to stop all such
smuggling. There is other evidence that Cambodia is
taking additional steps to improve its border controls.
On the other hand, according to a low level and suspect
GVN report, the FARK general staff had agreed to let the
Viet Cong establish a medical installation in Cambodia
opposite Duc Co in Pleiku Province and to provide several
helicopters to the hospital for evacuating wounded Viet
Cong to Phnom Penh.
B. SOUTH KOREA
Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau led a seven-man
delegation to the Republic of Korea in late November for
a five-day visit ostensibly to elicit support from Korean
Buddhist leaders for a second world Buddhist organization.
Although he also soughtaudiences with high-level ROK
officials, Chau only managed to see briefly the minister
of education. The US embassy in Seoul speculated that
the ROK ignored the Chau group possibly in order not to
give the impression that Korean Buddhists are a political
force. However, it is also possible that Korean offi-
cials were not aware of Chau's importance in SoUth-Viet-
nam (see I. The Situation in South Vietnam, A. Political,
paragraph 4).
C. DIPLOMATIC ASSIGNMENTS
Tran Van Tuyen, former deputy prime minister in
the Quat government, informed the US Embassy in Saigon
that the GVN had offered him the post of ambassador to
London, replacing Vu Van Mall who recently resigned.
Tuyen admitted that he was tempted by the offer but had
-14-
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not yet reached a decision. During his tenure as deputy
prime minister, Tuyen made moderately successful diplo-.
matic swings through several African countries.
D. ICRC AND PRISONER TREATMENT
1. The secretary general Of te GVN Foreign
Office informed the US Embassy in Saigon last week that
Premier Ky had endorsed the Foreign Office's brief on
GVN observance of the Geneva Convention on treatment of
prisoners of war. The secretary general added that For-
eign Minister Do was sending implementing instructions
to the ministers of defense and interior, specifically
asking for early action on the questions of forwarding
the lists of prisoners to the ICRC and of permitting
the ICRC representatives to visit prisoners. The Embassy
believes this constitutes a significant breakthrough on
the prisoner-of-war issue.
2. The US mission in Geneva reports that the ICRC
expects to be ready in one week to offer medical teams
of doctors and nurses to the DRV, GVN, and the Libera-
tion Front. The ICRC reportedly views the project as a
way of getting into Viet Cong areas and North Vietnam,
and would authorize its doctors to visit US prisoners
and otherwise observe compliance with the Geneva Con-
ventions.
E. FREE WORLD AID
1. JAPAN
A Japanese group headed by Ryutaro Nemoto,
formerly minister of agriculture, is planning to estab-
lish a Japanese - South Vietnamese economic cooperation
organization that may help to encourage greater Japanese
involvement in Vietnam. To be known as ASAVINA (Associ-
ation for Assistance to Vietnam), the organization will
train Vietnamese agricultural and technical students in
Japan, and will send Japanese instructors and machinery
to Vietnam. Nemoto thinks the training program would
be able to begin with 50 to 100 Vietnamese in Akita
Prefecture in April 1966, and be expanded to other pre-
fectures through the agricultural cooperative movement.
A Japanese delegation, including Nemoto and a Ministry of
Agriculture expert, plans to go to Vietnam in mid-January
to develop a specific program in cooperation with the
Vietnamese and USOM.
-15-
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2. LUXEMBOURG
The Luxembourg Government has offered
$20,000 in medicines to South Vietnam.
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Approved ForRbelease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472.4001800060002-5
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
SECRET WEEKLY REPORT
27 NOV - 4 DEC
PERSONNEL LOSSES
2 (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION,
,000
Jan I Feb I Marl Apr I May I Junel July I Aug I Sept
Wounded not included Such figures unavailable on Viet Cong.
WEAPONS LOSSES
I Jan ; Feb I 'Mar 1 Apr I May I June! July Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov Dec I
VIET CONG ACTIVITIES
757
0
I Jan Feb I Mar I Apr I May !June I July! Aug I Septl Oct I Nov I Dec I
II Attacks iiiilerrorism .:;!?; Sabotage APropaganaa Antiaircraft Fire
60090
SECRET
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800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
JAN FEB I MAR I APR I MAY I JUNE I JUL
Approved ForZelease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T0047-2A001800060002-5
SECRET
US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
I I
I
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
___
?
i 1
Non
Fatalities
1 1
fatal
Wounds
Fatalities
Non- fatal
Wounds
Cumulative, 1961 . 1964
Cumulative, 1965 to date
Total
(Figure do not include
or 27 carried
255
1101
1356
14 car ied as
as captured.)
1524
4771
6225
missing
H U
29 NOV
M6E
1
1
1
It
1
11
If
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
\
1
/ I
I
I
I
.._
'
/
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I
I
I
/
I? --?
I
/
/
\
\I178
-__:_l___.........?...--N......'
it
/
/
/
/
x?
1
\
1
.,,,,.......,....,\,/
i ?
\,..?
....
,.....?
,..--.
.... \
,...-...,
/
,
.. /
? ,
?
?
?
/
/
/
/
1
/
37
AUG I SEPT, OCT I NOV DEC
VIET CONG ATTACKS
10
? Company and battal!on sized attacks
? Battalion sized (and larger)attacks oaly
JAN FEB MAR
60075
MEW NU
Allik MI= 11
APR I MAY
JUNE
JUL I AUG I SEPT
SECRET
OCT
NOV
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DEC
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SECRET
60093
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Approved For Ria lease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T0047241)01800060002-5
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Approved FcRelease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00407.2A001800060002-5
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 November 1965
1. General Statistical Data:
Viet Killed Wounded
Cong in in Captured Total Weapons
Time Inci- Action Action or Missing Casualties Losses
Period dents GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
1962 1825 299 1294 475 212 116 390 890 1896 - -
Jan 1963 927 453 1754 908 318 102 379 1463 2451 457 683
1964 1770 343 1223 913 - 555 240 1811 1463 917 532
1965 2206 904 2203 1938 - 471 565 3313 2768 1700 711
1962 1460 244 1205 300 316 124 353 668 1874 - -
Feb 1963 788 379 1082 656 303 82 292 1117 1677 253 399
1964 2078 374 1055 916 - 303 289 1593 1344 708 471
1965 1982 880 1564 1840 - 1394 309 4114 1873 2454 620
1962 1961 523 1456 737 551 140 523 1400 2530 - -
Mar 1963 1282 410 1443 851 368 66 222 1327 2033 467 367
1964 2160 439 1456 1249 - 345 531 2033 1987 814 532
1965 2056 751 2022 1633 720 394 3104 2416 1442 698
1962 1933 387 1596 532 292 151 415 1070 2303 - -
Apr 1963 1331 506 1660 878 256 96 388 1440 2304 797 468
1964 2284 594 1671 1584 398 245 2576 1916 990 424
1965 1860 591 1909 1650 - 232 529 2473 2438 757 973
1962 1825 390 1756 509 352 94 524 993 2632 - -
May 1963 1208 435 1895 889 295 94 695 1418 2885 463 564
1964 2143 458 1135 987 - 202 242 1647 1377 723 281
1965 2263 1049 1975 2143 873 548 4065 2523 1701 831
1962 1477 325 1666 613 413 77 441 1015 2520 - -
Jun 1963 1311 389 1863 772 310 90 437 1251 2609 580 394
1964 2062 494 1005 1145 - 313 230 1952 1235 718 387
1965' 2597 1211 2208 1920 - 1260 189 4391 2397 2387 793
1962 1564 384 1544 686 424 212 542 1282 -2510 - -
Jul 1963 1368 529 1918 1071 372 306 387 1906 2677 663 374
1964 3045 900 1427 1812 - 51o, 219 3222 1646 1889 447
1965 2520 1160 2980 1591 - 540 580 3425 3560 1375 882
1962 1642 377 2271 626 367 63 669 1066 3307 - -
Aug 1963 1349 411 1685 804 237 352 482 1567 2404 637 428
1964 2580 721 1449 1612 - 478 282 2811 1731 1106 619
1965 2498 808 3624 1945 - 287 606 3040 4230 705 1074
-S1-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800060002-5
Time
Period
Approved ForZelease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00474A001800060002-5
Viet
Cong
Inci-
dents
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Killed Wounded
in in
Action Action
GVN VC GVN VC
Captured
or Missing
GVN VC
Total
Casualties
GVN VC
We
Losses
GVN VC
1962
Sep 1963
1964
1965
1962
Oct 1963
1964
1965
1962
Nov 1963
1964
1965
1962
Dec 1963
1964
1375 419
1763 672
3091 819
2473 655
1357 365
1422 428
2827 739
3330 961
1311 410
3182 664
1982 574
3638 1034
1346 294
1921 389
2504 1002
2218 646 365 59 446 1124 3029
1982 1155 234 566 347 2393 2563
1187 1759 - 737 230 3315 1417
3485 1724 - 266 838 2645 4323
1967 619 286 64 373 1048 2626
1520 989 244 398 236 1815 2000
1617 1583 - 693 576 3015 2193
3874 2416 - 225 660 3602 4534
1982 834 368 92 561 13J6 2911
2333 1554 373 665 252 2883
2958
1747 1404 - 410 570
2388 2317
5516 2056 - 520 592 3610 6108
2203 618 289 78 463 990 2955
1440 961 191 320 190 1670 1821
1813 2053 - 1092 303 4147 2316
878 389
1465 525
778 838
- _
753 330
1510 482
762 1013
1595 45- 5
1104 515
1126 2164
72- 4 546
2111 666
Time
Period
VC
Inci-
dents
Composite Annual Totals
Captured
KIA WIA or Missing
GVN VC GVN VC GVN VC
Total
Casualties
GVN VC
Weapons
Losses
GVN VC
1962
1963
1964
*41965
19076
17852
28526
27423
4417 21158 7195
5665 2057511488
7457 16785 17017
100C4 31360 20856
4235 1270
3501 3137
_ 6036
- 6922
5700
4307
4157
5810
12882 31093
20290 28383
30510 20942
37782 37170
5195 4049*
8267 5397
14055 5881
15187 10597
*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 30 November 1965
-82-
SECRET
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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 November 1965
Time
Period
Viet Cong
Incidents
ATTACKS
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propa-
ganda
Anti-
Aircraft
Small-
Scale
BN. Size
Co. Size
Total
m
m
n
?
<
M
a
m
0
n
X
mq
E
m
0
m
o
o
-%
so
co
_.
-
0
16.
1-
X
0
"0
???1
to
-I
0
o
.P.
???1
r..)
>
0
0
_.
o
oo
o
o
o
6.,
1962
Jan 1963
1964
1965
1962
Feb 1963
1964
1965
1962
Mar 1963
1964
1965
1962
Apr 1963
1964
1965
1962
May 1963
1964
1965
1962
Jun 1963
1964
1965
1962
Jul 1963
1964
1965
1962
Aug 1963
1964
1965
1825
927
1770
2206
1460
788
2078
1982
1961
1282
2160
2056
1933
1331
2284
1860
1825
1208
2143
2263
1477
1311
2062
2597
1564
1368
3045
2520
1642
1349
2580
2498
528
242
218
57
480
181
211
73
561
333
198
80
470
371
211
38
490
344
170
40
339
398
128
62
437
398
166
42
368
356
107
38
0
2
3
1
0
1
3
3
0
0
1
3
0
3
3
4
0
0
2
11
0
1
2
6
1
1
7
6
0
1
3
5
21
8
2
5
20
13
3
6
27
11
4
3
27
9
6
1
28
13
3
7
23
11
10
1
10
8
12
0
10
11
3
9
549
252
63
500
195
217
821411
588
344
203
86
383
43
528
357
175
58
362
410
140
69
448
407
185
48
378
368
113
52
-S3-
180
49
272
137
69
201
267
290
131
158
240
105
149
154
93
217
365
157
107
176
4
158
80
286
400
146
113
315
349
257
179
174
170
210
91
271
91
423
154
167
90
192
155
157
96
251
150
140
115
222
142
162
103
223
183
224
154
233
221
173
200
212
131
--
164
165
193
170
--0
194
172
_
218
212
204
300
>
M
m
n
o
<
m
a
M
m
E
m
m
r..)
o
o
_.
so
co
w
"
-
0
'
X
0
"0
???1
to
-I
o
g
N
>
o
o
omo
o
o
r..)
6
839
447
223129
124894,
613
433
1389
660
653
1632
1476
497220
la
220169
(34
892
608
1418
1555
736
652
1390
1
:
698
2132
1706
885
647
1775
1597
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
1 Time
, Period
Viet Cong
Incidents .
ATTACKS
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propa-
ganda
Anti-
Aircraft
Small-
Scale
BN. Size
Co. Size
Total
>
m 1962 1375 382 0 9
m
n Sep 1963 1763 483 3 17
o